THE  UNIVERSITY 


OF  ILLINOIS 
LIBRARY 


358.1 

lb»36t 


^-•’•!t:  v-  >.-  v: 

Msam 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE 
ARTILLERY 

Vol.  / 


Prepared  by 

The  Artillery  Sub-Section 


THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 

FORT  LEAVENWORTH,  KANSAS 


THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS  PRESS 
Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas 
713— 9-21-22— 2M 


19  2 2 


\ \ \ ' 


. 

Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016 


https://archive.org/details/tacticstechnique01usar 


memora: 


TEE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 
port  Leavenworth,  Kansas, 


16  August,  1924. 


MEMORANDUM  FOR: 

Command,  and  General  Staff  Class, 
SUBJECT:  Errata  sheets  for  T & T Artillery, 


1*  For  the  coming  year  the  following  should  be 
issued  with  Vols.  I and  II,  T & T Artillery: 

"Changes  and  Errata,  T & T Artillery,  Vcl  I," 
as  now  printed,  with  two  lines  on  page  2 deleted; 
(page  ISO,  paragraph  21  (a),  lines  6 and  7). 

- "Changes  and  Errata,  T & T Artillery,  Vol  II," 
as  now  printed, 

"Addenda  to  T & T Artillery,  Vols  I and  II,"  as 
now  printed, 

- "Changes  and  Errata  T & T Artillery,  Vols  I and  II," 
as  shown  below. 


2,  Changes  and  Errata  in  TT  Artillery,  Vols  I and  II, 
16  August,  1924; 


Fage 
Vol  I 


Paragraph 


Change 


12 


32 


Plate  II 


Plate-  IV 


Under  corps  artillery  delete 
"(Separate  regt  not  a part  of  corps 
arty  proper)," 

Under  army  artillery  delete  "(Not  a 
part  of  army  arty  proper)." 

Corresponding  changes  should  be  made 
throughout  the  text.  The  regiment 
of  antiaircraft  is  now. a part  of  the 
corp3  artillery,  and  the  antiaircraft 
brigade  is  a part  of  the  army  artillery » 

Delete,  Replace  by  new  plate  to  be 
issued  separately. 


53,  54: 
P 


Plates 


VIII  &: Delete.  Replace  by  new  plates  to  be 

IX  : issued  separately. 


99 


12 


Change  to  read  as  follows:  "32, 

TA. CTICAL  CLASSIFICATION  OF  ARTILLERY 
K'SfTiCNS. - a.  Artillery  may  be  in 
posi blun~or  in  readiness. 


b.  An  artillery  unit  is  said  to 
be  ln*~ position  when  the  pieces  are  in 
position  and  ready  to  fire  and  the 
necessary  system  of  observation  and 
communication  has  been  established. 


8-18-24/bmmd 


2 


Page 


Paragraph. 


Change 

<5,  An  artillery. unit  is  said 
to  be  posted  in  readiness  when  the 
pieces,  limbe"'I-or  coupled,  are 
held  under  cover  near  a position  for 
possible  immediate  action,  but  ready 
to  move  quickly  to  another  locality 
if  the  development  of  the  tactical 
situation  should  require  it. 


The  point  selected  for  posting  a 
unit  in  readiness  should  be  centrally 
located  with  reference  to  the  possible 
positions  in  which  it  may  be  ordered 
to  go  into  action*  During  the  time 
that  the  unit  is  posted  in  readiness, 
reconnaissance  is  continued  and  all 
other  possi  ble  preparations  are  made 
that  will  hasten  entry  into  action 
when  the  situation  requires  it," 


Vol  II 


196 


Plate  IX 


Delete,  Replace  by  new  plate  to  be 
issued  separately. 


R.  H,  ALLEN, 
Assistant  Commandant, 


8-18-24/bmmd 


Page 

Glos- 

sary 

2 

4 

11 

11 

11 

12 

12 

32 


Changes  and  Errata 

Tactics  and  Technique 

Artillery 

Vol.  i 


Paragraph 


18  (b) 


*Line 


2 


4 


Last  sen- 
tence 


8 (e)  (2) 


5 and  6 


Change 


Delete  “generally.” 

To  read  “The  corps  chief  of  ar- 
tillery performs  this  duty  for 
the  corps  commander.” 


“212”  and  “56”  to  “2i%”  aqd 


23  (c) 


5 


Delete  “independent.” 


23  (d)  (1)  7 

23  (d)  (2)  5 


Above  “3  regiments  75-mm.  guns 
(motorized)”  insert  “1  Brigade 
of 

Brigade  Headquarters.” 

“1  Regiment  16-inch  guns”  to  “1 
Regiment  16-inch  howitzers.” 


Plate  I 


Note 


“3d  and  Maintenance  Sections”  to 
“5th  and  Maintenance  Sec- 
tions.” 


Plate  II 


Lower  right 
hand  sec- 
tion: 


Between  3d  and  4th  rectangles 

insert: 

“1  Brigade 


75-mm.  guns 
GHQ  Re- 
serve 


3 Regts  (Portee)” 
and  delete  “3  Regts  (Portee)”  at 
top. 


Plate  IV 


(columns) 


“Extreme  1.  75-mm.  French  gun:  “8000”  to 
range  “8700.” 

yards” 


“Time  to  em-  7.  240-mm.  howitzers:  “10  to  24” 
place  . . to  “3  to  24  v.” 


Ditto 


8. 


6-inch  trench  mortar:  “2  hours 
to  3 weeks”  to  “4  hours  to  3 
weeks  w.” 


“Days 

march, 

miles 


Delete  this  column. 


-2 


Pape 

Paragraph 

*Line 

Change 

“Remarks” 

Add  the  following  two: 

“v  Minimum  time  has  been  low- 
ered since  the  World  War  by 
batteries  in  this  country.” 

- 

“w  To  install  a battery  in  a trench 
area  where  work  must  be  done 
after  dark  and  parts  and  am- 
munition must  be  carried 
through  approach  trenches  by 
hand,  from  3 to  4 weeks  may 
be  necessary.” 

38 

9 

small  print 

In  2d  line:  “80”  to  “30.” 
In  3d  line:  “30”  to  “80.” 

51 

10 

5 and  6 

“Batteries  report,  etc.”  to  “Bat- 
teries report  to  battalion  muni- 
tions officer  and  battalion  mu- 
nitions officers  to  regimental 
munitions  officer  by  telephone.” 

54 

Plate  IX 

Draw  dotted  line  from  “Army 

Ord  Officer”  to  “Corps  G4”  and 
mark  “copy.” 

102 

18  (b) 

2 

“IV”  to  “IX.” 

107 

25  (c) 

2 

“battery”  to  “better.” 

115 

6 (b)  (1) 

4 

“below”  to  “on  previous  page.” 

(2) 

7 

“(A  & B)”  to  “(A’  & B’) .” 

(4)  (c) 

2 & 5 

“B”  to  “B*  ” and  “A”  to  “A’ .” 

130 

21  (a) 

6 & 7 

Delete  sentence  beginning:  “The 
Signals.” 

151 

10  (a) 

2 

“72”  to  “70.” 

154 

17  (a) 

2 

“map  of”  to  “map  or.” 

161 

13  (b) 

2 

“supOrting”  to  “supported.” 

164 

16  (a) 

last 

“batter”  to  “better.” 

169 

2 (c)  (7) 

1 

“Company”  to  “Battery.” 

192 

22 

15 

Insert  “and  tactical”  after  “tech- 
nical.” 

220 

9 (a) 

2 (on  page) 

“required”  to  “requires.” 

(b) 

5 

after  “6000”  insert:  “yards  (for 
the  50%  zone).” 

223 

252 

16  (a)  (1) 

4 (d)  and 
(e) 

Last  sentence 

Delete  sentence. 

Delete  both  subparagraphs. 

— 3— 


Page 

Paragraph 

*Line 

Change 

(f) 

“(f)”  to  “(d).” 

253 

4 (d)  (2) 

Delete  subparagraph. 

(3) 

“(3)”  to  “(2).” 

268 

6 (b)  (5) 

2 

Insert  “observation”  between 

“brigade”  and  “posts.” 

NOTE. — *Number  in  “Line”  column  refers  to  number  of  line  in 
paragraph  or  subparagraph  designated,  not  to  number  from  top  of 
page. 

1264 — G.  S.  Schs.,  Fort  Leavenworth — 8-8-23 — 1800 


Addenda  to 


Tactics  and  Technique 
of  Artillery 

Volumes  I and  II 

ARTILLERY  FIRE  SUPPORT,  PREPARA- 
TION AND  ANTI-TANK  DEFENSE 


Prepared  by 

THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 
Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas 

1923 


THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS  PRESS 
Fort  Leavenworth.  Kansas 
214-9-1-23—1600 


THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 
Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas 

September  1,  1923. 

The  principles  and  doctrines  relating  to  artillery  fire 
support,  artillery  preparations  in  the  attack,  and  the  use  of 
anti-tank  artillery  published  in  this  pamphlet  express  the 
views  of  the  General  Service  Schools  in  the  premises  and 
will  be  observed  in  the  conduct  of  all  instruction. 

R.  H.  Allen, 
Assistant  Commandant. 

Approved  : 

HARRY  A.  SMITH, 

Commandant. 


Table  of  Contents 


Paragraphs 

Section  I. — Forms  of  Artillery  Fire  Support 1-9 

Section  II. — Artillery  Preparation  in  the  Attack 10-11 

Section  III. — Employment  of  Anti-tank  Artillery 12-13 


Section  I 


Form  of  Artillery  Fire  Support 

Paragraphs 


Part  A. — Defense  1-5 

Part  B. — Offense 6-9 


PART  A 
The  Defense 

Paragraph 


Deployed  defense  1 

Position  defense  2 

Zone  defense  3 

Principles  4 

Doctrine  5 


1.  Deployed  Defense. — a.  In  deployed  defense,  the 
kind  of  fire  to  be  laid  depends  on  the  tactical  scheme  of 
defense.  The  artillery  defense  depends  primarily  on: 

(1)  Observed  fire  on  targets  of  opportunity,  used 
when  possible  to  the  exclusion  of  organized  fire,  and, 

(2)  Organized  fire,  prepared  for  emergencies,  and 
when  observation  is  impracticable.  Whenever  possible,  data 
for  this  kind  of  fire  is  corrected  by  registration. 

b.  When  original  atmospheric  data  cannot  be  obtained, 
standing  barrages  for  close  defense  cannot  be  accurately 
laid,  and  are  dangerous.  Due  to  the  unsettled  conditions 
during  the  first  hours  of  the  occupation  of  a line  or  posi- 
tion, patrols  or  troops  in  front,  etc.,  adjustment  close  to 
the  lines  to  be  defended  becomes  impossible.  Due  to  lack 
of  precise  knowledge  of  the  enemy’s  dispositions  before 
his  attack  is  launched,  counter  preparation  is  limited  to 
special  designated  objectives. 

c.  In  the  counter  attack,  the  principles  of  offensive  fire 
apply. 

2.  Position  Defense. — a.  In  position  defense,  there  is 
time  to  prepare  the  artillery  defense,  which  depends  pri- 
marily upon : 


— 6 — 

(1)  The  use  of  observed  fire  to  the  exclusion  of  organ- 
ized fire  when  conditions  so  permit.  Prior  registration  is 
obtained  when  practicable. 

(2)  Organized  fire  when  observation  is  impossible. 

b.  The  artillery  promptly  attacks  by  observed  fire  all 
enemy  targets,  utilizing  quick  methods.  After  making  suit- 
able arrangements  for  observation,  the  artillery  prepares 
organized  fire  (primarily  counter  preparation)  for  use  when 
observation  fails  or  the  situation  demands. 

c.  The  next  fires  arranged  are  organized  fires  asked  for 
by  the  infantry,  which  may  be  in  the  form  of  standing 
barrages  or  concentrations.  Standing  barrages  generally 
are  prepared  to  be  laid  in  front  of  the  covering  forces,  and, 
later  on,  in  front  of  the  battle  position.  Concentrations 
may  be  laid  in  these  places  also,  or,  frequently  in  between, 
on  any  lines  of  entry  between  centers  of  resistance,  or  other 
organized  places  of  local  defense. 

3.  Zone  Defense. — a.  The  principles  which  apply  to 
the  position  defense  apply  in  general  to  the  zone  defense, 
with  the  modifications  noted  hereafter.  Observed  fire, 
based  on  prior  registration,  is  always  used  when  possible. 
The  following  relate  to  the  organized  defensive  fires : 

(1)  Shallow  zone . 

(a)  Concentrations  and  standing  barrages  in  front  of 
the  security,  observation,  and  delaying  systems,  and  in 
front  of  the  battle  position. 

(b)  Concentrations  between  the  covering  and  delaying 
areas  and  the  battle  position  on  probable  lines  of  hostile 
penetration. 

(2)  Average  zone . 

(a)  Concentrations  and  standing  barrages  in  front  of 
the  outpost  area,  the  delaying  area  and  the  battle  position. 

(b)  Concentrations,  between  the  outpost  and  delaying 
areas,  and  between  the  delaying  area  and  the  battle  position, 
all  on  probable  lines  of  hostile  penetration. 

(3)  Deep  zone . 

(a)  Concentrations  and  standing  barrages  in  front  of 
each  of  the  outpost,  delaying,  and  battle  areas. 


— 7 — 

(b)  Concentrations  between  the  outpost  and  delaying 
areas,  and  between  the  delaying  and  battle  areas  on  prob- 
able lines  of  hostile  penetration. 

b.  In  the  zone  defense,  a most  careful  system  of  counter 
preparation  is  developed,  based  on  information  obtained 
from  maps,  aerial  photographs,  location  of  enemy  works, 
and  known  and  probable  dispositions  of  the  enemy. 

c.  In  the  defense  of  zones  organized  in  great  depth,  it 
is  necessary  for  the  artillery  to  occupy  successive  positions. 
In  order  that  effective  fire  may  be  delivered  promptly  from 
these  positions,  it  is  necessary  that  basic  firing  data  be 
computed  for  each  position  prior  to  occupation. 

d.  Until  the  unorganized  position  of  deep  zones  are 
organized,  it  is  useless  to  prepare  organized  fires  in  front  of 
them,  but  reconnaissance  of  the  terrain  should  be  made  by 
the  artillery  in  order  to  determine  artillery  positions  and 
kinds  of  fire  that  may  be  executed  from  them. 

4.  Principles. — a.  In  all  situations,  the  most  effective 
and  most  desirable  method  for  the  use  of  artillery  is  direct 
attack  by  heavy  concentrations  of  observed  fire  on  the  visible 
or  definitely  located  enemy. 

b.  Where  observed  fire  cannot  be  obtained,  use  is  made 
of  organized  fire.  On  the  defensive,  this  includes  concentra- 
tions and  standing  barrages. 

c.  Counter  preparation  is  most  valuable  and  should  be 
fired  whenever  due  warning  of  an  attack  by  the  enemy  is 
obtained. 

d.  The  artillery  defense  of  a line  or  position  is  by  organ- 
ized fire  in  the  form  of  concentrations  or  standing  barrages, 
to  meet  unforeseen  attacks  or  unfavorable  conditions  of 
visibility  which  may  render  observed  fire  impossible. 

e.  In  cases  where  lack  of  visibility  prevents  observed 
fire,  the  advance  of  the  enemy  along  lines  of  penetration 
between  centers  of  resistance,  strong  points,  and  similar 
places,  is  opposed  by  concentrations  of  organized  fire  laid 
on  suitable  places. 

/.  Since  an  attack  is  ordinarily  made  in  depth,  concen- 
trations searching  a considerable  depth  as  an-  organized  fire 
are  more  often  preferable.  The  advantage  lies  in  the  fact 
that  a succession  of  ranges  gives  certainty  of  securing  some 


—8— 

effect  by  producing  a series  of  barriers  through  which  the 
enemy  must  pass,  whereas  the  standing  barrage  forms  but 
a single  barrier,  which  is  quickly  traversed,  frequently 
with  very  small  casualties.  The  effect  of  successive  concen- 
trations on  the  morale  of  attacker  is  greater  than  that  of 
a standing  barrage,  because  the  enemy  is  in  doubt  as  to 
where  successive  volleys  will  fall;  whereas  the  position  of 
a standing  barrage  is  plainly  defined  and  may  be  crossed 
in  a single  swift  rush.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  the  attacking 
front  line  only  be  held  under  fire.  To  gain  success,  support- 
ing troops  must  follow,  hence  an  attack  on  them  by  artillery 
assists  in  weakening  the  driving  force  of  the  enemy. 

g.  The  standing  barrage,  when  used,  is  utilized  by  lay- 
ing an  intense  fire  in  strips  on  or  near  places  (such  as  stream 
crossings  and  lines  of  wire)  which  form  natural  or  arti- 
ficial obstacles  and  which,  in  themselves,  tend  to  retard 
or  hold  the  attacking  troops  on  the  line  on  which  the  bar- 
rage is  falling.  To  prevent  dispersion,  it  should  be  laid  only 
on  the  most  sensitive  fronts. 

h.  Thin  barrages  are  practically  useless.  They  cause 
few  casualties,  waste  ammunition  and  may  give  inexper- 
ienced infantry  a feeling  of  false  security,  which  may  re- 
sult in  disaster. 

i.  If,  for  psychological  reasons,  the  infantry  desires  a 
standing  barrage  laid  in  its  front,  the  artillery  should  make 
it  dense  while  it  lasts,  thereby  not  only  aiding  the  infantry 
morale,  but  weakening  that  of  the  enemy  at  the  same  time. 
The  great  amount  of  ammunition  consumed  by  frequent  re- 
sponses to  unnecessary  calls  for  barrages  and  other  organ- 
ized fire  must  be  considered  by  all  concerned. 

j.  Even  when  conditions  indicate  an  opportunity  for 
reliance  on  observed  fire,  organized  fire  must  be  prepared 
for  use  when  observed  fire  is  not  practicable. 

k.  Secrecy  is  preserved  as  to  the  positions  of  the  bat- 
teries as  well  as  the  places  upon  which  they  are  to  lay  organ- 
ized fire.  On  this  account,  occasions  for  registration  may 
be  greatly  limited. 

5.  Doctrine. — From  the  above  principles  may  be  de- 
duced the  following  doctrine : 

a.  Observed  fire  is  used  whenever  possible. 


— 9— 

b.  Organized  fires  are  used  when  observed  fire  cannot 
be  obtained,  and  must  be  prepared  early  for  emergencies. 

c.  Counter  preparation  and  concentrations  form  the 
bulk  of  organized  defensive  fires . 

d.  Standing  barrages,  although  of  limited  application, 
are  prepared  to  meet  special  situations . 


PART  B 
The  Offense 

Paragraph 


Rolling  barrage 6 

Concentrations  7 

Principles  8 

Doctrine  9 


6.  Rolling  Barrage. — a.  Advantages. — The  advan- 
tages claimed  for  a rolling  barrage  are  as  follows: 

It  pins  the  enemy  to  the  ground  all  along  the  line,  and 
protects  the  troops  from  short  range  hostile  fire  and  local 
counter  attacks  immediately  prior  to  an  infantry  assault. 

It  stimulates  and  maintains  morale  of  troops  which 
follow  it. 

It  covers  those  targets  which  are  initially  unknown  and 
which  will  not  be  discovered  until  the  attack  is  launched. 

It  marks  a definite  line  for  the  infantry  to  follow. 

Its  execution  is  mechanical  and  does  not  require  as 
high  a degree  of  training  on  the  part  of  the  artillery  per- 
sonnel as  do  other  forms  of  artillery  fire  support. 

It  gives  the  infantry  more  intimate  fire  support. 

No  observation  is  necessary. 

It  screens  the  advance  of  the  infantry  by  smoke  and 
dust. 

It  affects  adversely  the  morale  of  hostile  troops,  es- 
pecially when  they  are  inexperienced. 

b.  Disadvantages. — The  disadvantages  alleged  for  a 
rolling  barrage  are  as  follows : 

It  requires  an  enormous  and  uneconomical  expenditure 
of  ammunition,  which  is  not  readily  obtainable  except  in 
a stabilized  situation. 


—10— 

It  limits  initiative  and  flexibility  of  maneuver  of  attack- 
ing infantry. 

The  exact  regulation  of  its  fire  by  observation  is  impos- 
sible. 

It  requires  a long  time  for  its  proper  and  exact  prepar- 
ation and  coordination. 

Its  density  is  uniform  throughout,  instead  of  placing 
heavy  fire  on  important  points. 

It  fails  to  protect  troops  from  the  fire  of  hostile  troops 
located  beyond  the  barrage. 

It  is  dependent  upon  accurate  maps  which  may  be  dif- 
ficult to  obtain. 

It  may  run  away  from  the  infantry. 

It  lacks  flexibility  of  fire — too  rigid. 

It  results  in  a dispersion  of  effort;  therefore,  it  is  not 
sound  tactically. 

It  gives  the  enemy  indications  of  movement. 

It  requires  a very  large  number  of  guns. 

For  a given  amount  of  artillery  and  ammunition,  it 
limits  the  front  of  the  attack. 

Under  certain  conditions  it  becomes  dangerous  to  the 
infantry  it  is  covering. 

7.  Concentrations.  — a.  Advantages.  — The  advan- 
tages claimed  for  concentrations  are  as  follows : 

They  permit  powerful  and  demoralizing  local  effect  on 
important  targets  and  lighter  densities  on  unimportant  ones, 
therefore  great  flexibility  of  fire;  at  the  same  time  avoid 
waste  of  fire  on  unoccupied  areas. 

They  are  more  economical  in  ammunition  expenditure 
than  the  rolling  barrage. 

They  frequently  offer  opportunities  for  observed  fire 
on  known  targets. 

They  permit  more  flexibility  to  meet  changes  in  tactical 
situations  occurring  after  the  initiation  of  the  attack. 

They  can  be  better  adapted  to  varying  rates  of  infantry 
advance,  should  unforeseen  conditions  render  a change  neces- 
sary or  desirable. 

Fire  can  be  opened  promptly  without  elaborate  calcula- 
tions. 

They  frequently  are  not  dependent  on  maps. 


—11— 

They  allow  infantry  greater  initiative  and  flexibility 
of  maneuver. 

They  permit  infantry  to  use  their  rifles  and  auxiliary 
arms  to  greatest  advantage  on  definite  local  targets. 

They  allow  enfilade  or  oblique  fire. 

The  surprise  element  is  more  practicable  than  with  the 
rolling  barrage. 

They  require  fewer  guns  for  a given  front. 

They  are  less  affected  by  withdrawal  of  batteries  for 
forward  displacement  than  are  rolling  barrages. 

They  may  be  held  on  a strong  position  to  neutralize  it 
and  permit  the  infantry  to  pass  it  by. 

b.  Disadvantages. — The  disadvantages  alleged  for  con- 
centrations are  as  follows: 

Through  inaccurate  information,  they  may  be  misplaced 
and  fail  to  properly  cover  the  advancing  infantry. 

The  psychological  effects  are  less  than  in  the  case  of 
rolling  barrages. 

They  require  greater  skill  in  making  accurate  adjust- 
ments and,  therefore,  may  result  in  limited  effect  on  small 
targets. 

Unless  concentrations  are  fast,  dense,  and  cover  quite 
a wide  area,  the  enemy  can  avoid  them  by  moving  elsewhere. 

Unless  timed  concentrations  are  used,  they  require  very 
efficient  communications.  Timed  concentrations  may  re- 
strict the  movements  of  the  infantry. 

8.  Principles. — a.  A rolling  barrage  to  be  effective, 
must  be  of  sufficient  density.  This  density  is  dependent  on 
the  number  of  guns  available  and  their  rate  of  fire.  A thin 
barrage  wastes  ammunition  and  does  not  give  the  infantry 
the  support  expected. 

b.  The  basis  of  the  rolling  barrage  is  the  75-mm.  gun. 
An  effective  barrage  requires  approximately  one  battery 
per  hundred  yards  of  frontage,  with  a sustained  rate  of  fire 
of  not  less  than  two  rounds  per  gun  per  minute. 

c.  Except  for  local  actions  of  minor  units,  a barrage 
should  be  thickened  by  additional  75s,  which  may  fire  shrap- 
nel and  smoke,  and  by  heavier  calibers,  which  fire  concen- 
trations in  advance  of  the  true  barrage  line.  The  machine 
guns  and  auxiliary  arms  of  the  infantry  are  also  used  to 
deepen  the  barrage. 


—12— 

d.  Where  progressive  concentrations  can  be  used  suc- 
cessfully, the  rolling  barrage  should  not  be  utilized. 

e.  The  rolling  barrage  is  especially  useful  under  the 
following  conditions: 

(1)  When  a deep  penetration  is  to  be  made  through  a 
highly  organized  defensive  area. 

(2)  When  it  is  necessary  as  a factor  to  sustain  the 
morale  of  inexperienced  or  badly  shaken  infantry. 

(3)  When  the  details  of  the  local  defense  of  the  enemy 
have  not  been  well  determined. 

(4)  When  there  is  an  ample  amount  of  artillery  to- 
gether with  a plentiful  supply  of  ammunition. 

/.  The  rolling  barrage  is  not  possible  in  the  earlier 
phases  of  a meeting  engagement  and  is  not  to  be  expected  in 
the  later  phases.  Sometimes  it  may  be  employed  in  the 
attack  of  a prepared  position,  but  its  most  frequent  use  is 
in  the  attack  of  portions  of  defensive  zones. 

g.  The  preferable  form  of  artillery  support  is  by  ob- 
served progressive  concentrations.  This  form  of  fire  is 
flexible  and  is  best  adapted  to  meeting  the  varying  tactical 
conditions  of  the  battlefield,  is  economical  in  the  use  of  am- 
munition and  guns,  is  best  adapted  to  celerity,  permits  the 
density  of  artillery  fire  to  be  adjusted  to  meet  the  character 
of  targets  to  be  neutralized,  and,  frequently,  is  independent 
of  maps. 

h.  The  better  the  liaison  with  supported  infantry,  the 
less  need  there  is  for  the  rolling  barrage,  since  fire  power 
can  be  more  effectively  concentrated  on  decisive  points. 

9.  Doctrine. — From  the  foregoing  principles,  the  fol- 
lowing doctrine  may  be  deduced : 

Observed  fire , when  practicable,  is  the  most  efficient 
support  artillery  can  give  an  attack.  However,  it  is  often 
necessary  to  employ  prearranged  organized  fire  in  the  form 
of  concentrations  or  of  rolling  barrages.  Observed  fire  is 
used  much  more  than  the  latter,  but  at  times  the  rolling  bar- 
rage is  advantageous,  hence  it  is  retained  as  one  of  the 
methods  of  artillery  support. 


» 


-13- 


Section  II 

Artillery  Preparation  in  the  Attack 

Paragraph 


Principle  10 

Doctrine  11 


10.  Principles. — The  following  principles  in  relation 
to  the  artillery  preparation  in  the  attack  are  presented  as 
the  principles  accepted  by  the  General  Service  Schools  as 
deduced  from  modern  artillery  experience : 

a.  (1)  Unlimited  preparations  will  be  rarely  used  and 
will  be  confined  to  those  cases  where  a certain  amount  of 
destruction  is  considered  absolute  necessary  before  an  attack 
can  be  launched. 

(2)  Limited  preparations  will  be  used  preceding  most 
attacks. 

(3)  Preparations  may  be  omitted  altogether,  under 
favorable  circumstances,  in  order  to  obtain  complete  sur- 
prise. Against  a defensive  position,  strongly  defended  by 
wire,  this  procedure  will  seldom  be  possible  unless  the  in- 
fantry is  supported  by  sufficient  tanks  to  make  the  necessary 
breaches  in  the  wire. 

b.  An  artillery  preparation  should  never  be  ordered 
without  a distinct  mission  as  to  targets  and  effects  desired. 

c.  Fire  of  extreme  precision  is  not  practicable  for  a 
limited  preparation.  Quality  of  fire  is  compensated  for 
by  quantity  of  fire. 

d.  Neutralization  of  hostile  artillery  is  of  primary  im- 
portance in  an  artillery  preparation. 

e.  No  definite  rules  to  cover  all  conditions  can  be  laid 
down  as  to  the  number  of  guns  required  to  neutralize  effec- 
tively a given  number  of  hostile  guns  or  batteries. 

/.  Complete  neutralization  of  artillery,  or  other  hostile 
elements,  cannot  be  expected.  The  degree  of  neutralization 
obtained  is  dependent  upon  several  factors  and  varies  be- 
tween wide  ranges. 

g . The  principal  factors  affecting  the  length  of  the 
artillery  preparation  are  the  surprise  element;  the  extent 
to  which  tanks  are  to  be  employed  for  making  breaches  in 


—14— 

the  wire ; the  strength  and  morale  of  the  hostile  forces ; the 
extent,  strength,  and  importance  of  hostile  defensive  ele- 
ments ; the  artillery  means  available  to  the  attacker ; the  state 
of  the  ammunition  supply ; and  the  accuracy  of  fire. 

h.  Generally,  the  length  of  preparation  will  be  greater 
as  the  strength  of  the  forces  engaged  and  the  extent  of  the 
hostile  defensive  organization  increase. 

i.  No  definite  rule  to  cover  all  cases  can  be  laid  down 
as  to  the  duration  of  the  artillery  preparation.  The  length 
in  each  situation  must  be  determined  from  a consideration 
of  all  the  existing  factors  which  affect  it. 

j.  The  fire  delivered  during  the  execution  of  the  attack 
is,  in  effect,  a continuation  of  the  artillery  preparation. 

11.  Doctrine. — a.  In  general,  attacks  will  be  preceded 
by  limited  preparations,  the  length  of  which  will  vary  be- 
tween a few  minutes  and  several  hours. 

b.  The  length  and  other  details  of  artillery  preparations 
are  determined  by  consideration  of  a number  of  factors, 
the  principal  ones  being:  surprise,  available  tank  support, 
extent  of  hostile  defensive  organization,  and  artillery  means 
available,  including  ammunition  supply. 


Section  III 

Employment  of  Anti-tank  Artillery 

Paragraph 


Command  12 

Units  to  be  used 13 


12.  Command. — a.  When  under  infantry  command. — 
Due  to  the  difficulty  of  maintaining  long  communications 
that  might  be  interrupted,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  when  the 
necessity  for  the  use  of  single  anti-tank  artillery  pieces 
exists,  the  supporting  artillery  is  busiest  in  coordinating  its 
efforts  as  such,  it  is  burdensome  (if  not  impossible)  for  any 
artillery  headquarters  to  attempt  to  control  promptly  these 
widely  separated  single  pieces  in  their  purely  local  tasks. 
In  the  general  case,  in  the  zone  defense  and  position  defense , 


— 16 — 

anti-tank  guns  properly  fall  within  the  tactical  command  of 
infantry  front  line  commanders,  as  attached  artillery. 

b.  When  under  artillery  command . — Since,  in  the  de- 
ployed defense , flexibility  of  maneuver  is  demanded,  and  the 
opportunities  become  fewer  for  safely  installing  single 
pieces  in  concealed  positions  well  forward  from  which  they 
may  surely  act  with  surprise  effect,  and  as  time  for  detailed 
arrangements  will  be  much  more  limited,  artillery  anti-  tank 
defense  must  be  undertaken  generally  by  entire  batteries. 
These  usually  will  be  the  most  advanced  batteries  in  each 
battalion,  and,  in  addition  to  attacking  other  suitable  targets 
of  opportunity,  will  function  as  a part  of  the  supporting 
artillery. 

13.  Units  to  be  Used. — a . Single  units  only  to  be  dis- 
rupted.— In  order  to  allow  batteries  to  be  utilized  in  the  man- 
ner for  which  they  are  essentially  organized,  and  to  prevent 
each  of  several  batteries  from  suffering  a severe  loss  in 
fighting  efficiency,  complete  units  should  be  broken  up  to 
supply  the  guns  needed  for  anti-tank  defense,  except  when 
the  contrary  action  is  justified  by  a very  extensive  front. 
If  four  pieces  are  needed,  a single  battery  only  should  suffer 
disruption ; if  five  or  six  pieces  are  needed,  then  in  addition 
to  one  battery,  an  additional  section  or  platoon  is  detailed 
from  another  battery.  Such  part  of  the  disrupted  battery 
as  must  be  kept  withdrawn  to  the  rear — limbers,  caissons, 
animals,  etc. — should  be  kept  as  a whole  for  administration 
and  supply. 

b.  Use  of  the  platoon. — When  a choice  of  position  is  per- 
mitted, anti-tank  pieces  are  emplaced  singly  and  cooperate 
in  their  fire  tactics  by  the  use  of  cross  fire  on  their  targets. 
Concealment,  which  enables  surprise  effect  to  be  obtained, 
can  be  far  more  readily  obtained  for  a single  piece  than  a 
platoon.  Hence,  the  use  of  a platoon  as  a tactical  unit  is 
unusual  for  anti-tank  defense. 


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INTRODUCTION 

The  Line  Class  Course  in  Tactics  and  Technique  of  Ar- 
tillery is  covered  in  Volume  I of  this  subject.  It  is  intended 
to  present  a sufficient  knowledge  of  artillery  units  and  their 
employment  to  prepare  for  the  solution  of  problems  in  com- 
bined arms — especially  of  units  not  larger  than  a division. 
The  main  part  of  the  text  therefore  treats  of  the  division 
artillery. 


There  has  been  included  also  an  introductory,  elemen- 
tary study  of  Corps  and  Army  Artillery,  Coast  and  Harbor 
Defense,  Submarine  Mine  Defense,  Railway  Artillery,  and 
Anti-aircraft  Defense,  sufficient  in  its  scope  to  disclose  the 
relation  of  division  artillery  to  that  of  the  corps  and  army, 
and  to  prepare  for  the  more  advanced  course  in  the  General 
Staff  School.  These  latter  subjects  are  taken  up  in  greater 
detail  in  Volume  II,  which  is  used  as  a text-book  for  the 
Staff  School. 

The  fable  of  Contents  presents  a detailed  synopsis  of 
the  subject  matter  covered.  A preliminary  study  of  the 
Glossary  of  Artillery  Terms”  will  aid  in  an  understanding 
oi  the  application  of  the  principles  taught. 

In  the  preparation  of  the  text,  an  attempt  has  been 
made  to  present  only  so  much  of  purely  technical  artillery 
matters  as  has  appeared  necessary  in  order  to  appreciate 
the  powers  and  limitations  of  Field  Artillery  and  to  ap- 
proach the  study  of  the  combined  arms  with  a proper 
conception  of  the  role  played  by  this  arm  in  supporting  in- 
fantry  under  battle  conditions. 


The  intimate  relation  that  must  exist  between  com- 
manders of  assaulting  battalions  of  infantry  and  support- 
ing battalions  of  artillery  has  been  especially  brought  out. 
Ihe  effort  is  made,  also,  to  impress  upon  the  reader  the 
necessity  for  a consideration  of  the  element  of  time  in  em- 
placing and  moving  artillery  units,  and  in  necessary  pre- 
paration of  firing  data,  which,  together  with  definite  assign- 
ment of  missions,  accurate  designation  of  targets,  and  full 
knowledge  of  troop  movements,  is  so  essential  to  success. 

It  is  believed  that  the  necessity  for  combined  effort  and 
unity  of  artillery  control  has  been  clearly  presented;  like- 


57  1099 


INTRODUCTION 


wise  the  necessity  for  a flexibility  of  fire  direction  that 
permits  quick  concentrations  by  all’  available  units  so  as  to 
promote  the  success  of  the  whole,  while  recognizing  the 
routine  and  direct  support  of  infantry  assaulting  units  by 
the  artillery  closely  linked  therewith.  The  principles  of 
organization  in  depth,  the  defense  of  successive  battle  posi- 
tions, the  mechanics  of  artillery  support,  and  forward  dis- 
placement in  successful  attacks,  are  clearly  set  forth. 

The  text  presents  the  necessity  for  infantry-artillery 
teamwork;  demonstrates  the  appropriate  command  of  sup- 
porting artillery  units;  and  makes  clear  the  situation  that 
calls  for  the  assignment  of  accompanying  batteries  and 
accompanying  guns,  and  for  the  attachment  of  artillery 
units  to  subordinate  infantry  commands. 

Much  use  has  been  made  of  the  appropriate  lessons  of 
The  World  War.  The  teachings  also  recognize  recent  de- 
velopments made  in  all  arms  and  auxiliary  units,  and  reveal 
a keen  conception  of  their  mode  of  employment  in  modern 
war. 

H.  A.  Drum, 

Assistant  Commandant. 

Approved  ; 

H.  E.  ELY, 

Commandant. 


IV 


Glossary  of  Artillery  Terms 


Section  I.  — General  

Section  II. — Kinds  of  Fire 


Paragraphs 

1-16 

16-37 


Section  I 

General 

1.  Artillery. 

(a)  Attached  Artillery. — Artillery  temporarily  de- 
tached from  its  organic  command  and  placed  tem- 
porarily under  the  orders  of  another  commander. 

(b)  Accompanying  Batteries. — Batteries  attached  nor- 
mally to  infantry  regiments.  They  assist  the  in- 
fantry when  it  is  out  of  touch  with  the  supporting 
artillery. 

(c)  Accompanying  Guns. — Guns  attached  to  smaller 
infantry  units — generally  assault  battalions — for 
use  as  emergency  weapons. 

(d)  Accompanying  Artillery. — A term  used  to  include 
accompanying  batteries  and  accompanying  guns. 
Accompanying  artillery  is  under  command  of  the 
infantry  unit  commander  and  advances  in  con- 
junction with  the  unit  to  which  attached. 

(e)  Supporting  Artillery. — Artillery  supporting  units 
of  other  arms,  while  retained  under  its  usual  ar- 
tillery command. 

2.  Batteries. 

(a)  Decoy  Batteries. — Batteries  (often  dummy)  in- 
stalled to  draw  hostile  attention,  thus  keeping  the 
enemy  from  firing  at  batteries  whose  position  it  is 
desired  not  to  disclose. 

(b)  Silent  Batteries. — Batteries,  generally  in  defense, 
prepared  to  fire  but  kept  silent,  to  prevent  dis- 
closing their  positions  until  a general  attack  or 
other  emergency  requires  their  use. 


GLOSSARY  OF  ARTILLERY  TERMS 


3.  Columns. 

(a)  Double  Section  Column. — Carriages  in  double 
column — caissons  (of  gun  sections)  abreast  of 
pieces.  Usual  formation  for  going  into  action. 

(b)  Section  Column. — Carriages  in  single  column — 
normally  each  piece  followed  by  its  caisson.  Usual 
march  formation. 

4.  Defilade. 

(a)  Defilade. — Concealment  from  all  points  within  the 
enemy’s  position. 

(b)  Dismounted  Defilade. — A position  in  which  a dis- 
mounted man — standing — can  just  see  the  hostile 
position  over  the  mask. 

(c)  Mounted  Defilade. — A position  in  which  a mounted 
man  can  just  see  the  hostile  position  over  the 
mask. 

(d)  Flash  Defilade. — A position  in  which  the  flash  of 
the  guns  will  be  defiladed.  Requires  ordinarily 
about  4 yards’  defilade  for  75-mm.  guns. 

5.  Echelons. 

(a)  Echelons  ( Artillery ). — Subdivisions  of  artillery 
units  made  for  the  purpose  of  placing  to  the  rear 
such  elements  as  are  not  required  at  firing  posi- 
tions or  with  forward  groups.  A rear  echelon 
will  generally  contain  administrative  personnel 
and  spare  men,  horses  and  materiel.  When  artil- 
lery is  in  action,  limbers  of  firing  batteries,  main- 
tenance sections  of  firing  batteries,  battalion  com- 
bat trains,  regimental  supply  trains  and  frequently 
caisson  bodies  of  gun  sections  will  all  be  posted  in 
rear.  Some  of  these  units  may  be  posted  together, 
or  all  have  separate  positions. 

(b)  Echelonment  in  Depth. — The  disposition  of  artil- 
lery batteries  or  other  firing  units  in  depth  with 
respect  to  the  enemy. 

6.  Field  of  Fire. — The  terrain  which  can  be  covered  by  the 

fire  of  an  artillery  unit  from  a given  position. 

7.  Front  of  Battery. — The  front  occupied  by  a battery  in 

firing  position.  Normally  a battery  of  light  or 


VI 


GLOSSARY  OF  ARTILLERY  TERMS 


medium  field  artillery  occupies  about  100  yards’ 
frontage.  This  may  be  considerably  decreased, 
and  at  times  will  be  considerably  increased. 

8.  Guns. 

(a)  Anti-Tank  Guns. — Guns  detached  from  batteries 
and  pushed  forward  for  individual  use  against 
tanks. 

(b)  Roving  Guns. — Guns  detached  usually  from  regu- 
larly installed  batteries  and  given  the  mission  of 
firing  from  many  different  positions,  so  as  to  con- 
ceal regular  positions  and  mislead  the  enemy  as 
to  artillery  strength. 

9.  In  Action. — Artillery  in  position  and  firing,  or  about  to 

fire. 

10.  Laying. 

(a)  Direct  Laying. — Guns  laid  by  directing  line  of 
sight  on  actual  target. 

(b)  Indirect  Laying. — Guns  laid  by  directing  line  of 
sight  on  an  auxiliary  reference  point  (aiming 
point)  with  proper  deflection  to  bring  the  guns 
on  the  target. 

11.  Lifting  Fire. — The  operation  of  shifting  fire  from  one 

target  to  another  at  greater  range. 

12.  Limbered  and  Unlimbered. — A battery  is  limbered 

when  the  trails  of  the  guns  (or  howitzers)  and  cais- 
sons are  attached  to  their  respective  limbers;  un- 
limbered when  the  trails  are  free  of  the  limbers 
and  lowered  to  the  ground.  A battery  is  limbered 
preparatory  to  movement ; unlimbered  preparatory 
to  firing. 

13.  March  Order. — An  artillery  command  given  when  a 

battery  is  in  firing  position,  preliminary  to  its 
being  limbered.  Sights  are  removed,  covers  re- 
placed, and  guns  and  carriages  generally  prepared 
to  be  limbered. 

14.  Positions. 

(a)  Alternate  Positions. — Positions  prepared  for  use 
if  those  originally  occupied  become  untenable. 

vii 


GLOSSARY  OF  ARTILLERY  TERMS 

(b)  Gas  Positions. — Alternate  positions  for  use  when 
the  original  positions  are  rendered  untenable  by 
gas. 

(c)  Positions  in  Readiness. — Units  limbered  and  ready 
to  move  or  to  go  into  action.  Held  (normally  un- 
der cover)  awaiting  orders. 

(d)  Positions  in  Observation. — Units  in  position  and 
prepared  for  action,  but  do  not  open  fire  without 
orders  from  higher  authority,  except  in  case  of 
emergency  when  communication  is  impracticable. 

(e)  Position  for  Immediate  Action. — Units  in  position 
from  which  fire  will  be  delivered  without  further 
orders  from  higher  authority. 

15.  Rocket  Posts. — Stations  from  which  rockets  are  fired. 

Such  signals  are  often  used  to  call  down  prear- 
ranged defensive  fires. 


Section  II 
Kinds  of  Fire 

16.  Accompanying  Fire. — Artillery  fire  supporting  the  in- 

fantry in  its  advance. 

17.  Artillery  Preparation. — Fire  delivered  prior  to,  and 

in  preparation  for  an  attack. 

18.  Barrage. 

(a)  Barrage. — A barrier  or  curtain  of  fire. 

(b)  Rolling  Barrage. — A barrage  that  moves  at  a pre- 
determined rate.  When  used,  it  generally  pre- 
cedes infantry  advancing  in  an  attack. 

(c)  Standing  Barrage. — A barrage  that  does  not  move. 
It  is  laid  on  a line  the  enemy  is  expected  to  at- 
tempt to  pass. 

(d)  Normal  Barrage. — A standing  barrage  laid  by  an 
artillery  unit  in  immediate  defense  of  the  sector 
which  it  supports. 

(e)  Eventual  Barrage. — A standing  barrage  laid  by 
an  artillery  unit  either  to  assist  in  the  defense  of 


Vlll 


GLOSSARY  OF  ARTILLERY  TERMS 

an  adjacent  sector,  or  as  a possible  defense  of  its 
own  sector  when  the  normal  barrage  is  not  ap- 
plicable. 

(f)  Box  Barrage. — A continuous  standing  barrage, 
put  down  so  as  to  cover  the  rear  and  flanks  of  an 
area  to  prevent  the  escape  of  an  enemy,  or  to 
protect  the  operation  of  a friendly  force. 

19.  Bombardment. — A term  sometimes  used  to  describe 

artillery  preparation. 

20.  Concentration. — Fire  by  one  or  more  units  (often 

several  firing  simultaneously)  upon  a designated 
position  or  a given  area. 

21.  Covering  Fire. — A term  at  times  applied  to  any  ac- 

companying fire.  More  properly  limited  to  fires 
upon  flanks,  and  upon  strong  points  for  neutrali- 
zation to  permit  their  being  passed. 

22.  Counter  Battery. — Fire  directed  upon  hostile  artillery 

in  position. 

23.  Counter  Battery  Officer.— An  officer  designated  to 

regulate,  supervise  and  control  the  counter  bat- 
tery work  of  the  command. 

24.  Counter  Offensive  Preparation. — Fire  placed  on  as- 

sembly points,  lines  of  departure,  and  routes  lead- 
ing thereto  from  which  it  is  believed  the  enemy 
is  about  to  launch  an  attack.  The  purpose  of  this 
fire  is  to  break  up  a hostile  attack  before  it  can  be 
' launched. 

25.  Destruction  Fire. — Fire  intended  to  cause  the  destrucr 

tion  of  the  (material)  target  attacked. 

26.  Enfilading  Fire. — Fire  whose  general  direction  is  par- 

allel to  and  intended  to  rake  the  hostile  lines  or 
works. 

27.  Fire  for  Adjustment. — Fire  for  the  purpose  of  cor- 

recting initial  firing  data  before  passing  to  fire  for 
effect. 

28.  Fire  for  Effect. — Fire  for  the  purpose  of  accomplish- 

ing a designated  mission.  Normally,  adjustment 
is  continued  throughout  fire  for  effect. 


IX 


GLOSSARY  OF  ARTILLERY  TERMS 

29.  Fire  for  Registration. — Fire  for  adjustment,  using 

as  a target  some  prominent  terrain  feature  in  or 
near  the  enemy’s  known  positions,  so  that  later  a 
prompt  and  effective  fire  for  effect  can  be  placed 
on  any  target  in  that  vicinity. 

30.  Harassing  Fire. — Fire  delivered  for  the  purpose  of  an- 

noying the  enemy,  causing  casualties,  and  lower- 
ing the  enemy  morale. 

31.  Interdiction  Fire. — Fire  delivered  on  established  or 

probable  lines  of  hostile  advance,  particularly  on 
vital  points  thereof,  for  the  purpose  of  preventing 
movements  of  troops  or  supplies.  Its  most  com- 
mon application  is  by  enfilade  fire  on  roads  and  rail- 
roads available  to  the  enemy. 

32.  Neutralizing  Fire. — Fire  whose  object  is  the  prohibit- 

ing of  all  hostile  activity  within  the  area  covered. 

33.  Observed  Fire. — Fire  in  which  the  firing  data  are  com- 

puted for  initial  firing,  after  which  corrections  are 
based  on  observation  of  fire. 

34.  Organized  Fire. — Prearranged  fire  which  may  be 

placed  mechanically,  without  regard  to  observation. 
However,  when  practicable  it  should  be  observed. 

35.  Progressive  Fire. — Any  accompanying  fire  which  pre- 

cedes the  infantry  advance. 

30.  Progressive  Concentrations. — Accompanying  fire 
which  precedes  the  infantry  advance  by  lifting 
from  target  to  target,  but  without  the  regularity 
of  the  rolling  barrage. 

37.  Surprise  Fire. — Fire  of  opportunity ; fire  delivered  with 
great  rapidity  upon  transient  targets. 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE, 
ARTILLERY 

(Line  School  Course) 
Volume  1 


1921-1922 


CONTENTS  VOLUME  I 


Introduction. 

Glossary  of  Artillery  Terms. 

Chapter  I. — Organization  and  Command  of  Artillery  Units. 

Paragraphs 

General  Discussion v 1 

Classes  of  Artillery  2 

Artillery  Organization  3 

Artillery  Command  4 

Artillery  Units  5 

Section  6 

Platoon  7 

Battery  8 

Battalion  9 

Regiment  10 

Brigade  11 

Groupment 12 

Day  of  Fire  13 

Transport  14 

Pack  Artillery  15 

Motorized  Artillery  16 

Portee  Artillery  17 

Railway  Artillery  18 

Distribution  of  Artillery  Personnel  19 

Small  Arms  Equipment 20 

Division  Artillery,  Infantry  Division 21 

Division  Artillery,  Cavalry  Division 22 

Artillery  of  Larger  Units 23 

Chapter  II. — Artillery  Weapons  and  Ammunition. 

Section  I,  Weapons. 

Classification,  General 1 

Light  Artillery  2 

Medium  Artillery  3 

Heavy  Artillery  4 

Section  II , Ammunition. 

Ammunition,  Defined,  Kinds  5 

Kinds  Used  by  Various  Types  of  Weapons 6 

The  Charge 7 

The  Primer  8 

The  Charge  in  Several  Parts 9 

Form  and  Type  of  Projectiles 10 

Projectiles  Classified  11 

Shrapnel  12 

Effect  of  Shell  and  Shrapnel  Compared 13 

Kinds  of  Projectiles,  Standard  for  Certain  Weapons 14 

The  Future  of  Shrapnel  15 

Fuses,  Defined  and  Classified : 16 

Percussion  Fuses  17 

Time  Fuses  18 

Safety  Precautions  19' 

Proportions  of  Various  Types  of  Projectiles  in  Ammunition 

Vehicles  20 

Effect  of  Individual  Projectiles  21 

Selection  of  Ammunition  for  a Given  Mission 22 

Effect  of  Artillery  Fire  Sometimes  Overestimated 23 

Ammunition  Required  for  Given  Missions 24 

xii 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Paragraphs 

Chapter  III. — Artillery  Chemical  Shells. 

Introduction  1 

Gases  Used  in  American  Shells 2 

Calibers  of  Chemical  Shell  3 

Gas  Shell  4 

Smoke  Shell 5 

Fuses  for  Gas  Shell  6 

Adjustment  of  Fire j. 7 

Ammunition  Consumption  8 

Smoke  Screens  9 

Conditions  Affecting  the  Use  of  Chemical  Shell 10 

Artillery  Gas  Tactics  11 

Gas  in  the  Offensive 12 

Gas  in  the  Defensive 13 

Smoke  Tactics  14 

Defense  Against  Gas  15 

Transportation  and  Storage 16 

Markings  of  Chemical  Shell 17 

Chapter  IV. — Artillery  Ammunition  Supply. 

General  1 

Agencies  of  Ammunition  Supply  2 

Use  of  Ammunition  Supply  Agencies 3 

Normal  Loads  Held  in  Reserve 4 

Accumulations  of  Ammunition  5 

Kinds  and  Amounts  of  Ammunition  Carried 6 

Replenishment  of  Ammunition  7 

Ammunition  for  Corps  Artillery  Attached  to  a Division 8 

The  Artillery  Brigade  Munitions  Officer 9 

Munitions  Reports  10 

Small  Arms  Ammunition  11 

System  Shown  by  Graphics  12 

Chapter  V. — Artillery  Firing. 

Section  I,  General. 

Recent  Developments  1 

Old  Methods  Essential _ 2 

Duty  of  Artillery 3 

Section  II,  Preparation  of  Fire. 

Definition  4 

Mechanism  of  Laying 5 

Kinds  of  Laying  0 

Laying  for  Direction 7 

Finding  the  Deflection 8 

Angular  Measurements 9 

Systems  of  Deflection  Graduation 10 

Map  and  Compass  Laying  11 

Deflection  Difference 12 

Laying  for  Elevation  13 

Finding  the  Site 14 

Finding  the  Range  15 

Finding  the  Elevation  16 

Time  Fire 17 

Summary  of  Firing  Data 18 

Refinements  of  the  Preparation  of  Fire 19 

Ballistic  Corrections  20 

Conclusions  as  to  Preparation  of  Fire 21 

xiii 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Paragraphs 

Section  111,  Firing  Over  Obstacles. 

Clearing  the  Crest  22 

Reaching  a Reverse  Slope 23 

Section  IV,  Ballistics. 

Defined  24 

Trajectory  25 

Nomenclature  of  Trajectory 26 

Drift  27 

Jump  28 

Effect  of  Muzzle  Velocity  and  Elevation  on  Range 29 

Rigidity  of  the  Trajectory  30 

Atmospheric  Conditions  : 31 

Section  V,  Dispersion,  Probability. 

General  32 

Defined  33 

General  Effects  of  Dispersion  34 

Nature  of  Dispersion 35 

Dispersion  on  Sloping  Ground  36 

Safety  of  Friendly  Troops  Due  to  Dispersion 37 

Probable  Error  38 

Probability  39 

Section  VI,  Firing. 

Subdivisions  of  Firing  40 

Observation  41 

Methods  of  Adjustment 42 

Adjustment  by  Measured  Deviations  43 

Adjustment  by  Bracketing  44 

Adjustment  of  Time  Fire . 45 

Method  of  Fire  During  Adjustment 46 

Fire  for  Effect 47 

Registration  48 

Barrages  49 

Section  VII,  Aerial  Observation. 

General  50 

Balloon  Observation  51 

Airplane  Observation  , 52 

Chapter  VI. — Selection  of  Positions. 

Section  I,  Reconnaissance. 

Reconnaissance  for  Positions  1 

Reconnaissance  for  Information 2 

The  General  Selection  of  Artillery  Positions.- 3 

The  Progression  of  Artillery  Reconnaissance 4 

Additional  Reconnaissance  Required 5 

Conveyances  for  Reconnaissance  6 

Instructions  to  Artillery  Units  During  a Reconnaissance 7 

Time  Available  for  Artillery  Reconnaissance 8 

Transmission  of  Information  During  a Reconnaissance 9 

Reconnaissance  by  Heavy  Artillery 10 

Section  II,  Selection  of  Positions. 

Tactical  Considerations  in  the  Selection  of  Artillery  Positions  11 

Tactical  Classifications  of  Artillery  Positions 12 

Selection  of  Battery  Positions  13 

Considerations  Affecting  the  Selection  of  Battery  Positions.  14 

Considerations  of  Range  15 

The  Field  of  Fire  and  Dead  Spaces 16 

xiv 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Paragraphs 

Considerations  of  Communications  in  the  Selection  of  a Bat- 
tery Position  17 

Consideration  of  Observation  in  the  Selection  of  Battery  Po- 
sitions   ^ 18 

Concealment  19 

Facility  of  Movement  20 

Favorable  Conditions  for  Resupply  of  Ammunition 21 

Cover  for  Limbers  or  Gun  Tractors 22 

Gun  Emplacements  23 

Interference  with  the  Operations  of  Other  Troops 24 

Security  of  a Battery  Position 25 

Protection  of  Guns  and  Personnel • 26 

Chapter  VII. — Artillery  Communications. 

Section  1,  General. 

Means  of  Communication  1 

General  Characteristics  2 

Dependence  Upon  Other  Systems  3 

Communication  Between  Artillery  Units  of  the  Same  Com- 
mand   4 

Communication  With  Troops  Supported  by  Artillery 5 

Supervision  and  Coordination  6 

Section  II,  Telephone. 

Telephone  Communications,  Past  and  Present  7 

Telephone  Equipment  for  Field  Artillery 8 

Laying  Telephone  Wire 9 

Selection  of  Wire  10 

Battery  Communications  1 11 

Battalion  Telephone  Communications  12 

Regimental  Telephone  Communications  13 

Brigade  Telephone  Communications 14 

Section  III,  Radio. 

Radio  Communication  Dependent  upon  Available  Equipment  15 

Communication  Between  Airplanes  and  Artillery 16 

Radio  Communication  Between  Artillery  Headquarters 17 

Radio  Communication  with  Infantry 18 

Section  IV,  Communication  with  Advancing  Infantry. 

Communication  with  Advancing  Infantry 19 

Section  V,  Pyrotechnics. 

Pyrotechnics  in  an  Advance 20 

Pyrotechnics  in  Defense  21 

Section  VI,  Training. 

Training  of  Artillery  Signal  Personnel 22 

Chapter  VIII. — General  Principles  Governing  the  Tactical  Em- 
ployment of  Artillery. 

Basis  of  Tactical  Use 1 

Characteristics  2 

Limitations  3 

Effect  of  Limitations  4 

Purpose  of  Field  Artillery 5 

The  Infantry  Artillery  Team 6 

ArtiUery  Tactics  Defined  7 

No  Independent  Artillery  Role  3 

Utility  of  Study  * 0 


xv 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


Paragraphs 

Information  the  Artilleryman  Must  Have 10 

Battle  Units  11 

Primary  Mission — Division  Artillery 12 

Organization  for  Combat  13 

Disposition  of  Attached  Artillery  14 

Disposition  for  Command  15 

Decisions  re  Artillery  Employment 16 

The  Division  Order 17 

Chapter  IX. — The  Tactical  and  Technical  Employment  of  the 

Battery. 

The  Battery  a Technical  Unit 1 

Light  Battery  the  Standard 2 

Composition  and  Subdivision  3 

The  Battery  Headquarters  4 

The  Battery  Detail  6 

Battery  Reconnaissance  (see  also  Chap.  VI.) 6 

Orders  of  the  Battery  Commander 7 

The  Firing  Battery  8 

Battery  Combat  Train  9 

Ammunition  10 

Batteries  Employed  Independently  (see  also  Chap.  XIII.) — 11 

Change  of  Position 12 

Communications  13 

Administration  and  Supply 14 

Conduct  of  Fire  15 

Observation  of  Fire  16 

Map  Firing  17 

Chapter  X. — Tactical  Employment  of  the  Battalion. 

Light,  Medium  and  Heavy  Artillery  Battalions 1 

General  Functions  of  the  Battalion 2 

General  Functions  of  the  Battalion  Commander 3 

Keeping  the  Battalion  Intact 4 

Formations  of  Battalion  5 

Reconnaissance  (see  also  Chap.  VI.)  6 

Selection  of  Positions  (see  also  Chap.  VI.) 7 

Security  8 

Communication  9 

Observation  10 

Ammunition  Supply  11 

Changes  of  Position  12 

Supporting  the  Infantry 13 

Battalion  Orders  14 

Conditions  Affecting  the  Efficacy  of  Battalion  Employment-  15 

Offensive  Employment  16 

Defensive  Employment 17 

Disposition  of  the  Batteries 18 

Disposition  of  Combat  Train  (see  Chap.  VI.) 19 

Provisional  Battalion 20 

Chapter  XI. — Tactical  Employment  of  the  Regiment  and  Brigade. 

Section  1,  The  Regiment. 

Composition 1 

General  Functions  2 

The  Rear  Echelon 3 

The  Regiment  on  the  March — 4 

Disposition  of  the  Regiment  in  Action 5 

Sectors  of  Fire  6 


xvi 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


Paragraphs 

Troops  to  be  Supported 7 

Enemy  Batteries  — 8 

Movements  from  Position  to  Position 1 9 

Regimental  Headquarters 10 

The  Service  Battery  11 

Reconnaissance  (see  also  Chap.  VI.)  12 

Communications  (see  also  Chapter  VII.)  13 

Observation  14 

Regimental  Orders  15 

Section  II,  The  Artillery  Brigade. 

Composition  16 

Headquarters  of  a Field  Artillery  Brigade 17 

General  Functions  18 

Tactical  Employment  of  the  Brigade 19 

Sectors  of  Fire  20 

Regimental  Principles  Applicable  to  Brigade 21 

Summary  of  Battle  Functions 22 

Chapter  XII. — Artillery  on  the  March  and  its  Entry  into  Action. 

Disposition  on  the  March 1 

Subdivision  of  Artillery  on  the  March  2 

Artillery  Headquarters  on  the  March 3 

Conduct  of  Marches  4 

Rates  of  March  5 

Distances  6 

Reconnaissance  on  the  March 7 

Communications  8 

Entry  into  Action  from  the  March 9 

Chapter  XIII. — Accompanying  Batteries  and  Accompanying  Guns. 

Defined  1 

General  Purpose 2 

Historical  3 

When  Used  4 

Duration  of  Mission,  Orders  5 

Command  of  Accompanying  Artillery 6 

Missions  7 


Units  from  Which  Accompanying  Artillery  Should  be  De- 
tailed   9 

Moral  Effect  of  Attached  Artillery  10 

Attached  Artillery  Drawing  Fire 'll 

Equipment  of  Accompanying  Artillery  12 

Suitability  of  75-mm.  Guns  13 

Necessity  for  Combined  Training 14 


Chapter  XIV. — Division  Artillery  in  the  Offensive. 
Section  I , General. 

General  

Kinds  of  Fire  Support 

Tactical  Employment  of  Fire 

Preparation  - 

Destruction  

Observation  

Neutralization 

During  the  Attack 

The  Rolling  Barrage 

Successive  Concentrations  


XVII 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


Paragraphs 

Other  Concentrations  11 

Counter  Battery  ~ 12 

Interdiction  ~~ ~~ 13 

Fire  on  Transient  Targets 14 

Positions  IIII_III  15 

Forward  Displacement 16 

Missions  ”11  17 

Organization  of  Command  18 

Limbers,  Combat  Trains  and  Field  Trains 19 

Section  II,  Meeting  Engagement. 

Position  on  the  March 20 

Advance  Guard  Artillery 21 

Plan  of  Attack  22 

The  Development  3 23 

Counter  Battery  24 

Approach  March  and  Deployment 25 

Advance  to  the  First  Firing  Position II  26 

The  Attack  Proper  ” 27 

The  Pursuit  IIIIII  28 

Section  III,  Attack  of  Enemy  Deployed  for  Defense. 

The  Situation  29 

Artillery  Action  30 

Section  IV,  Attack  of  a Prepared  Position. 

Situation  31 

Preliminary  Action  I I 32 

Artillery  Preparation  ~ 33 

The  Attack  Hill  34 

Section  V,  Attack  of  a Defensive  Zone. 

Situation  35 

Artillery  Action  t I 36 

Continuing  the  Support I I 37 

Chapter  XV. — Division  Artillery  in  the  Defensive. 

Section  I,  General. 

General  Duties  and  Principles  1 

Methods  of  Support  2 

Tactical  Employment  of  Artillery  Fire 3 

The  Defensive  Barrage  4 

Counter  Preparations  5 

Defensive  Concentrations  6 

Deployment  7 

Missions  8 

Organization  of  the  Command  , 9 

Section  II,  Defense  in  a Meeting  Engagement. 

Situation 10 

Action  of  the  Artillery 11 

Section  III,  Deployed  Defense — Defensive  Position. 

Deployed  Defense — Defensive  Position  12 

Section  IV,  Defensive  Zones. 

Artillery  Positions  13 

Section  V,  Withdrawal  and  Retreat. 

General  Discussion  14 

Fires  15 

xviii 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Paragraphs 

Chapter  XVI. — Artillery  Combat  Orders. 

Artillery  Provisions  of  Army  and  Corps  Orders 1 

Artillery  Subparagraph  of  a Division  Field  Order 2 

Field  Order  of  the  Field  Artillery  Brigade 3 

Artillery  Annex  to  the  Division  Order  — : 4 

Orders  of  Regiments  and  Subordinate  Units 5 

Use  of  Maps  and  Charts 6 

Chapter  XVII. — Corps  and  Army  Artillery. 

Introduction  1 

Unity  of  Fire  Direction  in  the  Combat  Unit 2 

The  Division  Artillery  3 

Corps  Artillery  4 

Summary  of  Corps  Artillery  Missions 5 

Organic  Artillery  of  the  Corps 6 

Front  Covered  Determines  Assignment » 7 

Mission  Determines  Location  of  Guns  8 

General  Character  of  Corps  Types  of  Weapons 9 

Army  and  Corps  Field  Orders  10 

Army  Artillery ^ 11 

New  Army  Artillery  Organization  12 

Organization  into  Brigades — Training,  etc. 13 

Railway  Artillery  14 

General  Scheme  of  Artillery  Support  and  Assignment 15 

Percentage  of  Guns— Division  and  Army 16 

Chapter  XVIII. — The  Artillery  Information  Service. 

Origin,  Development  and  Characteristics  1 

Organization  2 

Sources  of  Information ! 3 

Information  from  the  Air  Service 4 

Army  and  Corps  Artillery  Information  Service 5 

Functions  of  Division  Artillery  Information  Service 6 

Regimental  Artillery  Information  Service  7 

Battalion  and  Battery  AIS  8 

Operations  under  Varying  Conditions 9 

Chapter  XIX. — Anti-Aircraft  Service. 

General  1 

Function  of  Coast  Artillery  Corps 2 

Materiel  and  Missions  3 

Tactical  Employment  4 

Organization  5 

Technique  6 

Chapter  XX. — Coast  and  Harbor  Defense. 

Section  1,  Introduction 1 

Section  II,  General  Description 2 

Modifications  Since  World  War 3 

Section  III,  Forces  Employed. 

Forces  Employed  for  Defense — 4 

Naval  Forces  5 

Land  Forces  - 6 

Missions  : 7 

Armament  8 

Organization  9 

Projectiles  10 


xix 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


Paragraphs 


Trend  of  Development  11 

Mounts  and  Emplacements  12 

Fire  Control  System  , 13 

Security  and  Information  1 14 

Section  IV,  Forms  of  Attack 15 

Characteristics  of  Naval  Targets 16 

Coast  Artillery  Defense  17 

Artillery  Position  18 

Concentration  of  Fire 19 

Kinds  of  Fire 20 

Tactics  of  Fire 21 

Night  Attacks  22 

Heavy  Artillery  Available  for  Coast  Defense 23 

Section  V,  Submarine  Mines  in  Relation  to  Coast  Defense. 

Definition  24 

Operated  by  Army  25 

Classification  , 26 

Location  of  Mines  27 

Components  of  Mine  Defense 28 

Passageways  and  Sailing  Directions 29 

Possible  Future  Development  30 

Appendix. 

Pages 

Range  tables  of  75-mm.  gun  and  155-mm.  howitzer 304-307 

Charts  illustrating  artillery  fire  308-314 


The  protective  barrage. 

Box  Barrage. 

Organization  of  rolling  barrage. 

Counter  preparation. 

Ground  pattern  of  shell  bursts. 

Illustrative  Terrain  Exercises  and  Map  Problems 315-367 


xx 


I — 1-2 


CHAPTER  I 

Organization  and  Command  of 
Artillery  Units 

Paragraphs 


General  Discussion  1 

Classes  of  Artillery 2 

Artillery  Organization  3 

Artillery  Command  4 

Artillery  Units 5 

Section  6 

Platoon  7 

Battery  8 

Battalion  9 

Regiment  10 

Brigade  11 

Groupment  12 

Day  of  Fire 13 

Transport 14 

Pack  Artillery  15 

Motorized  Artillery 16 

Portee  Artillery 17 

Railway  Artillery 18 

Distribution  of  Artillery  Personnel 19 

Small  Arms  Equipment  20 

Division  Artillery,  Infantry  Division 21 

Division  Artillery,  Cavalry  Division 22 

Artillery  of  Larger  Units 23 


1.  General  Discussion. — A division,  when  acting 
alone,  usually  has  corps  artillery  attached,  and,  when  acting 
as  a part  of  a corps,  may  have  other  artillery  attached,  and 
normally  is  supported  by  corps  artillery  and  possibly  by 
GHQ  reserve  artillery.  Hence,  this  volume  includes  the 
necessary  consideration  of  other  than  division  artillery. 
Volume  II  treats  of  corps,  army  and  GHQ  reserve  artillery. 

2.  Classes  of  Artillery. — From  the  standpoint  of 
materiel,  field  artillery  is  classified  as  light,  medium,  and 
heavy.  In  our  service  all  light  artillery  is  now  (1921) 
equipped  with  75-mm.  guns.  The  155-mm.  howitzer  and 
the  4.7-inch  gun  are  classed  as  medium  artillery.  All  field 
artillery  of  heavier  caliber  is  classed  as  heavy  artillery. 


1-3-5 


2 TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

3.  Artillery  Organization. — (a)  Fro;m  the  stand- 
point of  organization,  the  artillery,  with  the  armies  in  the 
field,  is  divided  into  : 

Division  Artillery. 

Corps  Artillery. 

Army  Artillery. 

General  Headquarters  Reserve  Artillery. 

(b)  Each  of  these  is  separate  and  distinct  from  the 

other.  The  term  “Army  Artillery”  or  “Corps  Artillery” 
does  not  include  the  organic  artillery  of  subordinate  units. 
When  referring  to  all  the  artillery  in  an  army  or  a corps 
use  the  expression  “the  artillery  with — ^-Army”  or  “the 
artillery  with Corps.” 

(c)  The  scheme  of  organization  of  the  artillery  with 
a typical  army  is  shown  diagrammatically  in  Plate  II.  A 
numerical  summary  of  important  units  is  given  in  Plate 
III.  The  corps  and  army  data  are  to  be  regarded  as  a basis 
of  organization  only,  as  the  number  of  divisions  in  a corps, 
and  corps  in  an  army,  is  not  fixed,  especially  during  active 
operation. 

4.  Artillery  Command.— There  is  ho  chain  of  ar- 
tillery command  between  an  army  and  a division.  Com- 
mand of  the  artillery  is  exercised  by  the  commander  of  the 
unit  to  which  it  belongs  or  is  attached.  Control  by  higher 
commanders  is  exercised  through  the  normal  chain  of  com- 
mand. The  senior  artillery  commander  on  duty  with  a 
unit,  unless  otherwise  specially  directed,  commands  all  the 
artillery  belonging  to  the  unit  or  attached  thereto.  The 
army  artillery  commander  is  the  advisor  of  the  army  com- 
mander on  artillery  matters.  Likewise,  the  division  ar- 
tillery commander  is  the  advisor  of  the  division  commander. 
The  chief  of  the  corps  artillery  headquarters  performs  this 
duty  for  the  corps  commander. 

5.  Artillery  Units. — The  basis  of  artillery  organiza- 
tion is  the  efficient  employment  of  the  pieces  in  action.  The 
units  and  their  commanders,  in  general  terms,  are  as  fol- 
lows: 


1-5-8 


ORGANIZATION  AND  COMMAND  3 


Unit  Commander 

Section  Sergeant. 

Platoon  Lieutenant. 

Battery Captain. 

Battalion  Major. 

Regiment  Colonel. 

Brigade  Brigadier  General. 


Groupment  is  explained  later. 

6.  Section. — (a)  A gun  section  consists  of  a gun  and 
its  caisson,  manned,  horsed  (or  provided  with  motor  power) 
and  equipped.  A caisson  section  consists  of  two  caissons 
similarly  provided.  A section  ordinarily  operates  as  part 
of  a platoon,  or  battery,  but  in  special  cases  may  be  de- 
tached to  act  alone. 

(b)  The  75-mm.  gun  section,  in  addition  to  the  gun, 
has  a gun  limber,  carrying  18  rounds  of  ammunition,  a cais- 
son limber,  carrying  36  rounds,  and  a caisson  body  carry- 
ing 70  rounds.  The  total  for  a section  is  124  rounds.  The 
caisson  limber  and  caisson  body  together  form  what  is 
commonly  called  a caisson.  A 75-mm.  caisson  section  has 
two  such  caissons,  and  carries  a total  of  2 (36  plus  70),  or 
212  rounds. 

(c)  The  155-mm.  howitzer  limber  does  not  carry  am- 
munition; it  is  simply  a support  for  the  trail.  The  155- 
mm.  howitzer  section  includes  two  caisson  bodies,  each  carry- 
ing 14  rounds,  or  a total  of  28  rounds  for  the  caisson.  The 
caisson  section  includes  two  such  “caissons/’  or  a total  of 
56  rounds  for  the  section. 

7.  Platoon. — A platoon,  which  consists  of  two  sec- 
tions, is  simply  a convenient  command  subdivision  of  the 
battery.  In  rare  cases,  however,  it  may  be  detached  to  act 
alone. 

8.  Battery. — (a)  The  battery  is  primarily  a firing 
unit.  It  is  the  smallest  administrative  unit.  Tactically, 
it  operates  ordinarily  as  part  of  a battalion,  but  in  small 
commands,  or  in  special  cases,  may  act  alone. 

(b)  In  theory  a battery  should  consist  of  the  greatest- 
number  of  pieces  whose  fire  can  be  effectively  conducted 
technically  by  one  person.  The  practical  application  of 
this  theory  has  given  rise  to  much  discussion.  Prior  to  the 
introduction  by  France  in  1898  of  the  modern  long  recoil 


1—8 


4 TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

field  gun,  the  6-gun  battery  was  practically  universal.  After 
its  introduction,  with  its  increased  rate  of  fire  and  ammuni- 
tion consumption,  France  concluded,  after  exhaustive  ex- 
periments, that  the  6-gun  battery  was  too  large  and  reduced 
it  to  four  guns.  Other  nations,  upon  adopting  a modern 
gun,  adopted  various  battery'  organizations.  Many,  in- 
cluding the  United  States,  followed  the  lead  of  France; 
others,  notably  England  and  Germany,  adhered  to  the  6- 
gun  battery.  Early  in  The  World  War,  however,  Germany 
reorganized  on  the  basis  of  the  4-gun  battery. 

(c)  A small  battery  is  extravagant  in  officers  and 
headquarters  personnel.  A consideration  of  man  power 
alone  favors  the  large  battery.  The  small  battery  has  the 
advantage  of  ease  of  handling  and  mobility.  The  technical 
difficulties  in  the  conduct  of  fire  are  magnified  in  the  large 
battery,  and  great  skill  is  required  to  develop  the  full  power 
in  all  situations.  Modern  artillery  consumes  much  am- 
munition, but  the  supply  can  be  provided  for  either  a 4-gun 
battery  or  a 6-gun  battery.  Ammunition  supply,  therefore, 
is  not  a serious  consideration  in  deciding  between  the  two 
types  of  battery  organization. 

(d)  The  United  States,  probably  chiefly  influenced  by 
the  question  of  ease  of  technical  control,  adopted  the  4-gun 
battery  for  all  artillery,  except  trench  artillery  and  some  of 
the  most  powerful  types  of  railway  artillery.  The  battery 
has  been  lightened  by  taking  the  ammunition  carrying 
element  of  the  former  combat  train  out  of  the  battery.  It 
has  been  formed  into  a battalion  combat  train,  organized  as 
a separate  unit. 

(e)  A battery  is  organized  thus: 

Battery  headquarters. 

Firing  battery. 

Maintenance  section. 

(1)  The  battery  headquarters  is  organized  for  command, 
reconnaissance,  preparation  of  firing  data,  and  information. 

(2)  The  firing  battery,  the  unit  which  occupies  a firing 
position,  includes  four  gun  sections  and  one  caisson  section.  As 
already  explained,  a 75-mm.  gun  section  carries  124  rounds  of 
ammunition,  and  a caisson  section  212  rounds.  So  the  battery 
has  124  plus  212  or  177  rounds  per  piece.  Similarly,  a 155-mm. 
howitzer  battery  has  28  plus  56  or  42  rounds  per  piece. 

(3)  The  maintenance  section  provides  means  for  the  re- 
placement and  repair  of  materiel.  It  includes  a rolling  kitchen, 
a water  cart,  a ration  cart,  and  the  maintenance  personnel  of 
the  battery. 


ORGANIZATION  AND  COMMAND 


5 


(f)  The  light  artillery  battery  is  shown  diagrammati- 
cally  in  Plate  I.  Other  battery  organizations  are  generally 
similar  to  it.  The  battery  officers  are  distributed  ordinarily 
as  follows: 

1 captain,  battery  commander. 

1 first  lieutenant,  battery  executive. 

1 second  lieutenant,  assistant  to  the  executive. 

1 second  lieutenant,  reconnaissance  officer. 

9.  Battalion. — (a)  The  battalion  is  primarily  a tac- 
tical unit,  and  is  also  a convenient  subdivision  for  general 
command.  It  practically  never  is  used  as  a fire  unit.  In 
the  large  artillery  commands  it  may  function  tactically  as 
a part  of  a regiment  or  groupment. 

(b)  The  battalion  consists  of: 

Headquarters  and  headquarters  battery. 

Battalion  combat  train. 

3 batteries  in  the  division  light  artillery,  portee  artillery 
and  horse  artillery  (separate  battalion),  or  2 batteries 
in  medium  and  heavy  battalions. 

(c)  The  number  of  batteries  in  a battalion  is  prin- 
cipally a question  of  convenience  and  effectiveness  of  tac- 
tical employment.  For  example,  a corps  155-mm.  regiment 
attached  to  a division  may  employ  a battalion  as  support 
to  each  infantry  brigade  and  one  as  general  support  to  the 
division.  The  three  battalions  in  corps  and  GHQ  reserve 
regiments  lend  themselves  readily  for  employment  in  widely 
separated  positions  and  missions.  In  foreign  armies,  bat- 
talions are  more  usually  of  three  batteries  for  both  light 
and  heavy  artillery.  The  British  battalion,  called  a bri- 
gade, is  habitually  of  four  batteries  of  six  pieces  each. 

(d)  The  battalion  combat  train  is  in  effect  an  ammu- 
nition battery.  It  consists  of: 

Train  headquarters. 

Two  or  three  platoons,  of  three  sections  each.  The  number  of 
platoons  is  the  same  as  the  number  of  batteries  in  the 
battalion.  For  the  75-mm.  gun,  caisson  sections  are 
used;  for  the  155-mm.  howitzer,  truck  sections  are  used. 
The  amount  of  ammunition  carried  is  given  in  the  chap- 
ter on  ammunition  supply. 

Maintenance  section. 


If  occasion  demands,  one  platoon  can  be  detached  read- 
ily for  service  with  a detached  battery. 


6 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


10.  Regiment. — (a)  The  regiment  is  both  an  ad- 
ministrative and  a tactical  unit.  It  consists  of : 

Regimental  headquarters  and  headquarters  battery. 

Service  battery. 

Two  3-battery  battalions,  or  three  2-battery  battalions. 

Attached  medical  personnel  and  equipment,  and  attached 
chaplains. 

(b)  Regimental  headquarters  and  headquarters  bat- 
tery consist  of  the  personnel,  the  animals,  and  the  equipment 
necessary  for  the  command  and  tactical  employment  of  the 
regiment,  and  for  the  maintenance  of  regimental  head- 
quarters and  the  headquarters  battery  itself. 

(c)  The  service  battery  is  a unit  for  the  supply  and 
baggage  transport  of  the  regiment.  It  also  includes  the 
regimental  band  and  the  personnel  for  its  own  mess  and 
maintenance.  It  is  organized  so  that  a detached  battery 
or  battalion  can  be  accompanied  by  a proportionate  quota 
of  the  service  battery,  which  then  functions  as  a battery 
or  battalion  field  train. 

11.  Brigade. — The  brigade  is  principally  a tactical 
unit.  It  consists  of : 

Headquarters  and  headquarters  battery. 

2 (or  more)  regiments. 

Ammunition  train. 

12.  Groupment.' — In  the  tactical  handling  of  large 
masses  of  artillery  it  is  frequently  inexpedient  to  preserve 
the  tactical  unity  of  the  larger  artillery  units,  such  as  bri- 
gades and  regiments.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  necessary 
that  the  command  be  decentralized  and  localized  to  secure 
the  greatest  degree  of  efficiency.  This  is  accomplished  by 
the  formation,  for  particular  operations,  of  temporary,  im- 
provised, tactical  units,  called  “groupments.”  The  units, 
batteries,  battalions,  and  regiments,  are  conveniently 
grouped,  depending  on  location  and  mission  rather  than  on 
permanent  organization  or  caliber.  Available  commanders 
and  staffs  of  permanent  organizations  are  utilizedTor  group- 
ment commanders  and  staffs. 

13.  Day  of  Fire. — The  day  of  fire  is  an  arbitrary  unit 
of  measure  of  ammunition  and  is  taken  as  follows,  based 
on  our  experience  in  The  World  War: 


ORGANIZATION' AND  COMMAND 


;L — 13-19 


7 


Weapon 


Day  of . Fire 
Rounds  Per  Piece 


75-mm.  gun  

155-mm.  howitzer 

155-mm.  gun 

240-mm.  howitzer 


300 

150 

100 

60 


The  new  organization  provides  a total  of  about  1^  days 
of  fire  with  the  guns,  combat  train,  and  ammunition  trains, 
for  division  and  corps  artillery. 

14.  Transport. — In  the  matter  of  transport,  artillery 
is  classed  as  horse-drawn,  pack,  motorized,  portee,  and 
railway.  Only  the  75-mm.  gun  of  the  division  artillery  is 
horse-drawn,  the  teams  being  6-horse.  It  should  be  noted, 
however,  that  these  guns  constitute  nearly  half  of  all  the 
artillery  with  a typical  army. 

15.  Pack  Artillery. — The  1920  organization  provides 
one  regiment  of  pack  or  mountain  artillery  for  the  GHQ 
artillery  reserve,  and  certain  other  units  for  use  in  the  for- 
eign possessions.  In  these  units,  the  transport  is  the  pack 
mule.  Pack  artillery  has  been  used  for  many  years  in  our 
service,  but  was  not  used  in  the  AEF. 

16.  Motorized  Artillery. — The  motorized  artillery 
now  in  service  includes  the  155-mm.  howitzer,  the  155-mm. 
gun,  and  the  240-mm.  howitzer.  These  weapons  are  drawn 
by  tractors. 

17.  Portee  Artillery. — The  portee  (or  truck  car- 
ried) artillery  includes  some  of  the  regiments  of  75-mm. 
guns  of  the  GHQ  reserve  artillery. 

18.  Railway  Artillery. — The  railway  artillery  in- 
cludes a variety  of  guns  and  mortars  ranging  in  caliber 
from  8 to  16  inches,  inclusive.  New  types  are  being  de- 
veloped. The  1920  organization  contemplates  only  12-inch 
and  16-inch  guns. 

19.  Distribution  of  Artillery  Personnel. — A rela- 
tively small  proportion  of  the  personnel  of  artillery  is  re- 
quired for  the  actual  service  of  the  pieces  in  action.  A 
relatively  large  proportion  is  required  on  other  essential 
duties,  such  as  staffs,  details  for  instruments,  communica- 
tions, information,  liaison,  ammunition,  supply  and  trans- 
portation. For  example,  the  personnel  of  a light  regiment 
and  battery  may  be  classified  approximately  as  follows : 


I — 19-21 


8 TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


Regiment 

Battery 

No. 

% 

No. 

% 

Service  of  pieces  

288 

19 

48 

34 

Transport  _ 

461 

31 

42 

30 

Instruments  _ 

44 

3 

5 

4 

Information  _ _ 

40 

3 

3 

1.5 

Communication  _ 

Supply,  maintenance,  ad- 
ministration (includes 

146 

9 

13 

9.5 

supply  of  ammunition) 

401 

27 

23 

17 

Command,  reserve,  and  others 

127 

8 

6 

4 

1507 

100 

140 

100 

20.  Small  Arms  Equipment. — Artillery  combatant 
units  at  present  have  small  arms  equipment  substantially 
as  follows: 

(a)  Division  Artillery: 

All  individuals  armed  with  the  pistol. 

8 automatic  rifles  per  battery,  and  service  battery,  or  56  per 
regiment. 

No  rifles. 

2 machine  guns  per  battery  and  service  battery;  3 per  bat- 
talion combat  train,  or  20  per  regiment. 

8 automatic  rifles  and  two  machine  guns  per  ammunition  com- 
pany of  brigade  ammunition  train. 

Automatic  rifles,  only  for  the  battalion  combat  train  of  horse 
artillery  battalions. 

(b)  Corps,  Army  and  GHQ  Reserve  Artillery: 

Small  arms  equipment  follows  the  same  general  scheme : rail- 
road regiments  are  equipped  (partially)  with  rifles. 

21.  Division  Artillery.  — Infantry  Division.  — (a) 
The  division  artillery  is  the  quota  included  in  the  tabular 
organization  of  the  division.  Its  primary  function  is  in- 
fantry support. 

(b)  The  following  principles  underlie  the  division  ar- 
tillery organization: 

(1)  That  it  is  essential  that  a quota  of  artillery  be  perman- 
ently assigned  to  a division.  The  object  is  to  secure,  by  constant 
association  and  working  together,  close  cooperation  between  the 
infantry  and  artillery.  Without  this  cooperation  the  full  fighting 
efficiency  of  the  division  cannot  be  developed.  The  soundness  of 
this  principle  was  demonstrated  repeatedly  in  our  operations  in 
The  World  War. 

(2)  That  the  quantity  and  kind  of  division  artillery  be  such 
as  is  necessary  and  practicable  in  moving  situations,  considering 
difficulties  of  supply,  maintenance,  and  roads.  Too  much  will 
encumber  the  division;  too  little  will  increase  the  infantry  casual- 
ties and  diminish  the  effectiveness  of  the  division  as  a whole. 
In  stabilized  situations,  the  division  artillery,  when  necessary, 


1-21-22 


ORGANIZATION  AND  COMMAND  9 

can  be  readily  augmented  by  attaching  units  from  divisions  out 
of  line,  from  corps  artillery,  or  from  a general  reserve. 

(3)  That  the  types  included  in  the  division  artillery  pro- 
vide a large  volume  of  projectiles  effective  against  personnel, 
animals,  and  material;  and  a certain  quantity  of  projectiles  effec- 
tive against  field  works,  at  least  hastily  constructed  ones.  The 
trajectories  to  be  such  that,  to  a reasonable  extent,  the  fire  will 
not  be  masked  by  ordinary  accidents  of  the  terrain.  However, 
great  destruction  of  sheltered  personnel  is  not  contemplated  with 
division  artillery;  it  seeks  rather  to  neutralize  by  keeping  down 
the  enemy’s  fire,  thus  enabling  the  infantry  to  succeed  by  virtue 
of  the  superiority  of  its  fire  and  its  movement. 

(c)  The  division  artillery  consists  of  a brigade  com- 
posed of  a brigade  headquarters  and  headquarters  battery, 
two  regiments  of  light  artillery,  and  an  ammunition  train. 

(1)  The  brigade  headquarters  has  two  light  motor  cars, 
two  reconnaissance  cars,  and  four  motorcycles  with  side  cars. 
It  has  also  53  riding  horses  as  mounts  for  individuals,  which 
are  used  in  reconnaissance  and  general  service  when  motors  are 
not  practicable.  Transport  for  supplies  and  equipment  is  horsed. 

(2)  The  light  artillery  regiments  are  essentially  horsed, 
most  of  the  vehicles  being  6-horse.  One  driver  handles  a pair 
of  horses.  Cannoneers  of  animal-drawn  artillery  normally  walk, 
but  during  rapid  movements,  or  on  other  necessary  occasions, 
they  ride  on  limbers  and  caissons.  The  general  organization  of 
these  regiments  has  already  been  given. 

(3)  The  brigade  ammunition  train  consists  of: 

Train  headquarters. 

One  transport  company. 

One  ammunition  company. 

The  transport  company  has  a wagon  section  of  27  wagons, 
25  of  which  are  available  for  transportation  of  ammunition,  and 
a truck  section  of  27  trucks.  Twenty-five  of  the  trucks  are  in- 
tended for  artillery  ammunition,  one  for  small  arms  ammuni- 
tion, and  one  for  gasoline  in  drums.  The  organization  is  based 
on  a carrying  capacity  of  one-half  day  of  fire  of  75-mm.  ammu- 
nition, and  the  necessary  pistol,  anti-aircraft  machine  gun,  and 
automatic  rifle  ammunition.  Trucks  can  carry  200  rounds  and 
wagons  100  rounds  of  75-mm.  ammunition.  One  wagon  and 
one  truck  are  available  for  the  required  small  arms  ammunition. 
The  transport  company  is  split-  into  motorized  and  animal-drawn 
sections;  this  in  order  that  the  ammunition  train  may  be  able 
to  function  under  any  circumstances  in  which  the  other  trains 
of  the  division,  and  the  transport  of  the  regiments  of  the  bri- 
gade, can  function.  The  ammunition  company  provides  the  labor 
incident  to  the  supply,  handling,  and  delivery  of  ammunition. 

22.  Division  Artillery. — Cavalry  Division. — The  ar- 
tillery quota  of  a cavalry  division  is  one  separate  battalion 
of  horse  artillery;  that  is,  light  artillery  made  more  mobile 
by  mounting  the  cannoneers  on  individual  mounts.  The  bat- 
talion has  three  batteries,  a battalion  headquarters  and 
headquarters  battery,  and  a combat  train.  The  organiza- 


I-t— 22-23 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


10 


tion  is  almost  identical  with  the  light  artillery  battalion,  ex- 
cept that  additional  horses  are  provided  to  mount  the  can- 
noneers and  a few  other  additional  men.  A service  platoon 
takes  the  place  of  a service  battery.  It  is  a part  of  the 
battalion  combat  train. 

23.  Artillery  of  Larger  Units. — (a)  While  this  vol- 
ume deals  primarily  with  division  artillery,  it  is  deemed 
advisable  to  consider  briefly  the  artillery  of  units  larger 
than  a division. 

(b)  Corps  Artillery.* — Corps  artillery  consists  of  a 
corps  artillery  headquarters,  and  a corps  artillery  brigade. 
The  former  headquarters  is  distinct  from  the  headquarters 
of  the  latter. 


(1)  Corps  artillery  headquarters  is  a section  of  the  corps 
staff  It  is  made  necessary  by  the  large  amount  of  technical 
detail  connected  with  the  handling  of  large  masses  of  artillery. 
Its  functions  are  to  coordinate  the  operations  of  the  corps  ar- 
tillery brigade  and  the  division  brigades,  and  to  control  the  opera- 
tions of  such  artillery  reinforcements  as  may  be  assigned  to  the 


corps^y  £orpS  artillery  brigade  is  entirely  motorized  and 
consists  of: 

Brigade  headquarters.  x 

3 regiments,  155-mm.  howitzers  (24  howitzers  each), 
(i.e.,  1 regiment  per  division  in  normal  corps); 

1 regiment,  155-mm.  guns  (24  guns) ; 

1 observation  (flash)  battalion; 


1 ammunition  train.  . ,. 

(3)  A detailed  description  of  the  material  and  organization 
is  given  in  Vol.  II.  As  a regiment  of  155-mm.  howitzers  is  often 
attached  to  a division  a brief  description  of  this  unit  is  appro- 

Priatfa)  A regiment  of  155-mm.  howitzers  is  armed  as  indi- 
cated, and  has  the  same  general  organization  as  that  of  a 
75-mm.  gun  regiment.  It  has  three  2-battery  battalions. 
The  transport  is  entirely  motor,  5-ton  tractors  being  used 
for  the  firing  batteries,  trucks  for  battalion  combat  tram 
ammunition  transport;  trucks  for  field  train,  and  trailers 
for  reel  cart,  water  cart,  rolling  kitchen,  and  anti-aircraft 
machine  guns.  A 5-ton  tractor  draws  a howitzer  and  limber, 
about  8927  lbs.,  or  two  caisson  bodies,  about  8000  lbs.  On 
account  of  lack  of  seating  space  on  the  caissons  and  tractors, 
ammunition  trucks  are  provided  solely  for  transporting  per- 
‘sonncl. 

Ho)  The  formal  service  of  the  piece  requires  a gunner 
and  5 cannoneers  as  in  a light  battery.  The  number  of 
cannoneers  provided,  therefore,  seems  excessive,  but  in  real- 
ity is  not  so.  The  manual  labor  involved  in  serving  a heavy 
piece  (the  155-mm.  howitzer  projectile  weighs  100  pounds) 
is  so  considerable  that  experience  has  shown  that  it  is  neces- 
sary to  provide  two  shifts  of  cannoneers. 


1—23 


ORGANIZATION  AND  COMMAND  11 

(c)  Army  Artillery  organically  consists  of  only  the 
army  artillery  headquarters  and  ammunition  train.  In  op- 
erations, artillery  units  are  assigned  to  an  army  from  the 
General  Headquarters  Artillery  Reserve  for  use  as  army 
artillery,  or  for  reassignment  to  corps  and  independent  di- 
visions. 

(d)  GHQ  Reserve  Artillery. — The  object  of  the  GHQ 
artillery  reserve  is  to  provide  a pool  of  artillery,  particularly 
of  heavy  and  special  types,  which  can  be  drawn  upon  by 
the  combatant  units  as  needed.  This  relieves  tactical  units 
of  many  of  the  routine  burdens  of  administration,  training, 
and  upkeep  of  these  units,  and,  at  the  same  time,  provides 
artillery  for  distribution  according  to  the  requirements. 
The  reserve,  as  such,  has  no  tactical  functions. 

(1)  The  projected  pro  rata  of  GHQ  Reserve  Artillery  for  one 
Army  is: 

Light  artillery 
1 Brigade  of 

Brigade  Headquarters; 

3 regiments  75-mm.  guns  (portee) ; total  72 
guns. 

3 regiments  75-mm.  guns  (motorized) ; total, 
72  guns. 

Medium  and  Heavy  Artillery 
1 Brigade  of 

Brigade  Headquarters; 

2 regiments  155-mm.  guns  (motorized) ; total 
48  guns. 

2 regiments  240-mm.  howitzers  (motorized) ; 
total  48  howitzers. 

1 regiment  6-inch  guns  (motorized) ; total,  24 
guns. 

(2)  The  GHQ  Reserve  Artillery  for  6 Armies  is,  6 times  the 
amount  for  one  army  and  also: 

1 Regiment  trench  mortars;  24  mortars. 

1 Regiment  12-inch  guns  (railroad) ; 12  guns. 

1 Regiment  16-inch  guns  (railroad) ; 12  guns. 

Sound  ranging  service  of 
Headquarters. 

10  sound  ranging  companies. 

(3)  In  addition  to  the  above,  the  GHQ  Reserve  Artillery  is 
used  in  time  of  war  to  collect  all  artillery,  of  any  and  all  cali- 
bers, that  may  be  available,  or  become  so  during  the  war. 


BATTERY  OF  LIGHT  ARTILLERY 


12  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


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NUMERICAL  SUMMARY  OF  ARTILLERY  ORGANIZATIONS 


To  face  page  12 


Unit 

Table  of  Org 
No.  . 

Personnel 

Pieces 

Animals 

Animal 

drawn 

Vehicles 

Total 

Remarks 

Officers 
(Com.  & 
Warrant) 

Enlisted 

Men 

Total 

Motors 

Motor 

drawn 

Brig  Div  Arty 

31  W 

169  Com 
4 War 

3227 

3400 

48 

3432 

423 

49 

1 

473 

Brig  Corps  Arty 

402  Com 
6 War 

8196 

8694 

96 

1436 

495 

1931 

Brig  Mdm  and  Hv 
Arty  (GHQ  Res) 

541  W 

438  Com 
5 War 

10228 

10671 

120 

1818 

588 

2406 

Brig  Anti-aircraft 
Arty  (GHQ  Res) 

520  W 

426  Com 
6 War 

8949 

9381 

72 

1152 

132 

1284 

288  machine  guns  anti-aircraft 

Brig  Anti-aircraft 
Arty  (Army) 

220  W 

219  Com 
3 War 

4512 

4734 

36 



582 

66 

648 

144  machine  guns  anti-aircraft 

Hq  Div  Arty  Brig 

32  W 

12  Com 
2 War 

75 

89 

87 

8 

4 

12 

Hq  Corps  Arty  Brig 
(Mot.) 

132  W 

12  Com 
2 War 

76 

89 

11 

111 

Hq  Mdm  & Hv  Arty 
Brig  GHQ  Res 
(Mot) 

552  W 

12  Com 

75 

87 

12 

12  3 

Regt  75-mm.  Gun 
Div 

33  W 

75  Com 
1 War 

1495 

1671 

24 

1607 

193 

5 

198 

Regt  75-mm.  Gun 
Portee 

253  W 

69  Com 

849 

918 

24 

112 

16 

128 

Sep  Bn  75-mm.  Gun 
Horse  Arty  Cav 
Div 

436  W 

30  Com 

760 

790 

12 

1091 

96 

96 

Regt  75-mm.  j ^ 

533  W 

74  Com 
1 War 

1520 

ll 

695 

24 

2039 

28 

28 . 

855  Packs 

Regt  155-mm.  How 

133  W 

84  Com 
1 War 

1694 

lj 

779 

24 

300 

140 

440 1 

Regt  155-mm.  or 
6-in.-Gun 

143  W 

83  Com 
1 War 

1811 

1 

895 

24 

295 

62 

357 1 

Regt  240-mm.  How 

76  Com 
1 War 

2180 

2 

257 

24 

417 

187 

604 

Regt  anti-aircraft 
Artillery 

120  W 

69  Com 
1 War 

1479 

549 

12 

189 

22 

211  j 

48  machine  guns  anti-aircraft 

Regt  12-in.  or  16-in. 
Gun 

553  W 

75  Com 
1 War 

1349 

425 

12 

70 

TO 

95  railway  cars,  4 locomotives 

Regt  Trench  Mortar 

543  W 

64  Com 
1 War 

1465 

i 

>30 

36 

113 

22 

135 

Div  Arty  Am  Tn 

56  W 

7 Com 

162 

169 

131 

29 

35 

1 

65 

Eorps  Arty  Am  Tn 

156  W 

37  Com 

1021 

1 

058 

209 

9 

218 

Army  Arty  Am  Tn  . 

256  W 

28  Com 

518 

5 

46 

193 

6 

199 

Observation  (Flash) 
Bn-corps 

163  W 

18  Com 

207 

225 

21 

4 

25  | 

Sound  ranging 
Service,  GHQ, 
Reserve 

549  W 

68  Com 

891 

>59 

76 

20 

96 

(A)  Motorcycles  not  included. 

PLAT! 

1 III 

■ 

rn 


THE  LIBRARY 
OF  THE 

EW  flF  MJJSSMS 


Corps  Artillery 


To  face  page  12 


ARTILLERY  WITH  A TYPICAL  ARMY— 3 CORPS— 9 DIVISIONS 


ARTILLERY  WITH  I CORPS 


| Begt 


;tjlI 


ARTILLERY  WITH  II  CORPS 


ARTILLERY  WITH  III  CORPS 


CORPS  ARTILLERY  BRIGADE 


An  ti-air  craft 


CORPS  ARTILLERY  BRIGADE 


CORPS  ARTILLERY  BRIGADE 


(Separate  regt  not  a 
part  of  corps  arty 
proper) 


| Army  Am  Tn|  (6  transport  Cos) 


Anti-aircraft 


1 bn  76  G 
1 bn  MG’s 
1 SL  Co 


L bn  76  G 
L bn  MG’s 
L SL  Co 


1 Brigade 

3 Regts  (motorized) 
3 Regts  (Portee) 


1 Brigade 
(Motorized 

166  mm 
G 

Regt 

156  mm 
G 

Regt 

240  mm 
H 

Regt 

240  mm 
H 

Regt 

6-in  G 
Regt 

II— 1 


CHAPTER  II 

Artillery  Weapons  and  Ammunition 


Paragraphs 


Section"  I.  — Weapons  1-  4 

Section  II. — Ammunition 5-24 


Section  I 
Weapons 


Classification,  General  1 

Light  Artillery  2 

Medium  Artillery  3 

Heavy  Artillery 4 


1.  Classification,  General. — (a)  Artillery  may  be 
classed  broadly  as  follows : 

(1)  Field  Artillery,  that  which  is  designed  primarily  to 
accompany  an  army  in  the  field.  There  are  the  following  sub- 
divisions : 

(a)  Light  Artillery , exemplified  by  the  75-mm.  gun.  A 
howitzer  of  the  same  mobilitiy  would  be  included  in  this 
class,  for  example,  the  projected  105-mm.  howitzer.  Light 
artillery  is  primarily  for  infantry  support. 

(b)  Medium  Artillery. — Guns  of  caliber  between  that  of 
the  light  field  gun  and  the  field  gun  of  about  6-inch  caliber. 
It  is  exemplified  by  the  4.7  gun.  The  medium  howitzer  should 
be  of  the  same  mobility  and  of  about  6-inch  caliber.  The 
155-mm.  howitzer  is  an  example  of  this  type. 

(c)  Horse  Artillery , similar  to  the  light  artillery,  but 
with  greater  mobility,  all  cannoneers  being  individually 
mounted.  Intended  for  work  with  cavalry. 

(d)  Pack  Artillery , intended  primarily  to  replace  light 
artillery  in  difficult  terrain  which  is  unsuitable  for  wheeled 
vehicles. 

(e)  Heavy  Artillery,  which  includes  all  types  of  wheeled 
or  caterpillar  artillery  heavier  than  medium  artillery. 

(f)  Trench  Artillery,  a special  type  of  mortars,  of  short 
range,  useful  principally  in  stabilized  or  similar  situations. 

(2)  Railway  Artillery,  that  in  which  the  mount  is  spe- 
cially constructed  for  firing  and  transport  on  railroad  tracks. 
In  some  types,  the  piece  also  can  be  fired  from  fixed  or  semi- 
fixed platforms.  This  type  is  an  important  element  of  coast  de- 


13 


II— 1-2 


14  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

fense,  but  it  also  is  capable  of  being  used  with  the  armies  in  the 
field  under  some  conditions;  hence  its  special  classification. 

(3)  Coast  Artillery,  that  designed  primarily  for  coast  de- 
fense, mostly  on  fixed  mounts. 

(4)  Anti-Aircraft  Artillery,  a special  type  for  anti-air- 
craft defense.  It  may  be  employed  with  the  armies  in  the  field, 
for  the  defense  of  localities,  or  as  an  adjunct  of  coast  defenses. 
It  is  not  a part  of  the  field  artillery. 

(b)  More  elaborate  classifications  than  the  foregoing 
frequently  are  made;  for  example,  the  most  powerful  guns 
in  some  cases  are  distinguished  by  the  term  high  power 
guns;  the  term  super-gun  also  is  used. 

(c)  For  the  more  important  characteristics  of  the  prin- 
cipal service  types  of  field,  railway,  and  anti-aircraft  artil- 
lery, and  field  artillery  under  development,  see  the  tables 
following  this  chapter.  Only  the  field  artillery  is  considered 
here. 

2.  Light  Artillery. — (a)  While  the  individual  piece 
of  light  artillery  is  not  powerful  as  compared  with  the  heav- 
ier types,  the  light  artillery  is  easily  the  dominant  type.  In 
point  of  numbers,  it  constitutes  about  one-half  of  the  artil- 
lery with  the  armies  in  the  field ; in  addition,  it  has  greater 
all-round  usefulness  than  any  other  type. 

There  are  three  types  of  light  artillery  at  present 
available  for  service,  the  French,  the  British,  and  the  Amer- 
ican model  of  1916;  all  are  75-mm.  guns.  The  French  type 
predominates,  and  was  used  exclusively  in  France.  The 
British  type  was  adopted  to  hasten  the  equipment  of  our 
artillery  units  in  The  World  War.  The  American  Model  of 
1916  is  of  American  design  and  manufacture.  Its  develop- 
ment was  well  under  way  before  our  entry  into  The  World 
War;  it  probably  would  have  been  our  service  type  had  it 
been  possible  to  attain  quantity  production  with  sufficient 
rapidity.  All  three  of  these  types  use  the  same  ammuni- 
tion. 

(b)  The  75~mm.  French  Gun , Model  of  1897. — This  is 
the  service  type  of  the  French  Army,  introduced  by  them 
in  1898 ; it  was  the  forerunner  of  all  modern  field  artillery, 
and  is  today  one  of  the  most  efficient  weapons  in  existence. 
Of  those  on  hand  in  our  service,  a portion  were  purchased 
from  the  French  and  a portion  were  manufactured  in  this 
country. 


II— 2 


ARTILLERY  WEAPONS  AND  AMMUNITION  15 

Tiie  weight  of  the  gun  and  carriage  in  the  firing  posi- 
tion is  2657  pounds;  the  weight  behind  the  team,  including 
a loaded  gun  limber  (18  rounds),  but  without  cannoneers  on 
the  limber,  is  4181  pounds.  The  maximum  permissible  ele- 
vation of  the  gun  on  the  carriage  with  the  latter  on  level 
ground,  is  19  degrees  ; depression,  10  degrees.  The  permis- 
sible traverse  of  the  gun  on  the  carriage  is  6 degrees,  3 de- 
grees on  each  side  of  the  center.  A shield  of  limited  extent 
is  provided ; the  thickness  is  4 millimeters  (.16  inches) . The 
recoil  system  is  of  the  type  known  as  hydro-pneumatic,  the 
recoil  being  checked  by  a hydraulic  brake  (oil),  and  the 
counter-recoil  being  effected  by  compressed  air.  The  length 
of  the  recoil  is  44.9  inches.  The  carriage  embodies  the  so- 
called  independent  line  of  sight  system  of  laying  the  gun 
for  elevation.  The  sight  is  an  optical  one,  but  without  mag- 
nification or  the  panoramic  feature  which  is  standard  in  our 
service.  v 

(c)  The  75-mm.  British  Gun,  Model  of  1917. 

(1)  This  is  the  service  type  of  the  British  Army,  except  4hat 
the  British  use  a caliber  of  3.3  inehes  (18-pounder).  Those  in 
our  service  are  of  American  manufacture.  The  fact  that,  at  the 
time  of  our  entry  into  The  World  War,  this  type  was  in  produc- 
tion in  this  country  for  the  British  government  led  to  its  adop- 
tion with  modified  caliber  for  our  service.  It  is  considered  a 
very  satisfactory  weapon. 

(2)  The  weight  of  the  gun  and  carriage  in  the  firing  posi- 
tion is  2,945  pounds;  the  weight  behind  the  team,  including  a 
loaded  gun  limber  (18  rounds),  but  without  cannoneers,  is  4,469 
pounds.  The  maximum  permissible  elevation  of  the  gun  on  the 
carriage  is  16  degrees;  depression,  5 degrees.  The  permissible 
traverse  of  the  gun  on  the  carriage  is  8 degrees,  4 degrees  on?each 
side  of  the  center.  A shield  is  provided.  The  recoil  is  checked 
by  a hydraulic  buffer;  the  gun  is  returned  to  battery  by  a spring 
column,  which  is  compressed  in  recoil.  The  length  of  recoil  is 
49  inches.  An  unusual  feature  of  the  carriage  is  that  the  gun  is 
mounted  under  the  cradle,  instead  of  above  it,  as  is  the  common 
practice.  The  carriage  embodies  the  independent  line  of  sight 
system  of  laying  for  elevation.  The  sight  is  the  standard  pan- 
oramic type  of  our  service. 

(d)  The  75-mm.  American  Gun,  Model  of  1916. 

(1)  This  gun  is  quite  similar  to  the  Deport  (French)  gun, 
which  was  the;  first  one  produced  of  this  type.  The  Italian  field 
gun  is  also  of  the  Deport  type. 

(2)  The  weight  of  the  gun  and  carriage  in  the  firing  posi-  ' 
tion  is  3,045  pounds;  the  weight  behind  the  team,  including  the 
loaded  limber,  is  4,569  pounds.  It  has  the  so-called  split  trail. 
Instead  of  the  usual  single  or  box  trail,  the  trail  is  in  two  wings 
secured  to  the  axie  inside  of  each  wheel.  The  trail  spades  lock 


16 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE — ARTILLERY 


together  in  limbering  for  transport,  but,  for  firing,  the  trails  are 
spread  apart  so  as  to  pfermit  the  gun  to  recoil  between  them 
through  a traverse  of  22  degrees  30  minutes  on  each  side  of  the 
center.  The  maximum  permissible  elevation  of  the  gun  on  the 
carriage  is  53  degrees,  the  maximum  depression  is  7 degrees.  The 
recoil  system  is  of  the  hydraulic-spring  type.  The  length  of  re- 
coil is  varied  automatically  by  the  mechanism,  from  46  inches  at 
zero  elevation  to  18  inches  at  extreme  elevation.  This  variable 
recoil  is  necessary  to  insure  stability  of  the  carriage  in  firing  at 
low  elevations  and  to  prevent  the  breech  of  the  gun  from  striking 
the  ground  when  firing  at  high  elevations.  The  carriage  has  the 
independent  line  of  sight,  and  is  equipped  with  a shield. 

(e)  New  Types. — The  approved  artillery  development 
project  of  the  War  Department  includes  a 75-mm.  gun  and 
a 105-mm.  howitzer,  of  new  type.  They  are  still  in  the  ex- 
perimental stage.  In  the  split  trail  type,  the  same  carriage 
will  be  used  for  both  weapons.  It  is  expected  that  the  gun 
will  attain  a range  of  15,000  yards  with  a 15-pound  projec- 
tile and  the  howitzer  a range  of  12,000  yards  with  a 33- 
pound  projectile. 

(f)  Horse  Artillery. — In  our  service,  the  horse  artil- 
lery always  has  used  the  same  materiel  as  the  light  artil- 
lery, i.e.,  the  gun  of  3-inch  or  75-mm.  caliber. 

(g)  Pack  Artillery. — While  this  is  not  a part  of  divi- 
sion artillery,  it  is  attached  to  divisions  when  the  situation 
demands  its  use.  The  present  materiel  of  the  pack  artillery 
is  an  American-made  copy  of  that  purchased  some  twenty 
years  ago  from  the  Vickers-Maxim  Company,  of  England. 
Though  called  a gun,  the  weapon  is  a howitzer  strictly  speak- 
ing. It  is  of  75-mm.  caliber,  and  fires  a shell  or  shrapnel 
weighing  12J  pounds  to  an  extreme  range  of  5000  yards. 
The  carriage,  though  very  rugged  and  serviceable,  is  not 
of  modern  type  in  that  it  is  not  stable  in  firing  and  permits 
no  traverse  of  the  piece  on  the  carriage.  In  firing,  the  car- 
riage recoils  on  the  ground,  but  this  is  reduced  to  some  ex- 
tent by  the  piece  recoiling  on  the  carriage,  about  14  inches. 
This  type  of  carriage  is  known  as  the  short-recoil.  The  piece 
can  be  elevated  on  the  carriage  to  a maximum  of  27  degrees 
and  depressed  to  10  degrees.  The  carriage  has  been  modified 
to  receive  the  service  panoramic  sight,  which  permits  the 
use  of  indirect  laying. 

The  materiel  is  designed  for  transport  by  pack  mule, 
and  for  this  purpose  separates  into  four  loads:  the  piece 


II— 2-4 


ARTILLERY  WEAPONS  AND  AMMUNITION  17 

235  pounds,  the  cradle,  186  pounds;  the  wheels  and  axle, 
178  pounds;  and  the  trail,  231  pounds.  The  weight  of  the 
howitzer  in  the  firing  position  is  830  pounds.  The  materiel 
can  be  unpacked  and  assembled  for  firing,  or  the  reverse, 
in  less  than  one  minute.  One  round  per  piece  per  minute 
may  be  taken  as  a fair  maximum  rate  of  aimed  fire.  This 
rate  is  determined  by  the  operations  of  relaying  and  not 
by  the  wear  of  the  bore. 

3.  Medium  Artillery. — (a)  These  weapons  belong  to 
the  corps  artillery.  However,  they  are  at  times  attached 
to  divisions,  hence  a brief  description  is  given  here. 

(b)  The  7 -inch  Gun,  Model  of  1906. 

(1)  This  type  was  in  service  for  a number  oi  years  before 
The  World  War;  it  is  of  American  design  and  manufacture.  It 
is  not  included  in  the  present  organization. 

(2)  The  weight  of  the  gun  and  carriage  in  the  firing  posi- 
tion is  8,068  pounds;  the  weight  behind  the  tractor,  including  a 
limber,  simply  to  support  the  trail,  is  9,818  pounds.  The  maxi- 
mum permissible  elevation  of  the  gun  on  the  carriage  is  15  de- 
grees; depression,  5 degrees.  The  traverse  on  the  carriage  is  4 
degrees  on  each  side  of  the  center.  There  is  a shield.  The  recoil 
system  is  hydraulic-spring,  the  recoil  of  the  gun  on  the  carriage 
being  70  inches.  The  carriage  is  equipped  with  the  panoramic 
sight,  but  has  not  the  independent  line  of  sight. 

(c)  The  155-mm.  Howitzer,  Model  of  1918  ( Schneider ) . 

(1)  This  weapon  was  produced  originally  by  the  French 
firm  of  Schneider  and  Company,  and  is  a service  type  of  the 
French  Army.  It  was  adopted  for  our  service  after  our  entry 
into  The  World  War;  those  now  on  hand  are  partly  of  French 
and  partly  of  American  manufacture.  The  type  was  used  ex- 
tensively in  our  operations,  and  proved  very  satisfactory.  During 
the  war,  the  power  of  the  howitzer  was  increased  over  that  con- 
templated originally  by  increasing  the  powder  charge.  The  use 
of  this  augmented  charge  stresses  the  materiel  severely,  and  if 
used  too  extensively  will  cause  serious  damage. 

(2)  The  weight  of  the  howitzer  in  the  firing  position  is 
7,600  pounds;  the  weight  behind  the  tractor,  including  a limber, 
simply  to  support  the  trail,  is  8,927  pounds.  The  maximum  per- 
missible elevation  of  the  howitzer  on  the  carriage  is  42  degrees; 
depression,  zero.  The  traverse  on  the  carriage  is  3 degrees  on 
either  side  of  the  center.  There  is  a shield.  The  recoil  system  is 
hydro-pneumatic,  the  length  of  recoil  being  51  inches.  The  lay- 
ing system  does  not  include  the  independent  line  of  sight. 

4.  Heavy  Artillery. — Characteristics  of  these  wea- 
pons is  given  in  the  tables  following  this  chapter.  They  are 
described  in  detail  in  Volume  II  of  this  text. 


II— 5 


Section  II 

Ammunition 


Paragraphs 


Ammunition,  Defined,  Kinds  

Kinds  Used  by  Various  Types  of  Weapons 

The  Charge 

The  Primer  

The  Charge  in  Several  Parts 

Form  and  Type  of  Projectiles 

Projectiles  Classified 

Shrapnel 

Effect  of  Shell  and  Shrapnel  Compared 

Kinds  of  Projectiles,  Standard  for  Certain  Weapons 

The  Future  of  Shrapnel 

Fuses,  Defined  and  Classified  

Percussion  Fuses  

Time  Fuses 

Safety  Precautions  

Proportions  of  Various  Types  of  Projectiles  in  Ammuni- 
tion Vehicles  

Effect  of  Individual  Projectiles 

Selection  of  Ammunition  for  a Given  Mission  ____________ 

Effect  of  Artillery  Fire  Sometimes  Overestimated 

Ammunition  Required  for  Given  Missions 


5 

6 

7 

8 
9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 
19 


21 

22 

23 

24 


5.  Ammunition,  Defined,  Kinds. — A round  of  am- 
munition consists  of  one  projectile  and  the  necessary  pro- 
pelling charge  of  powder,  the  primer,  igniter  and  containers. 
Ammunition  is  classed  as  fixed,  semi-fixed,  and  separate- 
loading. In  fixed  ammunition,  the  round  is  handled  and 
loaded  in  the  piece  as  a unit,  in  the  same  manner  as  small 
arms  ammunition.  The  cartridge  case,  usually  of  brass,  con- 
tains the  primer,  igniter,  and  propelling  charge ; the  projec- 
tile is  forced  into  the  mouth  of  the  cartridge  case,  and  leaves 
it  only  when  the  round  is  fired.  Semi-fixed  ammunition  is 
the  same  as  fixed  ammunition,  except  that  the  projectile 
is  removable  from  the  cartridge  case  by  hand,  usually  for 
the  purpose  of  varying  the  charge.  Sometimes  a lock  is 
provided  for  securing  the  projectile  in  the  cartridge  case. 
The  round  is  loaded  in  the  piece  as  a unit.  In  separate  load- 
ing ammunition,  the  projectile  and  the  charge  are  separate 
and  are  loaded  in  the  piece  separately.  The  propelling 
charge,  primer,  and  igniter  may  be  contained  in  a cartridge 


18 


II— 5-8 


AMMUNITION  19 

case  as  for  fixed  and  semi-fixed  ammunition ; or  the  igniter 
and  propelling  charge  may  be  contained  in  a bag  of  com- 
bustible, cloth,  which  is  consumed  in  firing.  In  the  latter 
case,  the  primer  is  inserted  in  the  breech  mechanism  separ- 
ately. Separate  loading  is  used  for  heavy  ammunition;  in 
the  case  of  worn  pieces,  it  gives  greater  accuracy,  as  the 
projectiles  can  be  well  seated  by  ramming.  The  cartridge 
case  for  separate  loading  protects  the  charge  and  makes 
loading  easier  and  more  rapid ; it  is  costly  however,  and  for 
the  large  calibers,  heavy. 

6.  Kinds  Used  by  Various  Types  of  Weapons. — The 
light  artillery  of  all  nations  uses  fixed  ammunition.  There 
are  many  examples  of  pieces  using  separate  loading  ammu- 
nition, among  them  being  our  155-mm.  howitzer  and  all 
larger  calibers.  The  75-mm.  pack  howitzer  and  105-mm. 
howitzer,  now  being  developed  for  our  service,  as  well  as 
the  4.7-inch  gun,  probably  will  use  semi-fixed  ammunition. 

7.  The  Charge. — The  propelling  charge  is  of  smoke- 
less powder  with  grains  so  designed  as  to  present  a gra- 
dually increasing  burning  surface  and  of  a size  appropriate 
to  the  caliber  and  length  of  the  bore.  The  igniter  is  one  or 
more  small  packets  of  black  powder  suitably  distributed  in 
the  charge,  to  insure  a thorough  and  reliable  ignition  of  the 
propellant.  For  small  calibers,  such  as  the  75-mm.  gun,  the 
necessary  igniting  charge  is  included  as  a part  of  the 
primer. 

8.  The  Primer. — The  primer  (Figure  1)  is  a device 
resembling  a small  arms  cartridge  placed  at  the  base  of  the 


Figure  1. — 21-grain  Percussion  Primer,  Mark  IIA. 


II— 8-9 


20  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

charge  to  furnish  the  initial  ignition  when  the  piece  is  fired. 
The  percussion  primer,  used  in  field  artillery,  consists  essen- 
tially of  a percussion  cap  and  a small  amount  of  compressed 
black  powder.  The  cap  is  struck  by  the  firing  pin  in  firing. 
Electric  primers  are  used  in  some  seacoast  pieces. 

9.  The  Charge  in  Several  Parts. — For  certain 
pieces,  the  charge  is  made  up  in  several  parts.  (Figure  2.) 
By  the  removal  of  one  or  more  parts,  the  charge  can  be  var- 
ied. The  advantage  of  this  is  two-fold. 


First,  a sufficient  charge  can  be  used  to  give  the  desired 
range  and  no  more;  this  saves  the  bore,  since  the  greater 
the  charge  the  greater  the  wear  of  the  bore.  Second,  a 
reduced  charge,  if  sufficient  to  give  the  range  desired,  gives 
a greater  angle  of  fall  than  a greater  charge ; this  facilitates 
reaching  behind  accidents  of  the  terrain.  The  practice  of 
using  variable  charges  was  extended  greatly  during  the 
war.  While  it  has  the  disadvantage  of  complicating  the  am- 
munition, this  is  considered  to  be  more  than  outweighed  by 
the  gain  in  ballistic  properties  in  most  cases.  In  fact,  the 
use  of  variable  charges  for  the  light  field  gun  is  being  con- 
sidered. The  French  use  reduced  charge  ammunition  in 
their  light  field  gun  to  give  a more  curved  trajectory,  but 
this  is  fixed  ammunition  and  is  distinct  from  the  normal 
type.  In  the  variable  charges  used  up  to  the  present,  the 


II — 9-10 


AMMUNITION  21 

component  parts  are  not  of  uniform  size  and  weight.  This 
presents  some  disadvantages  in  manufacture  and  in  utiliz- 
ing the  parts  removed.  Studies  and  experiments  are  now 
being  made  in  our  service  with  what  are  known  as  aliquot 
part  charges.  These  are  variable  charges  in  which  the 
component  parts  are  identical  and  interchangeable.  Parts 
not  used  in  one  charge  are  available  to  make  up  others; 
moreover,  there  is  less  liability  to  error  in  making  up 
charges. 

10.  Form  and  Type  of  Projectiles. — The  forms  and 
types  of  ogival  projectiles  (Figures  3 and  4)  were  the  sub- 


3A5C  CCVtt- 


/ — ADAPTER 


5HELL 


Figure  3. — 155-mm.  Forged  Steel  Shell 


ject  of  extensive  study  and  experiment  before  the  war,  but, 
nevertheless,  the  changes  during  the  war  were  numerous 
and  marked ; and  since  the  war,  research  has  been  taken  up 
with  renewed  impetus.  To  quote  from  the  report  of  the 
so-called  Caliber  Board  in  this  connection:  “There  are  in- 

vestigations under  way  by  the  Ordnance  Department  cov- 
ering this  entire  subject  and  the  Board  recommends  that 
these  be  continued.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  this  subject 


11-10-12 


22  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

will  require  extended  investigation  and  is  one  which  can 
only  be  adequately  handled  by  a continuing  technical  body.” 

The  development  of  the  form  of  the  projectile  consists 
principally  in  lengthening  the  ogive  thus  giving  the  projec- 
tile a long  sharp  point,  and  in  tapering  the  base  in  rear  of 
the  rotating  band,  called  “boat-tailing.”  The  projectile 
modified  in  this  manner  sometimes  is  called  a stream-line 
projectile,  and  closely  resembles  the  modern  small  arms 
bullet.  The  effect  of  these  modifications  of  form  is  to  give  a 
considerable  increase  in  range. 

11.  Projectiles  Classified. — Projectiles  are  classed 
as  shell  and  shrapnel , depending  on  their  action  on  bursting. 
The  shell  is  a forged  steel  or  semi-steel  projectile,  filled  with 
high  explosive,  which  is  detonated  by  a fuse  carried  in  the 
point  of  the  projectile  (in  the  base  for  armor-piercing  shell). 
The  effect  is  obtained  by  the  projectile  being  broken  up  by 
the  action  of  the  bursting  charge  into  fragments  projected 
at  very  high  velocity.  The  endeavor  is  to  make  the  bursting 
charge  as  large  as  possible.  This  is  limited  by  considera- 
tions of  weight  and  size  from  the  ballistic  standpoint  (high 
explosive  has  a lower  specific  gravity  than  steel),  and  by  the 
fact  that  the  projectile  must  have  sufficient  strength  to 
withstand  the  shock  of  firing.  A projectile  specially  de- 
signed for  a howitzer  cannot  be  fired  in  a gun  of  like  cali- 
ber, as  it  would  break  up  under  the  firing  stresses  incident 
to  the  higher  velocity  of  the  gun.  Forged  steel  is  superior 
to  semi-steel,  as  the  fragments  are  larger  and  more  destruc- 
tive, and  the  shell  walls  can  be  made  thinner.  Semi-steel, 
a special  form  of  cast  iron,  gives  a shell  with  satisfactory 
fragmentation,  and  it  is  cheaper  and  better  adapted  than 
forged  steel  in  quantity  production. 

12.  Shrapnel. — Shrapnel  (Figure  5)  consists  essen- 
tially of  a steel  envelope  as  for  shell,  a base  charge  of  black 
powder,  a large  number  of  balls  embedded  in  a smoke-pro- 
ducing matrix,  and  a combination  time  and  percussion  fuse. 
The  fuse  is  set  so  as  to  burst  the  projectile  in  air  just  before 
it  strikes.  The  percussion  element  of  the  fuse  is  merely  an 
alternative  to  insure  the  burst  of  the  shrapnel  in  case  the 
time  element  of  the  fuse  does  not  function  as  intended. 
Shrapnel  are  not  employed  deliberately  with  the  idea  of 


AMMUNITION 


23 


Fuse  nose  piece  (tezs) — 7=lv  ASSEMBLED 
7Jme_  fuse  nngs (brass) — SHRAPNEL 

Fuse  cover  {fin) 

Resin 

Shrapnel  bof/s 
Powder  lube  (brass) 


Naptha  lene. 
Gun  codon 
Diaphragm  (steel) 


'Shrapnel  or  shell  head 


Obiuraior  (straw  board). 


Cartridge  case 
(drawn  brass) 


Pnmer  (brass) 
(screw  machine  product) 


—Bourre/et 

-Steel  shell  body 
(forged  & machined) 

Resin 

Black  powder 

Copper  band  or 
rotating  band. 


Smokeless  powder 


Hrac/vc/zan  H/y'-s/on 


Con  Ser//ori 
rr£s?«'-£s/J?%. 
yj  ames  r jTLfprj 


t-9»/  Or*  **  < 


Z)rau/r7  by  /ar/£*>1  [ J>i~i 


Figure  5. — Shrapnel. 


II — 12-15 


24  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

their  bursting  on  impact,  as  their  effect  in  this  case  is  much 
reduced.  The  action  of  the  base  charge  of  black  powder  is 
to  push  out  the  head  of  the  projectile  and  to  propel  the 
balls  with  increased  velocity;  the  cylindrical  portion  of  the 
case  is  not  ruptured.  The  balls  are  intended  to  be  individ- 
ually effective  against  personnel  or  animals,  when  the  shrap- 
nel bursts  in  air  at  the  proper  height. 

13.  Effect  of  Shell  and  Shrapnel  Compared. — The 
effect  of  shell,  when  burst  at  or  above  ground,  is  principally 
lateral ; the  effect  of  shrapnel  is  entirely  to  the  front.  Shrap- 
nel is  effective  over  a larger  area  than  shell  of  the  same 
caliber.  The  relative  moral  effect  of  shell  and  shrapnel  is 
a matter  of  dispute.  A projectile  was  developed  by  the 
Germans  before  the  war,  called  unit  projectile  or  high  ex- 
plosive shrapnel,  which  was  intended  to  combine  the  shell 
and  shrapnel.  It  resembled  a shrapnel,  but  the  bullets  were 
embedded  in  high  explosive  instead  of  a non-explosive  ma- 
trix. When  burst  in  air,  the  projectile  functioned  as  a shrap- 
nel, the  matrix  not  being  detonated.  When  burst  on  per- 
cussion, the  matrix  was  detonated,  and  the  entire  projectile 
ruptured  in  the  manner  of  a shell.  The  projectile  was  some- 
what complicated,  and  was  not  thoroughly  efficient  either 
as  a shell  or  a shrapnel;  the  type  disappeared  early  in  the 
war,  and  may  be  considered  as  definitely  abandoned. 

14.  Kinds  of  Projectiles  Standard  for  Certain 
Weapons. — The  shell  is  a standard  type  of  projectile  for  all 
types  and  calibers  of  artillery.  The  shrapnel  is  standard 
for  the  lighter  calibers,  such  as  the  75-mm.  gun,  the  4.7  inch 
gun  and  the  105-mm.  howitzer  (new).  Shrapnel  is  sup- 
plied for  the  present  155-mm.  howitzer,  but  has  been  aban- 
doned for  the  new  weapons  of  this  type. 

15.  The  Future  of  Shrapnel. — The  future  of  the 
shrapnel  is  not  assured,  even  though  it  survived  the  war. 
The  shrapnel  is  relatively  ineffective  in  howitzers,  and  even 
in  guns  at  the  longer  ranges,  because  the  high  angle  of 
fall  contracts  very  much  the  ground  pattern  of  shrapnel. 
In  guns  firing  at  long  range,  the  dispersion  of  the  fuse  be- 
comes great  and  makes  the  effect  unreliable;  in  addition, 
there  is  difficulty  in  making  a time  fuse  of  a time  capacity 
adequate  for  long  range  firing.  The  shrapnel  and  its  fuse 


II — 15-17 


AMMUNITION  25 

are  more  difficult  and  costly  to  manufacture  than  the  shell. 
The  firing  of  shrapnel  is  limited  practically  to  the  daytime 
when  visibility  and  other  conditions  permit  the  bursts  to  be 
observed.  The  technical  conduct  of  shrapnel  fire  is  more 
difficult  than  that  of  shell ; in  fact  it  is  questionable  whether 
the  hastily  trained  war  officer  can  be  expected  to  handle 
shrapnel  effectively.  While  a well  placed  shrapnel  is  more 
effective  against  animate  targets  in  the  open  than  shell,  dis- 
persion causes  a certain  proportion  of  shrapnel  fired  to  burst 
on  graze  with  little  effect.  On  the  other  hand,  the  new 
shell  fuses  give  bursts  effective  almost  entirely  above  the 
ground,  making  their  action  not  unlike  that  of  shrapnel. 
The  shell  is  independent  of  fuse  dispersion  and  can  be  used 
effectively  without  observation. 

16.  Fuses,  Defined  and  Classified. — The  fuse  is  the 
element  of  the  projectile  which  causes  it  to  burst  at  the 
end  of  its  flight.  Fuses  may  be  classed  as  point  or  base, 
according  to  the  position  of  the  fuse  in  the  projectile;  point 
fuses  now  are  used  exclusively  for  field  artillery  projectiles. 
The  more  usual  classification  is  based  on  the  action  of  the 
fuse:  percussion  fuses,  which  function  when  the  projectile 
strikes;  time  fuses,  which  function  any  desired  time  after 
the  projectile  leaves  the  bore;  and  combination  fuses, 
which  have  both  percussion  and  time  elements,  the  percus- 
sion element  functioning  automatically  unless  the  time  ele- 
ment acts  beforehand.  Percussion  fuses  are  widely  used 
for  all  calibers  of  field  artillery;  time  fuses  are  used  only 
in  anti-aircraft  artillery  when  firing  over  friendly  territory ; 
combination  fuses  are  used  for  all  shrapnel,  and  in  some 
cases  with  shell. 

17.  Percussion  Fuses. — Percussion  fuses  are  of  vari- 
ous types,  depending  on  the  particular  characteristics  of 
design,  and  on  their  speed  of  action  after  the  projectile 
strikes.  The  most  rapid  action  is  in  the  case  of  the  super- 
quick or  long  fuse  (French  I.A.L.  or  Mark  III)  (Figure  6), 
which  is  intended  to  burst  the  projectile  slightly  before  it 
strikes  the  ground.  This  is  effected  by  means  of  a long  fuse 
projecting  ahead  of  the  point  of  the  projectile.  The  instan- 
taneous fuse  (Figure  7)  bursts  the  projectile  just  as  it 


26 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


Figure  6. — Point  detonating  fuse  (long),  Mark  III 


Figure  7. — Point  detonating  fuse  (short)  Mark  IV 


11-17-18 


AMMUNITION  27 

strikes,  the  action  being  slightly  later  than  in  the  case  of 
the  super-quick  fuse.  A still  slower  action  is  obtained  with 
the  short  delay  fuse.  This  action  results  in  the  projectile 
burying  itself  slightly  before  bursting ; or  if  there  is  a rico- 
chet, the  burst  is  in  air  just  above  the  ground.  Ricochet  ac- 
tion is  obtained  only  with  guns,  under  certain  conditions  of 
terrain  and  at  ranges  generally  not  exceeding  4500  yards. 
The  long  delay  fuse  is  used  to  obtain  the  maximum  penetra- 
tion and  mining  effect  with  heavy  projectiles.  The  long  fuse 
lessens  the  range  and  accuracy  slightly.  It  is  unreliable  in 
its  action  where  the  angle  of  impact  is  small. 

The  present  effort  in  our  service  is  to  reduce  the  num- 
ber of  percussion  fuses  to  two  for  each  caliber,  one  a super- 
quick and  the  other  short  delay.  It  is  possible  that  these 
two  actions  can  be  combined  in  a single  fuse,  capable  of  be- 
ing set  beforehand  for  the  particular  action  desired. 

18.  Time  Fuses. — Time  fuses  (Figure  8)  are  con- 
structed with  a time  element  consisting  of  a train  of  powder 


Figure  8. — Forty-five-second  Combination  Fuse,  Mark  I 


which  burns  progressively.  The  fuse  is  set  so  that  it  will 
act  after  this  powder  train  has  burned  a distance  corres- 
ponding to  the  time  desired.  Considerable  progress  has 
been  made  in  the  development  of  mechanical  time  fuses , 
which  are  based  on  the  clockwork  principle.  The  fuses  are 
practicable,  and  are  particularly  useful  in  firing  to  great  al- 
titudes, where  the  rarified  air  would  affect  the  burning  of  a 
time  train.  They  are  delicate  and  costly,  and  difficult  to 
produce  in  quantities  in  time  of  war ; their  principal  applica- 
tion doubtless  will  be  in  anti-aircraft  artillery. 


11-19-21 


28  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

19.  Safety  Precautions. — Shells  habitually  are  issued 
and  transported  without  fuses,  because  of  the  sensitiveness 
of  the  latter;  the  fuse  is  inserted  by  hand  just  before  load- 
ing. This  also  permits  selection  of  the  fuse  used.  Shrapnel 
always  is  issued  fused  and  ready  to  fire.  Fuses  are  provided 
with  various  safety  devices,  to  protect  against  premature 
action  either  during  transport  or  during  the  passage  of  the 
projectile  through  the  bore.  Safety  devices  for  transport 
only  are  positive  devices  which  are  removed  before  the  pro- 
jectile is  loaded  in  the  piece;  the  bore  safety  devices  also 
protect  during  transport.  Accidents  in  handling  ammuni- 
tion are  now  very  rare.  Making  the  fuse  bore-safe  is  diffi- 
cult, and  it  may  be  said  that  no  shell  fuse  now  existing  is 
entirely  satisfactory  in  this  respect.  The  mechanisms  for 
this  purpose  fall  in  two  categories;  those  utilizing  the  in- 
ertia of  certain  moving  parts  to  arm  the  fuse,  that  is,  make 
it  capable  of  functioning,  by  the  shock  of  discharge  and  not 
before;  and  those  utilizing  the  rotation  of  the  projectile  to 
arm  the  fuse  by  means  of  the  centrifugal  action  of  certain 
moving  parts.  Long  and  painstaking  effort  has  been  de- 
voted to  this  feature  of  fuses,  but  it  continues  to  be  a source 
of  danger  to  gun  crews  and  has  resulted  in  many  fatal  acci- 
dents. Detonations  in  the  bore,  usually  due  to  the  fuse, 
generally  are  shrouded  in  mystery,  and  the  exact  cause 
rarely  is  determined.  A slight  obstruction  in  the  bore 
causes  a sudden  retardation  of  the  projectile  and  is  ordin- 
arily sufficient  to  cause  the  fuse  to  act,  if  it  is  armed,  in 
the  same  manner  as  when  the  projectile  strikes.  An  ir- 
regularity in  the  copper  rotating  band  or  a foreign  sub- 
stance adhering  thereto  is  apt  to  cause  explosion  in  the 
bore,  hence  care  is  needed. 

20.  Proportions  of  Various  Types  of  Projectiles  in 
Ammunition  Vehicles. — The  proportions  of  the  different 
types  of  projectiles  to  be  carried  in  the  artillery  ammunition 
and  combat  trains  has  not  been  prescribed  by  the  War  De- 
partment; and  even  if  a normal  apportionment  were  pre- 
scribed, it  doubtless  would  be  varied  in  actual  operations 
to  meet  conditions. 

21.  Effect  of  Individual  Projectiles. — (a)  When 
a shrapnel  bursts,  the  balls  are  projected  forward  in  a coni- 


11—21 


AMMUNITION 


29 


cal  sheaf.  The  angle  at  the  projectile  or  the  vertex  of  the 
cone  varies  with  the  velocity  of  the  projectile  at  the  instant 
of  burst,  being  greater  for  long  ranges  than  for  short  ones ; 
it  may  be  taken  roughly  as  15  degrees.  The  area  on  the 
ground  covered  by  the  balls  depends  on  the  height  of  the 
burst  above  the  ground  and  on  the  angle  of  fall.  Shrap- 
nel balls  lose  their  velocity  very  rapidly,  their  maximum 
effective  range  being  300  or  400  yards.  The  balls  are  not 
distributed  uniformly  over  the  ground  pattern,  being  denser 
for  the  elements  nearest  the  piece.  The  effective  pat- 
tern of  the  75-mm.  shrapnel  when  burst  in  air  at  a suitable 
height  may  be  taken  roughly  as  150  to  100  yards  in  range, 
varying  with  the  range,  and  25  yards  laterally.  The  effect 
of  shrapnel  bursting  on  graze  is  problematical;  if  there  is 
a richochet,  the  effect  may  be  comparable  to  that  of  an  air 
burst;  but  ordinarily  the  balls  are  merely  scattered  on  the 
ground  with  a very  local  and  mild  effect. 

(b)  A bursting  shell  has  three  distinct  sheafs  of  frag- 
ments, the  lateral  sheaf,  the  ogival  or  forward  sheaf,  and 
the  base  or  rear  sheaf.  The  lateral  sheaf  is  the  most  impor- 
tant and  is  the  only  one  counted  on  for  effect.  The  shell 
fragments  have  a very  high  initial  velocity,  said  to  be  be- 
tween 3000  and  5000  feet  per  second ; but  the  jagged  irregu- 
lar fragments  have  little  ballistic  efficiency  and  lose  their 
velocity  almost  immediately.  Small  fragments  do  not  fly 
generally  more  than  about  30  yards,  although  occasional 
large  fragments  may  fly  several  hundred  yards. 

(c)  The  following  table,  from  French  sources,  gives 
the  area  covered  effectively  by  75-mm.  and  155-mm.  shells, 
fused  so  as  to  burst  at  or  slightly  above  the  surface  of  the 
ground. 


Type  of  ehell 


Area  effective  covered 


In  range  Laterally 
yards  1 ards 


Effective  radius 
of  largest  frag - 


75-mm.  high  explosive  steel  shell 5 

155-mm.  high  explosive  steel  shell 8 

155-mm.  high  explosive  semi-steel  shell__  15 


ment. 

Yards 


15 

70 

70 


150 

500 

200 


(d)  In  time  shell  fire,  the  most  effective  height  of 
burst  is  taken  as  20  yards  vertically  above  the  target.  If 
the  shell  is  fused  so  as  to  burst  after  penetrating  the  ground 


11-21-23 


30  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

partially  or  wholly,  the  surface  effect  diminishes  or  disap- 
pears. Such  effects  may  be  desired,  however,  for  the  de- 
struction of  dugouts,  casemates  or  other  material  objects 
of  great  resistance. 

(e)  Incidental  effects  of  the  detonation  of  shells  are 
concussion  and  gas  poisoning.  The  former  may  be  serious 
in  case  of  large  shells.  The  latter  occurs  in  confined  spaces 
such  as  casemates  or  dugouts. 

22.  Selection  of  Ammunition  for  a Given  Mission. 
— (a)  Against  personnel  or  animals  in  the  open,  the  fol- 
lowing ammunition  may  be  used  effectively ; time  shrapnel, 
which  under  favorable  conditions  is  the  most  effective ; time 
shell;  percussion  shell  with  a super-quick  fuse;  percussion 
shell  with  a delay  fuse  when  ricochets  will  be  obtained. 
When  the  personnel  is  sheltered  in  open  trenches,  time 
shrapnel  will  only  neutralize  the  personnel,  unless  the 
trench  can  be  enfiladed.  Time  or  percussion  shell  fired 
from  a direction  perpendicular  to  the  trench  is  effective,  but 
a very  accurate  adjustment  of  fire  is  necessary.  Shell  is 
less  effective  than  shrapnel  for  enfilading  a trench. 

(b)  When  penetration  is  necessary,  shell  with  delay 
fuse  is  used. 

(c)  In  service,  the  fuses  available  often  restrict  the 
choice  materially. 

23.  Effect  of  Artillery  Fire  Sometimes  Over- 
estimated.— (a)  It  is  a common  tendency  to  overestimate 
the  material  effect  of  artillery  fire.  This  may  give  rise 
to  the  following  difficulties: 

(1)  The  artillery  may  be  assigned  missions  so  extensive  that 
they  cannot  be  executed  effectively; 

(2)  The  time  allotted  for  the  execution  of  missions  may  be 
inadequate;  or 

(3)  The  ammunition  expenditure  involved  in  the  assigned 
missions  may  be  so  great  as  to  make  their  execution  impracticable 
in  a given  situation. 

(b)  The  individual  projectile  is  a powerful  agency  of 
destruction  near  its  point  of  fall,  but  it  is  difficult  to  place 
this  point  of  fall  at  the  particular  point  whose  destruction 
is  sought,  due  to  imperfect  preparation  of  fire,  lack  of  ob- 
servation, and  dispersion. 


IX — 24 


AMMUNITION 


31 


,24.  Ammunition  Required  for  Given  Missions. — The 
following  data,  principally  from  French  sources,  are  given 
to  permit  calculations  to  be  made  as  to  the  ammunition  con- 
sumption for  various  missions  assigned  the  artillery.  If 
a rate  of  fire  is  assumed,  it  is  possible  to  arrive  at  the  time 
necessary.  These  tables  are  general  guides  only,  as  it  is 
impossible  to  specify  the  exact  number  of  rounds  necessary 
to  accomplish  any  given  destruction. 

(a)  Destruction  of  a Hostile  Battery: 

By  the  75-mm.  gun 500  to  800  rounds. 

By  the  155-mm.  howitzer 300  to  400  rounds. 

By  the  155-mm.  gun 400  to  600  rounds. 

In  each  case,  it  is  assumed  that  the  hostile  battery  is 
not  so  well  protected  as  to  prevent  its  successful  attack  by 
the  weapon  in  question. 

(b)  Wire  Cutting : 


By  the  75-mm.  gun,  a breach  25  yards  wide 
in  a band  of  wire  15  to  20  yards  deep, 

when  fired  by  one  battery,  at  mid-range 600  to  800  rounds. 

At  long  range 1000  to  1200  rounds. 

By  the  155-mm.  howitzer,  same  breach 300  to  400  rounds. 


(c)  Destruction  of  Trenches : 

75-mm.  gun,  not  effective,  except  to  a certain 
extent  when  the  trench  can  be  enfiladed. 

By  the  155-mm.  howitzer,  for  each  point  se- 
lected for  destruction 80  to  100  rounds. 


From  the  foregoing  figures,  it  is  evident  that  only  in 
exceptional  cases  is  it  possible  to  undertake  destructions  in 
the  strict  sense  of  the  term. 

(d)  Violent  Bombardment. — A violent  bombardment 
of  an  area  sometimes  is  advisable  to  produce  casualties 
among  personnel  distributed  irregularly  over  it  but  more  or 
less  without  cover.  The  fire  should  be  as  rapid  as  possible, 
and  should  be  based  on  the  following  expenditure  of  shell 
for  each  5000  square  yards  of  area  covered : 


Caliber 

75-mm.  

105-mm.  or  4.7-inch 

155-mm.  

8-inch  

9.2-inch  


Number  of  rounds 

35 

20 

10 

6 

4 


II— 24 


32  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(e)  Neutralization. — For  the  continuous  neutraliza- 
tion of  an  area,  the  expenditure  of  shell  should  be  about  the 
following  per  hour  for  each  5000  square  yards  of  area 
covered : 


Caliber 

Number  of  rounds 
1st  hour  Subsequent  hours 

75-mm. 

600 

480 

105-mm.  or  4.7-inch 

110 

80 

155-mm. 

60 

45 

8-inch 

35 

25 

9.2-inch 

_ 25 

20 

It  is  well,  when  practicable,  to  precede  this  fire  by  a 
violent  bombardment  according  to  the  figures  given. 

(f)  Harassing. — In  harassing  fire,  it  is  desirable  to 
use  the  figures  given  for  neutralization,  when  the  ammuni- 
tion is  available,  though  any  lesser  amount  will  give  some 
harassing  effect. 

(g)  Interdiction. — For  the  interdiction  of  a given 
point  on  a road,  the  hourly  expenditures  may  be  taken  as 
80  rounds  for  the  75-mm.  gun  and  40  rounds  for  the  heavier 
calibers.  The  shots  should  be  fired  at  irregular  intervals. 
A considerable  interdicting  effect  will  be  obtained  with  much 
smaller  amounts.  Shrapnel  may  be  substituted  for  shell 
when  conditions  are  favorable,  but  the  number  of  rounds 
fired  should  not  be  reduced  materially  on  this  account  alone. 


THE  LflSARY 
OF  THE 

tWtZWi  n?  ouhms 


To  face  page  32 


PLATE  IV 

CHARACTERISTICS  OF  FIELD,  RAILWAY  AND  ANTI- 
AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY 


Authority : Principally  data  supplied  by  the  Chief  of  Coast 
Artillery  and  the  Chief  of  Field  Artillery 


CALIBER  AND  TYPE 
1.  75-mm.  French  gun 

PROJECTILES 

RATE  OF  I^E 

Time  to  em- 
place for 
firing  or 
change  from 
firing  to 

traveling 

position 

g 

3 min. 

Piece 

Ammunition  transport 

Average 
rate  of 
march 
miles  per 
hour 

4 

Day’s 

march, 

miles 

25 

Kind 

Shrapnel 

Shell 

Shell 

Weight  of  Extreme  Corresponding  Number  of 

Weight  bursting  range,  elevation  range 

lbs.  charge,  yards  degrees  zones 

lbs. 

a be 

16  .185  9700  41  1 

11  to  12.65  1.76  8000  34  2 i 

12.8  to  14.7  1.35  12000  34  2 i 

Rounds  per  piecejpr  minute 

Prolonged 

d 

Short  Maximum  Day  of 
burst  possible  fire 

d el  f 

10  25  300 

transport 
Horse  j 

Kind 

Caisson 

Rounds 

vehicle 

h 

106  k 

Shrapnel 

60 

.59 

11000 

42 

1 

1 

2 

7 

100 

10  min. 

Tractor, 

Caisson  1 

56 

si 

I t 

40 

Shell 

46 

3.24 

13000 

40 

5-ton 

Truck 

49  m 

Shell 

46 

4.20 

13000 

40 

1 

56  n 

Shrapnel 

95 

1.35 

11000 

40 

7 

X 

2 

4 

150 

15  min. 

Tractor, 

Caisson  1 

28 

3.E 

t 

40 

Shell 

95 

15.2 

12600 

44 

7 

or  more 

6-ton 

Truck 

40 

Shell 

95 

9 

12000 

41 

7 

Shell 

95 

17 

17000 

40 

4 

X 

2 

4 

100 

6 to  24  hours 

Tractor, 

Truck 

40 

3 i 

t u 

35 

►J 

hJ 

Shell 

95 

16.2 

17800 

39 

2 

10-ton 

L_ 

£ 

5. 

8-inch  howitzer 

Shell 

200 

29 

12000 

46 

4 

X 

2 

3 

100 

6 to  24  hours 

Tractor, 

Truck 

20 

tu 

30 

Shell 

200 

20 

12000 

45 

4 

10-ton 

Q 

6. 

9.2-inch  howitzer,  platform 

Shell 

290 

34.3 

13000 

46 

6 

i 

X 

2 

80 

8 to  24  hours 

Tractor, 

Truck 

14 

3.5 

1 tu 

40 

w 

mount 

5-ton 

7. 

240-mm.  howitzer,  platform 

Shell 

356 

45 

14000 

44 

5 

i 

X 

2 

60 

10  to  24  hours 

Tractor, 

Truck 

10 

3.5 

tu 

40 

mount 

10-ton 

8. 

6-inch  Trench  Mortar 

Shell 

53 

11 

1800 

40 

7 

4 

6 

8 

150 

2 hours  to 

Cars 

Truck 

65 

8 

60 

3 weeks 

9. 

8-inch  gun,  all-round  fire 

Shell 

200 

30 

21000 

42 

X 

1 

1 

80 

30  min. 

Cars 

Cars 

96 

20 

200 

10. 

10-inch  gun,  sliding  mount 

Shell 

610 

66 

28000 

45 

i 

i 

i 

50 

3 hours 

Cars 

Cars 

20 

200 

11. 

12-inch  gun,  sliding  mount, 

Shell 

700 

90 

45000 

40 

i 

i . 

* 

40 

3 Yl  hours 

Cars 

Cars 

20 

200 

50-caliber 

& 

12. 

12-inch  mortar,  all-round  fire 

Shell 

700 

94 

16000 

45 

10 

X 

1 

1 

50 

30  min. 

Cars 

Cars 

48 

20 

200 

13.' 

14-inch  navy  gun 

Shell 

1200 

154 

46000 

43 

I 

i 

50 

31  hours 

Cars 

Cars 

24 

20 

200 

Shell 

1400 

88 

41000 

43 

i 

i 

i 

50 

14. 

16-inch  howitzer 

Shell 

1660 

226’ 

23000 

45 

6 hours 

Cars 

Cars 

20 

200 

15. 

3-inch  gun,  pedestal  mount 

Shrapnel 

15 

.17 

10000 

19 

i 

5 

10 

30 

Truck 

Trucks 

260 

8 

60 

Shell 

15 

1.72 

10000  • 

19 

16. 

3-inch  gun,  trailer  mount 

Shrapnel 

15 

.17 

14000 

37 

i 

5 

10 

30 

5 min. 

Truck 

Trucks 

260 

8 

60 

Shell 

15 

1.72 

14000  > 

37 

17. 

76-mm.  gun,  truck  mount 

Shrapnel 

14.3 

.17 

8000 

25 

i 

5 

10 

30 

5 min. 

Truck 

Trucks 

260 

8 

60 

<3<j 

- 

Shell 

14.3 

1.66 

8000  « 

25 

REMARKS 

a Varies  between  quite  wide  limits  depending 
on  type,  material, .etc. 
b Approximate. 

c Withjseparate  lading  ammunition  the  powder 
charges  are  made  up  generally  of  several  parts, 
the  shorter  ranges  and  higher  angles  of  fall 
being  obtained  by  omitting  one  or  more  parts 
of  the  charge. 

d Considering  the  wear  and  tear  on  material, 
particularly  the  bore. 

e Considering  the  design  of  the  materiel  and  the 
skill  of  the  personnel. 

f Day  of  fire  may  be  defined  as  an  arbitrary 
number  of4rounas  per  piece  which  experience 
has  shown  is  a usual  expenditure  .for  the  cali- 
ber in  question  during  24  hours  fighting  in 
active  operations.  It  is  essentially  a unit  of 
supply. 

g Varies  between  wide  limits,  depending  on  ter- 
rain and  conditions  of  action, 
h For  2-ton  metal  body  ammunition  truck;  for 
3-ton  truck,  add  50%.  On  roads, 
i Fixed  charges,  normal  and  reduced,  not  con- 
vertible in  the  field. 

j For  each  five  combat  divisions,  there  will  be 
one  regiment  of  75  guns  carried  on  motor 
trucks,  for  strategical  mobility.  Their  tac- 
ical  mobility  is  slight. 

k Caisson  limber,  36  rounds;  caisson  body,  70 
rounds;  piece  limber,  36  rounds. 

1 Caisson  consists  of  two  caisson  bodies, 
m Shrapnel, 
n Shell. 

o 8,000  firing  vertically, 
p 9,500  firing  vertically, 
q 7,000  firing  vertically, 
r Those  listed  are  at  present  representative 
types;  others  are  in  service,  and  others  are 
being  developed. 

s A 4.7-inch  anti-aircraft  gun  has  been  manu- 
factured. Horizontal  range  about  16,000 
yards,  vertical  range  about  11,000  yards, 
t Personnel  in  trucks  can  move  separately  at  8 
miles  per  hour. 

u Tractor  column  must  have  center  of  road, 
practically  monopolizing  a two-way  road. 


m 


THE  LIBRARY 
OF  THE 

EW  «F  UJLISYS 


To  face  page  32 


FIELD  ARTILLERY  UNDER  DEVELOPMENT 


Caliber  and  Type 

g> 

8 

Q 

Manufacture  * 

Weight  in 

Firing  Position 

| Weight  Behind 
Team  or  Tractor 

Type  of  Trail 

Kind  and  Amount 
of  Traverse 

Limits  of  Elevation 
Permitted  by 
Carriage 

Independent  or 
Dependent  Line 
of  Sight 

i 

r? 

Type  of  Recoil 
Mechanism 

Length  of  Recoil 

| Is  Pit  Necessary? 

Is  Firing  Platform 
Necessary? 

I 

7^° 

Variable 

75-mm.  Gun  Model  1920 

3700 

4600 

split 

PI30° 

to 

80“ 

Independent 

Panoramic 

hydro- 

pneumatic 

46-18 

no 

no 

yes 

4200 

box 

“S’.. 

— 7^° 
46° 

~ 

"Sstic 

42 

no 

no 

yes 

530 

“S’- 

+ 45° 

Dependent 

Panoramic 

kL, 

28-18 

no 

no 

no 

105-mm.  Howitzer  Model  1920 

3700 

4600 

sp.it 

*$r- 

7M» 

1°.. 

Panoramic 

v3Lc 

45-25 

no 

no 

yes 

105-mm.  Howitxer  Model  1921 

3000 

4200 

axle 
v 8° 

ir 

Panoramic 

iHatic 

42 

no 

no 

yes 

4.7-in.  Gun  Model  1920 

13000 

14500 

split 

pintle 

60° 

i 

Dependent 

Panoramic 

48-21 

no 

no 

no 

155-nun.  Howitzer  Mode]  1920 

13000 

14500 

split 

P160" 

n- 

Panoramic 

V^tic 

43-36 

no 

no 

155-mm.  Gun  Model  1920 

24000 

23000 

split 

P160” 

Dependent 

Panoramic 

VH.tio 

71-24 

no 

no 

no 

5-in.  Howitzer  Model  1920 

24000 

23000 

split 

P160° 

Dependent 

Panoramic 

y ... 

71-40 

no 

no 

no 

PLATE  VI 


PLATE  VII 


AMMUNITION 


33 


THE  NEW  AMERICAN  SEVENTY-FIVE 


HI— 1 


CHAPTER  III 

Artillery  Chemical  Shell 


Paragraphs 


Introduction  1 

Gases  Used  in  American  Shells 2 

Calibers  of  Chemical  Shell 3 

Gas  Shell 4 

Smoke  Shell  5 

Fuses  for  Gas  Shell 6 

Adjustment  of  Fire 7 

Ammunition  Consumption  8 

Smoke  Screens 9 

Conditions  Affecting  the  Use  of  Chemical  Shell 10 

Artillery  Gas  Tactics  11 

Gas  in  the  Offensive 12 

Gas  in  the  Defensive 13 

Smoke  Tactics 14 

Defense  Against  Gas 15 

Transportation  and  Storage 16 

Markings  of  Chemical  Shell 17 


1.  Introduction. — (a)  All  artillery  projectiles  for 
land  operations,  other  than  shrapnel  and  high  explosive,  are 
grouped  under  the  heading  of  special  shells.  The  most  im- 
portant of  these  comprise  gas,  smoke  and  incendiary  shell, 
known  collectively  as  chemical  shell.  Of  these,  gas  stands 
highest,  both  in  importance  and  amount  used. 

(b)  Artillery  is  at  present  the  most  important  instru- 
ment of  chemical  offense.  At  this  time  it  is  the  sole  means 
of  liberating  gas  accurately  at  ranges  greater  than  those 
of  gas  projectors  and  Stokes  mortars,  though  airplane  bombs 
for  this  purpose  are  future  possibilities.  Within  limits,  the 
use  of  gas  by  artillery  is  independent  of  meteorological  con- 
ditions and  of  the  positions  of  friendly  troops.  The  gas  car- 
rying capacity  of  the  projectile  is  its  greatest  deficiency. 
Only  10  to  15%  of  the  shell’s  weight  can  be  used  for  gas  as 
opposed  to  50%  in  the  case  of  the  gas  projector  drum. 

(c)  Gas  was  first  used  in  shells  by  the  Germans  in 
May,  1915,  and  its  use  continued  to  grow  in  importance 
from  that  time  on,  so  that  by  the  time  mustard  gas  first 
was  used  in  German  shells  (July  12,  1917)  it  had  attained 
the  important  place  it  now  holds  in  chemical  operations. 


34 


Ill— 1-3 


ARTILLERY  CHEMICAL  SHELL  35 

(d)  It  has  been  estimated  that  during  The  World  War 
the  American  artillery  put  over  three  or  four  times  as  much 
gas  as  did  all  other  American  gas  agencies.  It  does  not 
necessarily  follow,  however,  that  this  ratio  would  have 
been  maintained  had  the  war  continued.  During  the  war 
the  approved  manufacturing  program  contemplated  that 
gas  shells  should  comprise  10%  of  all  ammunition,  but  this 
was  not  fully  realized.  On  November  1,  1918,  the  General 
Staff,  General  Headquarters,  raised  this  percentage  to  20%, 
and  later  the  same  authority  decided  that  after  January  1, 
1919,  gas  shells  would  form  25%  of  all  shells  to  be  filled. 

(e)  At  the  date  of  the  Armistice  the  Germans  had  85 
different  kinds  of  gas  shells. 

2.  Gases  Used  in  American  Shells. — (a)  An  ex- 
tensive discussion  of  the  various  gases  employed  by  our 
Chemical  Service  will  form  no  part  of  this  chapter.  A brief 
description  of  the  principal  gases  used  as  artillery  shell 
fillers  may,  however,  aid  in  considering  this  special  use  of 
gas. 

(b)  As  regards  their  effects  on  man,  gases  may  be 
classified  as  follows : 

Lethal  (deadly). 

Vesicant  (burning  the  skin). 

Irritating  (affecting  the  nose,  throat  and  lungs,  but  not 
deadly) . 

Lachrymatory  (tear  gas). 

Some  gases  may  combine  two  or  more  of  these  proper- 
ties. 

(c)  Gases  are  also  classified  according  to  their  persis- 
tency, which  is  dependent  principally  upon  the  rate  of  evap- 
oration. The  present  tendency  is  to  make  this  division  of 
gases  into  two  classes  only — persistent  and  non-persistent 
gases.  For  instruction  at  these  schools  it  is  found  more 
convenient  to  consider  three  classes,  as  follows: 

Non-persistent. 

Semi-persistent. 

Persistent. 

3.  Calibers  of  Chemical  Shell. — It  is  intended  to 
supply  chemical  shell  for  the  following  calibers: 

75-mm.  gun. 

Pack  artillery  gun. 


36 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


4.7  inch  gun. 

155-mm.  gun. 

155-mm.  howitzer. 

(NOTE. — The  question  of  the  use  of  gas  and  smoke  in  larger 
calibers  is  still  under  consideration.  During  The  World  War  the 
Germans  used  chemical  shell  in  all  calibers  up  to  210-mm.,  and  in  our 
own  army  it  was  intended  to  use  gas  and  smoke  shell  in  calibers  up  to 
include  240-mm.  For  the  present,  the  larger  calibers  will  be  con- 
sidered available  for  instruction  purposes  at  these  schools.  The 
present  War  Department  program  does  not  provide  for  incendiary 
shell  in  any  caliber,  but  these  are  also  considered  available  for  in- 
struction purposes,  in  the  following  calibers  only,  which  were  those 
authorized  in  The  World  War:  75-mm.  gun,  4.7-inch  gun,  155-mm.  gun 
and  howitzer.) 

4.  Gas  Shell. — Chemical  shell  in  the  past  have  in 
general  been  simply  the  H.  E.  shell,  provided  with  a special 
joint  between  the  booster  and  the  shell  wall.  Ordinarily 
shell  steel  is  the  material  out  of  which  all  special  shells 
have  been  made.  There  are  certain  variations  in  weight 
from  standard  of  all  gas  shell  just  as  there  are  for  H.E. 
shell.  It  is  proposed  in  the  future  manufacture  of  gas 
shells  to  secure  but  one  weight  for  each  caliber. 

5.  Smoke  Shell. — Smoke  shell  will  be  provided  in  our 
service  for  the  pack  gun,  75-mm.  gun,  the  4.7-inch  gun  and 
the  155-mm.  howitzer.  (See  paragraph  3 above  as  to  larger 
calibers.) 

6.  Fuses  for  Gas  Shell. — Instantaneous  (super-quick) 
fuses  are  necessary  in  gas  shell,  as  the  projectile  should,  for 
best  effect,  burst  before  any  part  of  it  can  bury  itself  in 
the  ground.  As  all  gas  fuses  are  located  in  the  nose  of  the 
shell  it  also  follows  that  a fairly  steep  angle  of  fall  is  re- 
quired in  order  that  the  fuse  will  certainly  operate. 
Reduced  charges  when  firing  gas  from  the  75-mm.  gun  are 
desirable.  An  angle  of  fall  greater  than  10  degrees  is  re- 
quired for  the  75-mm.  gun.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  angle 
of  fall  is  too  steep,  partial  burial  of  the  shell  may  result. 

7.  Adjustment  of  Fire. — (a)  It  is  necessary  to  use 
other  than  gas  shell  when  firing  for  adjustment  and  then  to 
apply  the  necessary  correction  for  difference  in  weight  when 
changing  to  gas  shell. 

(b)  Adjustment  should  be  made  on  some  point  whose 
range  is  approximately  that  of  the  target.  It  should  be  as 
close  as  possible  to  the  actual  target  without  unduly  dis- 


Ill— 7-8 


ARTILLERY  CHEMICAL  SHELL  37 

closing  the  place  on  which  the  fire  for  effect  is  to  be  directed. 

(c)  The  adjustment  for  non-persistent  gases  must  be 
closer  than  for  persistent  gases.  Consequently,  for  the 
former  a narrow  bracket  is  sought  and  then,  if  there  is  no 
wind,  the  mean  elevation  of  the  bracket  is  used.  This  eleva- 
tion is  modified  if  there  is  wind. 

(d)  With  the  persistent  gases,  seek  the  narrow  bracket 
but  disregard  wind.  In  fire  for  effect,  a fire  of  precision  is 
needed  for  the  non-persistent  gases,  repeating  the  fire  by 
range  changes  of  100  yards  if  the  target  is  a deep  one. 

8.  Ammunition  Consumption. — (a)  The  amount  of 
gas  fired  from  each  caliber  to  produce  certain  effects  has 
been  calculated  for  the  usual  shell  fillers  and  put  in  the  form 
of  tables  and  charts  as  described  in  par.  71,  Text-Book  on 
Chemical  Service  (G.  S.  S.,  July , 1921),  which  reads  as 
follows : 


“Ammunition  Consumption. — Date  are  given  in  Appendices 
VIII  and  IX  for  the  number  of  guns  and  the  quantities  of  am- 
munition required  for  various  kinds  of  gas  bombardments  by 
75-mm.  and  155-mm.  artillery.  Appendix  VIII  gives  this  data 
for  intensive  bombardments  where  fatalities  and  casualties  are 
sought.  It  will  be  noted  that  two  types  of  bombardment  are  in- 
dicated in  Appendix  VIII  for  mustard  gas  shell;  one  type  for 
casualties  and  neutralization,  and  the  other  where  it  is  hoped  to 
force  evacuation  of  areas.  Appendix  IX  gives  data  for  harass- 
ing bombardments,  where  the  only  object  sought  is  to  force  the 
enemy  to  mask;  casualties  are  not  expected,  and  such  as  occur 
are  incidental  only.” 

“Ammunition  for  other  calibers  can  also  be  estimated  from 
these  tables,  in  connection  with  Appendix  VII,  by  considering 
the  relative  weights  of  contents  of  the  various  calibers.”  Ibid. 

“As  a rule  of  thumb  for  phosgene  and  mustard  gas,  the  nor- 
mal weight  of  gas  to  be  delivered  at  the  target  for  serious  casual- 
ty effect  should  be  185  pounds  per  hundred  yards  square  (disper- 
sion to  be  allowed  in  addition).”  Ibid. 

“The  dispersion  of  the  shots,  which  depends  of  course  on  the 
range,  causes  a decrease  in  the  gas  concentration  secured,  except 
in  the  case  of  neutralizing  gas  bombardments  over  large  areas. 
For  surprise  bombardments  this  dispersion  must  in  general  be 
allowed  for  by  an  increase  in  the  quantity  of  ammunition  dis- 
charged, as  shown  in  Appendix  X,  and  for  neutralizing  gases  as 
shown  in  Appendix  XI.  The  figures  given  in  Appendices  VIII 
and  IX  are  for  the  net  amounts  of  gas  that  should  be  delivered 
at  the  target.”  Ibid. 

(b)  The  most  recent  experiences  in  gas  firing  showed 
the  great  economy  to  be  secured  by  using  a powerful  tear 
gas  like  CA  for  the  purpose  of  making  men  wear  the  mask. 
It  is  estimated  that  for  this  purpose  one  pound  of  that  gas 
equals  500  to  1,000  pounds  of  phosgene. 


Ill — 9-10 


38  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

9.  Smoke  Screens. — (a)  The  quantities  of  guns  and 
ammunition  required  for  smoke  screens  vary  with  the  direc- 
tion and  strength  of  the  wind,  and  with  other  weather  con- 
ditions. Weather  conditions  are  never  “normal,”  hence  the 
difficulty  of  giving  general  rules  for  the  rate  of  fire.  The 
following  will  probably  give  sufficient  initial  density  for  a 
wind  of  about  10  to  14  miles  per  hour;  weather  dull,  cool, 
no  sun: 

75-mm.  shell,  2 rounds  per  10  yards  of  front  per  minute. 

4.7-inch  shell,  2 rounds  per  80  yards  of  front  per  minute. 

155-mm.  shell,  2 round  per  30  yards  of  front  per  minute. 

The  above  is  the  amount  for  a wind  parallel  to  the 
direction  of  fire,  and  for  establishing  the  screen,  which  takes 
from  one  to  four  minutes.  Once  the  screen  is  formed  these 
amounts  can  be  considerably  reduced.  In  general,  one-half 
the  above  rate  of  fire  will  maintain  the  screen.  The  actual 
quantity  of  ammunition  fired,  however,  once  the  screen  is 
formed,  is  that  necessary  to  maintain  an  effective  screen. 
This  is  determined  by  observation  of  the  smoke  cloud. 

For  oblique  winds,  i the  quantities  of  ammunition 
stated  above  will  usually  be  sufficient;  for  enfilade  winds, 
& the  quantities  stated.  For  winds  of  20  to  24  miles  per 
hour,  double  the  quantities  of  smoke ; and  for  bright,  sunny 
weather,  treble  the  same.  The  correct  amounts  are  so  de- 
pendent on  weather  conditions  that  in  general  reference  to 
Appendix  XIII,  Text-Book  on  Chemical  Service,  is  recom- 
mended. 

Smoke  screens  are  placed  100  yards  to  windward  of  the 
target  for  each  10  feet  per  second  of  wind  velocity. 

(b)  The  above  estimates  for  ammunition  consumption 
are  with  a view  to  the  production  of  opaque  screens.  Less 
efficient  screens  can  be  produced  with  a smaller  expenditure 
of  ammunition.  Smaller  quantities  of  ammunition  can  also 
be  used  in  very  dark  or  foggy  weather,  or  at  early  morning 
or  late  evening. 

(c)  Good  results  cannot  be  expected  in  winds  much 
over  20  miles  per  hour. 

10.  Conditions  Affecting  the  Use  of  Chemical 
Shell. — (a)  A number  of  conditions  affect  the  use  of 
chemical  shell,  especially  gas  shell,  in  any  particular  case. 


Ill— 10 


ARTILLERY  CHEMICAL  SHELL  39 

These  are  meteorological  conditions,  character  of  the  ter- 
rain, and  the  tactical  considerations  involved. 

(b)  Meteorologic. — Atmospheric  stability  is  what  is 
desired.  Warm,  sunny  days  produce  upward  air  currents 
and  tend  to  dissipate  the  gases.  The  exception  is  in  the  case 
of  mustard  gas,  which  is  then  more  readily  vaporized  and 
the  concentration  increased.  At  night  the  atmosphere  is 
relatively  more  stable  and  conditions  are  better  than  by 
day.  For  the  same  reason,  foggy  days  or  days  of  a light 
drizzly  rain  are  good.  A heavy  rain  tends  to  wash  down 
the  gases.  A low  barometer  tends  to  the  formation  of  air 
pockets  near  the  ground.  The  result  is  undesirable  upward 
currents  of  air.  Low  temperatures  hinder  the  action  of  the 
persistent  gases.  They  do  not  greatly  affect  the  non-per- 
sistent lethal  gases.  Wind  exercises  considerable  influence. 
Non-persistent  lethal  gases  are  comparatively  ineffective 
when  fired  in  winds  of  over  10  miles  per  hour  and  persistent 
or  tear  gases  in  winds  of  over  20  miles  per  hour.  Neverthe- 
less, when  gas  is  used  to  aid  operations  by  other  troops, 
tactical  requirements  must  not  wait  on  weather  conditions 
and  gas  will  be  used  even  under  the  most  unfavorable  cir- 
cumstances. 

(c)  Terrain . — Gas  is  most  satisfactorily  employed  in 
almost  level,  undulating  districts.  The  effect  of  hills  and 
valleys  tend  to  make  the  gases,  which  are  a little  heavier 
than  air,  flow  down  into  the  lower  levels.  At  the  same 

time  this  system  of  hills  and  valleys  may  lead  to  the  for- 
mation of  air  currents  whose  direction  differs  from  the  gen- 
eral direction  of  the  wind.  The  terrain  must  be  considered 
from  this  viewpoint,  thus  making  necessary  a study  of  the 
wind  at  the  enemy's  position.  Woods  have  a very  great  in- 
fluence on  a gas  shell  bombardment.  Often  gas  can  be  fired 
into  them  when  the  wind  is  too  strong  for  good  results  in 
the  open.  High  ground  or  open  spaces  in  general  must  get 
a heavier  concentration  than  woods  or  other  inclosed  locali- 
ties. 

(d)  Tactical  Considerations. — The  location  of  our  own 
troops  with  respect  to  the  concentration  must  be  considered. 
The  following  table  gives  the  general  rules  to  follow : 


Ill— 10 


40  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

SAFE  DISTANCES  FOR  GAS  SHELL  OBJECTIVES 
FROM  OUR  OWN  TROOPS 

(NOTE: — For  safety  angles  and  spread  of  gas,  see  paragraphs  48  and  109, 
Text-Book  on  Chemical  Service.) 


1.  With  Wind  Blowing  Toward  the  Enemy 


- 

Minimum 

distances 

Small  shoots 

Large  shoots 

Non-persistent  gases 

300  yards 

| 

300  yards 

Semi-persistent  and  Per- 
sistent gases 

500  yards 

2200  yards 

2.  With  Wind  Blowing  Toward  Our  Own  Line;  or  in  Calm 

MUSTARD  GAS : Permissible  number  of  rounds  of  HS  per  100  yards  front. 

Amounts  may  be  repeated  every  six  or  more  hours.  For  other  gases  see  below. 


Size  of  Pounds  of  Safe  distances  from  own  frort  line 


shell 

Gas  per  shell 
No. 

500  yds. 
rounds 

1000  yds. 
No.  rounds 

2000  yds. 
No.  rounds 

3500  yds. 
and  beyond 

No.  rru:  ds 

7 5 -mm. 

1.35 

5 

12 

4*1 

90  or  more 

4.7-inch 

4.4  • 

2 

7 

20 

15  or  more 

155-mm. 

11.3 

1 

2 

5 

18  or  more 

8-inch 

22.5 

3 

7 or  more 

9.2-inch 

29.45 

2 

5 or  more 

240-mm. 

37.5 

•2 

3 or  more 

FOR  OTHER  GASES: 


| Multiply  above  quantities 
Gas  for  HS  by: 

Repetitions  each 

CG  ' 2| 

\ hour  or  more 

PS.  PG.  NC.  or  BA. 

2 

[ 3 hours  or  more 

DA  h 

4 hours  or  more 

CA 

a 

] 4 hours  or  more 

The  above  figures  are  not  to  be  followed  .too  rigidly  if  the  tactical 
situation  and  the  advantages  to  be  derived  warrant  deviation  there- 
from. When  sufficient  reason  exists,  gas  bombardments  may  be 
placed  at  closer  distances,  and  our  troops  warned  to  take  the  necessary 
precautions.  Such  bombardments  may  do  extensive  damage  to  the 
enemy,  if  intelligently  employed,  while  offering  only  a slight  risk  or 
inconvenience,  comparatively,  to  our  own  troops. 

(e)  In  any  case  it  is  well  to  bear  in  mind  the  following 
paragraph  of  the  gas  manual  (Gas  Manual,  A.  E.  F.,  Part 
II : Use  of  Gas  by  the  Artillery)  : 

“The  chemical  officer  must  make  a careful  study  of  the  topo 
graphical  features  of  the  terrain  and  the  meteorological  condi- 
tions applying.  After  a solution  has  been  arrived  at,  the  chemi- 


Ill — 10-11 


ARTILLERY  CHEMICAL  SHELL  41 

cal  officer  must  be  able  to  advise  definitely  the  chief  of  staff  or 
artillery  commander  as  to  the  following: 

(1)  Location  of  target. 

(2)  Time  of  shoot. 

(3)  Rate  of  fire. 

(4)  Kind  of  gas  shell. 

(5)  Number  of  gas  shell  required. 

(6)  Object  to  be  accomplished.” 

11.  Artillery  Gas  Tactics. — (a)  All  artillery  gas 
firing  is  of  two  kinds ; casualty  producing,  or  intensive,  and 
neutralizing.  There  may  be  various  combinations  of  these 
two  which  go  under  different  names,  such  as  counter  bat- 
tery, harassing,  interdiction  and  the  like,  but  these  are  the 
two  basic  divisions. 

(b)  Casualty  producing  or  intensive  fire  is  intended  to 
produce  casualties.  Lethal  gases  are  employed  and,  as  they 
are  of  low  persistency,  the  concentration  must  be  built  up 
quickly.  This  is  secured,  for  any  given  number  of  rounds, 
by  using  as  many  guns  as  possible  firing  simultaneously 
with  a high  rate  of  fire.  The  usual  length  of  time  is  about 
two  minutes,  although  under  very  favorable  conditions,  such 
as  dead  calm  in  thick  woods,  or  at  night,  fire  may  last  for 
five  minutes  as  a maximum. 

(c)  Neutralizing  fire  is  intended  to  paralyze  or  greatly 
reduce  human  activity  by  wearing  down  morale  and  caus- 
ing the  mask  to  be  worn  for  long  periods  of  time.  For  this 
purpose  recourse  is  generally  had  to  persistent  gases,  pre- 
ferably to  mustard.  This  concentration  does  not  have  to 
be  quickly  built  up.  Fewer  guns  and  longer  time  to  fire  are 
permissible. 

(d)  For  counter  battery  work  a burst  of  lethal  gas  is 
often  employed,  followed  by  a slow  neutralizing  fire  with 
persistent  gas. 

(e)  Harassing  fire  is  usually  effected  with  tear  gas, 
which  makes  long  continued  wearing  of  the  mask  obligatory 
to  escape  its  annoying  effects. 

There  are  also  many  strategems  that  can  be  practiced. 
Amongst  them  may  be  mentioned  mixing  lethal  gas  with 
a blinding  smoke  cloud;  mixing  gas  with  high  explosive; 
firing  a nauseating  or  coughing  gas  causing  the  removal  of 
the  mask  and  following  it  with  a burst  of  lethal  gas;  firing 
gas  at  night  where  men  may  be  resting  with  masks  off  and 


Ill— 11-13 


42  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

possibly  not  readily  at  hand ; mixing  a small  amount  of  gas 
in  our  own  rolling  barrage,  not  enough  to  do  real  harm  but 
enough  to  induce  the  enemy  to  mask.  About  one  gun  per 
battery  (25%)  can  be  so  used.  With  a four-mile-per-hour 
wind,  our  troops  can  follow  this  barrage  in  one-half  minute 
without  their  masks.  However,  to  sacrifice  25%  of  the 
guns  in  barrage  for  this  artifice  is  open  to  debate.  This  by 
no  means  exhausts  the  list  of  devices  whereby  gas  may  be 
fired  with  increased  damage  to  the  enemy. 

12.  Gas  in  the  Offensive. — Gas  may  be  used  in  pre- 
paration for  the  attack,  during  the  attack,  during  lulls  in 
the  action  and  while  consolidating  a captured  position.  As 
previously  stated,  the  offensive  usually  demands  the  use  of 
non-persistent  gases  in  areas  over  which  our  troops  can  be 
expected  to  advance  within  a short  time.  It  is  necessary  in 
an  offensive  to  calculate  a safe  interval  as  to  time  before  the 
attacking  troops  arrive  at  successive  stages  of  their  ad- 
vance when  using  CG  and  DA  gas.*  This  calculation  must 
be  made  both  for  the  preliminary  bombardment  and  for  any 
gas  fired  during  the  course  of  the  attack.  For  lulls  in  the 
action,  and  for  support  during  consolidation,  semi-persis- 
tent or  persistent  gases  may  also  be  used,  depending  upon 
the  probable  time  elapsing  before  another  advance.  If  no 
further  advance  will  be  made  for  a number  of  days,  use 
persistent  gas,  especially  if  dangerous  counter  attacks  must 
be  warded  off. 

13.  Gas  in  the  Defensive. — In  defense  or  in  retreat 
the  use  of  persistent  gases  is  the  rule,  mustard  preferred. 
The  area  vacated  must  be  made  as  untenable  as  possible 
for  the  enemy,  and  for  the  maximum  length  of  time.  Mus- 
tard surpasses  all  other  gases  for  this  purpose.  This  does 
not  mean  that  gas  shell  is  necessarily  the  best  type  of  pro- 
jectile to  use  in  all  cases.  The  effects  of  mustard  are  not  im- 
mediately apparent,  and  the  hostile  advance  may  be  so  ra- 
pid that  casualties  must  be  inflicted  in  the  shortest  space 
of  time  and  in  the  greatest  numbers.  In  such  instances,  re- 
course is  had  to  shrapnel  and  high  explosive  shell  or  to 
quicker  acting  gases.  In  any  stabilized  condition,  such  as 

*CG,  Phosgene;  DA,  Diphenylchlorarsine. 


Ill— 13-16 


ARTILLERY  CHEMICAL  SHELL  43 

obtained  during  the  first  three  years  of  The  World  War, 
persistent  gas  can  be  freely  used. 

14.  Smoke  Tactics; — Smoke  shell  is  used  by  artillery 
for  four  purposes;  1st,  to  screen  our  own  troops;  2d,  to 
blot  out  enemy  observation  by  a concentration  of  smoke 
around  his  observation  stations ; 3d,  to  signal  to  the  infantry 
during  the  barrage  and  4th,  as  a feint. 

15.  Defense  Against  Gas. — (a)  This  subject  is  con- 
sidered only  in  so  far  as  concerns  certain  precautions  that 
are  taken  by  batteries  against  gas  shell. 

(b)  Gas  defense  measures  in  general  form  no  part  of 
this  discussion.  The  special  phase  of  gas  defense  to  be  dis- 
cussed is  that  of  gas  positions  for  batteries  of  our  own 
troops.  Arrangements  for  such  positions  usually  are  made 
when  a stabilized  condition  arises ; but  they  should  be  given 
some  consideration  even  during  conditions  of  movement. 
These  positions  are  alternative  positions  located  within  300 
to  500  yards  of  the  regular  battery  positions.  Firing  data 
are  prepared  for  them  and  all  other  necessary  arrangements 
made  so  that,  in  case  the  battery  receives  a shelling  of  per- 
sistent gas  which  makes  its  regular  position  no  longer  ten- 
able, the  guns  can  be  moved  into  the  gas  position  (by  hand) 
if  necessary.  The  material  taken  to  the  new  position  all 
should  be  cleansed  thoroughly  of  gas,  usually  by  wiping  off 
with  a strong  solution  of  chloride  of  lime. 

(c)  Gas  positions  are  sufficiently  remote  from  the  po- 
sitions of  neighboring  batteries  so  that  they  neither  draw 
fire  upon  those  batteries,  nor  receive  fire  intended  for  them. 
In  the  event  of  large  artillery  concentrations  in  restricted 
areas — as  in  preparation  for  a great  offensive — a strict  ad- 
herence to  this  principle  is  not  always  possible.  This  does 
not  alter  the  principle,  however,  that  alternative  positions 
are  provided,  when  practicable,  as  insurance  against  neu- 
tralization or  destruction. 

16.  Transportation  and  Storage. — In  general,  gas 
projectiles  are  safe  to  handle,  but  personnel  doing  so  should 
carry  masks.  The  mask  is  worn  if  working  amidst  leaky 
projectiles,  and,  in  the  case  of  mustard  gas,  special  clothing 
and  gloves  are  worn.  Leaky  gas  projectiles  are  disposed 
of  at  once,  either  by  firing,  burying  or  exploding  them  in 


Ill— 16-17 


44  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

piles.  Leaky  mustard  gas  shells,  however,  should  not  be 
fired.  Gas  shell  should  be  stored  in  a cool  place.  The  gas 
ammunition  at  battery  positions  should  be  placed  in  small 
piles,  apart  from  other  ammunition,  and  on  what  is  gener- 
ally the  leeward  side  of  a battery,  to  minimize  the  danger  in 
case  of  being  struck  during  bombardment  of  the  position. 
Each  pile  should  not  exceed, 

100  rounds  for  75-mm. 

50  rounds  for  4.7-inch. 

25  rounds  for  155-mm. 

17.  Markings  of  Chemical  Shell.— (a)  These  shell 
are  all  painted  and  marked  so  as  to  be  readily  recognized. 
The  body  is  painted  gray  and,  stenciled  lengthwise  of  the 
shell  in  black  letters,  are  the  words  “Special — Gas,  Smoke 
or  Incendiary,”  as  the  case  may  be.  Around  the  body  of 
the  shell  are  painted  stripes  of  varying  numbers  and  col- 
ors. 

White  stripes  are  used  for  non-persistent  gases,  usually 
lethal. 

Red  stripes  are  used  for  persistent  gases. 

Yellow  stripes  are  used  for  smoke. 

(b)  The  number  of  stripes  is  greater  for  the  degree 
of  indicated  quality.  For  example:  phosgene  (CG),  non- 
persistent,  has  two  white  stripes;  chlorpicrin  (PS),  semi- 
persistent  gas,  has  a red  and  white  stripe : chlorpicrin  and 
stannic  chloride  (NC)  has  three  stripes,  red,  white  and  yel- 
low because  it  is  a semi-persistent  gas  that  gives  off  smoke 
on  burst;  mustard  gas  (HS),  persistent,  has  three  red 
stripes. 

(c)  There  is  painted  on  the  shell  also  a series  of  crosses 
for  75-mm.  ammunition,  and  a series  of  squares  for  larger 
calibers,  to  indicate  departures  of  weight  from  the  standard 
projectile.  The  greater  the  number  of  crosses  or  squares 
the  greater  the  variation  from  standard.  Below  are  the 
weight  markings  for  75-mm.  ammunition. 

The  weights  of  the  shell  are  the  same  as  for  HE  shell 
and  are  marked  as  follows : 


Ill— 17 


ARTILLERY  CHEMICAL  SHELL  45 


From 

lbs.  oz. 

To 

lbs.  oz. 

Weight  mark  just 
above  driving 
band 

10 

11 

11 

0 

L 

11 

0 

11 

5 

+ 

11 

5 

11 

11 

+ + 

11 

11 

12 

0 

+ + + 

12 

0 

12 

5 

+ + + + 

IV— 1-2 


CHAPTER  IV 

Artillery  Ammunition  Supply 

Paragraphs 


General  1 

Agencies  of  Ammunition  Supply 2 

Use  of  Ammunition  Supply  Agencies  3 

Normal  Loads  Held  in  Reserve 4 

Accumulations  of  Ammunition  5 

Kinds  and  Amounts  of  Ammunition  Carried 6 

Replenishment  of  Ammunition 7 

Ammunition  for  Corps  Artillery  Attached  to  a Division 8 

The  Artillery  Brigade  Munitions  Officer 9 

Munitions  Reports 10 

Small  Arms  Ammunition  11 

System  Shown  by  Graphics 12 


1.  General. — Ammunition  is  a Class  IV  supply.  Re- 
quisitions therefor  by  an  army  (the  army  being  considered 
herein  as  a tactical  unit)  must  be  approved  by  the  comman- 
der in  chief  of  the  field  forces.  This  approval  comes  through 
G4,  general  headquarters,  who  notifies  the  army  of  the 
amounts  of  ammunition  allotted  to  it  and  from  what  depots 
of  the  communications  zone  the  ammunition  will  be  supplied. 
The  depots  are  notified  as  to  the  amount  of  ammunition  to 
be  furnished  the  army.  In  allotting  ammunition  for  an 
army,  general  headquarters  is  guided  by  the  plan  of  future 
operations. 

2.  Agencies  of  Ammunition  Supply. — In  consider- 
ing the  supply  of  ammunition  to  front  line  organizations,  it 
is  well,  in  order  to  gain  a clear  idea,  to  take  up  the  ammu- 
nition in  the  rearmost  depots  of  the  communications  zone 
and  follow  it  forward.  In  doing  so  the  following  agencies 
are  found,  from  rear  to  front. 

(a)  Branch  ammunition  depots  in  the  communications 
zone  (in  the  base,  intermediate,  and  advance  sections  if  the 
communication  zone  be  subdivided).  These  depots  are  on 
standard  gauge  railroads,  and  for  reasons  of  safety  are 
located  away  from  cities  and  towns.  Ammunition  goes  for- 
ward from  these  depots,  in  train  load  lots,  to  the  army  am- 
munition depots. 


46 


ARTILLERY  AMMUNITION  SUPPLY 


47 


(b)  Army  ammunition  depots,  also  on  standard  gauge 
railroads,  which  contain  the  army  reserve  ammunition  of 
all  kinds.  As  seen  in  (a),  they  are  supplied  by  train  load 
lots  from  the  branch  ammunition  depots  of  the  communi- 
cations zone. 

(c)  Advance  army  depots;  these  are  advanced  off- 
shoots of  the  army  depots  and  are  supplied  therefrom.  They 
contain  few  types  of  ammunition ; often  a single  type  only. 
They  are  on  standard  gauge  railroads  whenever  practicable 
and  should  always  be  on  a railroad  of  some  character,  over 
which  they  are  supplied.  In  special  cases,  they  may  be  sup- 
plied by  truck  train,  either  wholly  or  in  conjunction  with 
railways.  No  rule  as  to  the  distance  of  army  advance  de- 
pots from  front  lines  can  be  given  as  it  varies  widely  with 
the  mission  of  the  army.  In  stabilized  situations,  or  when 
the  army  is  on  the  defensive,  they  are  generally  from  twelve 
to  twenty  miles  from  the  front  lines,  while,  just  prior  to  a 
big  offensive,  they  may  be  advanced  to  within  three  miles. 

(d)  Refilling  points  which  are  points  at  which  the  divi- 
sion trains  are  refilled.  A refilling  point  may  be: 

(1)  An  army  ammunition  depot. 

(2)  An  advance  army  ammunition  depot. 

(3)  A corps  ammunition  park  (which  is  the  dumped  ammu- 
nition from  the  corps  quartermaster  train). 

(4)  A point  at  which  ammunition  is  transferred  from  the 
transportation  of  higher  units  to  division  transportation. 

The  use  of  (3)  or  (4)  as  refilling  points  is  exceptional. 

(e)  Division  ammunition  dumps,  which  contain  all 
types  of  artillery  ammunition  used  in  the  division.  If  prac- 
ticable they  are  located  on  railways  and  in  any  case  must  be 
on  roads  suitable  for  trucks.  They  are  supplied  from  ad- 
vance army  depots  by  division  transportation  (ammunition 
train,  field  artillery  brigade)  which,  in  special  cases,  may  be 
assisted  by  corps  or  army  transportation. 

(f)  Ammunition  distributing  points,  which  are  points 
at  which  regimental  transportation  (combat  trains)  receives 
ammunition  from  ammunition  trains. 

(g)  Regiment  and  battalion  ammunition  dumps  which 
contain  ammunition  for  a particular  regiment  or  battalion. 
They  should  be  located  on  good  roads  with  suitable  circula- 
tion facilities.  They  are  supplied  by  any  one  of  the  follow- 
ing methods: 


48 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


(1)  By  the  ammunition  train,  artillery  brigade,  direct  from 
refilling  point; 

(2)  By  truck  section  and  wagon  section  of  the  ammunition 
train  working  in  relays,  the  truck  section  working  from  refilling 
point  to  a transfer  point  and  the  wagon  section  from  this  transfer 
point  to  ammunition  dumps; 

(3)  By  truck  section,  wagon  section,  and  combat  trains 
working  in  relays,  the  truck  section  from  refilling  point  to  trans- 
fer point,  the  wagon  section  from  transfer  point  to  distributing 
point,  and  the  combat  trains  from  distributing  point  to  ammuni- 
ion  dumps; 

(4)  By  ammunition  train  (either  truck  or  wagon  section) 
to  distributing  point  and  by  combat  trains  from  there  to  ammuni- 
tion dumps; 

(5)  In  especially  favorable  cases  the  brigade  ammunition 
train  can  deliver  ammunition  direct  to  the  battery  positions. 

3.  Use  of  Ammunition  Supply  Agencies. — From  the 
foregoing  it  is  seen  that  the  artillery  ammunition  for  the 
division  generally  is  drawn  from  advance  army  depots  by 
the  ammunition  train,  field  artillery  brigade.  In  more  or 
less  stabilized  situations,  if  the  advance  depot  be  well  up 
and  good  roads  exist,  the  ammunition  train  can  deliver  the 
ammunition  directly  to  battery  positions.  Often  it  is  ad- 
visable to  relay  the  ammunition,  the  motor  section  of  the 
ammunition  train  accomplishing  the  rear  part  of  the  haul, 
and  the  horse  section  working  between  the  motor  section 
and  the  distributing  point,  from  which  point  the  battalion 
combat  trains  carry  the  ammunition  forward  to  the  gun  po- 
sitions. 

4.  Normal  Loads  Held  in  Reserve. — The  caissons  of 
the  battalion  combat  trains  maintain,  in  close  vicinity  of 
their  bivouacs,  their  normal  loads  of  ammunition,  which 
they  may  readily  pick  up  as  occasion  demands.  This  am- 
munition is  a reserve  to  be  drawn  on  only  in  emergency. 
Every  effort  is  made  to  keep  up  supply  from  rear  to  front 
without  using  it.  Similarly,  it  is  normal  for  the  ammuni- 
tion train,  artillery  brigade,  to  dump  its  normal  load  at  its 
bivouac,  and  to  endeavor  by  every  means  to  maintain  the 
supply  without  drawing  on  the  normal  load. 

5.  Accumulations  of  Ammunition. — In  stabilized 
situations,  particularly  just  prior  to  an  offensive,  it  may  be 
desirable  to  accumulate  considerable  ammunition  at  distri- 
buting points  and  battalion  dumps.  In  open  warfare,  how- 
ever, or  when  on  the  defensive,  it  is  unwise  to  accumulate 
great  stocks  of  ammunition  in  forward  areas,  hence,  except 


IV— 5-7 


ARTILLERY  AMMUNITION  SUPPLY  49 

for  the  dumped  loads  of  the  ammunition  train,  artillery  bri- 
gade, and  the  battalion  combat  trains,  it  is  better  to  supply 
directly  from  advance  army  depots. 

6.  Kinds  and  Amounts  of  Ammunition  Carried. — 
The  kinds  of  ammunition  to  be  carried  in  the  division  de- 
pend upon  the  orders  issued  for  the  contemplated  operations 
— generally  the  proportions  are: 

shell  50%  to  75%. 
shrapnel  40%  to  15%. 
smoke  10%. 

Gas  may  be  carried  if  conditions  warrant,  but  is  not 
carried  habitually ; hence  there  is  normally  no  gas  available 
in  the  division  unless  special  provision  has  been  made  there- 
for. The  amounts  of  ammunition  carried  within  a division 
are  as  follows  (75-mm.  guns)  : 

Within  the  regiment  (firing  battery  177, 

battalion  combat  train  159) 336  rounds  per  gun. 

In  the  ammunition  train  of  the  artillery 

brigade  155  rounds  per  gun. 

Total 491  rounds  per  gun. 

7.  Replenishment  of  Ammunition. — (a)  When  the 
division  is  part  of  a corps,  there  is  carried  in  the  corps  train 
(Quartermaster  Corps)  150  rounds  per  gun  for  the  divi- 
sion 75-mm.  guns,  which  amount  is  in  addition  to  that  car- 
ried in  the  division.  This  corps  train  ammunition  is  a roll- 
ing reserve  and  is  not  to  be  drawn  upon  except  in  grave 
emergencies.  Hence  it  may  be  said  that  the  division  artil- 
lery has  within  the  division  491  rounds  per  gun  and  that 
ammunition  beyond  that  amount  must,  except  in  great 
emergency,  be  brought  from  army  ammunition  depots. 

(b)  It  is  not  difficult  to  visualize  a situation  in  which, 
in  one  day  of  hard  fighting,  the  division  artillery  would  use 
this  amount  of  ammunition.  It  is  well,  therefore,  to  con- 
sider how  this  ammunition  is  to  be  replenished  and  a sup- 
ply maintained  at  the  guns. 

(c)  The  agency  through  which  this  is  accomplished  is 
the  ammunition  train  of  the  artillery  brigade  which  carries, 
when  all  trucks  and  wagons  are  in  commission,  approxi- 
mately one-half  a day  of  fire. 


IV— 7-8 


50  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(d)  To  supply  daily  one  day  of  fire,  therefore,  involves 
two  round  trips  of  this  train,  plying  between  the  ammuni- 
tion depot  and  the  distributing  point  (where  the  battalion 
combat  trains  draw  for  the  batteries). 

(e)  Roughly  one-third  of  the  ammunition  in  the  am- 
munition train,  artillery  brigade,  is  hauled  in  the  wagon  sec- 
tion. If  the  army  depots  are  well  to  the  rear,  the  wagon 
section  cannot  make  two  round  trips  per  day.  In  this  case 
an  additional  burden  is  imposed  on  the  truck  section,  and 
cases  may  arise  wherein  the  truck  section  alone  will  have 
to  do  all  the  carrying  between  army  depots  and  distributing 
points. 

(f)  The  truck  section  alone  carries  approximately  one- 
third  day  of  fire  for  the  division  artillery,  therefore,  if  it 
is  the  only  agency  carrying  ammunition  forward  from  army 
depots  to  distributing  points,  it  will  have  to  make  three 
round  trips  daily.  Whether  or  not  this  is  practicable  in  any 
situation  depends  upon  the  condition  of  the  roads,  the 
amount  of  traffic  passing  over  them,  and  the  distance  to  the 
army  depot. 

(g)  However,  as  the  average  day  in  and  day  out  ex- 
penditure of  ammunition  in  the  division  artillery  is  esti- 
mated as  one-third  of  a day  of  fire,  the  truck  section  of  the 
ammunition  train,  artillery  brigade,  was  organized  to  carry 
that  amount.  Whenever  a greater  consumption  can  be  fore- 
seen, it  must  be  arranged  for  in  advance  whenever  possible, 
by  bringing  up  stocks  of  ammunition  and  locating  them  so 
that  they  are  readily  available  to  combat  trains.  This  us- 
ually is  accomplished  by  establishing  advanced  army  am- 
munition depots  in  forward  areas. 

8.  Ammunition  for  Corps  Artillery  Attached  to  a 
Division. — (a)  When  a regiment  of  155-mm.  howitzers  is 
attached  to  a division  it  brings  with  it,  within  the  regiment, 
162  rounds  per  gun  (firing  battery  42,  battalion  combat 
train  120) . The  regiment  is  as  a rule  accompanied  by  a por- 
tion of  the  ammunition  train,  corps  artillery  brigade,  which 
carries  an  additional  60  rounds  per  gun;  hence  there  is 
generally  available  222  rounds  per  gun. 

(b)  While  the  howitzer  regiment  remains  attached 
to  the  division,  the  transport  company  is  handled  as  a part 


IV — 8-11 


ARTILLERY  AMMUNITION  SUPPLY  51 

of  the  division  artillery  brigade  and  assigned  for  operations 
to  the  ammunition  train,  carrying  ammunition  between 
army  depots  and  battery  positions.  The  battalion  combat 
trains  of  the  155-mm.  regiment  are  motorized,  and  nor- 
mally accompany  the  ammunition  train,  artillery  brigade, 
to  army  depots.  It  thus  follows  that  155-mm.  ammunition 
in  a division  is  usually  brought  directly  from  army  depots 
to  battery  positions. 

9.  The  Artillery  Brigade  Munitions  Officer. — It  is 
a duty  of  the  artillery  brigade  commander,  under  general 
staff  coordination,  to  insure  the  proper  supply  of  ammuni- 
tion for  the  division  artillery.  This  duty  he  executes  through 
one  of  his  staff  officers,  the  artillery  brigade  munitions  offi- 
cer. Generally  this  officer  is  charged  with  all  details  relating 
to  the  procurement  and  distribution  of  artillery  ammunition 
within  the  division,  including  staff  direction  of  the  operation 
of  the  ammunition  train,  artillery  brigade,  whenever  it  is 
released  to  the  artillery  brigade  commander.  He  is  charged 
with  all  records  and  reports  relating  to  ammunition.  He  re- 
commends to  G4  sites  for  ammunition  establishments  and  is 
responsible  for  camouflage,  safety  precautions  and  proper 
care  of  ammunition  from  the  time  it  is  received  by  the  artil- 
lery brigade  until  turned  over  to  the  regiments.  This  offi- 
cer is  also  the  supply  officer  of  the  headquarters  battery  of 
the  field  artillery  brigade.  He  has  one  sergeant  as  ammu- 
nition clerk  and  one  corporal  as  supply  clerk. 

10.  Munition  Reports. — Artillery  ammunition  resup- 
ply in  the  combat  zone  of  a theater  of  operations  is  based 
on  reports  of  expenditures.  Briefly,  it  may  be  said  that 
they  are  made  daily  as  of  a prescribed  hour  and  may  be  by 
phone  or  in  writing,  usually  both.  Batteries  report  to  their 
regimental  munitions  officer  by  phone.  Regimental  muni- 
tions officers  report  to  artillery  brigade  munitions  officer  by 
phone  and  by  written  copy.  The  division  artillery  brigade 
munitions  officer  reports  to  corps  munitions  officer  (the  lat- 
ter a staff  officer  of  the  corps  artillery  headquarters)  send- 
ing a copy  to  G4  of  the  division. 

11.  Small  Arms  Ammunition. — No  mention  has  been 
made  herein  of  small  arms  ammunition  for  artillery  units. 
The  expenditure  of  this  type  of  ammunition  is  usually  so 


IV — 11-12 


52  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

small  as  to  be  insignificant.  When  additional  ammunition 
of  this  type  is  needed  it  is  obtained  by  call  on  the  division 
ordnance  officer. 

12.  System  Shown  by  Graphics. — The  system  of  am- 
munition supply  and  of  ammunition  reports  are  set  forth 
graphically  in  Plates  VIII  and  IX. 


ARTILLERY  AMMUNITION  REPORTS 


( From  On/  Logistics) 
PLATE  YUL 


ARTILL  ERY  AMMUNITION  SUPPLY 


FA  Regis 


( From  D/v  Logistics) 
PLATE  IX 


V— 1-3 


CHAPTER  V 

Artillery  Firing 


Paragraphs 

Section  I. — General  1-3 

Section  II. — Preparation  of  Fire 4-21 

Section  III. — Firing  Over  Obstacles 22-23 

Section  IV. — Ballistics  24-31 

Section  V. — Dispersion.  Probability  32-39 

Section  VI. — Firing  40-49 

Section  VII. — Aerial  Observation  50-52 


Section  I 

General 


Recent  Developments  1 

Old  Methods  Essential  2 

Duty  of  Artillery 3 


1.  Recent  Developments. — Artillery  firing  changed  as 
a result  of  the  war.  But  the  changes  were  not,  as  is  fre- 
quently believed,  in  the  nature  of  discarding  the  old,  but 
rather  in  adding  to  it,  developing  and  refining  it,  when  time 
and  situation  permit.  The  accomplished  artilleryman  of 
today  must  have  a larger  technical  knowledge  than  formerly. 
For  example,  corrections  for  atmospheric  conditions  have 
developed  greatly,  although  applicable  only  under  certain 
conditions. 

2.  Old  Methods  Essential.— On  the  other  hand,  the 
older,  cruder  methods  in  use  before  the  war  are  still  sound, 
still  necessary,  and  cannot  be  neglected  without  seriously 
impairing  fighting  efficiency. 

3.  Duty  of  Artillery.— It  is  the  aim  and  duty  of  the 
artillery  to  deliver  effective  fire  when  and  where  needed. 
The  problem  of  delivering  effective  fire  on  a given  point  at  a 
given  time  is  largely  one  of  technique.  To  insure  that  the 
given  point  and  time  meet  the  needs  of  the  infantry  and  the 
situation  in  general  is  a tactical  problem;  in  fact,  it  is  the 
essence  of  the  tactical  handling  of  artillery.  The  discus- 
sion in  this  chapter  is  confined  to  technique. 


55 


V— 4-6 


56  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

Section  II 

Preparation  of  Fire 

Paragraphs 


Definition  4 

Mechanism  of  Laying 5 

Kinds  of  Laying 6 

Laying  for  Direction  7 

Finding  the  Deflection  8 

Angular  Measurements  9 

Systems  of  Deflection  Graduation 10 

Map  and  Compass  Laying 11 

Deflection  Difference 12 

’Laying  for  Elevation 13 

Finding  the  Site 14 

Finding  the  Range 15 

Finding  the  Elevation 16 

Time  Fire 17 

Summary  of  Firing  Data 18 

Refinements  of  the  Preparation  of  Fire 19 

Ballistic  Corrections  20 

Conclusions  as  to  Preparation  of  Fire 21 


4.  Definition. — Since  the  preparation  of  fire  is  an 
indispensable  preliminary  to  all  artillery  firing,  it  is  con- 
sidered first.  The  preparation  of  fire  is  finding  the  firing 
data,  which  are  defined  to  be  “the  information  and  com- 
mands necessary  to  enable  the  gun  squads  to  accomplish 
the  orderly,  rapid  and  accurate  service  of  the  pieces.” 

5.  Mechanism  of  Laying. — (a)  The  object  of  laying 
is  to  give  the  piece  such  direction,  and  such  an  elevation  (or 
depression)  in  a vertical  plane,  that  the  projectile  will  reach 
the  target. 

(b)  The  cannoneer  executes  commands  mechanically 
by  means  of  laying  instruments;  and  while  he  must  have 
a certain  amount  of  skill  and  dexterity,  the  responsibility 
for  successful  results  rests  mainly  with  those  determining 
the  announced  data. 

6.  Kinds  of  Laying. — Laying  may  be  direct  or  indirect. 

(a)  For  direct  laying,  the  piece  is  sighted  for  direction 
and  elevation  on  the  target  itself  which  must  be  visible  to 
the  gunner. 

(b)  For  indirect  laying,  the  piece  is  given  direction  by 
sighting  on  any  convenient  designated  point  (aiming  point), 
and  elevation  by  a quadrant  or  level.  The  cannoneers  do  not, 
of  necessity,  see  or  know  the  target. 


V— 6-7 


PREPARATION  OF  FIRE  57 

(c)  Indirect  laying  is  easily  the  predominating  method. 
It  has  a number  of  advantages.  The  pieces  can  fire  effec- 
tively from  concealed  and  protected  positions.  An  aiming 
point  is  distinct  and  definite ; the  target,  even  when  visible, 
is  generally  vague  and  indefinite.  Indirect  laying  thus  is 
possible  when  direct  laying  would  be  either  impossible  or 
very  difficult.  Indirect  laying  affords  decided  advantages  of 
collective  control  and  eliminates  difficulties  of  target  desig- 
nation. It  operates  to  place  the  brain  work  of  firing  on  the 
officer,  and  makes  the  soldier’s  work  more  purely  mechanical. 

(d)  Direct  laying  however  is  decidedly  superior  for 
moving  targets. 

7.  Laying  for  Direction. — (a)  This  operation  is  ac- 
complished by  means  of  the  sight,  a typical  example  of  which 
is  the  panoramic  sight.  It  is  telescopic  and  is  mounted 
on  the  left  side  of  the  carriage.  The  eye  piece  is  stationary, 
while  the  objective  lens  is  carried  in  a head  which  rotates 
about  a vertical  axis.  Vision  through  the  sight  is  the  same 
as  for  an  ordinary  telescope,  regardless  of  the  position  of 
the  rotating  head.  The  construction  is  periscopic  to  the  ex- 
tent of  about  six  inches. 

(b)  The  rotation  of  the  head  is  measured  by  a scale 
graduated  in  effect  clockwise  from  0 to  6400  mils.*  The 
sight  mounting  is,  such  that  when  the  setting  is  0 (or  6400) , 
the  line  of  sight  is  parallel  to  the  axis  of  the  bore  of  the 
piece;  when  the  setting  is  1600,  the  line  of  sight  is  to  the 
right  and  perpendicular  to  the  bore ; and  when  3200,  to  the 
rear.  A setting  of  1000  is  indicated  in  Figure  1. 


*It  is  assumed  that  the  student  is  familiar  with  the  mil  and  its 
properties.  1 mil  = 3%  minutes;  18  mils  (more  exactly,  17.778)  =1°. 
There  are  6400  mils  in  a circle.  1 mil  subtends  a portion  of  the  cir- 
cumference equal  to  Viooo  of  the  radius,  very  closely;  in  other  words, 
a mil,  for  approximate  calculations,  may  be  taken  as  the  angle  whose 
sine  or  tangent  is  Mooo-  Minutes  x3  = mils  (very  closely).  One  mil 
subtends  one  yard  at  1000  yards’  range,  5 yards  at  5000  yards’  range, 
etc. 


V— 7 

58  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


yVuzz  le 


Figure  1. — Deflection  graduation  of  sight. 

(c)  Thus  it  can  be  seen  that  if  the  sight  be  set  at  0, 
and  the  piece  with  the  sight  traversed  (moved  in  direction) 
until  the  line  of  sight  is  directed  on  the  aiming  point,  the 
bore  also  will  be  directed  on  the  aiming  point.  Similarly, 
a sight  setting  of  1600  will  cause  the  bore  to  be  directed 
1600  mils  to  the  left  of  the  aiming  point,  and  so  on.  In 
other  words,  the  piece  can  be  pointed  in  any  direction  by 
varying  the  setting  of  the  sight,  but  using  the  same  aiming 
point. 

(d)  If  then  we  measure  the  angle  clockwise  from  the 
target  to  the  aiming  point,  set  the  panoramic  sight  at  this 
angle,  and  direct  the  line  of  sight  on  the  aiming  point  by 
traversing  the  piece, — the  bore  will  be  directed  on  the  tar- 
get. The  angle  set  on  the  sight  is  called  the  deflection . 

(e)  Even  though  the  deflection  be  measured  accur- 
ately, the  projectile  in  general  will  not  fly  in  exactly  the 


V— 7-8 


PREPARATION  OF  FIRE  59 

correct  direction,  due  to  various  causes,  such  as  wind,  drift, 
movement  of  the  target,  etc.  The  deflection  must  be  cor- 
rected as  far  as  practicable  to  offset  these  influences.  For 
direct  laying,  since  the  aiming  point  is  the  target  itself  the 
deflection  would  be  0 but  for  these  influences;  therefore 
the  actual  deflection  consists  solely  of  the  correction  for 
them. 

8.  Finding  the  Deflection. — (a)  For  direct  laying, 
the  deflection  determination  consists  simply  of  calculating 
or  estimating  the  correction  for  the  influences,  mentioned 
in  the  preceding  paragraph,  which  cause  the  projectile  in 
flight  to  move  from  the  plane  of  fire.  Direct  laying  is 
generally  hurriedly  prepared,  however,  and  refinements  are 
often  impracticable;  so  that  frequently  the  deflection  is 
announced  as  0,  the  necessary  correction  being  made  as  a 
result  of  the  observation  of  the  first  shots. 

(b)  For  indirect  laying,  the  deflection  determination 
is  more  difficult.  The  simplest  method  is  to  place  an  in- 
strument at  the  gun  position  and  measure  the  angle  from 
the  target  clockwise  to  the  aiming  point,  which  gives  the 
deflection  directly.  This  method  is  applicable  when  a satis- 
factory map  or  equivalent  graph  is  available,  with  the  tar- 
get, aiming  point,  and  gun  position  located  on  it;  or  on  the 
ground,  in  the  exceptional  case  when  the  target  is  visible 
from  the  gun  position.  This  direction  and  origin  of  meas- 
urement are  important,  and  must  become  a fixed  habit; 
otherwise  errors  and  confusion  will  result. 

(c)  The  problem  generally  is  more  complicated,  since 
ordinarily  the  target  cannot  be  seen  from  the  position  of 
the  piece,  or  other  conditions  may  exist  which  prevent  the 
use  of  the  foregoing  method.  When  working  on  the 
ground,  two  cases  arise,  (a)  a distant  point  (Figure  2)  is 
used  as  an  aiming  point,  and  (b)  the  battery  commander’s 
instrument  at  B (Figure  3)  is  used  as  an  aiming  point. 

(d)  For  (a),  the  angle  TGP,  Figure  2,  is  the  deflection 
sought,  T being  the  target  and  G the  piece.  This  angle  can- 
not be  measured  directly.  The  battery  commander’s  post, 
B,  is  probably  the  nearest  point  from  which  the  target, 
piece,  and  aiming  point  can  be  seen.  But  if  the  deflection 


V— 8 


60  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


P 


Figure  2. — Deflection  determination,  using  an  aiming  point. 

be  measured  at  B as  the  angle  TBP,  it  will  be  incorrect  due 
to  the  displacement  of  B from  G. 

Draw  BT'  parallel  to  GT,  and  BP'  parallel  to  GP.  Then 
the  angle  T'  BP'  is  exactly  the  deflection  sought,  since  its 
sides  are  parallel  to  those  of  the  angle  TGP.  This  is  called 
the  parallel  method  of  finding  the  deflection. 

Although  simple  in  principle,  the  parallel  method  pre- 
sents some  difficulty  practically,  because  there  is  nothing 
on  the  ground  to  establish  the  parallels  T'B  and  BP'.  If 
time  is  important  they  must  be  estimated  by  eye,  which  can 
be  done  with  surprising  accuracy  after  a little  practice.  If 
more  time  is  available,  the  angle  TBP  can  be  measured  ac- 
curately and  corrected  by  the  angular  offsets  TBT'  and 
PBP'.  The  offsets  can  be  calculated  more  or  less  accur- 
ately depending  on  the  time  available.  For  example  the 
angle  TBT'  in  mils  is  roughly  BG  in  yards  divided  by  BT 
in  thousands  of  yards.  The  angle  PBP'  can  be  obtained  in 
a similar  manner. 


V— 8 


PREPARATION  OF  FIRE  61 

To  summarize  case  (a)  : An  instrument  (graduated 

clockwise)  is  set  up  at  B and  oriented,  not  on  T,  but  on  T', 
so  that  BT'  is  parallel  to  GT.  Without  disturbing  the  ori- 
entation, it  is  pointed,  not  on  P,  but  on  P',  so  that  BP'  is 
parallel  to  GP.  The  instrument  reading  is  then  the  deflec- 
tion sought. 

(e)  Reciprocal  Laying. — For  case  (b)  (par.  8c),  the 
method  is  similar.  The  instrument,  oriented  on  T'  (Fig- 
ure 3),  is  pointed  on  G. 


r 


Figure  3. — Deflection  determination,  using  reciprocal  laying. 

The  angle  T'BG  thus  obtained  is  not  the  deflection 
sought,  but  differs  from  it  by  exactly  3200  mils.  If  T'BG 
is  less  than  3200,  as  in  the  figure,  3200  is  aded  to  it;  if  T' 
BG  is  greater  than  3200,  3200  is  subtracted  from  it.  The 
result  is  the  deflection  sought.  The  correctness  of  this 
rule  can  be  verified  by  inspection  of  Figure  3 and  similar 
diagrams.  This  method,  where  the  battery  commander 
“lays”  on  the  piece  as  an  aiming  point  and  the  piece  on  the 
battery  commander’s  instrument,  is  called  reciprocal  laying. 
The  term  perhaps  is  applied  more  correctly  to  two  pieces, 
one  of  which  is  laid  in  the  desired  direction  and  is  used  by 


V— 8-12 


62  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

the  above  method  to  assist  in  laying  the  other  piece  parallel 
to  itself. 

9.  Angular  Measurements. — The  angular  measure- 
ments involved  in  finding  the  deflection  preferably  are  made 
by  instruments  such  as  the  aiming  circle,  scissors  tele- 
scope, and  the  like.  When  instruments  are  not  available, 
the  determination  still  is  possible,  but  naturally  with  less 
accuracy.  The  means  employed  would  be  handbreadths, 
the  battery  commander’s  ruler,  the  field  glass,  or  similar 
improvised  devices. 

10.  Systems  of  Deflection  Graduation. — The  con- 
tinuous deflection  graduation  from  0 to  6400  is  not  used  on 
all  service  materiel.  Some  sights  and  instruments  are  grad- 
uated from  0 to  3200  twice.  The  advantage  of  this  gradu- 
ation is  that  it  eliminates  the  arithmetical  calculation  in 
reciprocal  laying  (par.  8e).  The  sight  of  the  French  75- 
mm.  guns  has  four  quadrants  each  graduated  from  0 to  1600 
mils.  These  and  other  features  cause  the  deflection  deter- 
mination to  differ  in  details  for  each  type  of  materiel;  the 
essential  principles  however  are  the  same  for  all. 

11.  Map  and  Compass  Laying. — The  methods  of  de- 
flection determination  described  in  the  foregoing  para- 
graphs are  by  no  means  the  only  ones  in  current  use ; there 
are  many  variations  and  refinements  of  these  methods 
which  are  beyond  the  scope  of  this  discussion.  Frequently 
it  is  necessary  to  transmit  the  direction  of  the  target  to 
an  instrument  near  the  battery  by  means  of  an  azimuth, 
true,  magnetic,  or  referred  to  the  map  grid.  With  these 
data,  the  instrument  is  oriented  in  the  direction  of  the  tar- 
get, and  the  pieces  are  directed  by  reciprocal  laying. 

The  methods  are  so  complete  that  in  general  a piece  can 
be  directed  on  a known  target  regardless  of  conditions, 
such  as,  darkness,  fog,  dense  woods,  or  even  when  the  piece 
is  in  a closed  casemate  involving  the  use  of  mirror  laying. 

12.  Deflection  Difference. — (a)  Thus  far  only  a 
single  piece  has  been  considered,  while  the  battery  comman- 
der has  ordinarily  to  find  the  deflection  for  the  four  pieces 
of  his  battery. 

(b)  In  Figure  4 the  pieces  G„  G2,  G3,  and  G4  are  laid 
with  parallel  lines  of  fire  (parallel  fire),  by  means  of  a 


PREPARATION  OF  FIRE 


63 


Lines  of  fire 


Figure  4. — Deflection  difference. 

common  aiming  point  P.  The  deflections  are  dlf  d2,  etc., 
as  indicated.  G2  Px,  G3  P4,  and  G4P4  are  all  parallel  to  G4P. 
Similarly  G3P2  and  G4P2  are  parallel  to  G2P,  and  G4P3  is  par- 
allel to  G3P.  Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  the  deflections  de- 
crease successively  from  the  right  (1st  piece)  to  the  left 
(4th  piece) . d2  is  less  than  d4  by  the  angle  P4  G2P,  or  G2- 
PGj ; or  roughly  one  platoon  front,  G2G4,  divided  by  the  dis- 
tance to  the  aiming  point,  or 

20  (usual  distance  between  guns) 

GXP  (in  thousands) 

Also  d3  is  less  than  d2,  and  d4  than  d3,  by  the  same  amount. 

(c)  Thus,  if  the  pieces  are  equally  spaced,  the  deflection 
of  adjacent  pieces  for  parallel  fire  differs  by  a constant 


V— 12-13 


64  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

amount  called  the  deflection  difference.  The  deflection  dif- 
ference is  announced  with  respect  to  a certain  piece,  usually 
the  right,  for  which  the  deflection  was  determined.  A com- 
mand might  be,  for  example,  “Deflection  2235;  on  No.  1, 
close  5.”  All  pieces  set  at  2235.  “Close  5”  is  the  deflec- 
tion difference.  Close  means  to  decrease  the  deflection,  all 
pieces  except  No.  1 responding  to  the  command.  No.  2 de- 
creases its  deflection  by  5,  No.  3 by  twice  5 or  10,  and  No. 
4 by  three  times  5 or  15,  the  result  being  to  bring  the  lines 
of  fire  closer  together. 

(d)  For  nearby  aiming  points,  the  deflection  difference 
is  so  large  that  it  would  introduce  serious  errors  to  assume 
it  constant  for  all  pieces.  For  this  reason,  nearby  aiming 
points  (nearer  than  1000  yards)  are  avoided.  In  case  a 
distant  aiming  point  is  not  available,  reciprocal  laying  must 
be  used.  In  this  case  a deflection  is  announced  for  each 
piece,  or  it  may  be  announced  for  one  piece  and  the  other 
pieces  laid  parallel  as  already  described. 

13.  Laying  for  Elevation. — (a)  This  operation  dif- 
fers for  the  two  methods  of  direct  and  indirect  laying. 
But  in  both  cases  a range  setting  or  elevation  in  angular 
units  is  announced  to  give  the  bore  an  elevation  correspond- 
ing to  the  range  of  the  target. 


7" 

// 


Figure  5. — Influence  of  site  with  indirect  laying. 


y— 13 


PREPARATION  OF  FIRE  65 

(b)  The  problem  of  laying  for  elevation  is  illustrated 
by  Figure  5.  G is  the  piece,  T the  target,  and  GH  a hori- 
zontal through  the  piece  equal  in  length  to  the  range  of  the 
target.  E is  the  elevation  which  must  be  given  the  piece 
to  reach  as  far  as  the  target  on  horizontal  ground.  But  if 
the  piece  were  fired  at  this  elevation  at  the  target  shown, 
the  projectile  would  fall  short  by  PT,  due  to  the  target 
being  more  elevated  than  the  piece.  This  elevation  of  the 
target  in  angular  units  is  called  the  site,  or  angle  of  site , s. 
It  is  seen  that  if  the  piece  be  given  an  elevation  of  E and  S* 
the  projectile  will  reach  the  target. 

(c)  For  direct  laying,  the  range  of  the  target  is  set 
on  the  range  scale  of  the  sight  mounting,  in  much  the  same 
manner  as  for  an  infantry  rifle.  The  piece  with  the  sight 
then  is  elevated  till  the  line  of  sight  passes  through  the 
target.  The  sight  mounting  is  constructed  so  that  the  set- 
ting of  the  range  places  the  bore  above  the  line  of  sight  by 
an  amount  appropriate  for  the  range,  and  the  operation 
of  bringing  the  line  of  sight  on  the  target  corrects  for  the 
site  of  the  target,  accomplishing  the  correct  laying  of  the 
piece  for  elevation. 

(d)  For  indirect  laying,  two  methods  are  used: 

(1)  The  site  is  set  on  a separate  scale  provided;  and 
the  range  is  set  on  another  scale,  in  some  cases  the  same 
as  used  for  direct  laying.  The  mechanism  is  constructed 
so  that,  these  settings  having  been  made,  the  proper  eleva- 
tion is  given  by  elevating  the  piece  by  means  of  a hand- 
wheel  until  a bubble  is  centered. 

(2)  The  piece  is  laid  by  a quadrant  placed  on  the  piece 
itself.  The  elevation  set  on  the  quadrant  is  obtained  by 
the  expression, 

Eq=Er  plus  s 

where  Er  is  the  elevation  corresponding  to  the  range  of 
the  target,  and  is  taken  from  the  range  tables ; and  s is  the 
site,  plus  if  the  target  is  higher  than  the  piece,  and  minus 
if  the  target  is  lower  than  the  piece.  This  is  called  quad- 
rant laying , and  is  used  for  very  accurate  work,  when  speed 
is  not  important,  as  in  rolling  barrages  or  the  destruction 
of  material  objectives. 


V — 14-15 


66  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

14.  Finding  the  Site. — (a)  The  site  is  necessary  only 
for  indirect  laying.  It  may  be  determined  by  direct  meas- 
urement on  the  ground,  or  from  a contoured  map.  An  esti- 
mation of  site,  unless  comparative,  generally  is  worthless. 
It  is  better  to  use  zero  than  estimation,  unless  the  site  is 
so  considerable  that  its  sign  at  least  is  reasonably  certain. 

(b)  The  site  is  measured  directly  on  the  ground  by 
means  of  the  aiming  circle,  clinometer,  or  similar  instru- 
ment, equipped  to  measure  vertical  angles  from  the  hori- 
zontal. The  measurement  is  taken  from  the  positior  of 
the  piece.  If  the  target  cannot  be  seen  from  this  position, 
a position  must  be  selected  from  which  the  target  can  be 
seen  and  the  measured  angle  modified  appropriately.  The 
methods  of  doing  this  need  not  be  considered  here. 

(c)  The  determination  of  the  site  from  a map  is  shown 
by  the  following  example : 

The  piece  is  on  contour  520;  the  target  elevation  is  610  feet. 
Map  range,  3700  yards.  What  is  the  site  of  the  target? 

Solution : The  target  is  610-520=90  feet=30  yards  above 

the  piece.  The  site  is  plus  and  equal  to 

**0/ 3*7  mils,  or  8 mils,  or  27'. 

(d)  Care  must  be  taken  to  give  the  site  its  proper 

sign. 

15.  Finding  the  Range.  — (a)  Three  methods  are 
used: 

(1)  The  map, 

(2)  Range  finder, 

(3)  Estimation, 

in  the  order  of  general  accuracy. 

(b)  The  map  ordinarily  is  more  accurate  than  the 
range  finder ; but  if  the  map  is  poor  and  the  range  finder  is 
reasonably  well  handled,  the  latter  may  be  more  accurate. 
The  accuracy  of  a map  range  frequently  can  be  increased 
by  topographical  operations  to  locate  the  target  and  piece 
accurately:  time  is  an  important  factor  in  such  work. 

(c)  The  service  range  finder  in  the  hands  of  a reas- 
onably well  trained  officer  or  soldier  is  some  four  times 
more  accurate  than  estimation.  Its  probable  error  for 
artillery  ranges  up  to  5000  yards  is  about  100  yards.  The 
range  finder  is  in  most  cases  more  rapid  than  the  map.  It 
is  the  only  reliable  means  of  determining  the  range  to  a 


y — 15-16 


PREPARATION  OF  FIRE  67 

rapidly  moving  target  which  is  visible  only  a short  time, 
unless  it  is  possible  to  use  previously  prepared  data. 

16.  Finding  the  Elevation. — (a)  As  shown  in  a pre- 
ceding paragraph,  some  types  of  materiel  have  scales  grad- 
uated in  range,  in  which  case  the  elevation  need  not  be  de- 
termined. Such  graduations  however  are  correct  only  for 
one  kind  of  ammunition.  During  the  war,  there  were  as 
many  as  20  kinds  of  ammunition  issued  for  the  75-mm.  gun 
at  one  time,  so  that,  even  though  there  be  scales  graduated 
in  range,  a fictitious  range  setting  must  be  used  when  firing 
other  ammunition  than  that  for  which  the  scale  is  graduated. 

(b)  When  the  scales  are  not  graduated  in  range,  or 
when  quadrant  laying  (par.  13)  is  used,  it  is  necessary  to 
know  the  elevation  corresponding  to  a given  range. 

For  each  type  of  artillery,  there  are  issued  range  tables, 
giving,  for  each  range  and  kind  of  ammunition,  the  range 
setting,  elevation,  and  other  useful  data.  Such  tables  are 
given  in  abbreviated  form  for  the  75-mm.  gun  and  for  the 
155-mm.  howitzer  in  the  appendices.  Ranges  are  given 
in  meters  since  range  scales  are  graduated  in  this  unit.* 
When  the  range  has  been  found,  the  use  of  the  range 
tables  to  find  the  range  setting  or  elevation  is  best  ex- 
plained by  the  following  examples : 

(1)  The  range  has  been  determined  as  1500  meters.  What 
range  should  be  announced  for  the  75-mm.  gun,  using  shell  with 
direct  laying? 

Solution : In  the  range  tables,  opposite  the  range  1500,  is 

found  the  required  value,  1550.  The  range  scale  was  graduated 
for  French  shrapnel;  the  shell  is  a lighter  projectile,  has  a diff- 
erent muzzle  velocity,  and  the  range  scale  graduations  are  not 
directly  applicable. 

(2)  The  range  has  been  determined  as  7000  meters,  and  the 
site  as  plus  24  mils.  What  data  should  be  announced  in  order  to 
lay  the  155-mm.  howitzer  for  elevation  by  means  of  the  sight 
mountings? 

Solution : Since  there  is  no  stated  condition  to  make  this 

inadvisable,  the  smallest  practicable  charge  will  be  used.  Charge 
5 theoretically  will  reach  this  range,  but  conditions  might  well 
give  a short  with  the  maximum  range;  therefore  Charge  6 is 


*The  metric  system  was  adopted  for  use  in  France.  For  future 
manufacture,  range  scales  will  be  graduated  in  yards  when  linear 
units  are  used. 

Meters  can  be  converted  to  yards  by  adding  ^o;  thus  7500  meters 
=8250  yards  (8200  more  accurately).  Yards  can  be  converted  to 
meters  by  dividing  by  11  and  multiplying  by  10;  thus  8200  yards = 
7455  meters  (7500  more  accurately). 


y — 16-19 


68  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

chosen.  The  required  data  are  then:  Site,  plus  24;  charge  6; 
elevation  396. 

(3)  The  range  has  been  determined  as  4500  meters,  and  the 
site  as  plus  14  mils.  What  data  should  be  announced  in  order  to 
lay  the  75-mm.  gun  for  elevation  by  means  of  the  gunner’s  quad- 
rant, using  shell? 

Solution:  The  elevation  for  4500  meters  is  180  mils;  the 

quadrant  elevation  is  then  180  plus  14,  or  194  mils.  The  data 
required  are  then;  Shell;  quadrant,  194. 

17.  Time  Fire. — Time  fire  is  fire  with  projectiles,  either 
shell  or  shrapnel,  equipped  with  time  fuses  set  to  give 
bursts  in  air  before  the  projectile  strikes.  In  this  case,  an 
additional  element  of  the  firing  data  is  necessary,  the  fuse 
setting.  This  may  be  the  tabular  time  of  flight  given  in 
the  range  tables,  or  a special  column  of  fuse  settings  may 
be  included  in  the  tables. 

The  fuse  setter  for  the  75-mm.  gun  is  graduated  in 
range  to  avoid  reference  to  the  range  tables.  There  is  also 
an  auxiliary  scale,  called  the  corrector  or  corrector  scale , 
to  facilitate  adapting  the  range  scale  to  the  special  condi- 
tions existing  at  the  moment  of  firing. 

18.  Summary  of  Firing  Data. — From  the  foregoing 
discussion,  the  firing  data  and  the  methods  of  obtaining 
them  may  be  summarized  as  follows,  in  the  order  in  which 
they  usually  are  announced: 

Aiming  point  or  target. — Former  for  indirect  laying;  latter 
for  direct  laying.  Aiming  point  may  be  a distinct  and  distant 
natural  object,  or  an  instrument  near  the  pieces. 

Deflection. — Setting  of  sight  to  give  correct  direction;  neces- 
sary in  both  direct  and  indirect  laying. 

Deflection  difference. — Correction  applied  with  indirect  lay- 
ing to  make  the  deflection  applicable  to  the  pieces  other  than 
the  one  for  which  it  was  determined. 

Site. — The  angular  elevation  of  the  target  with  respect  to 
the  piece,  used  only  with  indirect  laying;  announced  and  set 
separately  from  the  elevation,  or  included  in  the  announced  ele- 
vation, according  to  materiel  and  method. 

Projectile,  charge,  fuse. — Generally  speaking,  matters  of 
selection  rather  than  determination;  must  be  announced  however. 

Fuse  setting. — Necessary  in  time  fire  only. 

Method  of  fire. — Discussed  later. 

Range  or  elevation. — Necessary  in  both  direct  and  indirect 
laying.  Determined  range  announced  without  change,  or  range 
setting  or  elevation  taken  from  range  tables,  depending  on  ma- 
teriel, ammunition,  and  method  of  laying. 

19.  Refinements  of  the  Preparation  of  Fire. — Ref- 
erence already  has  been  made  in  several  instances  to  details 
in  which  the  preparation  of  fire  could  be  refined  when  time 
and  facilities  permit,  such  as: 


V — 19-20 


PREPARATION  OF  FIRE  69 

The  use  of  accurate  maps  for  deflection  and  range. 

Topographical  operations  to  secure  more  accurate  data  as  to 
deflection,  site,  and  range. 

Care  and  minuteness  of  instrumental  measurements  and  cal- 
culations, affecting  deflection,  site,  and  range. 

The  advantage  of  so  doing  is  evident.  The  effect  de- 
sired is  produced  more  rapidly  and  more  surely,  since  the 
accurate  preparation  eliminates  a part  of  the  adjustment 
during  firing.  Shortening  the  fire  for  adjustments  ren- 
ders our  artillery  less  exposed  to  neutralization  or  destruc- 
tion before  accomplishing  its  mission. 

20.  Ballistic  Corrections. — (a)  The  war  gave  great 
impetus  to  the  practical  application  in  the  field  of  refine- 
ments in  the  following  respects: 

Those  related  to  peculiarities  and  irregularities  of  the  pieces 
and  ammunition  which  affect  the  fire;  such  as,  weight  and  form 
of  projectile,  variation  in  powder  charge,  wear  of  the  bore,  etc. 

Atmospheric  conditions;  such  as,  the  density  of  the  air,  tem- 
perature and  its  effect  on  the  air  and  powder,  wind. 

All  of  these  matters  had  been  studied  before  the  war, 
but  their  practical  application  had  been  limited  to  the  coast 
artillery.  Their  wide  application  in  the  war  was  possible 
on  account  of  the  elaborate  organization  and  equipment  of 
the  front.  Refinements  of  this  character  had  the  greatest 
tactical  importance  in  the  surprise  attacks  on  the  Western 
Front  in  1918. 

(b)  No  detailed  explanation  of  such  corrections  is 
possible  here.  It  is  important,  however,  that  the  combat 
arms  with  which  the  artillery  works  appreciate  in  a gen- 
eral way  the  disturbing  elements  affecting  artillery  fire. 
Those  here  considered  are  distinct  from  dispersion,  dis- 
cussed later.  Values  are  tabulated  below  for  the  75-mm. 
gun  at  ranges  of  5,000  and  10,000  meters,  for  the  various 
elements  stated.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  they  are  for  a con- 
crete case  only,  and  are  not  generally  applicable. 


V— 20-22 


70  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


Range 

Meters 

1.5  inches  of  barometer  change , due 

5,000 

10,000 

to  both  temperature  and  pressure, 
will  change  the  actual  range,  in  me- 
ters, by  

144 

367 

33  feet  per  second  change  in  muzzle 
velocity  of  the  piece  will  change  the 

actual  range,  in  meters,  by 

A wind  up  or  down  the  range  of  22 
miles  per  hour  will  cause  a varia- 
tion from  the  tabular  range,  in  me- 
ters, of  _ _ _ 

93 

134 

88 

322 

A variation  of  1 lb.  10  oz.  in  the 
weight  of  the  projectile  will  cause  a 
variation  in  the  range,  in  meters, 
of  _ _ 

40 

132 

365 

955 

If  a combination  of  such  influences  should  occur,  as  is 
possible,  in  such  a way  that  their  results  would  be  cumula- 
tive, it  can  be  seen  that  the  point  of  fall  of  the  projectiles 
would  be  changed  by  365  meters  for  the  range  of  5,000 
meters  and  955  meters  for  the  range  of  10,000  meters. 

It  is  possible  to  correct  at  least  partially  for  such  con- 
ditions, provided  the  necessary  meteorological  and  other 
data  are  available.  This  may  or  may  not  be  the  case. 

21.  Conclusions  as  to  Preparation  of  Fire. — It  may 
be  concluded  that  the  preparation  of  artillery  fire  requires 
a period  of  time  varying  from  a minute  to  hours,  depending 
on  the  situation.  The  artilleryman’s  art  consists  not  only 
of  a familiarity  with  all  methods,  but  also  of  a sensible  ap- 
preciation of  what  methods  are  applicable  in  a given  situa- 
tion, and  what  results  can  be  expected. 


Section  III 

Firing  Over  Obstacles 

Paragraphs 


Clearing  the  Crest 22 

Reaching  a Reverse  Slope IIIIIIIIIIIIII  23 


22.  Clearing  the  Crest.— (a)  It  has  been  stated  that 
protection  and  concealment  are  advantages  of  indirect  lay- 
ing; in  fact,  they  are  the  principal  ones.  The  amount  of 


V— 22 


FIRING  OVER  OBSTACLES  71 

protection  afforded  by  a ridge  behind  which  artillery  is 
emplaced  depends  principally  on  the  steepness  of  the  slope 
in  front  of  the  position,  the  steeper  the  slope  the  better  the 
protection.  But  if  the  slope  is  too  steep,  firing  will  be  im- 
possible because  the  projectiles  will  not  clear  the  crest.  It 
is  evident  that  the  crest  might  be  cleared  for  a long  range 
or  a large  site,  and  yet  not  be  cleared  for  a short  range  or 
small  site. 

(b)  A number  of  methods  are  used  to  determine  whe- 
ther a crest  can  be  cleared  under  given  conditions,  but  this 
discussion  will  be  limited  to  a single  method. 

It  has  been  shown  that  the  quadrant  elevation  used 
with  indirect  laying  is  the  elevation  for  the  range  increased 
algebraically  by  the  site.  The  crest  may  be  considered  as 
a target,  and  the  quadrant  elevation  for  it  found  by  this 
rule.  This  elevation  will  give  a trajectory  which  will  just 
clear  the  crest.  By  comparing  this  quadrant  elevation  with 
that  for  the  target,  it  can  be  seen  at  once  whether  fire  on 
the  target  will  clear  the  crest.  To  clear  the  crest , the  quad- 
rant elevation  for  the  target  must  exceed  that  for  the  crest. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  addition  of  the  elevation  for 
the  range  of  the  crest  and  the  site  of  the  crest  always  will 
be  an  arithmetical  one,  since  from  its  nature  the  crest  will 
be  above  the  pieces  and  its  site  plus.  The  site  of  the  tar- 
get however  must  be  considered  carefully  as  to  sign. 

The  following  examples  illustrate  the  method: 

(1)  Site  of  target,  minus,  12  mils;  range  of  target,  6000 
meters. 

The  pieces  are  in  position  500  meters  behind  a crest  whose 
site  is  270  mils.  Can  the  crest  be  cleared  with  75-mm.  shrapnel 
fire?  With  shell  fire? 

Solution : Shrapnel. — The  elevation  for  the  range  of  the  tar- 
get is,  from  the  range  tables,  269  mils.  The  quadrant  elevation 
for  the  target  then  is  269-12=257  mils. 

The  elevation  for  the  range  of  the  crest  is  10  mils ; the  quad- 
rant elevation  for  the  crest,  280  mils. 

Since  the  quadrant  elevation  for  the  target  does  not  exceed 
that  for  the  crest,  the  crest  will  not  be  cleared. 

Shell. — The  quadrant  elevation  for  the  target  is  290  mils. 
This  exceeds  that  for  the  crest,  so  that  the  crest  will  be  cleared. 

(2)  A certain  battery  position  has  been  selected  tentatively 
from  the  map,  on  the  eastern  slope  of  Sentinel  Hill  on  the  900- 
foot  contour.  What  is  the  minimum  range  which  could  be  used 
with  75-mm.  shell,  firing  west  over  the  hill?  Assume  the  site 
of  target  as  0,  and  the  height  of  the  trees  on  the  hill  as  30  feet. 

Solution : Judged  from  the  contours,  the  shoulder  on  the 


V — 22-24 


72  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

slope  is  about  on  the  1000-foot  contour.  The  distance  between 
the  900  and  1000-foot  contours  is  200  yards,  or  600  feet.  The 
vertical  interval,  including  the  trees,  is  130  feet.  The  slope  of 
the  “crest”  is  then  130/600=21.7%.  21.7x#=12.4  degrees,  or 

the  slope  is  about  12°  24'.*  In  addition,  it  is  well  to  allow  about 
30'  clearance  to  cover  inaccuracy  and  irregularities  on  the  hill. 
The  elevation  for  the  range  of  the  crest  is  about  12'.  The  per- 
missible quadrant  elevation  is  then  12°  24'  plus  30'  plus 

12'  = 13°  6'. 

Since  the  site  of  the  target  is  0,  13°  6'  is  the  permissible  ele- 
vation for  the  range  of  the  target.  The  required  minimum  range 
is,  from  the  tables,  about  5200  meters.f 

23.  Beaching  a Reverse  Slope. — Ground  protected 
from  hostile  fire  by  a covering  crest  can  be  reached  if  the 
angle  of  fall  of  the  fire  directed  upon  it  is  sufficiently  great. 
The  vulnerability  of  terrain  to  fire  in  this  manner  may  be 
determined  with  sufficient  accuracy  by  comparing  the  re- 
verse slope  with  the  angle  of  fall  of  the  trajectory.  The 
latter  is  given  in  the  range  tables,  or  may  be  taken  roughly 
as  one-half  greater  than  the  elevation.  The  slope  of  the 
terrain  may  be  determined  from  the  map,  or  the  scale  of 
slope  equivalent  may  be  used.  The  problem  may  be  solved 
also  by  the  method  of  clearing  the  crest,  already  described. 


Section  IV 
Ballistics 

Paragraphs 


Defined  24 

Trajectory  25 

Nomenclature  of  Trajectory 26 

Drift  27 

Jump  28 

Effect  of  Muzzle  Velocity  and  Elevation  on  Range 29 

Rigidity  of  the  Trajectory 30 

Atmospheric  Conditions  31 


24.  Defined. — Ballistics  treats  of  the  motion  of  pro- 
jectiles fired  from  cannon  or  small  arms.  The  subject  may 


* Empirically,  the  slope  in  % x % = slope  in  degrees.  The  mil  re- 
lation is  rather  inaccurate  for  large  angles.  In  mils,  this  slope  would 
be  217.  200  mils=732  minutes  = 12°  12'.  The  accurate  value  of  the 

slope  is  12°  16'. 

fThe  use  of  the  slope  in  per  cent  and  the  degree  units  in  this 
problem  is  merely  illustrative.  It  would  be  more  convenient  and 
simpler  to  use  mils  throughout.  Both  methods  give  substantially  the 
same  result. 


V— 24-25 


BALLISTICS  73 

be  divided  into  three  branches;  interior  ballistics , treating 
of  the  motion  of  the  projectile  within  the  bore;  exterior 
ballistics , treating  of  the  motion  of  the  projectile  after  leav- 
ing the  bore  and  during  its  flight;  and  a third  category* 
termed  the  ballistics  of  'penetration , treating  of  the  effect 
of  the  projectile  on  the  object  it  strikes. 

This  brief  discussion  will  be  confined  to  exterior  bal- 
listics. 

25.  Trajectory. — The  trajectory  is  the  path  followed 
by  the  projectile  in  its  flight.  The  trajectory  is  determined 
by  the  angle  of  departure  (almost  the  same  as  elevation), 
the  muzzle  velocity  of  the  projectile,  and  the  characteris- 
tics of  the  projectile. 

If  the  force  of  gravity,  the  resistance  of  the  air,  and  the 
rotation  of  the  projectile  about  its  axis  could  be  eliminated, 
the  projectile  would  describe  a straight  line  determined  by 
the  line  of  departure;  its  velocity  would  remain  constant. 
The  force  of  gravity  causes  the  projectile  to  drop  away  from 
the  line  of  departure.  Neglecting  the  resistance  of  the  air, 
and  considering  only  the  angle  of  departure,  the  muzzle 
velocity,  and  the  force  of  gravity,  the  trajectory  would  be 
a parabola,  with  the  highest  point  at  midrange,  and  with 
the  two  halves  identical  in  shape.  Such  a trajectory  is 
known  as  the  trajectory  in  vacuo. 

The  resistance  of  the  air  acts  to  retard  the  projectile, 
and  from  the  instant  the  projectile  leaves  the  bore  tends 
continuously  to  reduce  the  velocity.  As  a result,  the  highest 
point  of  the  trajectory  in  air  is  nearer  the  point  of  fall,  and 
the  ascending  and  descending  branches  are  unequal  and  un~ 
symmetrical.  Figure  6 is  a comparison  of  the  trajectory 
in  air  with  that  in  vacuo  for  the  3-inch  gun.  The  angle  of 


Figure  6. — Trajectories  in  air  and  in  vacuo 


V— 25-29 


74  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

departure  is  that  for  a range  of  5000  yards  in  air.  The 
vertical  scale  has  been  doubled  in  the  figure. 

26.  Nomenclature  of  Trajectory. — Figure  7 shows 
the  nomenclature  of  the  principal  elements  of  the  trajec- 
tory. 


27.  Drift. — The  rotation  imparted  to  the  projectile  by 
the  rifling  of  the  bore,  together  with  the  resistance  of  the 
air,  causes  the  projectile  to  deviate  from  the  plane  of  fire. 
This  deviation  is  called  drift.  The  rifling  of  all  field  artil- 
lery has  a right  hand  twist,  and  consequently  the  drift  is 
always  to  the  right. 

28.  Jump. — The  angle  of  departure  differs  from  the  ele- 
vation at  which  the  piece  is  laid  by  such  derangement  of 
the  laying  as  takes  place  while  the  projectile  is  moving 
through  the  bore.  This  angular  difference  is  called  the 
jump.  The  jump  is  upward  or  positive  when  the  angle  of 
departure  is  greater  than  the  elevation.  The  jump  is  given 
in  the  various  service  range  tables;  it  is  positive  for  most 
types  of  artillery. 

29.  Effect  of  Muzzle  Velocity  and  Elevation  on 
Range. — (a)  For  the  same  projectile  and  elevation,  the 


V— 29 


BALLISTICS 


75 


greater  the  muzzle  velocity,  the  greater  the  range.  The 
practical  limitation  on  muzzle  velocity  is  the  weight  of  the 
materiel,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  the  wear  of  the  bore  is 
great  for  high  velocities. 

Up  to  a certain  elevation,  about  45  degrees*,  the  range 
increases  with  the  elevation;  for  greater  elevations,  the 
range  decreases.  This  is  shown  in  Figure  8. 


(b)  The  various  types  of  field  artillery  may  be  classi- 
fied in  this  respect  as  follows : 

(1)  Guns,  having  relatively  high  muzzle  velocity  and  a more 
or  less  limited  maximum  elevation. 

(2)  Howitzers  and  mortars , having  relatively  low  muzzle 
velocity  but  capable  of  firing  at  high  elevation. 


*The  German  long  range  gun  is  of  interest  in  this  connection.  It 
will  be  remembered  that  7 of  these  guns  were  built,  of  21  cm.  (8.15") 
caliber  except  that  probably  one  was  of  24  cm.  (9.3")  caliber.  They 
bombarded  Paris  on  44  days,  killing  256  and  wounding  620  persons. 
303  projectiles  were  fired,  183  falling  inside  of  the  walls  and  120  out- 
side. 

The  guns  were  121  feet  long;  the  life  was  about  50  rounds;  they 
were  mounted  on  railway  carriages.  The  extreme  range  was  76 
miles,  the  trajectory  reaching  a maximum  height  of  24  miles.  The 
elevation  for  this  range  was  55  degrees.  The  projectile  weighed  264 
lbs.,  was  41i  inches  long,  and  had  a muzzle  velocity  of  5090  feet  per 
second.  The  time  of  flight  for  extreme  range  was  about  3 minutes. 


Figure  8 


V — 29-30 


76  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(c)  For  a given  caliber,  the  gun  would  have  the  great- 
est weight  of  materiel  and  the  greatest  range,  with  the  how- 
itzer and  mortar  next  in  the  order  named.  For  a given 
weight  of  materiel,  the  gun  would  have  the  smallest  cali- 
ber, greatest  velocity,  and  longest  range ; the  mortar  would 
have  the  largest  caliber,  least  velocity,  and  shortest  range ; 
the  howitzer  would  be  between  the  gun  and  the  mortar  in 
these  characteristics.  In  addition,  the  mortar  has  the  dis- 
tinctive feature  that  it  fires  only  at  elevations  greater 
than  45  degrees,  so  that  its  range  decreases  as  the  eleva- 
tion increases.  The  gun  and  howitzer  classification  is  a 
comparative  one,  and  not  based  on  rigid  numerical  values. 
Guns  are  being  made  today  that  can  be  elevated  to  45  de- 
grees, and  modern  howitzers  have  muzzle  velocities  that 
formerly  might  have  placed  them  in  the  gun  class.  The 
anti-aircraft  gun  is  a gun  properly  speaking,  because  of  its 
high  velocity ; yet  it  can  be  elevated  to  90  degrees,  an  eleva- 
tion formerly  characteristic  of  mortars.  The  mountain 
howitzer,  having  a muzzle  velocity  of  about  900  feet  per 
second,  formerly  was  classed  as  a gun. 

(d)  The  dominant  characteristic  of  the  gun  is  its  long 
range ; of  the  howitzer,  its  high  angle  of  fall  with  considera- 
ble range;  of  the  mortar,  its  extreme  angle  of  fall  with 
short  range. 

BO.  Rigidity  of  the  Trajectory. — (a)  The  range 
tables  are  computed,  stricty  speaking,  for  horizontal  planes 
of  site.  This  obviously  is  rarely  the  case  in  the  field.  In 
order  to  simplify  the  mechanism  and  methods  of  field  ar- 
tillery firing,  use  is  made  of  what  is  known  as  the  principle 
of  the  rigidity  of  the  trajectory. 

(b)  The  principle  of  the  rigidity  of  the  trajectory  is 
the  assumption  that  the  relations  existing  between  the  ele- 
ments of  the  trajectory  and  the  chord  representing  the 
range  are  the  same  whether  the  chord  be  horizontal  or  in- 
clined. In  other  words,  a trajectory  remains  rigid  as  to  form 
and  extent  while  it  and  its  chord  are  revolved  in  a vertical 
plane  about  the  origin  or  muzzle  as  a center,  through  the 
relatively  small  angles  involved  in  practice. 


V — 30-31 


BALLISTICS 


77 


Figure  9. — Rigidity  of  Trajectory 

(c)  In  Figure  9 three  planes  of  site  are  shown,  GPa, 
GPh,  and  GPb.  Pa,  Pb,  and  Pb  are  all  the  same  distance  from 
G.  Ph  will  be  reached  by  a trajectory  whose  elevation  above 
GPh  is  Eh,  which  value  may  be  obtained  from  the  range  ta- 
bles. By  the  principle  of  the  rigidity  of  the  trajectory,  if 
the  piece  be  elevated  above  GPa  by  the  same  amount  Eh,  the 
trajectory  will  reach  Pa;  and  if  the  piece  be  elevated  by  Eh 
above  GPb,  the  trajectory  will  reach  Pb. 

(d)  The  principle  is  applied  in  both  direct  and  indi- 
rect laying. 

(e)  The  determination  of  the  range  of  the  horizontal 
trajectory  which  would  pass  through  an  elevated  or  de- 
pressed target  ordinarily  would  be  impracticable  in  service, 
so  that, the  application  of  the  principle  greatly  simplifies 
the  practical  operation  of  laying  for  elevation.  The  differ- 
ence between  the  horizontal  and  inclined  ranges  is  consider- 
able only  when  the  elevation  is  great  and  the  site  is  what 
may  be  considered  as  extreme.  Nevertheless,  correction 
sometimes  is  made  for  it,  the  necessary  data  being  contained 
in  the  service  range  tables. 

31.  Atmospheric  Conditions. — (a)  The  range  of  the 
projectile  and  the  burning  of  the  powder  train  in  the  time 
fuse  are  influenced  by  the  atmospheric  temperature,  baro- 
metric pressure,  and  movement  (wind).  Moisture  in  the 
air  (humidity)  has  a negligible  effect. 


V — 31-32 


78  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(b)  For  a constant  barometer,  the  lower  the  tempera- 
ture the  shorter  the  range ; the  higher  the  temperature,  the 
longer  the  range.  For  a constant  temperature,  the  lower 
the  atmospheric  pressure  or  barometer,  the  longer  the 
range ; the  higher  the  pressure,  the  shorter  the  range.  In 
a high  altitude,  where  the  pressure  is  low,  the  range  is 
long. 

(c)  In  summer,  when  the  temperature  is  high  and  the 
barometer  low,  the  range  is  long;  in  winter,  when  the  tem- 
perature is  low  and  the  barometer  high,  the  range  is  short. 

(d)  The  lower  the  temperature,  the  more  slowly  the 
time  train  of  the  fuse  burns;  the  higher  the  temperature, 
the  more  rapidly  it  burns.  The  lower  the  pressure,  the 
more  slowly  the  time  train  burns;  the  higher  the  pressure, 
the  more  rapidly  it  burns. 

(e)  A wind  behind  the  projectile  increases  the  range; 
a head  wind  has  the  opposite  effect. 

(f)  When  a battery  commander  is  furnished  meteoro- 
logical data,  he  can  correct  his  firing  data  accordingly  by 
means  of  the  service  range  tables. 


Section  V 

Dispersion — Probability 

Paragraphs 


General 32 

Defined  33 

General  Effects  of  Dispersion 34 

Nature  of  Dispersion 35 

Dispersion  on  Sloping  Ground 36 

Safety  of  Friendly  Troops  Due  to  Dispersion 37 

Probable  Error  38 

Probability  39 


32.  General. — In  the  preparation  of  fire,  sufficient  de- 
tails were  given  to  show  the  unavoidable  approximations 
and  many  uncertain  elements  entering  into  the  problem,  and 
make  it  evident  that  the  preparation  of  fire  in  the  general 
case  must  be  imperfect.  Imperfections  are  not  confined  to 
the  preparation  of  fire,  but  enter  into  the  firing  itself,  not- 
ably because  of  dispersion. 


y— 33 


DISPERSION— PROBABILITY  79 

33.  Defined. — Dispersion  as  applied  to  firing  is  the 
scattering  of  shots  intended  to  strike  or  burst  in  the  same 
place.  Shots  fired  with  the  same  data  and  ammunition 


Zone 


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Figure  10 — Dispersion 


V — 33-35 


80  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

should  strike  in  the  same  place,  but  it  is  well  known  that 
such  is  never  the  case.  Figure  10  shows  the  results  ob- 
tained from  firing  400  shots  from  the  same  gun  under  as 
nearly  as  possible  the  same  conditions.  The  longer  dimen- 
sion of  the  pattern  is  in  the  direction  of  range ; the  shorter 
dimension,  laterally. 

34.  General  Effects  of  Dispersion. — Dispersion  is 
a practical  factor  in  several  respects. 

(a)  It  decreases  the  hits  on  a target  of  limited  extent. 

(b)  It  decreases  the  effectiveness  of  the  support  af- 
forded the  infantry  by  artillery  fire,  because  the  fire  on  the 
objective  of  attack  must  cease  or  lift  when  the  infantry  still 
is  some  distance  away;  or  if  the  infantry  approaches  too 
close,  they  suffer  casualties  from  our  artillery  fire. 

(c)  It  increases  greatly  the  difficulty  of  conducting  ar- 
tillery fire. 

35.  Nature  of  Dispersion. — (a)  It  has  been  estab- 
lished conclusively  that  the  points  of  fall  of  a large  number 
of  supposedly  like  shots  always  will  be  grouped  according 
to  a fixed  law,  called  the  law  of  errors.  The  law  can  be  ap- 
plied to  a particular  case  and  all  desired  details  calculated 
when  a characteristic  value,  called  the  probable  error,  is 
known.  The  probable  error  is  tabulated  in  the  range  tables. 
Explanation  of  dispersion  by  what  is  known  as  the  ladder 
of  dispersion  or  25-16-7-2  rule  is  sufficient  for  this  discus- 
sion. 

(b)  The  supposedly  like  shots  group  themselves  about 
a center , or  center  of  impact.  Consider  the  positions  of  the 
shots  only  in  range.  One-half  are  short  and  one-half  over. 
Their  distribution  in  range  is  shown  in  the  longitudinal 
ladder  of  dispersion  in  Figure  11. 

(c)  The  parallel  lines  are  equally  spaced  and  one  prob- 
able error  apart.  The  middle  line  passes  through  the 
center  of  impact  C.  With  the  space  divided  in  this  manner, 
the  percentages  of  a very  large  number  of  shots  which  would 
fall  in  the  various  spaces  are  those  shown.  These  values 
are  not  strictly  accurate  in  all  cases,  but  are  sufficiently  so 
for  practical  purposes.  The  principal  inaccuracy  is  in  the 
outer  or  2%  spaces.  The  shots  actually  are  not  confined  to 
the  exterior  limits  shown,  but  the  proportion  outside  is  very 


DISPERSION— PROBABILITY 


81 


Longitudinal  Ladder  of  Dispersion 


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Figure  11 


small  (7/10  of  1%  for  both  sides  of  the  center).  The  2% 
spaces  include  all  shots  not  included  in  the  other  spaces. 

(d)  The  lateral  ladder  of  dispersion  is  constructed  in 
a manner  similar  to  that  for  the  longitudinal  ladder  (Fig- 
ure 11). 

(e)  By  superimposing  the  longitudinal  ladder  of  dis- 
persion on  the  lateral  ladder,  the  shot  pattern  is  divided  into 
64  rectangles  as  shown  in  Figure  12.  This  is  called  the 
rectangle  of  dispersion. 


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Figure  12. — Rectangle  of  dispersion 


(PE  stands  for  “probable  error’') 


The  percentages  for  the  various  rectangles  are  obtained 
by  multiplication  of  the  appropriate  longitudinal  and  lat- 


V — 35-38 


82  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

eral  percentages;  for  example,  6.25%  is  the  product  of  25% 
and  25%,  4%  is  the  product  of  25%  and  16%  etc.  The  to- 
tal of  the  percentages  for  all  rectangles  is  of  course  100, 
since  all  of  the  shots  are  assumed  to  fall  somewhere  within 
the  rectangle  of  dispersion. 

36.  Dispersion  on  Sloping  Ground. — The  tabular 
values  of  the  range  probable  error  are  for  horizontal  ground. 
If  the  ground  on  which  the  shots  fall  slopes  downward  away 
from  the  piece,  as  on  the  reverse  slope,  the  dispersion  is 
greater  than  on  horizontal  ground ; if  the  ground  were  paral- 
lel to  the  descending  branch  of  the  trajectory,  the  disper- 
sion would  be  indefinitely  great.  If  the  ground  slopes  down- 
ward toward  the  piece,  as  on  a forward  slope,  the  disper- 
sion is  less  than  on  horizontal  ground,  the  minimum  being 
when  the  ground  is  perpendicular  to  the  trajectory  at  the 
point  of  fall.  The  probable  error  for  sloping  ground  may  be 
obtained  by  projecting  the  horizontal  value  onto  the  slope 
by  means  of  the  trajectory. 

37.  Safety  of  Friendly  Troops  Due  to  Dispersion. — 
For  horizontal  ground  it  generally  is  taken  that  friendly 
infantry  cannot  approach  more  closely  than  the  following 
distances  to  the  center  of  impact  of  fire  of  the  75-mm.  gun 
in  the  direction  of  range,  that  is,  when  the  fire  is  over  their 
heads : 

Percussion  shell  or  time  shrapnel, 

depending  on  the  range : 150  to  200  yards. 

Time  shell  200  to  250  yards. 

This  takes  into  consideration  not  only  the  dispersion 
of  the  trajectory,  but  also  the  effective  radius  of  the  frag- 
ments, and,  in  time  fire,  the  dispersion  of  the  fuse  in  time 
of  burning.  For  the  155-mm.  howitzer,  the  distance  is  500 
yards.  With  the  75-mm.  gun  firing  in  enfilade,  the  distance 
may  be  reduced  to  about  75  yards. 

For  ground  sloping  downward  away  from  our  lines  (re- 
verse slope),  the  safe  distances  are  greater;  such  ground  is 
dangerous  for  friendly  troops,  and  precautions  should  be 
taken  to  guard  against  losses.  For  ground  sloping  down- 
ward toward  our  lines,  the  safe  distances  are  less. 

38.  Probable  Error. — (a) ‘The  tabular  values  of  the 
probable  error  constitute  a measure  of  the  relative  accur- 


V— 38-39 


DISPERSION— PROBABILITY  83 

acy  of  the  pieces ; a small  probable  error  indicates  an  accur- 
ate piece. 

(b)  It  will  be  noted  that  the  probable  error  increases 
with  the  range,  and  very  rapidly  at  extreme  ranges ; so  that 
the  accuracy  decreases  with  the  range.  The  accuracy  in 
direction  is  much  greater  than  in  range;  hence,  from  this 
viewpoint,  it  is  desirable  to  attack  a target  so  that  the  direc- 
tion of  fire  will  be  along  the  greatest  dimension  of  the  tar- 
get ; for  example,  a trench  should  be  enfiladed. 

(c)  As  between  a gun  and  a howitzer  of  comparable 
characteristics,  the  howitzer  is  generally  more  accurate  in 
range,  principally  on  account  of  its  greater  angle  of  fall. 
The  reason  is  analogous  to  the  case  of  dispersion  on  ground 
sloping  downward  toward  our  lines.  There  are  however 
some  factors  that  tend  to  make  the  gun  more  accurate. 

(d)  The  tabular  probable  errors*  are  obtained  by  ex- 
perimental firing  at  the  proving  ground,  with  extreme  care 
in  laying  and  favorable  atmospheric  conditions.  In  service, 
conditions  usually  are  less  favorable;  it  is  therefore  cus- 
tomary to  increase  the  tabular  probable  errors  by  50%  in 
using  them  practically.  The  probable  error  varies  with 
conditions ; it  is  greater  in  a rapidly  fluctuating  wind,  when 
the  piece  is  worn,  or  when  the  ammunition  is  old. 

39.  Probability. — (a)  Probability  is  applicable  to 
events  involving  uncertainty,  and  furnishes  a numerical 
measure  of  our  reasonable  expectations  based  on  an  incom- 
plete knowledge.  Since  most  artillery  problems  involve  some 
degree  of  error  or  uncertainty,  there  is  a wide  field  for  the 
application  of  probability  in  many  forms,  most  of  which 
cannot  be  taken  up  here. 

(b)  One  of  the  commonest  applications  of  probability 
is  in  connection  with  hitting  a target.  Two  illustrations  will 
be  given. 

(1)  Assume  a target  20  meters  in  range  by  15  meters  later- 
ally. The  fire  has  been  adjusted  correctly  for  direction,  that  is, 
the  center  of  impact  is  in  the  direction  of  the  center  of  the  target; 
but  the  center  is  25  meters  short  of  the  nearest  element  of  the 
target.  The  piece  is  a 75-mm.  gun  firing  shell  at  a range  of  6000 
meters. 


*It  is  contemplated  that  future  range  tables  shall  give  probable 
errors  which  are  50%  greater  than  the  proving  ground  values.  These 
values  will  be  called  the  field  probable  error . 


V— 39 


84  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


What  is  the  probability  that  the  next  shot  fired  will  hit  the 
target? 

Solution'.  The  desired  probability  is  the  percentage  of  hits 
that  would  be  obtained  out  of  a large  number  of  shots.  Such 
shots  would  be  grouped  around  the  center  in  accordance  with  the 
ladder  of  dispersion. 

The  tabular  probable  error,  plus  50%,  is  33  meters  for  range 
and  6 meters  for  deflection. 

First  neglect  lateral  dispersion  and  consider  the  target  as 
of  indefinite  extent  laterally.  It  extends  33  — 25  = 8 meters 
into  the  25%  space.  Therefore  %s  of  the  25%  of  the  shots  falling 
in  this  space  would  be  hits,  or  6.06%.  Similarly  the  target  ex- 
tends 20  — 8 = 12  meters  into  the  16%  space,  so  that  of  the 
16%  of  shots  falling  in  this  space  would  be  hits,  or  5.81%.  The 
total  percentage  of  hits  for  range  then  would  be  6.06  plus  5.81,  or 
11.87%. 

Now  neglect  dispersion  in  range  and  consider  the  target  as  of 
indefinite  extent  in  range.  All  shots  falling  in  both  25%  spaces 
will  be  hits.  In  addition,  the  target  extends  7.5  — 6 = 1.5  meters 
in  each  of  the  16%  spaces.  Therefore  l.%  of  the  16%  of  shots 
falling  in  each  of  these  spaces  will  be  hits,  or  4%  for  each  space; 
or  8%  for  both  spaces.  The  total  percentage  of  hits  for  direction 
then  would  be  50  plus  8,  or  58%. 

Since  11.87%  of  shots  are  hits  for  range  and  58%  are  hits 
for  direction,  the  percentage  that  will  be  hits  for  both  range  and 
direction  11.87%  x 59%  = 6.9%,  which  is  the  probability  sought. 
In  other  words,  the  chance  of  the  next  shot  hitting  is  about  1 in 
15. 

More  precise  methods,  involving  the  use  of  the  probability 
table,  give  a value  of  7.5%  instead  of  6.9%. 

(2)  An  attack  is  preceded  by  a rolling  barrage  of  shells  fired 
by  75-mm.  guns.  The  first  infantry  wave  is  100  meters  behind 
the  centers  of  impact.  What  is  the  probability  of  a shell  falling 
among  friendly  infantry  when  the  guns  are  firing  at  4000  meters? 
When  they  are  firing  at  8000  meters? 

Solution’.  4000  meters.  The  desired  probability  is  the  per- 
centage of  short  shots  of  a large  number  such  as  the  one  con- 
sidered. 

The  field  probable  error  in  range  is  22.5  meters.  4 probable 
errors  is  only  90  meters,  so  that  the  percentage  of  short  shots 
is  negligibly  small,  and  the  required  probability  is  practically  0. 

8000  meters.  The  probable  error  in  range  is  58.5  meters. 
100  meters  (the  distance  the  infantry  is  behind  the  center  of  im- 
pact) includes  the  25%  space  and  41.5  meters  of  the  16%  space. 
Therefore  41.5/58.5  of  the  16%  space  would  receive  safe  shots, 
or  11.4%.  All  shots  beyond  the  center  would  be  safe.  Therefore 
the  percentage  of  safe  shots  would  be  the  sum  of  50,  25,  and  11.4, 
or  86.4.  The  remainder  would  be  short  shots,  and  the  required 
probability  is  100 — 86.4  = 13.6%.  In  other  words,  1 shot  in  7 
would  fall  among  the  friendly  infantry. 

(c)  The  second  example  shows  the  increased  danger 
to  friendly  troops  due  to  the  use  of  long  ranges  by  the  artil- 
lery. From  a comparison  of  the  results  with  the  data  given 
in  paragraph  37,  it  may  appear  that  the  data  given  are  un- 
necessarily conservative,  but  it  should  be  noted  that  the 
example  does  not  consider  the  range  of  effective  fragments. 


V — 40-41 


FIRING  85 

Section  VI 

Firing 

Paragraphs 


Subdivisions  of  Firing 40 

Observation  41 

Methods  of  Adjustment 42 

Adjustment  by  Measured  Deviations I 43 

Adjustment  by  Bracketing 44 

Adjustment  of  Time  Fire 45 

Method  of  Fire  During  Adjustment 46 

Fire  for  Effect 47 

Registration  48 

Barrages  49 


40.  Subdivisions  of  Firing. — (a)  As  brought  out  in 
paragraph  19,  it  is  desirable  to  make  the  preparation  of  lire 
as  accurate  as  possible,  but  it  always  is  found  necessary  to 
make  corrections  during  the  firing  in  order  to  secure  the 
maximum  effectiveness.  This  is  in  general  possible  if  the 
firing  can  be  observed,  and  the  period  of  firing  devoted  to 
this  purpose  is  called  fire  for  adjustment.  When  the  ad- 
justment has  been  completed  as  far  as  circumstances  per- 
mit, fire  for  effect  is  or  may  be  undertaken.  If  observation 
is  not  possible,  fire  for  effect  is  delivered  from  the  outset, 
but  with  diminished  effectiveness.  No  amount  of  careful 
preparation  of  fire  can  eliminate  the  necessity  of  fire  for 
adjustment,  or  yield  the  same  effectiveness. 

(b)  There  is  no  clear  line  of  demarcation  between  fire 
for  adjustment  and  fire  for  effect;  considerable  effect  may 
be  obtained  during  adjustment,  and  adjustment  is  continued 
if  necessary  during  fire  for  effect.  During  adjustment  how- 
ever, effect  is  a secondary  consideration;  while  during  fire 
for  effect,  effect  is  the  principal  object. 

41.  Observation. — (a)  Observation,  on  which  fire  ad- 
justment depends,  is  viewing  the  strike  of  the  projectiles 
in  order  to  determine  their  location  with  respect  to  the  tar- 
get. Observation  is  of  two  kinds,  terrestrial  and  aerial.  The 
latter  will  be  discussed  later. 

(b)  Terrestrial  observation  is  classified,  according  to 
the  position  of  the  observer  with  respect  to  the  line  of  fire, 
as : axial,  when  the  observer  is  on  or  near  the  line  of  fire ; 


V — 41-43 


86  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

lateral,  when  he  is  considerably  displaced  from  the  line  of 
fire ; flank,  when  he  is  on  or  nearly  on  the  flank  of  the  target ; 
combined,  when  one  axial  observer  and  one  lateral  or  flank 
observer  are  used  conjointly;  and  bilateral,  when  two  or 
more  lateral  or  flank  observers  are  used  conjointly  from 
considerably  separated  points. 

(c)  A single  observer  near  the  line  of  fire  can  deter- 
mine the  angular  deviation  of  the  shot  in  direction,  that  is, 
its  angular  distance  from  the  target.  In  range,  ordinarily 
he  can  determine  only  that  the  shot  is  short  or  over,  that  is, 
he  can  sense  it;  but  he  cannot  determine  the  deviation  in 
range.  The  sensing  is  by  means  of  the  smoke  of  the  burst; 
if  it  hides  the  target,  the  shot  is  short ; if  it  brings  the  tar- 
get into  relief,  the  shot  is  over.  If  the  observer  is  directly 
to  one  flank  of  the  target,  he  can  determine  the  angular 
deviation  in  range,  but  cannot  do  no  more  than  sense  the  shot 
in  direction  as  right  or  left. 

(d)  The  use  of  combined  observation  under  favorable 
conditions  may  permit  the  determination  of  the  deviation 
of  the  shot  in  both  range  and  direction. 

42.  Methods  of  Adjustment. — There  are  two 
methods  of  adjustment  employed,  depending  on  whether 
the  system  of  observation  of  fire  is  such  that  the  deviation 
in  both  range  and  direction  can  or  cannot  be  determined. 

(a)  Adjustment  by  measured  deviations,  sometimes 
called  the  method  of  successive  approximations,  used  when 
the  deviation  of  the  shot  in  range  and  direction  can  be  de- 
termined accurately. 

(b)  Adjustment  by  bracketing , used  when  the  method 
by  measured  deviations  is  not  practicable. 

The  bracketing  method  is  the  usual  one  in  field  artil- 
lery firing;  that  by  measured  deviations,  the  exceptional 
one. 

43.  Adjustment  by  Measured  Deviations. — (a)  The 
actual  first  shot  is  disregarded,  or  numbered  0,  as  it  is  apt 
to  give  misleading  results.  The  first  shot,  so-called,  is  fired 
with  the  same  data.  The  second  shot  is  fired  with  data 
corrected  by  the  deviations  of  the  first  shot,  and  should  hit 
the  target;  but  in  general  it  does  not,  due  to  dispersion. 
The  third  shot  is  fired  with  data  corrected  by  one-half  the 


V — 43-44 


FIRING  87 

deviations  of  the  second  shot.  Similarly  the  deviations  of 
the  third  shot  are  divided  by  three  for  application  to  the 
fourth  shot,  and  so  on  till  the  adjustment  is  sufficiently 
refined.  It  is  seen  that  the  method  consists  in  dividing  the 
deviations  for  a shot  by  the  number  of  the  shot,  as  a basis 
of  correcting  for  the  succeeding  shot.  This  gives  due  weight 
to  the  results  of  all  shots  fired  and  should  insure  a steady 
approach  to  the  target.  If  the  adjustment  is  not  satisfac- 
tory after  the  sixth  shot,  it  is  taken  as  an  indication  that 
some  of  the  deviations  have  been  erroneous  and  the  adjust- 
ment is  begun  anew. 

(b)  Unfortunately  the  measured  deviations  essential 
to  this  method  are  rarely  available,  and  its  application  is 
limited  to  highly  organized  fronts.  It  is  to  be  noted  that 
dispersion  makes  its  influence  felt  in  this  method  by  pro- 
tracting and  complicating  the  process. 

44.  Adjustment  by  Bracketing. — (a)  The  observer 
usually  is  near  the  line  of  fire.  Fire  is  opened  with  the  de- 
termined data.  The  direction  then  is  corrected  by  the 
measured  deviation.  If  the  observation  for  range  is  “short” 
the  range  is  increased;  if  “over”  the  range  is  decreased. 
The  amount  of  the  range  change  depends  on  the  accuracy 
of  the  initial  determination ; if  we  were  very  confident  of  its 
accuracy,  about  100  meters  would  be  sufficient;  but  if  the 
initial  range  was  estimated  and  rather  long,  a change  of 
400  meters  might  be  advisable.  One  or  more  shots  are 
fired  at  the  altered  range;  and  if  still  in  the  same  sense  as 
the  first  range,  the  range  is  changed  again  by  the  same 
amount.  Finally  a range  will  be  found  which  gives  shots  in 
the  opposite  sense.  Thus  there  will  be  two  ranges,  differing 
by  100,  200,  or  400  meters,  or  by  a substantially  equivalent 
amount  in  elevation,  one  range  giving  observations  short 
and  the  other  observation  over.  These  two  ranges  consti- 
tute what  is  called  a bracket. 

(b)  It  would  seem  that  a bracket  based  on  correctly 
observed  shots  would  make  it  certain  that  the  target  lay 
within  the  ranges  of  the  bracket.  This  would  be  true  but 
for  one  factor — dispersion.  If  one  shot  is  observed  at  say 
the  short  limit  of  the  bracket,  the  shot  may  be  one  at  the 
short  limit  of  the  dispersion.  In  this  case,  although  the 


V — 44-45 


88  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

shot  actually  is  short,  the  center  of  impact  and  the  range 
may  be  over,  which  raises  doubt  as  to  the  correctness  of 
the  bracket.  For  this  reason,  it  is  good  practice  to  verify 
a bracket,  before  finally  accepting  it,  by  securing  at  least 
two  observations  at  each  limit. 

(c)  After  obtaining  the  first  bracket,  the  process  of 
range  adjustment  is  continued  by  firing  at  the  mid-range 
of  the  bracket.  When  this  range  has  been  observed,  a new 
bracket  results  of  one-half  the  size  of  the  former  one. 

This  process  is  continued  until  a further  reduction 
would  make  the  bracket  smaller  than  the  target,  or  until 
the  bracket  is  of  a size  equal  to  four  field  probable  errors, 
approximately  100  to  200  meters,  generally  near  the  lesser 
value.  This  process  is  called  a bracket  adjustment. 

(d)  If  a more  accurate  adjustment  is  necessary,  and 
time  permits,  as  for  the  destruction  of  a small  target  like 
a battery  or  trench,  a precision  adjustment  is  undertaken. 
Fire  is  opened  at  the  mid-range  of  the  last  bracket  obtained, 
that  is,  one  of  six  tabular  probable  errors.  This  range  al- 
most surely  will  give  both  shorts  and  overs.  Based  on  the 
proportions  of  shorts  and  overs,  small  changes  of  range  or 
elevation  are  made  until  substantially  equal  proportions  of 
shorts  and  overs  are  obtained.  If,  during  the  early  stages 
of  bracketing,  a range  gives  both  shorts  and  overs,  the 
precision  adjustment  may  be  undertaken  at  once. 

(e)  If  the  observer,  instead  of  being  near  the  line  of 
fire,  is  to  the  flank  of  the  target,  adjustment  for  range  is  by 
measured  deviations  and  that  for  direction  is  by  bracket- 
ing. 

45.  Adjustment  of  Time  Fire. — Time  fire  may  be 
with  either  shrapnel  or  shell.  Shrapnel  adjustment  consists 
of  the  adjustment  of  the  trajectory  as  just  described,  fol- 
lowed or  accompanied  by  an  adjustment  of  the  fuse  so  that 
the  projectile  will  burst  in  air  at  the  proper  height.  This 
height  depends  on  the  weapon. 

For  the  75-mm.  gun,  the  best  height  of  burst  in  fire 
for  effect  is  3 mils  above  the  target,  with  the  trajectory  pass- 
ing through  the  target. 

With  time  shell  fire,  the  object  is  to  place  the  burst 
vertically  above  the  target,  at  a linear  height  of  about  20 


V — 45-47 


FIRING  89 

yards.  The  methods  are  different  from  those  used  with 
time  shrapnel. 

46.  Method  of  Fire  During  Adjustment. — The  usual 
method  of  fire  during  adjustment  is  the  salvo,  and  generally 
by  the  entire  battery.  A salvo  is  the  successive  discharge 
of  the  pieces  at  regular  intervals  from  one  flank  of  the  bat- 
tery to  the  other.  The  interval  is  about  3 seconds.  The 
object  of  the  interval  between  shots  is  to  permit  the  obser- 
vation of  individual  shots,  in  order  that  all  possible  infor- 
mation may  be  derived  from  them.  Salvos  may  be  platoon 
or  battery,  depending  on  whether  two  or  four  pieces  are 
used. 

In  precision  adjustment,  the  pieces  sometimes  are  ad- 
justed separately. 

47.  Fire  for  Effect. — (a)  Fire  for  effect  is  of  three 
classes,  depending  on  the  extent  of  the  preceding  adjust- 
ment. 


(1)  That  based  on  a precision  adjustment  called  precision 
fire  for  effect.  This  is  simply  a continuation  of  the  last  stage 
of  adjustment.  Successive  salvos  are  fired  at  the  range  or  eleva- 
vation  determined  in  adjustment.  Firing  is  continued  until  the 
desired  effect  is  obtained  or  until  a large  accumulation  of  obser- 
vations show  that  the  range  is  incorrect.  In  the  latter  case, 
which  generally  would  be  due  to  atmospheric  conditions,  a suita- 
ble change  in  elevation  is  made  and  the  firing  continued. 

(2)  That  based  on  a bracket  adjustment.  The  entire  depth 
of  the  bracket  and  width  of  the  target  are  searched  with  a 
thoroughness  depending  on  the  time  and  ammunition  available 
and  the  importance  of  the  target.  Usually  the  range  is  changed 
by  bounds  of  25  or  50  meters  for  shell  and  100  meters  for  time 
shrapnel.  It  is  desirable  to  use  bounds  in  direction  of  10  meters 
for  the  75-mm.  gun  and  20  meters  for  the  155-mm.  howitzer. 

The  method  of  fire  used  may  be  battery  volleys,  in  which 
each  piece  fires  rapidly  a prescribed  number  of  rounds  with 
fixed  data,  but  without  regard  to  the  other  pieces. 

(3)  That  based  merely  on  the  preparation  of  fire,  without 
previous  adjustment  called  systematic  fire  for  effect.  It  was  this 
method  which  was  used  so  extensively  on  the  Western  Front,  since 
the  consideration  of  secrecy  Drevented  practically  all  fire  for  ad- 
justment. 

(b)  The  methods  of  zone  and  systematic  fire  for  effect, 
particularly  the  latter,  are  extravagant  in  ammunition,  and 
relatively  ineffective.  The  lack  of  concentrated  effect  must 
be  offset  by  increasing  the  amount  of  artillery  firing  on  a 
given  locality ; the  rate  of  fire  is  limited  by  the  resistance  of 
the  materiel.  These  methods  are  useful  principally  for  neu- 
tralizing, that  is,  causing  the  enemy  to  take  cover,  and 
keeping  down  or  stopping  his  fire. 


V — 47-49 


90  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(c)  Precision  fire  for  effect  is  the  only  method  which 
can  be  relied  upon  for  considerable  and  thorough  destruc- 
tion. 

48.  Registration. — (a)  Adjusted  fire  can  be  delivered 
on  a target  without  adjustment  on  the  target  itself,  particu- 
larly when  good  maps  are  available.  A distinctive  point, 
called  the  datum  or  registration  point,  is  selected  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  target,  and  a precision  adjustment  made  upon 
it  at  leisure.  The  fire  then  is  shifted  to  the  target  by  meas- 
uring the  difference  in  data  between  the  datum  point  and 
the  target,  either  from  the  map  or  on  the  ground. 

(b)  The  use  of  a datum  point  may  be  necessary  either 
because  observation  on  the  target  is  not  possible  or  because 
the  target  has  not  yet  appeared.  This  method  of  registra- 
tion is  effective  in  preparing  to  attack  prospective  targets 
quickly,  but  it  may  reveal  prematurely  the  presence  of  the 
artillery. 

49.  Barrages. — (a)  Barrages  are  a form  of  fire  for 
effect,  in  that  they  are  prepared  or  adjusted  beforehand  and 
effect  is  the  primary  consideration  while  they  are  being  de- 
livered. 

(b)  In  a defensive  or  standing  barrage  in  a stabilized 
situation,  a 75-mm.  gun  battery  generally  covers  a front 
of  200  meters  or,  desirably,  less.  This  front  is  divided  into 
four  portions,  each  assigned  to  one  gun.  Each  gun  fires 
initially  at  the  right  extremity  of  its  portion;  the  succeed- 
ing shots  are  distributed  to  the  left  of  the  first  shot  at  in- 
tervals of  about  15  meters  until  the  allotted  portion  is  cov- 
ered, when  the  sweep  is  repeated.  Such  barrages  must  be 
fired  immediately  on  call  from  the  infantry,  so  that  the 
pieces  are  kept  laid  constantly  for  the  normal  barrage.  A 
sentinel  is  on  duty  at  each  gun  emplacement  night  and  day 
with  orders  as  to  just  how  the  barrage  is  to  be  fired  and 
with  what  data.  The  ammunition,  habitually  shell,  is  piled 
by  the  piece  ready  for  use.  The  firing  data  are  corrected 
periodically  for  weather  conditions  where  the  necessary 
meteorological  data  are  available. 

(c)  Similar  detailed  preparatory  measures  are  taken 
in  the  case  of  the  other  emergency  missions,  such  as  possible 
barrages  and  counter  preparations. 


V — 49-51 


AERIAL  OBSERVATION  91 

(d)  The  rolling  barrage  is  prepared  initially  in  much 

the  same  detail  as  the  standing  barrage,  with  additional 
detailed  provisions  for  its  progression  according  to  a fixed 
time  schedule.  Ordinarily  each  piece  is  supplied  with  a form 
sheet  filled  in  under  the  following  headings:  the  H time, 

giving  the  time  at  which  fire  is  opened  at  each  of  the  suc- 
cessive elevations  referred  to  H hour;  the  synchronized 
time,  filled  in  after  H hour  is  announced ; the  site,  varying 
if  necessary  with  the  terrain;  the  kind  and  lot  of  ammuni- 
tion and  fuse ; the  elevations ; the  method  of  fire  and  num- 
ber of  rounds  at  each  elevation ; the  rate  of  fire.  The  forms 
are  filled  in  progressively  as  the  data  become  available,  the 
last  elements  usually  being  the  synchronized  times  and  the 
deflections  and  elevations  corrected  for  the  meteorological 
data  received  just  before  the  firing. 

(e)  The  great  amount  of  ammunition  expended  in  fir- 
ing either  a standing  or  a rolling  barrage  should  be  appre- 
ciated by  all  officers.  For  a standing  barrage,  with  an  aver- 
age rate  of  fire  and  an  average  duration,  the  expenditure 
for  75-mm.  guns  is  about  28  rounds  per  gun  each  time  the 
barrage  is  put  down.  For  a rolling  barrage,  with  an  aver- 
age rate  of  fire  and  an  average  rate  of  advance,  the  expendi- 
ture may  be  taken  as  one  day  of  fire  (300  rounds)  for  each 
75-mm.  gun,  for  each  2500  yards’  advance. 


Section  VII 

Aerial  Observation 

Paragraphs 


General  50 

Balloon  Observation  51 

Airplane  Observation  52 


50.  General. — Aerial  observation  is  of  two  kinds,  bal- 
loon and  airplane.  Both  have  decided  advantages  over  ter- 
restrial observation  in  the  greater  amount  of  hostile  terrain 
vissible. 

51.  Balloon  Observation. — The  methods  of  balloon 
observation  are  essentially  those  used  on  the  ground.  Com- 


V— 51-52 


92  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

munication  is  normally  by  telephone  direct  to  the  battalion 
or  battery  firing. 

52.  Airplane  Observation. — (a)  An  airplane  has  the 
advantage  of  practically  vertical  observation,  which  is  val- 
uable not  only  in  the  observation  of  fire  but  also  in  the  loca- 
tion of  targets.  The  deviation  of  the  shots  can  be  deter- 
mined in  both  range  and  direction,  at  least  as  far  as  the 
position  of  the  observer  is  concerned  (par.  41).  The  dis- 
advantages of  airplane  observation  of  fire  are  in  communi- 
cation with  the  ground,  the  movement  of  the  plane,  the  ob- 
struction of  vision  for  various  reasons,  and  the  operations 
of  hostile  planes.  In  addition,  a high  degree  of  cooperation 
between  the  airplane  and  the  artillery  is  necessary  and  is 
difficult  of  attainment. 

(b)  Communication  between  the  airplane  and  the 
ground  is  now  by  radio;  it  was  formerly  by  visual  signal, 
and  developments  point  to  the  use  of  the  radio  telephone  for 
the  future.  Communication  between  the  ground  and  the 
airplane  is  ordinarily  by  panel  signals  displayed  on  the 
ground,  but  some  airplanes  are  now  equipped  with  facilities 
for  receiving  radio,  in  which  case  reciprocal  radio  communi- 
cation is  possible.  Codes  are  used ; messages  rarely  can  be 
spelled  out,  as  it  would  require  too  much  time. 

(c)  The  observer  can  estimate  distances  in  connection 
with  the  burst  of  shots  by  comparison  with  known  distances 
between  prominent  points,  or  he  may  use  a gridded  map  or 
photograph.  When  the  shots  are  close  to  the  target  (about 
100  yards  in  range  or  10  yards  in  direction),  the  observer 
reports  only  the  sense,  as,  short  or  over,  right  or  left. 

(d)  The  methods  of  adjustment  and  fire  for  effect  are 
those  described  in  connection  with  terrestrial  observation. 
Adjustment  by  measured  deviations  (par.  43)  sometimes 
can  be  used,  when  the  observer  can  estimate  the  deviations 
with  sufficient  accuracy.  The  preparation  should  be  as  ac- 
curate as  possible.  In  addition,  if  the  battery  has  oppor- 
tunity to  adjust  partially,  the  first  shots  are  less  apt  to  be 
lost  by  the  aerial  observer  and  the  adjustment  will  be  expe- 
dited. 

(e)  Airplane  observation  at  night  is  possible,  under 
special  conditions. 


VI— 1-2 


CHAPTER  VI 

Reconnaissance.  Selection  of  Positions 


Paragraphs 


Section  I.  — Reconnaissance 1-10 

Section  II. — Selection  of  Positions 11-26 


Section  I 
Reconnaissance 

Paragraphs 


Reconnaissance  for  Positions 1 

Reconnaissance  for  Information 2 

The  General  Selection  of  Artillery  Positions 3 

The  Progression  of  Artillery  Reconnaissance 4 

Additional  Reconnaissance  Required 5 

Conveyances  for  Reconnaissance  6 

Instructions  to  Artillery  Units  During  a Reconnaissance — 7 

Time  Available  for  Artillery  Reconnaissance 8 

Transmission  of  Information  During  a Reconnaissance 9 

Reconnaissance  by  Heavy  Artillery 10 


1.  Reconnaissance  for  Positions. — (a)  Reconnais- 
sance for  positions  is  greatly  aided  by  familiarity  with  the 
terrain.  It  is,  therefore,  essential  that  artillery  officers  con- 
stantly study  the  topography  and  compare  the  terrain  fea- 
tures with  available  topographical  maps.  An  “eye  for  the 
ground”  is  one  of  the  principal  requisites  of  an  artillery 
officer. 

(b)  Invariably  a reconnaissance  is  made  for  the  pur- 
pose of  locating  suitable  positions  for  artillery  units,  and  the 
actual  sites  for  battery  emplacements,  or  the  emplace- 
ments for  platoons  or  individual  guns.  Co-related  with  this 
reconnaissance  is  that  made  for  the  locations  of  suitable 
sites  for  observation  posts,  command  posts,  and  radio  sta- 
tions, of  suitable  positions  for  limbers  and  combat  trains,  of 
routes  of  approach  and  supply,  and  of  routes  for  laying  tele- 
phone lines. 

2.  Reconnaissance  for  Information. — (a)  In  gen- 
eral, reconnaissance  for  locating  the  enemy  and  gaining  in- 


93 


94 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


formation  concerning  him  devolves  upon  troops  of  other 
arms.  Successful  artillery  support  depends  in  a great 
measure  upon  the  prompt  transmission  of  such  information 
to  the  artillery.  Artillery  commanders  employ  every  means 
in  their  power  to  establish  such  relations  with  commanders 
of  other  arms  as  to  insure  prompt  transmission  of  informa- 
tion. Quick  and  reliable  communications  are  essential,  as 
well  as  an  efficient  information  service  in  the  artillery  com- 
mand for  gathering  and  disseminating  the  information  ob- 
tained. The  artillery  information  service  is  discussed  in 
Chapter  XVIII. 

(b)  Though  depending  to  a large  extent  upon  other 
arms  for  information  concerning  the  enemy  and  the  tactical 
situation,  there  are  certain  types  of  information  that  must 
be  gathered  by  means  of  artillery  reconnaissance.  Artillery 
liaison  officers  accompany  the  commanders  of  supported  in- 
fantry and  cavalry  units  in  both  offensive  and  defensive 
action,  in  order  to  keep  the  artillery  commanders  informed 
as  to  changes  in  the  tactical  situation,  and  as  to  the  coop- 
eration desired  of  the  artillery  by  the  other  arms.  These 
liaison  officers  usually  have  reconnaissance  detachments 
(scouts)  that  search  for  special  information  of  tactical  and 
technical  value  to  the  artillery  command  to  which  they  be- 
long, such  as  the  effect  of  both  hostile  and  friendly  artillery 
fire,  the  description  and  coordinates  of  suitable  artillery  tar- 
gets, the  location  of  forward  observation  posts,  routes  of  ad- 
vance, battery  positions,  and  places  where  the  assistance  of 
engineers  will  be  required  for  the  advance  of  artillery. 

(c)  In  addition  to  these  reconnaissance  parties  closely 
associated  with  the  other  arms,  there  must  be  reconnais- 
sance parties  with  independent  artillery  missions,  such  as 
those  sent  out  by  battalion  and  higher  commanders  for  the 
reconnaissance  of  routes  and  positions  or  to  gain  some  spe- 
cial information,  those  accompanying  raids  to  gain  informa- 
tion within  the  hostile  lines,  and  those  sent  forward  by  bat- 
tery commanders  to  seek  observation  close  to  the  front  lines, 
in  order  that  the  effect  of  fire  may  be  observed,  targets  lo- 
cated, or  fire  conducted  on  targets  that  cannot  be  seen  from 
observation  posts  nearer  the  firing  batteries. 


YI— 2-4 


RECONNAISSANCE  95 

(d)  Active  reconnaissance  is  essential  to  artillery  ef- 
ficiency. An  artillery  command  must  find  most  of  its  own 
targets  and  determine  the  necessary  technical  information 
concerning  them;  it  cannot  depend  upon  the  troops  it  is 
supporting  to  tell  it  constantly  when,  where  and  how  to 
employ  its  fire. 

3.  The  General  Selection  of  Artillery  Positions. — 

(a)  The  tactical  situation  and  the  plan  of  action  decided 
upon  by  the  commander  of  the  troops  limit  the  areas  with- 
in which  artillery  takes  position.  The  artillery  is,  there- 
fore, not  usually  free  to  choose  its  owm  locations,  but  makes 
the  best  use  of  the  terrain  within  the  limits  imposed. 

(b)  After  considering  the  recommendations  of  his  ar- 
tillery advisor,  the  commander  of  the  troops  designates  the 
areas  within  which,  or  places  near  which,  the  artillery  is  to 
take  up  its  positions,  and  influences  the  distribution  of  units 
by  a general  indication  of  the  tasks  to  be  performed. 

4.  The  Progression  of  Artillery  Keconnaissance. — 
(a)  Our  field  artillery  drill  and  service  regulations  require 
that  “all  field  artillery  commanders  habitually  precede  their 
commands  to  the  position  to  be  occupied.” 

(b)  The  artillery  advisor  or  the  senior  artillery  com- 
mander should  be  in  close  touch  with  the  commander  of  the 
troops,  and  should  accompany  him  on  his  preliminary  re- 
connaissance. In  this  way  he  is  kept  informed  as  to  the  tac- 
tical situation  and  plan  of  action,  and  receives  early  instruc- 
tions as  to  the  special  tasks  to  be  performed  by  the  artillery. 
During  this  reconnaissance,  and  in  accordance  with  the  in- 
structions he  receives,  he  formulates  a plan  for  the  disposi- 
tion and  employment  of  the  artillery.  At  the  earliest  op- 
portunity he  communicates  this  plan  to  the  next  subordinate 
artillery  commanders.  Depending  upon  the  situation  and 
the  time  available,  this  plan  is  communicated  by  means  of  a 
written  order,  or  verbally  to  his  next  subordinates,  who 
either  accompany  him  on  a reconnaissance  or  meet  him  at 
a designated  rendezvous  point.  Thus  commences  a pro- 
gression of  reconnaissances  that  extend  successively  from 
each  artillery  commander  to  those  of  the  next  lower  units. 

(c)  In  large  commands  this  progressive  reconnaissance 
is  made : first,  by  brigade  commanders  to  determine  suitable 


VI— 4-6 


96  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

areas,  within  the  limits  imposed  by  the  commander  of  the 
troops,  for  the  employment  of  their  regiments;  second,  by 
regimental  commanders  to  select  the  general  locations  for 
battalion  positions;  third,  a more  detailed  reconnaissance 
by  battalion  commanders  to  locate,  within  narrow  limits, 
the  position  for  their  batteries ; and,  last  of  all,  a reconnais- 
sance by  battery  commanders  to  determine  the  exact  posi- 
tions for  the  guns.  These  various  steps,  in  the  reconnais- 
sance for  the  selection  of  artillery  positions,  generally  merge 
together;  regimental  commanders  usually  accompany  their 
brigade  commanders  on  reconnaissance,  following  which 
battalion  commanders  must  be  close  at  hand  to  receive  or- 
ders from  their  regimental  commanders.  Battalion  com- 
manders then  go  over  the  terrain  with  their  battery  com- 
manders, or  if  the  battery  commanders  have  not  yet  come 
up,  they  indicate  the  battery  positions  to  the  battery  agents 
or  to  the  battery  reconnaissance  officers,  should  the  latter 
have  accompanied  the  battalion  commanders. 

(d)  In  some  situations  this  progressive  reconnaissance 
must  be  curtailed.  There  may  not  be  sufficient  time  for 
brigade  commanders  to  make  a complete  reconnaissance  on 
the  ground,  and  the  map  must  be  resorted  to  for  indicating 
to  regimental  commanders  the  general  areas  to  be  occu- 
pied by  the  regiments.  Reconnaissance  on  the  ground  is 
always  to  be  preferred. 

5.  Additional  Reconnaissance  Required. — With  the 
reconnaissance  for  the  selection  of  artillery  positions,  dis- 
cussed in  the  preceding  paragraph,  there  must  be  a sim- 
ultaneous reconnaissance  for  routes  of  approach,  routes 
for  lines  of  communications,  positions  for  limbers  and  com- 
bat trains,  and  of  positions  for  observation  posts  and  com- 
mand posts.  All  of  these  factors  influence,  to  a varying 
extent,  the  selection  of  artillery  positions.  They  will  be 
discussed  in  detail  in  succeeding  paragraphs. 

6.  Conveyances  for  Reconnaissance. — A few  years 
ago  artillery  reconnaissance  was  made  on  horseback  or  on 
foot.  At  present  the  automobile  and  motorcycle  afford  a 
means  of  rapid  conveyance  on  reconnaissance  that  will  be 
extensively  employed  in  future  wherever  roads  permit;  es- 
pecially by  the  higher  artillery  commanders  and  the  com- 


VI— 6-8 


RECONNAISSANCE  97 

manders  of  motorized  units.  As  a rule,  a thorough  recon- 
naissance cannot  be  made  entirely  from  the  seat  of  a motor 
vehicle,  and  though  a motor  vehicle  may  provide  a rapid 
means  of  transportation  to  the  scene  of  a reconnaissance, 
much  of  the  detailed  reconnaissance  must  be  completed  on 
foot. 

7.  Instructions  to  Artillery  Units  During  a Re- 
connaissance.— When  a commander  goes  forward  on  re- 
connaissance he  instructs  the  officer  left  in  command  on  the 
following  points,  as  far  as  they  may  be  desirable  or  practi- 
cable: (1)  The  tactical  situation;  (2)  whether  or  not  the 
command  is  to  follow  at  once,  and  if  so  the  route  to  be  fol- 
lowed and  the  rate  of  march.  Additional  instructions  may 
be  transmitted  from  time  to  time  by  markers,  who  should 
be  left  at  places  where  uncertainty  as  to  the  route  may  arise 
or  where  difficulties  are  to  be  avoided.  As  soon  as  the  bat- 
tery positions  and  the  best  routes  for  approaching  them  have 
been  selected,  the  battalions  or  batteries  are  sent  for  and 
guided  to  their  respective  positions. 

8.  Time  Available  for  Artillery  Reconnaissance. 
— (a)  Under  some  circumstances  a reconnaissance  may  be 
carried  on  for  days,  as  it  was  in  preparation  for  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  St.  Mihiel  Salient.  Under  other  circumstances 
the  reconnaissance  must  be  completed  within  a few  hours 
or  even  a few  minutes  while  artillery  units  are  marching 
toward  the  positions  they  are  to  occupy  for  fire.  Fre- 
quently, it  is  not  desirable  to  halt  an  artillery  column,  so 
that  the  reconnaissance  must  be  made  with  great  haste.  It 
is  under  conditions  of  this  kind,  conditions  that  are  fre- 
quently met  in  a moving  situation,  that  a well-trained  head- 
quarters with  a systematized  scheme  of  operation  is  of  in- 
valuable assistance  to  an  artillery  commander. 

(b)  When  it  is  necessary  to  bring  guns  into  action 
quickly  for  the  support  of  other  troops,  delay  occasioned 
by  a protracted  search  for  technical  and  tactical  advantages 
is  inadmissible.  The  main  consideration  is  to  place  the 
guns  as  promptly  as  possible  in  a position  from  which  they 
can  render  effective  support;  but  even  under  such  circum- 
stances, a good  eye  for  the  ground  and  skill  in  taking  ad- 
vantage of  cover,  enables  an  artillery  commander  to  post 


VI— 8-10 


98  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

his  guns  advantageously.  As  a rule,  however,  the  necessity 
for  the  employment  of  artillery  may  be  foreseen,  and  op- 
portunity may  be  gained  for  adequate  reconnaissance.  Ev- 
ery effort  should  be  made  to  conclude  all  preparations  before 
the  arrival  of  the  firing  batteries. 

9.  Transmission  of  Information  During  a Recon- 
naissance.— Since  the  plan  of  the  commander  of  troops 
is  the  determining  factor  in  the  selection  of  positions,  it  is 
essential  that,  during  the  progress  of  a reconnaissance,  all 
commanders  transmit  to  their  subordinates  all  available 
information  as  to  the  plan  of  action  and  the  part  to  be  taken 
by  their  respective  units;  also  all  available  information  as 
to  the  location  of  the  enemy  and  of  friendly  troops. 

10.  Reconnaissance  by  Heavy  Artillery. — The  re- 
connaissance of  positions  for  heavy  artillery  commences 
usually  with  a reconnaissance  of  roads  and  an  examination 
of  bridges  to  determine  whether  or  not  they  are  strong 
enough  for  the  passage  of  heavy  guns.  The  engineers  us- 
ually assist  the  artillery  in  this  reconnaissance.  The  posi- 
tions for  the  very  heavy  guns  depend  largely  upon  the  loca- 
tion of  suitable  roads  for  advancing  and  supplying  these 
guns,  and  the  availability  of  narrow  or  standard  gauge 
track  for  the  supply  of  ammunition. 


Section  II 

Selection  of  Positions 

Paragraphs 


Tactical  Considerations  in  the  Selection  of  Artillery 

Positions  11 

Tactical  Classification  of  Artillery  Positions 12 

Selection  of  Battery  Positions 13 

Considerations  Affecting  the  Selection  of  Battery  Posi- 
tions   14 

Considerations  of  Range 15 

The  Field  of  Fire  and  Dead  Spaces 16 

Considerations  of  Communications  in  the  Selection  of  a 

Battery  Position 17 

Consideration  of  Observation  in  the  Selection  of  Battery 

Positions 18 

Concealment  19 

Facility  of  Movement 20 

Favorable  Conditions  for  Resupply  of  Ammunition 21 

Cover  for  Limbers  or  Gun  Tractors 22 


VI— 11-12 


SELECTION  OF  POSITIONS  99 

Gun  Emplacements 23 

Interference  with  the  Operation  of  Other  Troops 24 

Security  of  a Battery  Position 25 

Protection  of  Guns  and  Personnel 26 


11.  Tactical  Considerations  in  the  Selection  of 
Artillery  Positions. — The  tactical  situation  and  the  plan 
of  action  decided  upon  by  the  commander  of  the  troops,  as 
well  as  the  terrain,  determine  whether  the  artillery  com- 
mand is  to  be  massed  close  to  the  front  lines  or  well  to  the 
rear,  on  either  flank  or  in  the  center ; distributed  along  one 
or  more  lines  parallel  to  the  front  or  disposed  in  consider- 
able depth.  The  character  of  the  terrain  is  a strong  in- 
fluencing factor  in  the  general  dispositions  of  an  artillery 
command.  Tactical  dispositions  are  discussed  in  detail  in 
the  chapters  on  tactical  employment  that  follow. 

12.  Tactical  Classification  of  Artillery  Positions. 
— (a)  Artillery  may  be  posted  for  immediate  action,  in  ob- 
servation or  in  readiness . 

(b)  When  posted  for  immediate  action  the  guns  are 
unlimbered  and  fire  is  opened  as  promptly  as  possible  upon 
indicated  targets. 

(c)  When  posted  in  observation  the  guns  are  unlim- 
bered and  all  preparations  made  for  opening  fire  at  the  de- 
sired moment  upon  existing  or  expected  targets.  Fire 
should  not  be  opened  without  instructions  from  the  com- 
mander who  ordered  a position  in  observation,  except  under 
circumstances  that  place  the  commander  of  the  artillery 
unit  out  of  communication,  and  require  him  to  act  on  his 
own  responsibility. 

(d)  When  posted  in  readiness,  the  guns  are  not  un- 
limbered. They  are  held  under  cover  near  a position  for 
possible  immediate  action,  but  so  that  they  can  be  moved 
quickly  to  another  locality  if  the  development  of  the  tactical 
situation  so  requires.  In  the  meantime  the  immediate  tac- 
tical situation  is  studied,  positions  in  the  neighborhood  for 
posting  the  guns  to  meet  different  eventualities  are  selected, 
and  preparations  are  made  for  occupying  the  selected  posi- 
tions and  for  opening  fire  upon  existing  or  expected  targets. 


VI— 12-15 


100  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(e)  The  use  of  these  terms  in  orders  is  dangerous  un- 
less their  meaning  is  thoroughly  understood  by  all  con- 
cerned. 

13.  Selection  of  Battery  Positions. — “The  only  in- 
variable rule  in  the  choice  of  a position  is  to  post  the  guns 
so  as  to  be  able  to  carry  out  effectively  the  task  assigned 
them.”  This  involves  consideration  of  range,  field  of  fire, 
communications,  and,  in  most  cases,  observation  and  con- 
cealment. There  are  also  other  considerations  varying  in 
importance  in  different  situations.  They  are  enumerated 
in  the  following  paragraph. 

14.  Considerations  Affecting  the  Selection  of 
Battery  Positions. — 

(a)  Effective  range. 

(b)  Field  of  fire  (and  elimination  of  dead  spaces). 

(c)  Communications. 

(d)  Observation. 

(e)  Concealment  of  both  the  position  and  the  approaches. 

(f)  Facility  of  movement  to  the  front,  flanks  and  rear. 

(g)  Favorable  conditions  for  resupply  of  ammunition. 

(h)  Proximity  of  good  cover  for  limbers,  or  gun  tractors. 

(i)  Suitablity  of  the  soil  and  the  slope  of  the  ground  for 
“gun  platforms”  especially  for  heavy  artillery. 

(j)  Non-interference  with  the  operations  of  other  troops  in 
the  same  vicinity. 

(k)  Security,  by  the  proximity  of  troops  of  other  arms. 

(l)  Possibilities  for  providing  protection  and  comfort  for 
the  personnel,  if  the  position  is  to  be  occupied  during 
an  extended  period. 

These  considerations  are  discussed  in  detail  in  the 
following  paragraphs. 

15.  Considerations  of  Range. — (a)  At  long  ranges 
where  each  increase  in  range  requires  a comparatively 
large  increase  in  the  elevation  of  the  gun,  there  is  a ma- 
terial decrease  in  the  accuracy  of  artillery  fire,  and,  con- 
sequently, in  its  effect.  Shell  may  be  employed  effectively 
at  greater  ranges  than  shrapnel.  To  increase  the  maxi- 
mum range  originally  intended  for  the  75-mm.  gun,  a spec- 
ial shell  was  designed,  but  the  protracted  use  of  this  shell, 
or  of  the  heaviest  propelling  charges  in  howitzers,  is  very 
wearing  on  the  guns,  recoil  mechanism  and  gun  carriages. 
Consequently,  very  long  ranges  are  to  be  avoided. 

(b)  On  the  other  hand,  short  ranges,  though  in  most 
cases  advantageous  to  howitzers,  result  in  increased  dead 


VI— 15-16 


SELECTION  OF  POSITIONS  101 

spaces  to  guns  with  flat  trajectories.  To  obviate  this  dis- 
advantage for  the  75-mm.  gun,  reduced  charge  ammuni- 
tion is  manufactured,  but  its  supply  cannot  always  be  de- 
pended upon,  especially  in  moving  situations. 

(c)  Considerations  of  range  are  not  only  technical, 
but  tactical  as  well,  when  considered  in  relation  to  the  field 
of  fire  discussed  in  the  next  paragraph. 

16.  The  Field  of  Fire  and  Dead  Spaces. — (a)  Tech- 
nically speaking,  the  field  of  fire  of  a battery  includes  all 
the  ground  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy  that  can  be  cov- 
ered effectively  with  fire  from  the  emplacements  of  the 
guns.  Usually,  when  the  field  of  fire  of  a battery  is  spoken 
of,  it  includes  only  that  part  of  the  battery’s  possible  field 
of  fire,  within  which  it  is  expected,  through  tactical  con- 
siderations, to  employ  its  fire  power.  This  tactical  field 
of  fire  usually  includes  a normal  sector  within  which  the 
battery  is  given  its  main  fire  missions,  and  an  emergency 
sector,  on  one  or  both  flanks  of  the  normal  sector,  within 
which  the  battery  may  be  assigned  emergency  missions. 

(b)  In  selecting  a battery  position,  due  consideration 
must  be  given  to  the  sectors  assigned,  in  depth  as  well  as 
width.  If  no  definite  sectors  have  been  designated,  then 
the  possible  field  of  fire  must  be  such  as  to  include  all  pos- 
sible sectors  that  may  be  assigned. 

(c)  Due  to  deep  depressions  in  the  terrain,  or  to  ob- 
structions to  the  trajectories  within  the  possible  azimuth 
of  the  guns,  there  are  usually  parts  of  the  ground  within 
the  field  of  fire  of  a battery  position  that  cannot  be  reached. 
These  are  called  dead  spaces  and  because  of  the  flat  tra- 
jectory of  guns  at  the  shorter  ranges,  they  are  usually 
found  comparatively  close  to  the  battery  position.  Dead 
spaces  for  howitzers  seldom  exist. 

(d)  By  the  skillful  selection  of  gun  positions,  dead 
spaces  may  be  reduced  to  a minimum.  Except  in  very 
open  and  flat  country  they  cannot  be  avoided  entirely. 

(e)  So  far,  the  discussion  of  the  field  of  fire  and  of 
dead  spaces,  pertains  to  a single  battery.  In  an  artillery 
command  the  existence  of  dead  spaces  may  be  greatly  re- 
duced and  the  field  of  fire  enlarged  by  disposing  the  bat- 


VI — 16-19 


102  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

teries  so  that  a dead  space  for  one  battery  will  be  within 
the  field  of  fire  of  another. 

17.  Considerations  of  Communications  in  the  Se- 
lection of  a Battery  Position. — Communications  estab- 
lished by  a battery  are  usually  limited  to  those  necessary 
for  command  and  for  observation.  When  a battery  is  act- 
ing independently,  additional  communications  are  neces- 
sary for  close  connection  with  the  supported  troops  of  other 
arms.  Long  communications  or  communications  that  are 
difficult  to  maintain,  are  a distinct  disadvantage.  Bat- 
tery communications  are  discussed  in  another  chapter. 

18.  Consideration  of  Observation  in  the  Selection 
of  Battery  Positions. — (a)  In  spite  of  the  innovation  of 
map  firing,  high  burst  ranging,  and  adjustment  by  aerial 
observation,  terrestrial  observation  continues  to  be  the  prin- 
cipal means  of  conducting  the  fire  of  field  artillery.  Even 
for  map  firing  a certain  amount  of  registration  by  terres- 
trial observation  is  essential  to  assure  its  effectiveness. 

(b)  Terrestrial  observation  is  classified  and  discussed 
in  Chapter  IV.  Observation,  in  most  cases,  must  cover  ade- 
quately the  sector  or  sectors  assigned  to  the  battery,  and 
must  be  sufficiently  close  to  the  firing  battery  to  insure 
uninterrupted  communication  therewith.  The  proximity 
of  good  observation  usually  has  a decided  influence  upon 
the  selection  of  battery  positions,  especially  where  quick 
action  is  required  in  moving  situations.  Circumstances 
may  sometimes  demand  observation  through  the  gun  sights 
to  permit  direct  laying. 

19.  Concealment. — (a)  Due  to  the  ease  with  which 
an  exposed  battery  may  be  neutralized  by  hostile  fire,  posi- 
tions for  direct  laying  have  become  exceptional  and  are 
used  only  when  absolutely  necessary,  or  when  there  can 
be  little  or  no  danger  of  neutralization  by  hostile  artillery 
fire.  The  sustained  service  of  an  artillery  command  can 
only  be  insured,  in  the  face  of  an  active  enemy,  by  render- 
ing the  guns  inconspicuous  or  by  entirely  concealing  them. 
Concealment  from  terrestrial  observation  is,  as  a rule,  more 
important  than  concealment  from  aerial  observation.  A 
defilade  of  four  yards  from  all  hostile  points  of  observa- 
tion is  necessary  to  conceal  the  flashes  of  field  guns  (75- 


SELECTION  OF  POSITIONS 


103 


mm.)  in  daylight.  To  conceal  the  flashes  of  guns  of  larger 
caliber,  this  defilade  must  be  considerably  increased.  If  flash 
defilade  is  not  possible,  and  a battery  can  be  located  by  its 
flashes  and  by  the  conformation  of  the  ground  within  very 
restricted  limits,  the  battery  is  subject  to  neutralization  or 
even  destruction  by  hostile  artillery  fire.  If,  however,  such 
a battery  is  located  in  a broad  valley,  and  can  be  reached 
only  by  a searching  fire  with  considerable  depth,  its  chances 
of  being  able  to  sustain  its  fire  are  greatly  increased. 


Gun  Sight 


Line  of  Sight 


target—^ 


FIELD  GUN  WITH  SIGHT  DEFILADu 


Line  of  Vision 


ENEMY  OP 


FIELD  GUN  WITH  FLASH  DEFILADE 


(b)  Skill  in  the  concealment  of  guns  is  acquired  by 
careful  study  of  the  ground  and  by  long  experience  on  var- 
ied terrain. 

(1)  From  the  enemy’s  point  of  view  positions  on  the  sky 
line,  or  in  front  of  a distinct  background,  usually  are  the  most 
conspicuous.  When  the  background  is  unfavorable  to  enemy 
observation,  guns  frequently  are  difficult  to  locate,  even  in  the 
open.  In  the  absence  of  natural  cover,  artificial  means  may  be 
resorted  to  for  concealing  the  guns. 

(2)  A position  in  rear  of  a crest,  especially  when  there  are 
other  crests  about  the  same  height  in  front  or  in  rear,  offers 
many  advantages.  Trees,  hedges  and  standing  grain  may  be 
utilized  to  mask  hostile  observation. 

(3)  A position  on  a gentle  slope,  just  far  enough  behind 
the  crest  to  insure  concealment  of  the  flashes,  best  facilitates 
running  the  guns  up  to  the  crest  should  direct  laying  be  called 
for.  From  the  point  of  view  of  concealment  alone,  the  most 
advantageous  position  is  one  more  than  400  yards  in  rear  of  a 
covering  mask,  having  flash  defilade,  and  hidden  from  the  view 
of  any  auxiliary  observers  that  the  enemy  may  push  to  the 
front  or  flanks. 

(4)  Concealment  from  aerial  observation  is  obtained  by 
camouflage  or  by  utilizing  natural  overhead  cover  to  screen  the 
guns,  the  ammunition  and  the  approaches. 

(5)  Concealment  of  approaches  is  important.  If  a battery 
can  be  seen  by  the  enemy  while  approaching  a position,  efforts 
to  locate  the  position  occupied  are  greatly  facilitated. 


VI— 20-21 


104  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

20.  Facility  of  Movement. — (a)  When  a position  is 
selected  for  a battery,  due  consideration  must  be  given  to 
the  feasibility  of  moving  the  battery  quickly,  in  daylight 
or  darkness,  to  some  other  position,  and,  in  some  cases,  to 
the  feasibility  of  moving  the  guns  by  hand  to  a direct  fire 
position  in  an  emergency.  The  latter  consideration  can 
apply  only  to  light  artillery. 

(b)  A position  to  which  guns  are  moved  with  difficulty, 
usually  opposes  even  greater  difficulties  to  their  removal. 
Instances  may  be  cited,  also,  in  which  guns  were  placed 
in  position  easily  in  good  weather.  A few  hours’  rain, 
however,  resulted  in  great  difficulty  and  delay  in  moving 
them  out. 

(c)  An  ideal  battery  position  insures  quick  movement 
under  cover  to  both  front  and  rear,  as  well  as  to  one  or 
both  flanks. 

21.  Favorable  Conditions  for  Resupply  of  Ammu- 
nition.— (a)  Covered  approaches  from  the  rear  are  es- 
sential to  the  resupply  of  ammunition  in  the  daytime.  Other- 
wise the  flow  of  ammunition  may  be  interrupted  by  hos- 
tile fire,  or  the  battery  position  discovered  by  the  movement 
of  caissons  or  ammunition  trucks  bringing  up  ammuni- 
tion. 

(b)  The  first  consideration  in  selecting  positions  for 
battalion  combat  trains,  are  protection  from  hostile  fire, 
and  covered  approaches  to  the  firing  positions  of  the  bat- 
teries. Other  considerations  are:  ample  space  to  permit 
parking  the  carriages  with  considerable  intervals;  ease  of 
access  to  roads  running  back  to  the  distributing  point  es- 
tablished by  the  ammunition  train;  facilities  for  visual  or 
other  communication  with  the  battalion  commander  and 
the  batteries.  It  is  desirable  that  the  distance  to  the  firing 
batteries  not  exceed  1200  yards,  but  this  distance  may  be 
somewhat  increased  when  ample  cover  is  not  available. 

(c)  When  positions  are  occupied  for  long  periods  and 
when  there  are  no  prospects  of  a movement,  both  limber  and 
combat  trains  may  be  established  further  to  the  rear,  and, 
if  possible,  together,  in  order  to  facilitate  administration 
and  the  supply  of  rations  to  both  men  and  animals.  When 
conditions  permit  such  a procedure,  ammunition  may  be 


VI— 21-23 


SELECTION  OF  POSITIONS  105 

supplied  direct  to  the  battery  positions  by  the  ammunition 
train,  keeping  the  combat  trains  filled  and  ready  for  a re- 
sumption of  movement. 

22.  Cover  for  Limbers  or  Gun  Tractors. — The  pre- 
servation of  artillery  mobility  depends  upon  the  protection 
of  the  teams  or  tractors  from  hostile  fire.  Maximum  pro- 
tection, and  free  and  prompt  access  to  the  guns,  are  the 
objects  in  view  in  reconnoitering  positions  for  the  limbers 
or  tractors.  The  ideal  position  is  one  with  vertical  cover 
that  affords  protection  against  searching  fire.  When  it  is 
impracticable  to  conceal  the  limbers  from  the  view  of  the 
enemy,  they  should  be  posted  as  far  from  the  guns  as  the 
situation  warrants,  formed  in  line,  faced  toward  the  ene- 
my, with  as  wide  intervals  between  carriages  as  the  ground 
permits. 

23.  Gun  Emplacements. — (a)  Most  heavy  guns  re- 
quire the  installation  of  a special  platform.  Usually  a field 
gun  may  be  fired  without  any  work  on  the  gun  emplace- 
ment; but  if  the  soil  is  too  hard  for  the  trail  spade  to  en- 
gage therein  when  the  gun  is  fired,  a narrow  trench,  about 
one  foot  deep,  should  be  dug  in  the  shape  of  an  arc  to 
provide  a bearing  surface  for  the  trail  spade.  The  length 
of  the  arc  must  be  sufficient  to  permit  laying  the  gun  in  any 
direction  within  its  possible  field  of  fire.  If  the  soil  is  very 
soft,  a similar  trench  should  be  dug,  and  the  bearing  sur- 
face for  the  trail  spade  (rear  wall  of  the  trench),  revetted 
with  fascines,  logs  or  other  material,  preferably  of  an  elas- 
tic nature. 

(b)  An  instance  is  known  in  The  World  War  in  which 
155-mm.  howitzers  were  fired  in  swampy  ground.  The 
trails  did  not  bury  themselves  deeply,  but  the  wheels  were 
soon  in  the  mud  up  to  the  hubs.  Moving  the  gun  carriages 
in  azimuth  became  extremely  difficult,  and  each  time  a how- 
itzer was  fired,  mud  was  splattered  in  all  directions  by 
the  recoil  of  the  breech  into  the  mire.  It  was  necessary 
to  haul  the  howitzers  from  this  position  by  means  of  block 
and  tackle. 

(c)  In  selecting  a battery  position,  sandy  soil  should 
be  avoided.  Dust  is  almost  as  bad.  Sand  and  dust,  blow- 
ing into  the  mechanism  and  adhering  to  the  greased  sur- 


VI— 23-24 


106  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

faces  of  the  projectiles,  are  the  causes  of  abnormal  wear, 
and  may  result  in  putting  guns  out  of  action  after  a few 
rounds. 

(d)  Flat  horizontal  ground  or  a gentle  slope  is  de- 
sirable for  a gun  emplacement.  If  the  ground  slopes  to 
one  flank,  the  guns  cannot  be  elevated  in  a vertical  plane, 
with  resulting  errors  in  azimuth.  With  field  guns,  this 
condition  may  be  corrected  by  digging  a trench  for  the 
higher  wheel,  provided  the  slope  is  not  too  great.  A steep 
slope  to  the  rear  will  cause  an  abnormal  recoil  of  a field 
gun  carriage,  resulting  in  considerable  man-handling  and 
consequent  delay  in  moving  the  gun  back  up  the  slope.  A 
forward  slope  greatly  assists  in  checking  the  recoil  of  the 
gun  carriages,  but,  to  fire  at  long  range,  it  may  be  necessary 
to  dig  deep  holes  for  the  trails  in  order  to  give  the  guns 
sufficient  elevation. 

24.  Interference  with  the  Operations  of  Other 
Troops. — (a)  Sites  selected  for  battery  positions  are  us- 
ually far  enough  in  rear  of  the  front  line  to  avoid  inter- 
ference with  the  operations  of  other  branches.  The  most 
desirable  battery  positions  sometimes  are  found  in  close 
proximity  to,  or  on  the  ground  actually  occupied  by,  com- 
mand posts,  supports,  reserves,  or  other  troops  or  establish- 
ments. In  such  cases,  the  question  that  arises  is  not  one 
of  priority  or  preference  as  between  one  and  another,  but 
rather  is  a question  of  utilizing  the  avaliable  ground  in 
such  manner  as  to  secure  the  best  possible  teamwork  under 
the  circumstances.  The  decision  rests  with  the  commander 
of  the  whole.  The  criterion  is,  that  the  technical  and  tac- 
tical needs  of  any  particular  branch  or  element,  as  such,  al- 
ways are  subordinated  to  the  good  of  the  whole. 

(b)  Due  to  the  noise  and  the  possibility  of  drawing 
hostile  artillery  fire,  it  is  not  pleasant  to  other  troops  to  have 
a battery  in  close  proximity.  When  unavoidable,  this  con- 
dition is  tolerated  without  question. 

(c)  Placing  guns  along  the  rear  edge  of  a lateral  road 
should  be  avoided,  because  of  possible  interference  with  traf- 
fic. It  is  well  not  to  place  batteries  close  to  and  on  the 
leeward  side  of  dusty  roads,  or  too  close  to  roads  that  are 
subject  to  heavy  interdiction  and  harassing  fire. 


VI — 24-26 


SELECTION  OF  POSITIONS  107 

(d)  The  batteries  of  a battalion  or  regiment  usually 
are  placed  in  position  within  the  sectors  assigned  to  the 
troops  they  support,  but  when,  within  an  adjacent  sector, 
better  positions  are  available  that  do  not  interfere  with 
the  troops  occupying  that  sector,  arrangements  usually  can 
be  made  to  occupy  such  positions. 

25.  Security  of  a Battery  Position. — (a)  Conceal- 
ment is  a battery’s  best  security.  Artillery  should  be  free 
to  devote  its  efforts  to  the  support  of  the  other  arms  and 
not  be  hampered  by  the  necessity  of  protecting  itself  from 
attack.  Battery  positions  usually  are  selected  where  they 
are  amply  protected  by  the  proximity  of  other  troops,  but 
there  are  many  incidents  on  record  where  the  protecting 
troops  have  been  driven  back,  and  batteries  sacrificed,  the 
cannoneers  engaging  in  a hand-to-hand  conflict  and  serving 
the  guns  until  the  latter  were  disabled  or  captured. 

(b)  In  most  of  the  battles  of  the  Franco-Prussian 
War,  German  light  batteries  were  hurried  ahead,  with  lit- 
tle or  no  escort,  to  engage  the  enemy  and  cover  the  de- 
ployment of  the  infantry.  The  longer  range  of  modern 
artillery  makes  this  exposure  unnecessary,  and  artillery 
escorts  are  now  seldom  required. 

(c)  Artillery,  in  some  unusual  situations,  is  able  to 
render  battery  support  from  positions  to  one  flank  rather 
than  from  positions  directly  in  rear  of  the  troops  sup- 
ported. In  such  cases  steps  are  taken  to  protect  the  guns 
from  surprise  or  capture. 

26.  Protection  of  Guns  and  Personnel. — (a)  As 
previously  stated  in  this  chapter,  concealment  is  a bat- 
tery’s greatest  protection.  Elaborate  battery  emplacements 
can  be  built  in  the  field  only  during  periods  of  long  stabiliza- 
tion, when  concealment  from  continual  aerial  reconnaissance 
becomes  almost  impossible.  The  first  step  toward  protec- 
tion is  the  digging  of  shallow  emplacements  for  the  guns, 
and  of  trenches  for  the  protection  of  the  cannoneers  and 
ammunition.  As  time  permits,  the  guns  and  ammunition 
are  further  protected  by  log  or  even  concrete  construc- 
tion, and  the  personnel  by  dugouts. 


VI— 26 


108  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(b)  From  the  above  it  can  be  seen  that  protection 
from  hostile  artillery  fire  is  gained  by  the  development  of 
a battery  position  occupied  for  a protracted  period,  and  is 
usually  a very  minor  consideration  in  its  original  selection. 


VII— 1 


CHAPTER  VII 

Artillery  Communications 

Paragraphs 


Section  I. — General  1-  6 

Section  II. — Telephone  7-14 

Section  III. — Radio  15-18 

Section  IV.— Communication  with  Advancing  Infantry. _ 19 

Section  V. — Pyrotechnics  20-21 

Section  VI. — Training  22 


Section  I 
General 

Paragraphs 


Means  of  Communication  1 

General  Characteristics  2 

Dependence  Upon  Other  Systems 3 

Communication  Between  Artillery  Units  of  the  Same 

Command  4 

Communication  With  Troops  Supported  by  Artillery 5 

Supervision  and  Coordination  6 


1.  Means  of  Communication. — (a)  At  present,  ex- 
cept for  communication  with  airplanes,  main  dependence 
for  artillery  communications  is  placed  upon  the  telephone. 
The  use  of  radio  telegraphy  by  the  artillery,  in  the  past, 
has  been  confined  almost  exclusively  to  receiving  messages 
from  airplanes,  in  the  adjustment  of  artillery  fire  by  aerial 
observation ; but,  in  the  future,  with  the  rapid  strides  now 
being  made  in  the  development  of  radio  telegraph  and  radio 
telephone  equipment,  radio  communication  will  constitute 
an  important  auxiliary  for  communication  between  artil- 
lery units,  and  for  communication  between  artillery  and 
supported  infantry. 

(b)  No  one  means  of  communication  can  ever  be  con- 
sidered infallible,  so  that  alternative  means  of  communica- 
tion always  must  be  immediately  available,  if  not  in  actual 
operation.  Advance  in  offensive  operations  is  usually  so 
rapid  that  the  installation  of  telephone  lines  can  seldom 


109 


110  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

keep  pace  with  the  advance.  Under  such  conditions  aux- 
iliary means  of  communication  must  serve,  at  least  tem- 
porarily, to  the  maximum  advantage. 

(c)  The  various  means  of  communication  employed 
by  artillery,  for  which  equipment  is  issued,  are: 

The  telephone. 

The  radio  telegraph. 

The  radio  telephone. 

Visual  signalling  (semaphore  and  wigwag). 

Pyrotechnics. 

Motorcycle,  mounted  and  dismounted  messengers. 

(d)  Buzzerphone  and  ordinary  telegraph  equipment 
is  not  at  present  issued  to  artillery  units.  The  projector, 
though  employed  to  a limited  extent  in  The  World  War,  no 
longer  forms  a part  of  the  basic  equipment  for  artillery 
units.  However,  it  is  believed  that  its  use  by  artillery 
has  not  been  discontinued  permanently. 

(e)  With  the  rapid  advances  being  made  in  electrical 
devices  for  communication,  equipment  is  constantly  chang- 
ing, and  it  is  impossible  to  look  any  distance  into  the  fu- 
ture and  say  what  the  equipment  will  be.  Practically  all 
signal  equipment  in  use  by  the  artillery  is  issued  by  the 
Signal  Corps,  and  it  is  mainly  to  the  Signal  Corps  that  the 
artillery  looks  for  future  development  and  improvement 
in  this  equipment. 

2.  General  Characteristics. — Artillery  in  combat  in- 
stalls, operates  and  maintains  its  own  system  of  signal  com- 
munications. The  system  of  each  battery,  battalion,  regi- 
ment and  brigade  is  normally  complete  in  itself  and  func- 
tions under  the  control  of  the  commander  of  the  unit,  yet 
each  system  forms  an  integral  part  of  the  system  of  the 
next  higher  unit,  and,  for  that  reason,  requires  coordina- 
tion therewith.  The  communication  system  of  any  artil- 
lery unit  must  be  coordinated  and  interlaced  with  the  sys- 
tems of  supported  troops,  or  troops  with  which  the  ar- 
tillery unit  is  operating,  including  adjacent  artillery  units 
with  which  mutual  fire  support  is  arranged, 

3.  Dependence  Upon  Other  Systems. — (a)  If  an  ar- 
tillery unit  depends  upon  exterior  agencies  for  communica- 
tion vital  to  its  own  functioning  in  combat,  in  other  words, 
if  its  system  of  communication  is  not  complete  in  itself  the 


VII— 3-4 


GENERAL  111 

efficiency  of  this  unit  in  combat  will  depend  largely  upon 
the  effective  maintenance  of  a communication  system  over 
which  it  has  no  direct  control.  For  instance,  should  a bat- 
tery depend  upon  a battalion  axial  telephone  line  for  com- 
munication between  the  firing  battery  and  an  observation 
post  from  which  fire  is  habitually  conducted,  the  efficiency 
of  this  battery  in  combat  will  depend  largely  upon  the  main- 
tenance of  this  telephone  line  by  the  battalion.  Even  should 
it  be  effectively  maintained,  other  needs  for  this  battalion 
wire  may  interfere  frequently  with  the  conduct  of  fire  of 
the  battery.  In  the  same  way,  a battalion  should  not  be 
dependent  upon  a regimental  line  for  communication  with 
its  batteries.  Cases  of  this  kind  cannot  be  avoided  always, 
but  should  be  avoided  whenever  it  is  possible  to  do  so. 

(b)  On  the  other  hand,  in  order  to  conserve  both  wire 
and  labor,  an  artillery  command  must  take  advantage  of 
systems  of  communication  established  and  maintained  by 
other  units.  These  are  used  to  provide  for  alternative 
means  of  communication  between  its  various  elements  and 
with  the  troops  supported,  and  to  provide  for  communica- 
tion not  so  vital  to  its  own  functioning  in  combat,  such  as 
communication  with  other  units  of  artillery,  with  flash  and 
sound  ranging  stations,  with  observation  squadrons,  and 
with  rear  echelons  of  artillery  headquarters  and  field  trains. 

4.  Communication  Between  Artillery  Units  of  the 
Same  Command. — (a)  Under  the  principle  of  independent 
communications  outlined  in  the  preceding  paragraph,  it 
appears  that  a battalion  habitually  establishes  communica- 
tion with  its  batteries,  a regiment  with  its  battalions,  and 
a brigade  with  its  regiments.  This  is  the  system  pre- 
scribed by  our  present  regulations. 

(b)  An  economical  compromise  is  made  frequently  by 
the  use  of  an  axial  line.  For  instance,  assuming  a par- 
ticular case  in  which  an  artillery  regimental  command  post 
is  at  a considerable  distance  in  rear  of  the  command  posts 
of  its  battalions,  the  telephone  personnel  of  the  regimental 
headquarters  lays  an  axial  line  forward  and  establishes  a 
switchboard  as  a forward  communication  center  at  a point 
convenient  to  the  battalion  command  posts. 


VII— 4 


112  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(c)  The  diagrams  below  show  an  artillery  regimental 
command  post  considerably  in  rear  of  the  command  posts  of 
two  of  its  battalions,  but  close  to  the  command  post  of  the 
third  battalion  (assuming  a regiment  of  three  battalions). 


In  Figure  1,  direct  wire  communication  is  established 
between  the  regimental  command  post  and  the  command 
post  of  all  of  the  battalions.  This  requires  three  miles  of 
wire.  In  Figure  2 a regimental  axial  line  is  employed  and 
the  forward  battalions  are  connected  with  the  forward 
communication  center.  The  amount  of  wire  required  is 
two  miles  instead  of  three. 

The  employment  of  axial  lines  should  not  be  carried 
too  far.  Direct  communication  usually  is  to  be  preferred, 
especially  in  the  smaller  units,  for  lines  employed  in  the 


VII — 4-6 


GENERAL  113 

“conduct  of  fire” ; but  axial  lines  frequently  are  desirable  or 
necessary  through  considerations  of  time  and  economy. 

In  Figure  1,  by  connecting  the  two  forward  battalion 
command  posts,  alternative  and  independent  routes  of  tele- 
phone communication  are  established  between  the  regimen- 
tal command  post  and  both  of  these  distant  battalions.  This 
is  not  possible  with  the  system  employed  in  Figure  2. 

(d)  Another  important  consideration  to  be  taken  into 
account  in  planning  the  system  of  communications  for  an 
artillery  command  is  a more  or  less  equitable  distribution 
of  installation,  operation  and  maintenance,  among  the  head- 
quarters of  the  various  units  of  the  command,  in  propor- 
tion to  the  signal  personnel  and  equipment  available  in  each. 
An  illustration  will  be  found  in  a later  paragraph. 

5.  Communication  With  Troops  Supported  by  Ar- 
tillery.— As  an  auxiliary  arm,  and  largely  dependent  for 
its  action  in  combat  upon  information  from  the  troops  sup- 
ported by  its  fire,  artillery  must  bear  the  burden  of  estab- 
lishing and  maintaining  communication  with  the  troops 
supported.  In  a moving  situation  there  are  few  problems 
of  communication  more  difficult  than  this,  so  that  coopera- 
tion and  assistance,  upon  the  part  of  the  troops  supported 
frequently  may  be  essential  to  the  maintenance  of  this  com- 
munication. 

6.  Supervision  and  Coordination. — (a)  An  artillery 
brigade  commander,  through  his  communications  officers, 
has  direct  control  over  the  communications  established  by 
the  personnel  of  his  headquarters,  and  supervisory  control 
over  the  communications  established  by  the  subordinate 
units  of  his  command.  The  same  applies  to  regimental  and 
battalion  commanders.  The  communications  within  an  ar- 
tillery command,  vital  to  combat,  are  established  usually  as 
a matter  of  routine,  but  battery  positions,  observation  posts 
and  command  posts  are  selected  always  with  due  regard  to 
communications,  not  only  communications  within  the  ar- 
tillery command  itself,  but  communications  with  other  troops 
with  which  the  artillery  command  is  operating.  It  is  there- 
fore obvious  that,  in  any  operation  or  in  any  movement,  a 
plan  of  signal  communications  is  an  important  considera- 
tion. In  order  that  the  system  of  each  subordinate  unit 


VII— (5 


114  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

may  form  an  integral  part  of  the  system  of  the  next  higher 
unit,  in  order  to  make,  where  necessary,  a more  equitable 
distribution  of  installation,  operation  and  maintenance,  and 
in  order  to  get  the  best  results  with  the  greatest  economy 
of  time,  labor  and  materiel,  there  must  be  supervision,  by 
higher  units,  over  the  communications  established  by  sub- 


UU 

BtryC 
Bn.  CP 


Q 

Bn  C Tn 


CP 

of  Supported 
Inf  Beg  I 


V 


Arty  Reg'/\ 
Switchboard 


Figure  3 


VII— 6 


TELEPHONE 


115 


ordinate  units,  and  there  must  be  a spirit  of  harmonious 
cooperation  among  all  the  communicating  officers  of  the 
command. 

(b)  (1)  As  an  illustration,  consider  a special  case  requiring  su- 
pervision and  cooperation  in  carrying  out  a plan  of  communica- 
tions. A battalion  of  light  artillery  takes  up  a position  in  a 
defensive  situation.  The  sketch  below  is  not  intended  to  illus- 
trate either  an  ideal  or  a typical  disposition,  but  serves  to  ex- 
emplify difficulties  in  communications  that  frequently  may  be 
expected. 

(2)  The  most  essential  battalion  telephone  lines,  other  than 
communication  with  the  batteries,  are  shown  in  broken  lines,  re- 
quiring nearly  two  miles  of  wire.  To  connect  the  batteries  with 
the  battalion  switchboards  nearest  thereto,  requires  an  additional 
mile  of  wire.  To  establish  telephone  communication  with  the 
battalion  combat  train  and  with  the  command  posts  of  two  adja- 
cent artillery  battalions  (A  and  B)  requires  another  two  miles 
of  wire. 

(3)  There  is  but  one  reel  cart  with  the  headquarters  of  an 
artillery  battalion.  To  establish  and  maintain  five  miles  of  tele- 
phone line  is  a great  deal  for  a battalion  headquarters  to  under- 
take. 

(4)  In  this  particular  case,  the  batteries  have  good  observa- 
tion close  at  hand,  on  ridge  590  and  on  hill  625,  and,  consequently, 
have  very  short  telephone  lines  to  lay.  Each  battery  has  a reel 
cart  of  the  same  wire  capacity  as  the  reel  cart  of  battalion 
headquarters.  To  save  time,  and  to  make  a more  equitable  dis- 
tribution of  the  communications  to  be  established  and  maintained, 
it  is  probable,  in  this  case,  that  the  battalion  telephone  officer 
would  make  the  following  recommendations  to  his  battalion  com- 
mander. 


(a)  Battalion  headquarters  to  establish  and  maintain 
only  the  lines  shown  in  broken  lines  on  the  sketch. 

(b)  Batteries  to  establish  wire  communication  with  the 
nearest  battalion  switchboard. 

(c)  Battery  B to  establish  communication  with  the  ar- 
tillery battalion  headquarters  at  B.  In  establishing  field 
artillery  communications,  it  is  normal  for  lateral  communi- 
cations to  be  run  toward  the  left.  So  the  battalion  head- 
quarters at  A should  connect  with  the  battalion  on  its  left. 

(d)  Battery  C to  establish  communication  with  the  bat- 
talion combat  train. 


Section  II 


Paragraphs 


Telephone  Communications,  Past  and  Present 

Telephone  Equipment  for  Field  Artillery 

Laying  Telephone  Wire  

Selection  of  Wire 


7 

8 
9 

lu 


VII— 7-9 


116  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


Battery  Communications  11 

Battalion  Telephone  Communications  12 

Regimental  Telephone  Communications 13 

Brigade  Telephone  Communications 14 


7.  Telephone  Communications,  Past  and  Present. 
— Before  The  World  War,  the  switchboard  was  never  used 
in  our  field  artillery.  The  telephone  system  of  an  artillery 
command  consisted  of  a number  of  independent  lines,  us- 
ually with  ground  return,  and  sometimes  with  several  sta- 
tions on  the  same  line.  All  stations  on  one  line  could  com- 
municate with  each  other,  but  there  was  no  means  pro- 
vided for  communication  with  stations  on  some  other  line. 
A compact  instrument  known  as  the  service  buzzer  was 
employed  on  these  lines.  It  combined  both  telephone  and 
buzzer  telegraph.  This  system  was  entirely  supplanted 
during  The  World  War  by  our  present  system,  employing 
switchboards,  field  telephones  and  metallic  return. 

8.  Telephone  Equipment  for  Field  Artillery. — 
The  following  items  are  extracted  from  the  tables  of  basic 
allowances  published  in  Circulars  178,  179,  and  180,  War 
Department,  May  12,  1920: 


Article 

Btry 

Bn  Hq 

Reg  Hq 

Brig 

Telephones 

6 

6 

6 

12 

Switchboards  (different  sizes)  — 

3 

3 

4 

6 

Breast  reels  with  spools 

4 

4 

2 

0 

Wire  (for  75-mm.)  kilometers 

Heavy  twisted  pair 

5 

10 

15 

Light  twisted  pair 

8 

5 

2 

Wir^  (for  155-mm.  How),  kilo. 

Heavy  twisted  pair 

8 

16 

32 

Light  twisted  pair 

8 

5 

2 

Wire  (for  brig  Hq),  kilometers 

Heavy  twisted  pair 

50 

9.  Laying  Telephone  Wire. — (a)  Spools  for  breast 
reels  carry  one-half  mile  of  light  twisted  pair.  Breast  reels 
are  carried  by  a single  man  either  mounted  or  dismounted 
or  may  be  rigged  on  a pack  animal.  Heavy  twisted  pair 
is  issued  on  spools  holding  about  one  mile  of  wire.  Four 
men  can  lay  wire  with  one  of  these  spools,  two  men  carry- 
ing the  spool  on  a crowbar  or  piece  of  pipe.  This  is  a slow 


VII— 9 


TELEPHONE  117 

and  tedious  operation.  It  is  a simple  matter  to  rig  up  a 
spool  on  the  back  end  of  a truck.  As  a truck  can  carry 
several  spools  of  wire  it  is  well  adapted  to  laying  long  lines 
of  heavy  twisted  pair  along  good  roads.  Seven-strand 
twisted  pair  weighs  127  pounds  per  mile,  eleven-strand  187 
pounds  per  mile. 

(b)  For  all  round  use,  especially  on  poor  roads  and 
across  country,  the  reel  cart  provides  the  simplest  means  of 
laying  heavy  twisted  pair.  Reel  carts  can  also  pick  up 
wire  from  the  ground  almost  as  rapidly  as  they  can  lay 
wire.  Artillery  reel  carts  hold  about  3 miles  of  heavy 
twisted  pair,  but  cannot  carry  a reserve  supply.  It  re- 
quires considerable  time  to  transfer  wire  from  spools  to 
the  reel  cart.  One  reel  cart  is  furnished  to  each  battery, 
battalion  and  regimental  headquarters  of  light  and  medium 
artillery  and  one  to  the  artillery  brigade  headquarters  of 
an  infantry  division.  They  are  drawn  either  by  horses  or 
tractors. 

(c)  A hand  reel  18  inches  long  and  10  inches  in  diam- 
eter is  issued  to  batteries  for  attachment  to  a fifth  section 
caisson.  Light  or  heavy  twisted  pair  may  be  used  on  this 
reel.  It  is  very  useful  for  running  out  short  lines  by  hand 
from  the  firing  battery. 

(d)  Artillery  telephone  lines  usually  are  laid  along 
the  ground,  or  suspended  on  existing  poles,  hedges  or 
branches  of  trees.  Traffic  continually  passing  over  wire 
at  the  same  point  will  soon  break  the  insulation,  so  that, 
where  telephone  lines  cross  roads  or  other  traffic  routes, 
they  should  be  run  through  culverts,  or  suspended  not  less 
than  16  feet  from  the  ground. 

(e)  Wire  laid  on  the  ground  should  not  be  taut,  but 
it  will  be  so  if  the  linemen  are  not  careful  to  pull  out  plenty 
of  slack  while  the  wire  is  being  unreeled.  In  order  to  pre- 
vent material  displacement,  wire  laid  on  the  ground  should 
be  secured  to  a tree,  bush  or  other  object  every  few  hundred 
feet,  particularly  where  there  is  a decided  change  of  direc- 
tion. Wire  laid  loosely  so  that  it  “hugs”  the  ground  is 
not  liable  to  be  broken  by  hostile  artillery  fire,  except  by 
a direct  hit;  neither  is  it  so  easily  snapped  when  a horse 
gets  his  foot  caught  in  it. 


VII — 9-11 


118  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(f)  When  time  permits,  telephone  lines  should  be 
tagged  at  frequent  intervals  with  the  designation  of  the 
organization  to  which  the  wire  belongs.  This  is  particu- 
larly necessary  where  many  wires  are  run  along  the  same 
route. 

10.  Selection  of  Wire. — An  artillery  command  relies 
mainly  upon  heavy  twisted  pair  for  its  telephone  communi- 
cations. Light  twisted  pair  is  employed  where  it  is  danger- 
ous to  expose  telephone  trucks  and  reel  carts  to  enemy  fire, 
and  is  especially  valuable  for  keeping  up  observation  of 
fire  and  communication  with  the  infantry  in  an  advance. 
A long  line  of  light  twisted  pair  is  difficult  to  maintain,  and 
will  not  give  efficient  service  over  more  than  a mile,  when 
laid  on  the  ground.  Important  lines  of  light  twisted  pair 
should  be  replaced  by  heavy  twisted  pair  as  soon  as  it  is  pos- 
sible to  do  so, 

11.  Battery  Communications. — (a)  In  a battery  of 
light  artillery,  a signal  detail  of  10  men  (not  including  reel 
cart  driver),  and  a reel  cart  drawn  by  two  horses,  are  pro- 
vided for  establishing,  maintaining,  and  operating  the  bat- 
tery communications.  The  main  reliance  is  the  telephone, 
but  semaphore  or  wigwag  may  be  used  for  short  distances. 
Fifteen  combination  flag  kits  form  part  of  the  equipment 
of  a light  battery. 

(b)  The  signal  detail  commences  its  operations  as  soon 
as  the  battery  position,  observation  post  and  command  post 
are  selected.  Communication  is  established  usually  before 
the  firing  battery  reaches  its  position,  firing  data  are  cal- 
culated and  transmitted,  and  hence  the  battery  can  open 
fire  almost  as  soon  as  the  trails  of  the  guns  are  dropped. 

(c)  The  principal  communications  to  be  established 
are  between  the  firing  battery  and  the  battery  observation 
post  or  posts,  and  between  the  battery  commander  and  the 
battalion  commander.  As  discussed  in  a previous  para- 
graph, the  latter  communication  is  established  normally 
by  the  battalion  headquarters.  This  communication  us- 
ually is  established  by  telephone,  and  is  primarily  a com- 
mand line  between  the  battalion  commander  and  the  bat- 
tery commander.  It  may  have  other  uses,  including  com- 


TELEPHONE 


119 


munication  with  the  battalion  radio  station  in  the  adjustment 
of  fire  by  airplane  observation. 

(d)  This  link  between  the  battalion  and  battery  tele- 
phone nets  is  established  usually  between  the  switchboard 
at  the  battery  commander’s  command  post  and  the  nearest 
switchboard  of  the  battalion  net.  In  a stabilized  situation 
requiring  a large  amount  of  map  firing  and  adjustments  by 
aerial  observation,  the  battery  commander  usually  estab- 
lishes his  command  post  at  the  firing  battery,  but  in  a mov- 
ing situation  the  battery  commander  generally  conducts 
most  of  the  fire  by  terrestrial  observation  from  a battery 
observation  post,  and  it  is  preferable,  in  such  cases,  to  have 
the  battalion  wire  run  to  that  point.  If  the  battery  obser- 
vation post  is  not  occupied  after  dark,  the  switchboard  may 
be  removed,  and  the  line  to  the  battalion  commander  con- 
nected to  the  line  to  the  firing  battery,  thus  giving  direct 
communication  from  the  battalion  commander  to  the  firing 
battery. 

(e)  Communication  with  the  position  of  the  limbers 
is  usually  visual  or  by  mounted  messenger.  The  same  ap- 
plies to  communication  with  the  combat  train  when  the  bat- 
tery is  acting  independently,  and  has  extra  caissons  at- 
tached from  the  battalion  combat  train. 

(f)  Unless  acting  independently  as  a tactical  unit,  a 
battery  seldom  has  occasion  to  establish  communication 
with  other  troops,  unless  required  to  do  so  in  order  to  relieve 
the  battalion  signal  personnel  of  part  of  its  burden  when 
a large  number  of  battalion  lines  are  to  be  established. 

(g)  For  medium  artillery,  the  principles  of  battery 
communication  are  the  same.  The  reel  cart  is  drawn  by 
a 5-ton  tractor,  and  the  signal  personnel  is  transported  on 
reconnaissance  cars,  motorcycle  sidecars,  and  the  reel  cart. 

12.  Battalion  Telephone  Communications. — (a) 
A battalion  telephone  net  may  be  compared  to  the  local  tele- 
phone system  of  a small  town,  except  that  the  former  may 
have  more  than  one  central  station  or  switchboard.  In  the 
same  way  that  the  local  telephone  system  of  a small  town 
is  connected  with  the  telephone  systems  of  neighboring 
towns,  the  battalion  telephone  net  is  connected  with  the 
telephone  nets  of  other  units  with  which  communication  may 


VII— 12 


120  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

be  necessary.  The  battalion  communications  officer  in  com- 
bat is  responsible  for  the  prompt  development  of  a system  of 
coordination  with  the  communications  officers  of  other  units 
in  order  that  efficient  telephone  service  may  be  quickly  es- 
tablished and  maintained  with  all  the  units  and  headquarters 
with  which  the  battalion  has  need  for  telephone  communica- 
tion. 

(b)  For  the  telephone  communications  of  a light  artil- 
lery battalion  headquarters  there  are  provided  a reel  cart 
with  three  drivers,  a lieutenant  as  communications  officer, 
two  signal  corporals,  and  12  privates  as  follows : eight  tele- 
phone operators,  three  lineguards,  and  a wireman  on  the 
reel  cart;  all  mounted  except  the  last  named.  Other  per- 


Figure  4.  Diagram  of  a battalion  telephone  communica- 
tions light  artillery. 


Bn  CO  & Staff 

Bn  Radio  Sta 

Supported 
Infantry  Unit 

Bn  C Tn* 


LEGEND 

Switchboard 


Bn  Arty  Liaison  Officer  with 
front  line  infantry 

Artillery  Regiment 
Batteries 


Artillery  units  with  which 
mutual  support  is  arranged. 

Observation  Balloon 


One  telephone  for  the  operator  at  each  switchboard 
Telephone 


□ O 

Lines  laid  by  the  battalion 

Line  laid  by  either  artillery  regiment  or  battalion  (normally  by 
sii— —in  regiment) 

_______ Lines  laid  by  either  battalion  or  batteries  (normally  by  bat> 

talion ) 

— — Lines  laid  by  either  battalion  or  other  units 


Line  laid  by  balloon  company 


Communication  with  Bn  C Tn  is  not  invariably  established  by 
telephone. 


VII— -12-13 


TELEPHONE  121 

sonnel  of  the  headquarters  battery  may  be  called  upon  to 
supplement  this  detail,  when  necessary.  The  personnel  and 
equipment  for  a 155-mm.  howitzer  battalion  is  approximately 
the  same,  except  that  the  reel  cart  is  drawn  by  a 5-ton 
tractor.  The  telephone  personnel  is  transported  on  recon- 
naissance cars  and  motorcycle  sidecars,  as  well  as  on  the 
reel  cart. 

13.  Regimental  Telephone  Communications. — (a) 
Regimental  telephone  communications  correspond  in  prin- 
ciple to  the  battalion  telephone  communications  discussed 
in  the  preceding  paragraph.  Usually  a regimental  head- 
quarters has  fewer  telephone  communications  to  install 
than  a battalion,  and  therefore  should  be  prepared,  when- 
ever necessary,  to  assist  the  battalions  with  their  telephone 
installations.  Frequently  this  may  be  accomplished  by  es- 
tablishing axial  lines  convenient  for  the  battalions  to  use, 
especially  in  situations  requiring  a forward  displacement  of 
the  battalions.  The  regimental  communications  officer,  un- 
der the  supervision  of  the  brigade  communications  officer, 
is  responsible  for  the  supply  and  replacement  of  telephone 
equipment  and  wire  to  the  batteries  and  to  the  battalion 
headquarters.  As  provided  by  tables  of  organization,  the 
regimental  communications  officer  is  a captain  and  has  a 
lieutenant  as  assistant. 

(b)  For  the  signal  communications  of  the  headquarters 
of  a light  regiment,  there  are  provided,  exclusive  of  the  ra- 
dio detail:  two  signal  sergeants,  two  signal  corporals,  eight 
privates  as  telephone  operators,  five  privates  as  line  guards, 
all  mounted,  a reel  cart  with  three  drivers  and  a wireman 
on  the  reel  cart.  The  telephone  personnel  for  the  head- 
quarters of  a 155-mm.  howitzer  regiment  is  greater  in 
number  than  that  provided  for  the  headquarters  of  a 155- 
mm.  howitzer  battalion,  discussed  in  the  preceding  para- 
graph. 


VII — 13-14 


122  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


Figure  5.— DIAGRAM  OF  REGIMENTAL  TELEPHONE  COM- 
MUNICATIONS LIGHT  ARTILLERY 


Arty 

Brigade 


Rear  Echelon 
of  Kegtl  Hq 


Battalions 


Artillery  units  with 
which  mutual  support 

is  arranged 


Observation  Balloon 


LEGEND 


, — . Switchboard  /-v  _ . , 

Q Telephone 

— Lines  laid  by  regiment 

x x x—  Lines  laid  by  brigade  or  regiment  (normally  by  brigade) 

. Lines  laid  by  regiment  or  battalions  (normally  by  regiment) 


Lines  laid  by  regiment  or  other  units 


— Line  laid  by  balloon  company 


14.  Brigade  Telephone  Communications. — (a)  Bri- 
gade telephone  communications  correspond  in  principle  to 
the  regimental  and  battalion  communications  already  dis- 
cussed. Besides  his  responsibility  for  the  telephone  com- 
munications of  brigade  headquarters,  the  brigade  commun- 
ications officer,  under  authority  of  the  brigade  comman- 
der, exercises  general  supervisory  control  over  the  tele- 
phone communications  throughout  the  entire  brigade.  This 
supervisory  control  is  for  the  purpose  of  insuring: 

(1)  Efficient  and  hormonious  installation,  operation  and 
maintenance  of  telephone  communications  throughout  the  brigade. 

(2)  Equitable  supply  and  replacement  of  telephone  equip- 
ment and  wire  by  the  regimental  communications  officers. 


Figure  6- 


Brig  CO 
and  staff 


Radio  Sta 


Message 

Center 


Brig  OP 
when  one  i: 
established 


LEGEND 


VII— 14 


TELEPHONE 


123 


(3)  Uniformity  in  the  system  of  instruction  for  telephone 

personnel.  , _ 

(4)  Effective  interlacing  of  the  artillery  telephone  system 
with  the  systems  of  other  units. 

(5)  Utilization,  in  the  most  efficacious  manner,  of  existing 
telephone  lines,  or  lines  abandoned  by  the  enemy. 

(6)  Salvage  of  wire  from  discontinued  lines. 

(b)  The  brigade  communications  officer  must  be  closely 
associated  in  his  work  with  the  division  signal  officer. 

(c)  For  the  artillery  brigade  headquarters  telephone 
communications  of  an  infantry  division,  there  are  provided : 
one  telephone  sergeant,  one  telephone  corporal,  six  privates 
as  telephone  operators,  and  eleven  privates  as  lineguards. 

All  are  mounted  except  six  lineguards.  A six-horse  reel 
cart  with  three  drivers  also  is  provided.  As  provided  by  or- 
ganization tables,  the  brigade  communications  officer  is  a 
captain  and  has  a lieutenant  as  assistant. 

(d)  The  telephone  communications  usually  essential 
to  brigade  headquarters  are  shown  diagrammatically  as  fol- 
lows: 

-Diagram  of  Brigade  Headquarters  Telephone  Communications — Divisional  Art. 


Corns 

Artillery  Headquarters 


Division  Hq 

Rear  Echelon  of 
Brig  Hq  and  Am  Tn 


Regiments 


Artillery  units  with  which 
mutual  support  is  arranged 
including  the  corps  artillery 
brigade  or  subordinate  units 
thereof 


One  telephone  for 
the  operator  at 
each  switchboard 


Switchboard 


n 


X X *■ 


Telephones 

Lines  laid  usually  by  signal  corps  personnel 

Lines  laid  by  brigade  or  regiments  (normally  by  brigade) 

Lines  laid  by  brigade  or  other  units 


VII— 15 


124  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

Section  III 

Radio 

Paragraphs 


Radio  Communications  Dependent  Upon  Available  Equipment  15 

Communication  Between  Airplanes  and  Artillery 16 

Radio  Communications  Between  Artillery  Headquarters 17 

Radio  Communication  with  Infantry 18 


15.  Radio  Communications  Dependent  Upon  Avail- 
able Equipment. — (a)  The  present  policy  relative  to  radio 
telegraph  and  telephone  equipment  is  toward  development 
rather  than  toward  immediate  production.  Circulars  Nos. 
178,  179,  and  180,  War  Department,  May  13,  1920,  prescribe 
the  basic  allowances  of  radio  equipment  for  field  artillery 
units,  yet  the  types  prescribed  do  not  exist  in  sufficient 
quantity  to  supply  all  units  of  our  peace  organizations.  So 
rapid  is  the  present  development  in  military  radio  devices, 
that  before  the  present  authorized  equipment  could  be  man- 
ufactured in  sufficient  quantity  to  supply  an  army  at  war 
strength,  this  equipment  would  be  superseded  by  more  ad- 
vanced types. 

(b)  In  the  event  of  war  it  would  be  necessary,  at  the 
beginning  to  make  the  best  use  possible  of  the  radio  equip- 
ment available  and  to  expedite  production  of  the  most  ad- 
vanced types  that  have  been  developed  and  that  have  been 
thoroughly  tested  under  service  conditions. 

(c)  The  practical  employment  of  radio  communications 
is  largely  dependent  upon  atmospheric  conditions,  includ- 
ing intentional  or  unintentional  “jamming  of  the  air.”  It 
is  now  the  most  important  means  of  communications  be- 
tween airplanes  and  ground  troops,  but  no  matter  how 
highly  developed,  can  never  supersede  in  importance  the 
field  telephone  for  communication  between  stations  on  the 
ground.  Nevertheless,  there  will  be  instances  in  which  the 
radio  would  be  of  greater  utility  to  the  artillery  than  the 
field  telephone,  and  perhaps  many  instances  in  which  it 
will  be  the  only  practical  means  of  communication  in  a 
crisis. 


VII— 16 


RADIO  125 

16.  Communication  Between  Airplanes  and  Artil- 
lery.— (a)  The  occasions  for  this  communication  are  as 
follows:  (1)  With  batteries,  through  battalion  headquar- 

ters, for  the  adjustment  of  fire  by  airplane  observation;  (2) 
with  battalion  or  other  headquarters,  to  inform  artillery 
units  of  the  location  of  suitable  targets  discovered  by  an 
airplane  observer,  or  other  information  of  value  to  the  artil- 
lery. 

(b)  The  present  method  of  communication,  in  the  ad- 
justment of  artillery  fire  is  by  two-way  radio  telephone  com- 
munication between  airplane  and  radio  station  at  battalion 
headquarters,  and  wire  telephone  communication  between 
the  radio  station  and  the  battery.  There  is  under  develop- 
ment at  this  time  a switching  device  to  be  used  in  connec- 
tion with  the  radio  telephone,  by  means  of  which  communi- 
cation with  the  airplane  can  be  carried  on  directly  with  the 
firing  battery.  With  this  device,  the  radio  signals  from  the 
airplane  are  received  at  the  battalion  radio  station,  and 
transmitted  over  the  ordinary  field  telephone  to  the  bat- 
tery. The  battery  replies  over  the  ordinary  telephone  to 
the  battalion  radio  station  where  the  special  switching  de- 
vice transfers  the  message  to  the  radio  telephone,  by  which 
it  is  sent  directly  to  the  airplane. 

(c)  Should  radio  telephone  communication  fail,  the 
radio  telegraph  is  resorted  to,  and  the  following  would  be 
the  usual  cycle  of  communications  during  the  adjustment  of 
fire: 

Airplane  to  battalion  radio  station  by  radio  telegraph  mes- 
sage, employing  a code  of  abbreviations. 

Battalion  radio  station  to  firing  battery  and  return,  by  wire 
telephone. 

Battalion  radio  station  to  airplane  by  panel  signal.  (The 
panel  signals  employed  for  this  communication  are  given  in  the 
appendix  of  “Signal  Communications  for  All  Arms,  G.S.S.,  1922.”) 

(d)  In  special  cases,  airplanes  may  communicate  with 
artillery  units  by  means  of  dropped  messages,  or  by  a pre- 
arranged code  of  pyrotechnic  signals.  The  latter  is  of  espe- 
cial value  in  controlling  the  rate  of  advance  of  accompany- 
ing fire  during  an  attack,  when  other  means  of  keeping  track 
of  the  infantry  rate  of  advance  fail. 


VII— 16-17 


126  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(e)  All  radio  stations  at  artillery  command  posts  are 
equipped  with  identification  panels  differing  in  design.  (See 
Appendix  to  Signal  Communications  for  all  Arms,  G.S.S. 
1922).  They  must  be  conspicuously  displayed  in  order  to 
be  seen  from  an  airplane  at  a high  altitude.  Where  many 
radio  stations  are  grouped  within  a restricted  area,  it  is 
difficult  for  the  airplane  observer  to  pick  out  the  panel  of 
a particular  unit  unless  its  location  is  known  beforehand. 
It  is  therefore  essential  that  the  air  service  unit  working 
with  an  artillery  command  be  notified  promptly  of  any 
change  in  the  location  of  panels. 

17.  Radio  Communications  Between  Artillery 
Headquarters. — (a)  In  The  World  War,  the  use  of  the 
radio  telegraph  by  the  artillery  was  confined  almost  exclu- 
sively to  receiving  messages  from  airplanes  and  meteorolo- 
gical stations,  and  intercepting  messages  that  might  con- 
tain information  of  value.  Two-way  radio  telegraph  com- 
munication was  provided  between  the  headquarters  of  an 
artillery  brigade  and  the  headquarters  of  its  regiments, 
but  this  communication  was  seldom  used.  The  headquarters 
of  the  division  artillery  brigades  were  equipped  with  radio 
telegraph  for  communication  with  division  headquarters 
and  with  the  headquarters  of  infantry  brigades.  The  utility 
of  this  station  in  the  division  net  is  questionable. 

(b)  The  present  program  of  development  contemplates 
eventual  radio  communication  for  division  artillery  as  fol- 
lows: 

(1)  Artillery  brigade  net: 

Brigade  headquarters. 

Headquarters  of  75-mm. 
regiments. 

Headquarters  of  attached 
155-mm.  regiments. 

(2)  Artillery  regimental  net:  Radio  telegraph  employing  the  S. 

(75-mm.  regiments.)  C.  R.  77-A  loop  set  (see  also 

Regimental  headquarters.  par.  18).  The  headquarters 

Headquarters  of  battalions.  of  battalions  are  provided  with 

the  S.  C.  R.  109  set,  primarily 
for  intercommunication  by  ra- 
dio telephone  with  observing 
planes.  This  set  may  be  used 
for  radio  communication  with 
regimental  headquarters  in  an 
emergency. 


Radio  telephone  and  telegraph  em- 
ploying the  S.  C.  R.  109  set. 
(Used  also  for  radio  telephone 
communication  with  observing 
planes.) 


VII— 17-18 


RADIO  127 

(c)  Normally  the  headquarters  of  a division  artillery 
brigade  is  included  in  the  division  net,  with  radio  telegraph 
communication  with  division  headquarters  and  the  head- 
quarters of  infantry  brigades,  employing  the  S.C.R.  79-A 
set  for  this  purpose.  The  corps  plan  of  signal  communica- 
tions may  authorize  the  employment  of  this  set  for  radio 
telegraphic  communication  with  corps  and  army  artillery. 

(d)  In  the  cavalry  division,  it  is  contemplated  equip- 
ping every  battalion  and  battery  headquarters  of  horse  ar- 
tillery with  the  S.  C.  R.  109  radio  set.  In  the  pack  artillery, 
it  is  contemplated  equipping  only  the  battalion  headquar- 
ters with  the  same  set,  arranged  for  pack  transportation. 

18.  Radio  Communication  With  Infantry. — The  in- 
novation of  a light  weight  radio  telegraph  set  that  can  be 
carried  easily  by  two  or  three  men,  that  can  be  set  up  quick- 
ly for  transmitting  and  receiving,  and  that  is  provided  with 
a break-in  feature  by  means  of  which  a message  may  be  in- 
terrupted for  any  necessary  repetition,  opens  up  new  pos- 
sibilities for  solving  that  most  difficult  problem — communi- 
cation between  advancing  infantry  and  its  supporting  ar- 
tillery, This  radio  telegraph  set,  the  S.  C.  R.  77-A,  will  be 
utilized  in  the  future  for  inter-communication  between  the 
following  headquarters : 

Headquarters  of: 

1 Light  artillery  regiment, 

2 Light  artillery  battalions, 

2 infantry  regiments, 

4 infantry  battalions  (assuming  that  each  infantry  regi- 
ment has  2 battalions  in  line,  and  one  battalion  in  re- 
reserve, the  latter  not  requiring  radio  telegraph  com- 
munication). 

As  the  S.  C.  R.  77-A  set  has  nine  different  and  non-in- 
terfering wave  lengths,  a different  wave  length  will  be  as- 
signed to  each  of  the  nine  stations  in  this  net,  and  a maxi- 
mum of  four  messages  can  be  transmitted  at  the  same  time 
between  four  pairs  of  stations  within  this  net. 


VII— 19 

128  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

Section  IV 

Communication  with  Advancing  Infantry 

Paragraph 

Communication  with  Advancing  Infantry 19 


19.  Communication  with  Advancing  Infantry. — (a) 
In  a defensive  situation,  or  in  a withdrawal,  the  mainten- 
ance of  communications  with  supported  infantry  does  not 
present  a problem  that  compares  in  difficulties  with  the 
maintenance  of  communication  when  the  infantry  is  mov- 
ing forward.  The  latter  is  the  most  difficult  problem  of 
communications  with  which  the  artillery  must  cope. 

(b)  A few  accompanying  batteries,  or  accompanying 
guns,  by  frequent  changes  of  position,  may  keep  pace  with 
the  infantry  advance  and  maintain  close  connection  there- 
with, but  the  bulk  of  the  supporting  artillery  of  large  com- 
mands usually  must  fire  during  a day’s  operations  without 
more  than  one  or  two  changes  of  position.  Under  these  con- 
ditions, to  obtain  the  greatest  efficiency  from  artillery  ac- 
companying fire,  two  important  problems  in  forward  com- 
munications present  themselves: 

First. — Battery  commanders  must  continue  to  provide  for  the 
technical  observation  of  their  accompanying  fire,  in  order  to  make 
it  fit  the  needs  of  the  infantry. 

Second. — Artillery  battalion  commanders  must  maintain  tac- 
tical connection  with  the  commander  of  the  infantry  assault  bat- 
talions. Though  closely  related,  both  of  these  problems  require 
independent  communications. 

(c)  The  accompanying  fire  of  a battery  sometimes  may 
be  observed  from  an  exceptionally  good  observation  post  up 
to  the  extreme  limit  of  range  of  the  guns;  balloon  and  air- 
plane observation  may  be  of  great  assistance;  but  usually 
a battery  commander  must  provide  for  moving  his  terres- 
trial observation  forward  to  successive  points  of  vantage, 
keeping  pace  with  the  infantry  advance.  The  first  obser- 
vation post  must  not  be  abandoned  until  communication  has 
been  established  with  the  second  and  it  is  ready  to  function ; 
and  so  on.  In  close  country,  where  observation  for  any  con- 
siderable distance  is  impossible,  battery  observation  details 


VII— 19 


COMMUNICATION  WITH  ADVANCING  INFANTRY  129 

must  accompany  the  infantry  assault  battalions,  and  be  pro- 
vided with  the  necessary  means  of  communication  with 
their  batteries.  Communication  with  the  batteries  should 
be  by  telephone  whenever  possible,  with  all  available  auxil- 
iary means  held  ready  should  telephone  communications 
fail. 

(d)  Considering  now  the  second  problem : tactical  con- 
nection with  infantry  assault  battalions  is  insured  by  means 
of  an  artillery  battalion  liaison  officer  with  the  commander 
of  each  assault  battalion.  Each  liaison  officer  must  be  pro- 
vided with  sufficient  personnel  and  equipment  to  maintain 
communication  with  the  commander  of  the  supporting  ar- 
tillery battalion  to  which  he  belongs.  Also  he  must  be  pre- 
pared to  conduct  the  fire  of  a battery  in  cases  where  artil- 
lery fire  must  be  adjusted  on  a particular  target  visible  to 
him,  but  for  which  no  battery  observation  is  available.  For 
this  communication  between  artillery  liaison  officers  and  ar- 
tillery battalion  commanders  the  telephone  usually  is  to  be 
preferred,  but  no  means  of  communication  is  infallible  and 
for  that  reason  no  one  means  of  communication  should  be 
depended  upon  to  the  exclusion  of  others.  Though  every 
effort  should  be  made  to  maintain  telephone  communica- 
tions, provision  should  be  made  to  have  these  important 
communications  function  with  the  idea  that  the  telephone 
lines  will  be  out.  Runners  should  be  available,  also  motor- 
cycle or  mounted  couriers  if  conditions  warrant,  and  projec- 
tors may  be  utilized  for  one-way  communication  (front  to 
rear) . 

(e)  A loop  radio  telegraph  set  is  provided  to  infantry 
battalion  commanders  to  supplement  the  communications 
maintained  by  the  artillery  personnel,  and  in  time  it  is  not 
unlikely  that  artillery  battalion  liaison  officers  will  be  pro- 
vided with  radio  equipment  for  the  establishment  of  this 
radio  communication. 


VII— 20-21 


130  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

Section  V 

Pyrotechnics 

Paragraphs 


Pyrotechnics  in  an  Advance 20 

Pyrotechnics  in  Defense 21 


20.  Pyrotechnics  in  an  Advance. — (a)  Any  use 
made  of  pyrotechnics  for  the  transmission  pf  messages 
from  assaulting  infantry  to  supporting  artillery  must  be 
carefully  prearranged. 

(b)  Under  conditions  of  good  visibility,  a message  can 
be  conveyed  instantaneously  to  several  units,  that  might  re- 
quire several  minutes  to  relay  by  telephone. 

(c)  The  required  prearrangements  for  the  use  of  pyro- 
technics are : 

(1)  A definite  understanding  as  to  the  meaning  of  each  signal 
or  combination  thereof. 

(2)  A prearrangement  of  points  or  rocket  posts  from  which 
pyrotechnics  signals  intended  for  any  particular  artillery  unit 
or  units  are  to  be  fired.  This  is  necessary  in  order  to  avoid  con- 
fusion with  enemy  pyrotechnics.  For  each  pyrotechnic  detail, 
successive  points  or  rocket  posts  must  be  decided  upon,  so  that  the 
detail  may  proceed  from  one  to  another,  keeping  pace  with  the 
infantry  advance.  As  each  successive  rocket  post  is  abandoned 
a prearranged  signal  may  be  fired  to  indicate  this  fact. 

(d)  The  signals  prearranged  should  be  as  few  in  num- 
ber as  possible.  Only  the  simplest  and  most  reliable  pyro- 
technics should  be  employed.  It  is  dangerous  to  assign  dif- 
ferent meanings  to  one-star,  three-star,  and  five-star 
rockets  of  the  same  color,  for  the  reason  that  some  of  the 
stars  might  be  obscured  by  the  rocket  bursting  low. 

21.  Pyrotechnics  in  Defense. — (a)  In  defensive 
situations,  the  infantry  units,  occupying  centers  of  resis- 
tance that  are  in  danger  of  attack  by  the  enemy,  usually 

, are  provided  with  pyrotechnics  for  the  purpose  of  calling 
upon  the  supporting  artillery  for  defensive  fire  in  the  form 
of  counter  preparations  and  barrages.  The  signals  are 
fired  usually  by  infantry  personnel.  They  are  fired  invari- 
ably at  rocket  posts  agreed  upon  with  the  supporting  artil- 
lery. 


VII— 21-22 


TRAINING  131 

(b)  Rocket  posts  are  first  established  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  outposts.  In  case  an  outpost  may  be  with- 
drawn if  attacked,  rocket  posts  should  be  provided  for  in 
the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  line  of  resistance  next  in  rear 
thereof. 

(c)  A rocket  post  must  be  established  so  that  good  com- 
munications are  insured  to  all  parts  of  the  defensive  posi- 
tion that  the  defensive  fire,  called  for  from  this  rocket  post, 
is  intended  to  cover.  It  must  also  be  established  in  such  a 
position  that  its  signals  can  be  clearly  seen  by  the  support- 
ing artillery  units. 

(d)  The  batteries  must  have  observers  continually 
watching  the  rocket  posts  from  which  signals  are  fired  to 
which  they  must  respond  with  defensive  fire.  These  obser- 
vers must  be  provided  with  means  of  knowing  the  exact 
directions  to  the  rocket  posts  they  are  required  to  keep  un- 
der observation.  Otherwise  there  may  be  confusion  with 
pyrotechnics  fired  from  other  rocket  posts  or  with  enemy 
pyrotechnics.  An  improvised  rocket  board,  or  stakes  set 
in  the  directions  of  the  rocket  posts,  will  answer  the  pur- 
pose. 


Section  VI 

Training 

Paragraph 

Training  of  Artillery  Signal  Personnel 22 


22.  Training  of  Artillery  Signal  Personnel. — (a) 
There  is  some  difference  of  opinion,  among  field  artillery 
officers,  as  to  how  personnel  for  artillery  communications 
should  be  obtained.  All  artillery  communications  are  for 
one  purpose ; the  efficient  tactical  and  technical  employment 
of  the  guns . The  first  training  of  signal  personnel  and  all 
other  specialists  should  be  with  the  gun  squads  of  the  firing 
battery.  Communications  specialists  who  have  had  this 
training,  gain  a spirit  of  cooperation  with  the  firing  units 
that  cannot  be  inculcated  in  any  other  way.  Specialists 


VII— 22 


132  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

who  have  not  had  this  training,  almost  invariably  look  upon 
the  service  of  the  guns  as  an  auxiliary  to  their  own  work. 

(b)  Training  must  be  standardized.  Methods  in  one 
unit  should  not  differ  from  those  in  another.  Understudies 
should  be  in  constant  training  and  ready  to  take  the  place 
of  any  specialists.  In  the  use  of  Signal  Corps  equipment, 
Signal  Corps  methods  must  be  carefully  adhered  to. 


VIII— 1-2 


CHAPTER  VIII 

General  Principles  Governing  the  Tactical 
Employment  of  Artillery 

Paragraphs 


Basis  of  Tactical  Use 1 

Characteristics  2 

Limitations  3 

Effect  of  Limitations 4 

Purpose  of  Field  Artillery  5 

The  Infantry-Artillery  Team  6 

Artillery  Tactics  Defined 7 

No  Independent  Artillery  Role 8 

Utility  of  Study 9 

Information  the  Artilleryman  Must  Have 10 

Battle  Units  11 

Primary  Mission — Division  Artillery 12 

Organization  for  Combat  13 

Disposition  of  Attached  Artillery 14 

Disposition  for  Command  15 

Decisions  Concerning  Artillery  Employment 16 

The  Division  Order 17 


1.  Basis  of  Tactical  Use. — The  general  principles 
governing  the  tactical  employment  of  field  artillery  are 
based  upon  the  characteristics  and  limitations  of  this  branch. 

2.  Characteristics. — (a)  The  basic  characteristics  of 
field  artillery  are : 

(1)  Great  fire  power  concentrated  in  a relatively  small  tac- 

tical unit. 

(2)  Rapidity  of  fire. 

(3)  Long  range. 

(4)  Ability  to  act  from  concealed  positions. 

(b)  The  first  characteristic,  great  fire  power  concen- 
trated in  a relatively  small  unit,  facilitates  intelligent  direc- 
tion. It  enables  a commander  to  hold  a powerful  force  well 
in  hand  and  to  bring  it  to  bear  with  the  desired  intensity  at 
the  proper  place  and  time. 

(c)  The  second  characteristic,  rapidity  of  fire,  enables 
artillery  to  bring  a crushing  fire  to  bear  upon  a vulnerable 
enemy  before  he  can  escape  from  its  action. 

(d)  The  third  characteristic,  long  range,  permits  great 
freedom  of  action,  by  enabling  it  to  interpose  its  fire  effec- 


133 


VIII- — 2-6 


134  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

tively  over  a broad  terrain  and  to  secure  the  concentration 
of  effort  of  widely  dispersed  units. 

(e)  The  fourth  characteristic,  ability  to  act  from  con- 
cealed positions,  facilitates  establishing  the  guns  in  favora- 
ble positions,  facilitates  surprise  action,  preserves  freedom 
of  maneuver,  and  makes  it  possible  for  inferior  artillery  to 
remain  on  the  battlefield. 

3.  Limitations.— Artillery,  on  the  other  hand,  has 
certain  limitations  which  prevent  its  employment  as  an  inde- 
pendent, self-sustaining  branch.  Among  these  are : 

(a)  Artillery  is  unable  to  act  otherwise  than  by  fire 
action.  As  it  must  fire  from  position,  and  as  its  changes  of 
position  must  be  few,  it  is  not,  like  infantry  and  cavalry, 
capable  of  continuous  maneuver  in  battle. 

(b)  Artillery  is  extremely  vulnerable  when  exposed, 
in  the  open,  to  percussion  fire  at  medium  ranges ; and  when 
exposed  to  shrapnel  fire  in  route  formation,  or  when  chang- 
ing position,  as  it  can  protect  itself  only  with  difficulty  by 
fire  action,  or  by  concealment  or  escape.  Even  when  unlim- 
bered,  it  is  difficult  to  defend  itself  against  attacks  on  its 
flanks  and  rear. 

4.  Effect  of  Limitations. — These  limitations  prevent 
the  employment  of  the  artillery  as  an  independent,  self- 
sustaining  branch.  It  is  always  an  auxiliary  branch — by 
itself,  it  can  do  nothing. 

5.  Purpose  of  Field  Artillery. — “The  reason  for  the 
existence  of  the  field  artillery  is  its  ability  to  assist  the  other 
arms,  especially  the  infantry,  upon  the  field  of  battle.  The 
degree  to  which  field  artillery  prepares  itself  to  render  this 
assistance  is  then  the  measure  of  its  training.”  ' This  quota- 
tion constitutes  the  first  paragraph  of  the  Field  Artillery 
Drill  Regulations,  which  shows  the  importance  attached  to 
it  by  the  artillery.  It  is  the  first  principle  taught  the  field 
artilleryman  as  the  purpose  of  his  training. 

6.  The  Infantry-Artillery  Team. — Success  in  com- 
bat, in  all  but  very  minor  operations,  is  dependent,  primar- 
ily, upon  the  mutual  support  of  the  infantry  and  artillery. 
Artillery  prepares  the  way  and  assists  the  infantry,  but  it 
cannot  alone  carry  an  attack  to  a definite  conclusion.  Infan- 
try, on  the  other  hand,  requires  the  support  of  the  artillery 


VIII— 6-9 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES— TACTICS  135 

in  order  to  make  the  advance  with  minimum  loss ; therefore, 
both  work  together  as  mutually  interdependent  parts  of  the 
combined  arms. 

7.  Artillery  Tactics  Defined. — (a)  Artillery  tactics 
is  defined  as  the  art  of  disposing  artillery  troops,  guns,  am- 
munition and  communications  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy 
so  as  to  apply  its  maximum  fire  power  in  such  a manner  as 
will  assist  the  infantry  in  accomplishing  its  mission. 

(b)  The  definition  given  goes  into  more  detail  than 
usual  in  enumerating  the  different  elements  of  the  artillery 
command.  The  words  artillery,  or  artillery  troops,  usually 
have  been  accepted  as  sufficiently  comprehensive,  but  it  is 
desired  to  emphasize  the  importance  of  all  the  primary  ele- 
ments of  the  artillery  team  (troops,  guns,  ammunition  and 
communications)  and  the  internal  as  well  as  the  external 
cooperation  necessary  in  the  efficient  handling  of  this  arm. 

8.  No  Independent  Artillery  Role. — The  exact 
method  of  employing  field  artillery  depends,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  other  branches,  upon  the  particular  tactical  situa- 
tion; but,  in  addition,  its  use  always  must  conform  to  the 
plan  decided  upon  by  the  commander  of  the  troops  which  it 
supports  and  under  whose  orders  it  acts.  For  this  reason, 
an  artillery  commander,  unlike  the  commanders  of  the  other 
primary  branches,  has  no  independent  role  as  a tactician  ex- 
cept in  so  locating  the  units  of  his  command  as  best  to  ren- 
der the  assistance  required  by  the  troops  which  his  com- 
mand supports. 

9.  Utility  of  Study. — An  infantry  or  independent 
cavalry  force  is  usually  commanded  by  an  infantry  or  cav- 
alry officer.  Artillery,  as  an  auxiliary  to  such  a force,  is  al- 
most invariably  under  the  command  of  an  officer  of  another 
arm.  Therefore,  for  the  good  of  the  service  at  large,  it  is 
important  that  officers  of  other  arms  study  its  characteris- 
tics. The  commander  of  a mixed  force  containing  artillery 
often  finds  himself  in  difficulties  when  it  comes  to  the  utiliza- 
tion of  his  artillery.  He  is  liable  to  make  one  of  two  mis- 
takes ; he  will  either  so  hamper  his  artillery  with  unwise  and 
impossible  orders  that  its  energy  is  wasted ; or  he  will  leave 
his  artillery  commander  to  his  own  devices,  without  even 
giving  him  information  that  would  enable  him  to  act  intel- 


VIII— 9-11 


136  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

ligently.  He  should  not  deprive  himself  of  the  expert  ad- 
vice of  his  artillery  commander,  but  he  should  be  able  to 
pass  judgment  upon  the  suggestions  offered.  Then,  when  he 
gives  an  order  to  his  artillery,  he  can  give  it  with  confidence, 
on  his  own  responsibility — not  merely  approve,  as  a matter 
of  routine,  the  recommendations  made  by  his  adviser. 

10.  Information  the  Artilleryman  Must  Have. — 
(a)  When  fire  is  ordered  or  requested  on  a certain  target, 
the  artilleryman  must  be  given  sufficient  information  to 
enable  him  to  act  intelligently.  The  following  information 
is  essential: 

(1)  Target  must  be  accurately  designated,  and  if  possible 
the  nature  of  the  target  described. 

(2)  The  object  of  the  fire  must  be  stated,  in  order  that  the 
proper  ammunition  and  fuse  may  be  selected  and  the  number  of 
rounds  required  to  accomplish  the  object  in  view  calculated. 

(3)  The  time  limit  is  of  great  importance  when  our  infan- 
try is  advancing  toward  the  target. 

(b)  Instances  in  The  World  War  are  known  in  which 
our  advancing  infantry  sent  messages  to  the  artillery  re- 
questing fire  on  a particular  woods.  The  artilleryman  re- 
ceiving this  message  did  not  know  what  time  the  message 
was  sent,  nor  how  long  it  took  the  message  to  reach  him.  He 
did  not  know  how  long  the  infantry  would  wait  for  this  fire 
before  attempting  to  advance.  He  had  to  guess  at  the  ob- 
ject of  this  fire  and  at  the  part  of  the  woods  upon  which 
to  direct  his  fire.  It  is  always  the  best  policy  to  transmit 
messages  calling  for  artillery  fire  through  the  artillery  liai- 
son officers  with  front  line  units,  in  order  to  insure  these 
messages  containing  all  the  information  required. 

11.  Battle  Units. — (a)  There  has  been  much  diver- 
sity of  opinion  as  to  when  and  to  what  extent  an  artillery 
command  should  be  broken  up,  and  all  of  it,  or  parts  of  it, 
attached  to  temporary  battle  units.  The  division  is  the 
smallest  unit  to  which  artillery  is  organically  assigned,  yet 
circumstances  sometimes  require  that  a brigade,  a regiment, 
or  even  a battalion  have  artillery  temporarily  attached  to  it, 
and  placed  directly  under  the  orders  of  the  commander 
thereof.  The  decision  must  be  made  by  the  division  com- 
mander. If  he  thinks  that  his  subordinate  can  carry  out 
his  task  only  by  having  full  control  of  all  his  troops,  the 
division  commander  should  give  him  the  necessary  amount 


VIII— 11-12 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES— TACTICS  137 


of  artillery  unconditionally,  and  take  the  chance  of  not  be- 
ing able  to  get  hold  of  it  again  promptly.  It  would  be  very 
unusual  to  attach  all  the  division  artillery  to  subordinate 
infantry  units,  unless  the  action  develop  into  a number  of 
local  and  almost  independent  engagements  over  which  the 
division  commander  has,  temporarily,  little  or  no  control. 
Powerful  concentrations  of  artillery  fire  at  particular  points 
are  frequently  essential  to  the  success  of  the  division  as  a 
whole,  so  that  the  division  commander,  through  his  artillery 
brigade  commander,  must  have  control,  ordinarily,  over  a 
sufficient  amount  of  artillery  to  execute  these  concentra- 
tions quickly  and  effectively.  This  requires  good  communi- 
cations and  cannot  be  accomplished  with  too  great  a dis- 
persion of  the  division  artillery.  The  execution  of  artillery 
fire  in  support  of  the  division  as  a whole  may  be  made  the 
primary  mission  of  some  units  of  the  division  artillery.  To 
other  units  this  may  be  assigned  as  a secondary  mission, 
with  a primary  mission  of  supporting  a particular  infantry 
unit  without  being  actually  attached  thereto. 

(1)  The  infantry  division  is  the  combat  unit  of  the  combined 
arms.  Within  this  combat  unit  all  branches  are  knitted  together 
into  a fighting  team.  The  basis  of  organization  of  this  fighting 
team  is  its  infantry  units.  The  fighting  team  is  organized  into 
infantry  groups  and  supporting  fire  units. 

(2)  Each  infantry  group  generally  comprises,  or  has  closely 
associated  with  it,  elements  of  all  branches  of  the  division. 
The  infantry  commanders  are  the  leaders  of  these  groups  and 
coordinate  the  fighting  powers  of  all  the  branches  included  in 
their  respective  groups. 

(3)  The  supporting  fire  units  comprise  units  of  artillery. 
They  are  employed  by  the  division  commander  to  support,  by  fire, 
any  or  all  of  the  infantry  groups  indicated  above  and  to  assist 
infantry  groups  of  adjacent  divisions. 

(4)  Bearing  in  mind  the  composition  and  functions  of  the 
infantry  groups  and  supporting  fire  groups  indicated  above, 
several  different  combinations  are  available  to  meet  special  situa- 
tions. As  an  example,  all  artillery  may  be  retained  in  the  sup- 
porting fire  units  while,  at  the  same  time,  specific  elements  of 
these  fire  units  are  closely  associated  with  specific  infantry 
groups. 

(b)  The  principles  indicated  above  form  the  basis  of 
the  role  and  command  of  division  artillery  in  action. 

12.  Primary  Mission — Division  Artillery. — The  pri- 
mary mission  of  the  division  artillery  is  to  support  the  in- 
fantry of  its  own  division  by  firing  on  those  hostile  elements 
which  are  causing  losses  to  the  infantry,  impeding  its  ad- 


VIII — 12-13 


138  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

vance,  or  imperiling  its  security.  The  division  artillery, 
therefore,  has,  in  general,  no  independent  battle  role  or  mis- 
sion. (See  Artillery  Drill  and  Service  Regulations,  para- 
graph 1466.)  The  main  purpose  of  the  division  artillery  in 
battle  should  be  to  cooperate  with  the  infantry  by  meeting 
the  needs  of  the  latter  in  fire  power.  All  instructions,  or- 
ders and  the  conduct  of  the  division  artillery  should  be  based 
on,  point  to  and  seek  the  closest  cooperation  with  the  infan- 
try it  supports. 

13.  Organization  for  Combat. — (a)  For  practical 
operation  in  rendering  the  assistance  indicated  above,  aside 
from  questions  of  command,  it  is  possible  to  organize  the 
division  artillery  in  three  ways: 

(1)  First,  to  apportion  all  the  division  artillery  to  support 
of  the  subdivisions  of  the  infantry,  “infantry  groups”  mentioned 
in  a previous  paragraph.  Each  artillery  subdivision  is  then 
given  the  primary  mission  of  supporting  closely  a particular 
infantry  unit,  and  a secondary  mission  of  firing  in  support  of 
other  infantry  units  or  the  division  as  a whole.  The  foregoing 
method  makes  for  close  cooperation  between  infantry  and  artil- 
lery by  establishing  teamwork  between  specific  infantry  and  ar- 
tillery units.  At  the  same  time,  it  permits  all  of  the  supporting 
artillery  that  is  not  fully  committed  to  its  primary  missions,  to 
take  part  in  concentrations  of  artillery  fire  on  localities  desired 
by  the  division  commander. 

(2)  Second,  to  maintain  continuously  the  division  artillery 
as  a separate  and  distinct  tactical  unit  of  the  division,  which 
places  its  fire  on  appropriate  points  with  respect  to  the  infantry 
as  a whole. 

(3)  Third,  a combination  of  the  foregoing  methods,  appor- 
tioning part  of  the  division  artillery  to  support  infantry  subdi- 
visions, and  retaining  the  remainder  for  the  support  of  the  divi- 
sion as  a whole.  The  primary  and  secondary  missions  of  the  ar- 
tillery units  that  are  apportioned  to  support  infantry  subdivisions, 
remain  the  same  as  outlined  in  the  first  method  above.  The  mis- 
sion of  that  part  of  the  division  artillery  apportioned  to  support 
the  division  as  a whole,  is  to  participate  in  such  fires  as  may  be 
desired  by  the  division  commander. 

(4)  NOTE. — Habitually,  one  regiment  of  light  guns  must 
train  with  one  of  the  infantry  brigades  to  the  point  that  it  ac- 
tually feels  itself  to  be  a part  of  the  brigade.  In  the  artillery 
regiment,  the  same  battalion  should,  whenever  possible,  serve  the 
same  infantry  regiment.  Throughout  his  entire  team,  the  divi- 
sion commander  and  his  staff  must  force  this  intimate  daily  con- 
tact and  cooperation,  requiring  at  the  same  time  the  senior  ar- 
tillery commander  to  coordinate  all  the  artillery  fire  so  as  to 
insure  the  success  of  the  team.  (Superior  Board,  A.  E.  F.) 

(b)  The  first  method  will  be  used  habitually ; the  second 
method  is  not  applicable  in  any  tactical  situation,  as  the  first 
and  third  methods  make  suitable  and  ample  provisions  for 


VIII — 13-15 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES— TACTICS  139 

emergency  and  rapid  concentrations  of  fire.  The  use  of  the 
third  method  will  be  very  exceptional  except  in  the  case  of 
medium  and  heavy  guns  or  howitzers  attached  to  the  divi- 
sion artillery. 

(c)  The  amount  of  artillery  retained  to  support  speci- 
fic infantry  units,  and  the  amount  retained  to  support  the 
division  as  a whole,  are  questions  for  the  division  comman- 
der to  decide  in  each  situation.  Generally,  all  of  the  light 
artillery  supports  specific  infantry  units;  some  or  all  of  at- 
tached 155-mm.  howitzers  may  be  so  assigned  or  all  may 
support  the  division  as  a whole.  When  the  division  artillery 
is  heavily  reinforced,  some  of  the  reinforcing  light  artillery 
may  support  the  division  as  a whole. 

(d)  By  designating,  whenever  practicable,  the  same 
artillery  regiment  to  support  a specific  infantry  brigade,  or 
the  same  artillery  battalion  to  support  a specific  infantry 
regiment,  teamwork  and  mutual  cooperation  between  in- 
fantry and  artillery  are  developed. 

14.  Disposition  of  Attached  Artillery. — (a)  Me- 
dium howitzers,  usually  a regiment,  may  be  attached  to  the 
division  from  the  corps  artillery,  when  the  division  is  acting 
alone,  or  when  there  are  special  reasons  for  such  attach- 
ment. When  attached  to  the  division,  medium  howitzers 
form  part  of  the  division  artillery,  and  normally  support  the 
division  as  a whole.  When  circumstances  make  it  advisable, 
a battalion  of  medium  howitzers  may  be  associated  with  a 
light  artillery  regiment,  with  a secondary  mission  of  answer- 
ing special  calls  to  supplement  the  fire  of  the  light  guns  in 
support  of  infantry  subdivisions. 

(b)  When  the  division  artillery  is  reenforced  by  other 
battalions,  regiments  or  brigades  of  light  artillery,  the  dis- 
positions and  missions  thereof  are  questions  for  the  divi- 
sion commander  to  decide. 

15.  Disposition  for  Command. — (a)  From  the  view- 
point of  command,  there  are  two  recognized  dispositions  of 
the  division  artillery: 

(1)  That  retained  under  the  artillery  brigade  commander, 

termed  supporting  artillery. 

(2)  That  attached  to  subordinate  infantry  or  cavalry  units. 

This  includes  artillery  with  advance  ,rear,  or  flank  guards, 

or  with  a small  detached  force,  such  as  a reinforced  brigade. 

Also  accompanying  batteries  and  accompanying  guns,  when  used. 


VIII— 15-16 


140  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(b)  (1)  In  principle,  some  of  the  division  artillery  is  attached 
to  infantry  units  whenever  the  action  has  resolved,  or  is  likely 
to  resolve,  itself  into  disconnected  local  engagements.  In  such 
cases,  local  infantry  commanders  require  artillery  support  con- 
trolled by  themselves,  as  they,  and  not  superior  commanders,  are 
conversant  with  the  local  situations  and  are  responsible  for  de- 
cisions and  actions  thereon. 

(2)  It  should  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  artillery  thus 
attached  is  not  readily  available  for  division  concentrations;  the 
number  of  guns  therefore  should  be  relatively  small,  and  their 
use  confined  to  situations  where  supporting  artillery  is  not  equal- 
ly effective. 

(c)  In  defensives,  and  at  least  in  the  initial  stages  of 
offensives,  in  open  warfare  situations,  the  division  artillery 
is  in  principle  used  to  support,  and  no  detachments  there- 
from are  made.  In  pursuits,  retreats,  meeting  engagements, 
and  security  functions,  and  other  such  situations  in  which 
the  division  cannot  be  employed  as  a coordinated  whole, 
some  attached  artillery  is  the  rule ; in  exceptional  cases,  all 
of  the  division  artillery  may  be  so  disposed. 

(d)  Artillery  ordered  to  support  a specific  infantry 
unit  has  the  role  of  closely  supporting  that  unit  with  its 
own  fire,  and  of  securing  additional  fire  from  other  support- 
ing units,  when  its  own  is  inadequate  or  not  suitable  in 
type  for  a particular  mission.  It  has  the  additional  role  of 
delivering  other  fires  directed  by  the  division  commander. 

(e)  In  order  that  the  collective  missions  ordered  by 
the  division  commander  may  be  carried  out  to  best  advan- 
tage, the  division  artillery  commander  formulates  plans  to 
meet  possible  needs  in  this  connection.  These  plans  vary 
in  extent,  depending  on  the  time  available  and  the  situa- 
tion. 

(f)  However,  in  any  situation,  the  division  artillery 
commander  is  given  such  tactical  control  of  all  the  support- 
ing artillery  that  the  orders  of  the  division  commander  for 
collective  missions  may  be  carried  out  promptly  and  effec- 
tively. 

16.  Decisions  Concerning  Artillery  Employment. 
(a)  While  the  selection  of  the  exact  position  to  be  occupied 
by  batteries,  etc.,  is  a function  of  the  junior  artillery  com- 
manders, the  division  commander  selects  the  general  local- 
ity for  each  artillery  regiment.  In  making  this  selection,  the 
division  commander  considers  not  only  the  infantry  unit 


VIII— 16-17 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES— TACTICS  141 

the  artillery  regiment  supports,  but  also  the  questions  of 
road  circulation,  traffic  control,  supply  and  evacuation.  In 
order  to  secure  smooth  working  of  the  whole  divisional  team 
as  well  as  close  cooperation  between  the  infantry  and  the 
supporting  artillery,  the  division  order  should  announce, 
in  all  offensives  and  defensives,  the  general  localities  se- 
lected. 

(b)  The  command  of  the  artillery  brigade  of  an  infan- 
try division  is  exercised  in  the  same  manner  as  that  of  an 
infantry  brigade.  It  should  be  thoroughly  understood  that 
in  arriving  at  decisions  governing  the  dispositions  and  em- 
ployment of  the  division  artillery,  the  artillery  brigade  com- 
mander is  the  chief  adviser  of  the  division  commander. 
Nevertheless  the  actual  decisions,  in  the  cases  cited,  are 
functions  of  the  division  commander  and  not  of  the  artil- 
lery brigade  commander. 

17.  The  Division  Order. — (a)  In  attacks  and  de- 
fenses, the  division  commander's  order  should  cover : 

(1)  The  artillery  unit  or  units  to  support  each  large  infan- 
try unit.  Whenever  possible,  the  same  artillery  habitually  sup- 
ports the  same  infantry  unit.  In  a stabilized  defensive  sector, 
where  frequent  changes  are  made  in  the  infantry  units  occupying 
the  position,  the  artillery  may  be  ordered  to  support  a defined  ter- 
rain area  (sector). 

(2)  The  general  locality  in  which  each  artillery  regiment  is 
to  be  placed. 

(3)  Any  attachment  of  artillery  units  to  infantry  commands. 

(4)  Any  special  targets  or  missions,  and  any  special  direc- 
tions as  to  gas  and  smoke. 

(5)  General  directions  as  to  forward  movement  or  retire- 
ment of  the  artillery  if  any  is  contemplated. 

(b)  In  framing  the  division  field  order,  the  subpara- 
graph of  paragraph  3,  relating  to  the  artillery,  is  drafted 
in  consultation  with  the  artillery  brigade  commander.  His 
recommendations  thus  are  given  consideration,  and  he  se- 
cures early  information  to  enable  him  to  prepare  the  artil- 
lery brigade  field  order. 


IX— 1 


CHAPTER  IX 

The  Tactical  and  Technical  Employment 
of  the  Battery 

Paragraphs 


The  Battery  a Technical  Unit 1 

Light  Battery  the  Standard 2 

Composition  and  Subdivision 3 

The  Battery  Headquarters 4 

The  Battery  Detail 5 

Battery  Reconnaissance  (See  also  Chapter  VI) 6 

Orders  of  the  Battery  Commander 7 

The  Firing  Battery  8 

Battery  Combat  Train  9 

Ammunition  • 10 

Batteries  Employed  Independently  (See  also  Chapter  XIII) __  11 

Change  of  Position  12 

Communications 13 

Administration  and  Supply 14 

Conduct  of  Fire 15 

Observation  of  Fire 16 

Map  Firing  17 


1.  The  Battery  a Technical  Unit. — The  battery  is 
a technical  unit.  Its  fire  power  is  directed  and  controlled 
by  one  man.  Its  effectiveness  in  combat  is  largely  depen- 
dent upon  technical  efficiency.  To  give  a battery  comman- 
der the  additional  burden  of  tactical  responsibilities,  tends 
to  detract  from  the  battery’s  technical  efficiency  and  to 
impose  upon  the  personnel  of  the  battery  headquarters  ad- 
ditional duties  for  which  it  is  not  organized  nor  adequately 
equipped.  For  this  reason,  the  tactical  handling  of  batteries 
associated  with,  or  supporting  troops  of  other  arms,  is  cen- 
tered in  the  battalion  commander.  A battalion  commander 
should  concern  himself  as  little  as  possible  with  the  techni- 
cal details  of  fire  accuracy,  and  should  remain  free  to  direct 
his  energy  and  attention  toward  the  tactical  employment  of 
the  fire  power  of  his  batteries  so  as  best  to  carry  out  the 
plan  of  action  of  the  commander  of  the  troops  he  is  support- 
ing. The  duties  of  the  battalion  commander  and  his  head- 
quarters, in  this  connection,  are  discussed  in  the  next  chap- 
ter. 


142 


IX— 2-4 


TACTICAL— TECHNICAL  EMPLOYMENT— BATTERY  143 

2.  Light  Battery  the  Standard. — (a)  For  field  ar- 
tillery employment,  the  light  battery,  horse-drawn,  is  the 
standard.  In  designing  the  light  field  gun,  sufficient  power 
has  been  sacrificed  to  give  it  the  mobility  to  keep  up  with 
infantry  under  normal  conditions.  Other  types  of  artil- 
lery are  substituted  for  particular  employment.  Where 
greater  mobility  is  required,  horse  artillery  or  portee  artil- 
lery is  substituted.  In  mountainous  country,  or  where  the 
terrain  is  impracticable  for  horse  or  tractor-drawn  trans- 
portation, light  artillery  is  replaced  by  pack  artillery.  When 
movement  is  slow,  or  greater  power  is  required,  guns  and 
howitzers  of  larger  caliber  are  brought  forward.  Each  class 
of  artillery  has  its  particular  uses,  and  it  is  not  a matter  of 
indifference  whether  heavy  howitzers  or  light  guns  are 
assigned  to  a particular  task,  any  more  than  whether  a par- 
ticular mission  should  be  assigned  to  cavalry  or  to  infantry. 

(b)  In  the  paragraphs  that  follow,  the  discussion  is 
based  upon  the  employment  of  light  artillery,  but,  unless 
specifically  excepted,  the  principles  are  applicable  to  the 
heavier  types  of  artillery  that  accompany  troops  in  the  field. 

3.  Composition  and  Subdivision. — In  our  army,  all 
light,  medium  or  heavy  artillery  batteries  that  accompany 
troops  in  the  field  are  equipped  and  manned  for  the  service 
of  four  guns  or  howitzers.  The  personnel  and  equipment 
provided  to  a battery  for  communications,  computation  of 
firing  data  and  observation  of  fire,  are  adequate  normally 
for  only  one  firing  unit.  Consequently,  the  utilization  of 
detached  platoons  or  of  single  guns  should  be  avoided  when 
possible.  Especially  is  this  true  in  the  case  of  the  75-mm. 
battery. 

The  principal  subdivisions  of  a battery  are: 

1.  The  battery  headquarters. 

2.  The  firing  battery. 

3.  The  maintenance  section. 

Each  will  be  considered  in  some  detail. 

4.  The  Battery  Headquarters. — The  headquarters 
of  a 75-mm.  battery  (horse-drawn)  consists  of  2 officers  (1 
captain  as  battery  commander  and  1 second  lieutenant  as 
reconnaissance  officer),  26  enlisted  men,  a 4-horse  reel  cart, 
and  a 4-horse  f-ton  spring  wagon  for  carrying  instruments 
and  additional  wire. 


IX— 4 


144  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

The  principal  functions  of  the  battery  headquarters 
are  briefly  as  follows : 


Functions 

Command  and  administration. 


Reconnaissance  and  security 

(also  liaison  with  supported 
infantry  when  battery  is 
acting  alone). 

Establishment  and  maintenance 
of  observation. 


Conduct  of  fire,  calculation  of 
firing  data,  and  any  topogra- 
phical work  connected  there- 
with. 

Establishment  and  maintenance 
of  battery  communicatins. 


Liaison  with  artillery  battalion 
commander. 

Liaison  with  the  limbers,  when 
the  battery  is  in  firing  posi- 
tion, and  with  the  firing  bat- 
tery when  the  headquarters 
is  separated  therefrom  on 
the  march  or  during  a re- 
connaissance. 

Marking  the  route  for  the  firing 
battery. 


By  Whom  Performed 
Battery  commander  assisted  by  1st 
sergeant  and  battery  clerk. 

Battery  commander  assisted  by  re- 
connaissance officer  and  two 
scout  corporals. 


Battery*  commander  assisted  by  re- 
connaissance officer,  instrument 
sergeant  and  four  instrument 
men. 

Same. 


Signal  sergeant,  two  signal  cor- 
porals, five  telephone  opera- 
tors, two  line  guards,  and  reel 
cart  with  drivers. 

Battery  agent.* 


1st  Sergeant. 


Under  the  direction  of  the  1st  Ser- 
geant.f 


*Designated  as  “battalion  agent”  in  Table  38W,  Tables  of  Or- 
ganization, 1921. 

fWhen  the  battery  commander  with  his  detail  goes  forward  on 
reconnaissance,  he  is  followed  by  his  battery  at  a slower  gait.  Upon 
reaching  any  point  where  the  officer  with  the  battery  might  be  in 
doubt  as  to  the  proper  direction  to  take,  the  first  sergeat  drops  off  a 
man,  as  a “marker.”  The  first  marker  waits  for  the  approach  of  the 
battery,  and  as  soon  as  he  has  indicated  to  the  officer  at  the  head  of 
the  battery  the  direction  to  be  followed  (usually  by  a signal  acknow- 
ledged by  the  officer),  he  rides  forward  at  an  increased  gait  until 
he  comes  to  the  second  marker.  He  relieves  the  second  marker  who 
in  turn  rides  forward  to  relieve  the  third.  This  process  is  continued. 

When  the  battery  commander  arrives  at  a point  where  he  wishes 
the  battery  to  halt  until  the  completion  of  the  reconnaissance  he  calls 
out  “Last  Marker.” 


IX— 4-5 


TACTICAL— TECHNICAL  EMPLOYMENT— BATTERY  145 

In  addition  to  the  administrative  and  technical  person- 
nel of  the  battery  headquarters,  a bugler  and  three  horse- 
holders  are  provided. 

5.  The  Battery  Detail. — (a)  Eliminating  from  the 
battery  headquarters  the  battery  commander,  the  battery 
agent  (usually  with  the  battalion  commander),  the  battery 
clerk  (usually  with  the  rear  echelon  of  the  regiment),  and 
one  telephone  operator  with  the  firing  battery,  we  have  what 
long  custom  in  our  service  has  been  pleased  to  call  “the  bat- 
tery detail.” 

(b)  The  battery  detail,  in  column  of  twos,  requires  ap- 
proximately 60  yards  of  road  space.  It  is  formed  from  head 
to  rear  in  the  approximate  order  in  which  the  personnel  com- 
mences to  function  during  and  following  a reconnaissance. 
At  the  head  of  the  detail  are  the  reconnaissance  officer,  two 
scouts,  the  instrument  sergeant  and  signal  sergeant.  These, 
with  the  bugler  and  a horseholder,  constitute  what  is  known 
as  the  “battery  commander’s  party”  (BC  Party).*  This 
forms  a convenient  subdivision  of  the  battery  detail  to  take 
forward  on  a reconnaissance  for  positions,  under  conditions 
that  make  it  inadvisable  to  take  forward  the  entire  battery 
detail.  Following  the  battery  commander’s  party  are  the 
instrument  men,  then  the  communications  personnel  with 
the  reel  cart  and  spring  wagon  following  in  rear.  A bicycle 
is  included  in  the  equipment  of  the  battery  headquarters. 

(c)  The  position  of  the  battery  detail  in  column  on  the 
march  varies : 

(1)  If  the  battery  is  acting  alone,  the  battery  detail  marches 
at  the  head  of  the  battery. 

(2)  If  the  battery  forms  part  of  a battalion  on  a march, 
in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  it  is  usual  to  assemble  all  the  bat- 
tery details  at  the  head  of  the  battalion  and  march  them  im- 
mediately in  rear  of  the  battalion  detail. 

(3)  If  marching  in  a mixed  column,  and  rencontre  with  the 
enemy  is  expected,  the  battery  commander’s  detail  (or  the  battery 
commander’s  party  thereof)  may  be  placed  in  the  column  several 


*In  the  BC  Party,  the  reconnaissance  officer  is  a general  assistant 
to  the  battery  commander,  particularly  for  reconnaissance.  The  in- 
strument sergeant  is  the  understudy  of  the  reconnaissance  officer, 
commands  the  battery  detail,  and  is  present  with  the  BC  Party  pri- 
marily to  receive  instructions  relative  to  observation,  and  to  assist, 
if  called  upon,  in  the  location  of  observation  posts.  The  signal  ser- 
geant is  present  to  receive  early  information  as  to  communications  to 
be  established,  the  scouts  for  reconnaissance  and  security. 


IX— 5-7 


146  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

hundred  yards  ahead  of  the  firing  battery.  This  is  particularly 
advisable  when  it  is  anticipated  that  quick  action  upon  the  part 
of  the  artillery  may  be  required,  as  it  gives  the  battery  detail 
more  time  to  make  the  necessary  preparations  for  firing  while 
the  battery  is  moving  to  its  firing  position. 

6.  Battery  Reconnaissance. — (a)  On  a battalion  re- 
connaissance, mounted,  the  battery  commander  usually  is 
accompanied  by  his  reconnaissance  officer  and  bugler,  the 
remainder  of  the  battery  detail  remaining  with  the  bat- 
talion detail,  the  movements  of  which  are  controlled  by 
the  battalion  commander.  As  soon  as  the  battery  comman- 
der has  received  the  necessary  orders  as  to  his  mission,  posi- 
tion, communications,  etc.,  and  leaves  the  battalion  com- 
mander, he  sends  for  his  battery  detail,  which  should  be 
at  no  great  distance,  and  issues  his  verbal  order.  The  bat- 
tery may  be  sent  for  either  before  or  after  the  battery  com- 
mander issues  his  verbal  order,  depending  upon  the  time 
element.  The  verbal  order  is  issued  actually  to  the  recon- 
naissance officer,  instrument  sergeant,  signal  sergeant,  and 
1st  sergeant,  but  it  is  advantageous  to  have  all  members 
of  the  battery  detail  hear  it.  Usually,  it  is  the  1st  sergeant 
who  rides  back  to  the  battery  and  conveys  the  verbal  order 
of  the  battery  commander  to  the  senior  officer  with  the  fir- 
ing battery,  known  as  the  executive  officer. 

(b)  When  the  battery  is -acting  alone,  the  battery  re- 
connaissance is  conducted  in  a similar  manner.  The  bat- 
tery commander  is  accompanied  by  his  reconnaissance  of- 
ficer and  bugler,  or  by  the  entire  battery  commander’s  party. 
The  remainder  of  the  battery  detail  follows  in  rear,  or  on  a 
Rank,  at  a distance  designated  by  the  battery  commander, 
keeping  the  latter  always  in  sight.  The  battery  follows  at 
a slower  gait  along  the  route  marked  by  the  battery  detail 
under  the  direction  of  the  1st  sergeant  (see  footnote  to  par. 
4). 

(c)  The  above  paragraphs  outline  the  normal  methods 
of  conducting  a reconnaissance.  The  method  must  be  var- 
ied to  suit  each  particular  situation. 

(d)  In  this  connection,  see  also  Chapter  VI. 

7.  Orders  of  the  Battery  Commander. — (a)  As  soon 
as  the  battery  commander  has  completed  his  reconnais- 
sance, or  has  received  orders  for  the  occupation  of  a posi- 


IX— 7-8 


.TACTICAL— TECHNICAL  EMPLOYMENT— BATTERY  147 

tion  selected  by  his  battalion  commander,  he  issues  a ver- 
bal order  that  should  include  all  of  the  following  items,  or 
such  as  are  essential  to  the  particular  situation: 

1.  Information  concerning  the  enemy  and  our  supporting  troops. 

2.  Mission  of  the  battery. 

3.  (a)  Position  of  the  battery,  or  of  each  individual  gun. 

(b)  Route  to  battery  position. 

(c)  Reference  point. 

Sector  of  fire  (usually  the  normal  sector). 

Aiming  point. 

(d)  Time  battery  position  is  to  be  occupied. 

(e)  Establishment  of  observation. 

(f)  Establishment  of  communications. 

(g)  Liaison  with  supported  troops  (when  battery  is  acting 

alone) . 

(h)  Limbers  and  combat  train. 

(i)  Security  and  use  of  machine  guns  and  automatic  rifles. 

4.  Battery  aid  station. 

5.  Location  of  battery  commander. 

As  stated  in  the  preceding  paragraph,  this  order  is  is- 
sued to  the  reconnaissance  officer,  the  instrument  sergeant, 
the  signal  sergeant,  the  1st  sergeant,  and  to  the  executive 
officer  (to  the  last  named  usually  through  the  1st  sergeant) . 

(b)  As  soon  as  this  order  is  issued  the  normal  proce- 
dure is  for  the  1st  sergeant  to  ride  back  to  the  battery,  re- 
port to  the  executive,  transmit  to  him  the  battery  comman- 
der’s order,  and  then  guide  the  battery  to  the  position  se- 
lected, riding  ahead  with  the  executive  to  show  him  the  posi- 
tions for  the  guns.  As  soon  as  the  guns  and  caissons  have 
been  unlimbered,  the  1st  sergeant  posts  the  limbers. 

NOTE. — The  above  is  based  upon  the  form  for  battery  orders  in 
use  at  the  Field  Artillery  School,  Fort  Sill,  Okla. 

8.  The  Firing  Battery. — The  details  in  the  following 
discussion  apply  to  light  artillery  only : the  principles  apply 
to  all  types  of  artillery  that  accompany  troops  in  the  field. 

(a)  Composition  and  Formation. — Four  gun  sections 
and  a caisson  section  (the  fifth  section)  constitute  the  fir- 
ing battery.*  The  habitual  formation  before  going  into  a 
position  is  in  double  section  column.  In  this  formation  the 
gun  sections  are  formed  in  column,  with  the  caissons  either 
on  the  right  or  left  of  the  guns  at  one  yard  interval;  one 

*A  section  is  commanded  by  a sergeant.  A gun  section  has  one 
gun  and  one  caisson,  each  trailed  behind  a limber.  A caisson  section 
has  two  caissons  with  a limber  for  each. 


IX— 8 


148  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

caisson  of  the  fifth  section  is  in  front  and  one  in  rear  of  the 
column  of  gun  sections.  This  formation  is  called  “Formed 
for  action.” 

(b)  Preparation  for  Action. — When  it  is  but  a short 

distance  to  the  position  selected  for  the  battery,  and  when 
the  ground  is  not  too  rough,  the  command  is  given:  “Pre- 

pare for  action,”  or  two  commands  may  be  combined : “Form 
and  prepare  for  action.”  In  preparing  for  action  the  breech 
and  muzzle  covers  are  removed,  the  sights  placed  in  posi- 
tion, the  breech  is  opened  and  the  bore  examined,  the  ele- 
vating and  traversing  mechanism  are  tested,  and,  with  some 
guns,  the  upper  and  lower  shields  adjusted  in  position. 

(c)  Occupation  of  a Position. — 

(1)  In  going  into  a position,  a firing  battery  may  approach 
the  position  in  double  section  line  from  the  front  or  from  the  rear. 
The  battery  is  halted  on  the  line  selected  for  the  battery  position, 
and  the  command  given:  “Action  front”  or  “Action  rear”  as  the 
case  may  be.  Usually,  however,  a position  is  approached  in  double 
section  column  from  either  flank  and  the  command  given:  “Ac- 
tion right  (or  left).” 

(2)  The  above  is  based  upon  drill  ground  maneuver  and  is 
the  invariable  method  of  occupying  a position  when  maneuvering 
space  is  available.  When  the  terrain  does  not  permit  of  maneu- 
vering, or  when  a position  must  be  occupied  in  the  dark,  each  gun 
and  caisson  may  be  led  individually  to  the  emplacement  selected 
and  marked  for  it.  This  method  is  also  employed  for  placing 
heavy  guns  and  howitzers  in  positions  where  emplacements  must 
be  prepared  beforehand. 

(3)  When  a light  battery  is  in  action,  each  gun  caisson  is 
placed  on  the  left  of  its  piece  with  not  more  than  one  foot  be- 
tween adjacent  wheels.  The  normal  interval  between  guns  may 
be  taken  as  20  yards  muzzle  to  muzzle,  but  this  interval  usually 
varies  and  may  be  reduced  to  as  little  as  8 yards  or  increased 
to  as  much  as  40  or  50.  The  caissons  of  the  fifth  section  are 
normally  placed  about  20  yards  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  flank 
gun  sections  and  usually  a little  in  rear  of  the  line  of  guns.  In- 
cluding these  flank  caissons,  a light  battery  normally  occupies  a 
front  of  approximately  100  yards. 

(d)  The  Executive  Officer. — Two  lieutenants  are  pro- 
vided with  the  firing  battery.  The  senior  is  “executive  of- 
ficer” or  “executive.”  The  junior  is  assistant  to  the  exe- 
cutive. Though  the  captain  usually  conducts  the  fire  of  his 
battery,  he  is  seldom  in  close  proximity  to  the  firing  position, 
so  that  the  responsibility  for  the  quick  and  accurate  ser- 
vice of  the  guns  devolves  upon  the  executive.  The  principal 
duties  of  the  executive  may  be  summarized  as  follows : 


too  yards 


TACTICAL— TECHNICAL  EMPLOYMENT— BATTERY  149 


150 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


(1)  Usually  conducts  the  firing  battery  to  and  establishes 
it  in  the  firing  position.  Causes  such  measures  to  be  taken  as  will 
facilitate  the  rapid  opening  of  accurate  fire.  Sees  to  the  prepara- 
tion of  all  practicable  protection  for  the  personnel  in  addition  to 
that  provided  by  the  shields. 

(2)  Exercises  immediate  command  of,  or  supervision  over, 
the  battery  in  the  firing  position. 

(3)  Repeats  all  firing  data  when  the  captain  is  not  near 
enough  for  the  battery  to  command  it  by  voice. 

(4)  Gives  the  command  for  commencing  firing  whether  the 
captain  be  at  the  battery  or  not. 

(5)  Supervises  the  resupply  of  ammunition  at  the  firing  bat- 
tery. 

(6)  Has  charge  of  the  replacement  of  casualties. 

(e)  The  assistant  to  the  executive  assists  in  the  super- 
vision of  the  gun  sections,  especially  when  difficulties  or 
errors  occur  in  a gun  squad. 

9.  Battery  Combat  Train. — (a)  The  combat  train  of 
a battery  is  normally  the  “maintenance  section”  (Table 
38W) , and  carries  no  ammunition.  However,  occasions  will 
arise  when  the  position  to  be  occupied  by  a battery  is  so 
restricted  that  the  fifth  section  caissons  will  be  detached 
from  the  firing  battery  and  placed  in  the  combat  train.  Un- 
der conditions  of  long  stabilization,  it  may  be  advisable  to 
place  all  the  caissons  in  the  battery  combat  train,  employing 
trenches  or  other  means  for  storing  the  ammunition  at  the 
firing  position,  with  as  much  protection  from  weather  and 
enemy  artillery  fire  as  possible. 

(b)  In  the  75-mm.  battery  (horse-drawn)  the  transpor- 
tation with  the  maintenance  section  consists  of: 

1 ration  cart. 

1 water  cart. 

1 rolling  kitchen. 

1 battery  wagon,  6-horse. 

1 store  wagon,  6-horse. 

1 spare  team  (6  horses). 

The  battery  wagon  and*  store  wagon  carry  a large  assort- 
ment of  tools  and  equipment,  including  those  necessary  for 
shoeing  horses,  repairing  harness  and  carpenter  work.  Ex- 
tra wheels,  extra  harness,  and  spare  parts  for  the  gun 
mechanism  are  carried.  Witl^  the  maintenance  section  are 
the  mess  sergeant,  stable  sergeant,  supply  sergeant,  cooks, 
mechanics  and  other  artificers. 

(c)  Normally,  the  maintenance  section  remains  with 
the  firing  battery  until  the  latter  is  about  to  go  into  posi- 


IX— 9-11 


TACTICAL— TECHNICAL  EMPLOYMENT— BATTERY  151 

tion.  The  maintenance  section  then  falls  behind  and  goes 
to  the  post  of  the  limbers.  The  battalion  commander  may 
combine  the  maintenance  sections  of  the  batteries  and  have 
them  march  together  under  the  command  of  an  officer,  or 
non-commissioned  officer.  In  exceptional  cases  he  may  at- 
tach them  temporarily  to  the  battalion  combat  train. 

(d)  If  the  battery  is  acting  alone,  and  extra  caissons 
are  furnished  the  battery  from  the  battalion  combat  train, 
these  caissons  are  attached  to  the  battery  combat  train. 

10.  Ammunition. — (a)  The  American  caisson  (75- 
mm.  Model  of  1918)  carries  72  rounds  of  ammunition, 
the  caisson  limber  36  rounds,  the  gun  limber  18  rounds.  To- 
tal carried  in  the  battery,  177  rounds  per  gun. 

(b)  The  first  ammunition  used  by  a battery  is  taken 
from  the  six  caisson  chests  of  the  firing  battery.  This  am- 
munition is  replenished  by  the  ammunition  in  the  caissons 
and  limbers  of  the  battalion  combat  train.  When  the  nature 
of  the  action  permits,  the  empty  caissons  of  the  firing  bat- 
tery may  be  replaced  by  full  ones  from  the  combat  trains. 
Except  for  the  two  flank  caissons,  this  procedure  may  inter- 
fere with  the  service  of  the  guns,  so  that  ammunition 
brought  forward  to  the  battery  position  is  usually  dumped 
as  close  to  the  guns  as  possible,  and  carried  to  the  gun  posi- 
tion by  the  cannoneers. 

(c)  The  ammunition  in  the  gun  limbers  is  used  only 
as  a last  resort. 

11.  Batteries  Employed  Independently. — (a)  Be- 
sides accompanying  batteries  (discussed  in  Chapter  XIII), 
individual  batteries  may  be  detached  for  employment  with 
small  advance  or  rear  guards  or  with  other  small  forces. 
The  battery  commander  virtually  assumes  the  functions  of 
a battalion  commander  with  only  one  battery  at  his  disposal, 
and  the  tactical  principles  involved  are  the  same  as  dis- 
cussed for  the  battalion  in  the  following  chapter. 

(b)  The  power  of  heavy  materiel,  and  the  less  intimate 
tactical  connection  required  with  supported  troops,  make 
it  possible  to  employ  batteries  separately  more  freely  than 
with  light  guns  and  light  howitzers ; but  the  same  principle 
applies  to  heavy  as  to  light  artillery — the  tactical  unit,  the 
battalion,  should  be  held  intact  as  far  as  possible. 


IX— 12-15 


152  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

12.  Change  of  Position. — (a)  Moving  a battery  from 
one  position  to  another,  during  an  action,  is  attended  with 
more  difficulties  as  a rule,  than  movement  into  an  initial 
position.  In  addition  to  being  out  of  action  during  the  move- 
ment, it  takes  time  for  a battery  to  adjust*  itself  to  a new 
position.  The  general  rule  is  to  move  a battery  during  an 
engagement  as  infrequently  as  possible,  consistent  with  tac- 
tical needs  and  effective  firing  at  reasonable  ranges.  Advan- 
tage should  be  taken  of  darkness  and  lulls  in  the  combat  to 
improve  artillery  positions.  This  matter  is  discussed  in  more 
detail  under  the  tactical  employment  of  the  battalion. 

(b)  In  moving  a battery  from  one  position  to  another, 
the  guns  should  be  kept  out  of  action  the  shortest  time  pos- 
sible. For  this  reason  it  is  bad  tactics  to  start  a battery  out 
toward  a new  position  that  has  not  been  definitely  selected, 
along  a route  that  has  not  been  thoroughly  reconnoitered. 
At  least  a preliminary  reconnaissance  should  be  made  while 
the  battery  is  still  in  its  old  position.  Before  the  battery 
reaches  its  new  position,  communications  must  be  estab- 
lished and  firing  data  computed,  so  that  the  guns  may  com- 
mence firing  almost  as  soon  as  the  trails  are  dropped.  This 
requires  rapid  action  and  the  best  of  teamwork  on  the  part 
of  the  battery  commander  and  his  detail. 

13.  Communications. — Battery  communications  are 
discussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  VII. 

14.  Administration  and  Supply. — In  all  matters  of 
supply,  and  in  minor  matters  of  administration  not  involv- 
ing policy  or  personnel,  the  regiment  deals  direct  with  the 
battery.  In  combat,  rations  are  delivered  by  the  regimental 
service  battery  to  the  position  of  the  limbers,  where  they 
are  cooked  and  sent  forward  in  ration  carts  to  the  firing  bat- 
teries. In  a stabilized  situation,  the  limbers,  maintenance 
sections  and  combat  trains  are  withdrawn  usually  well  to 
the  rear,  out  of  effective  range  of  the  enemy’s  light  guns. 
Under  such  conditions,  it  is  desirable  to  establish  cooking 
facilities  for  the  men  of  the  firing  batteries,  somewhere  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  battery  positions. 

15.  Conduct  of  Fire. — (a)  The  conduct  of  fire  means 
the  control  of  fire  upon  any  target  by  communicating  the 
necessary  commands  to  the  firing  battery.  Conduct  of  fire 


IX— 15-16 


TACTICAL— TECHNICAL  EMPLOYMENT— BATTERY  153 

is  usually  a function  of  the  battery  commander,  but  may  be 
delegated  to  any  officer  in  a position  to  observe. 

(b)  Conduct  of  fire  should  not  be  confused  with  “fire 
direction,”  which  is  a function  of  the  battalion  commander. 
The  battalion  commander  tells  the  battery  commander  what 
targets  to  fire  upon,  and  the  object  of  the  fire,  whether  de- 
struction, neutralization,  harassing,  interdiction,  or  screen- 
ing by  smoke.  He  may  indicate  the  hour  the  fire  is  to  com- 
mence and  the  period  it  is  to  continue.  He  may  even  indi- 
cate the  rate  of  fire,  or  limit  the  number  of  rounds.  This 
all  comes  under  the  category  of  “fire  direction.”  As  a 
rule,  as  much  detail  as  possible  is  left  to  the  battery  com- 
mander, even  the  selection  of  targets  within  the  battery’s 
normal  sector  of  fire,  in  a situation  where  there  are  fre- 
quent transient  targets,  or  targets  of  opportunity. 

(c)  Conduct  of  fire  usually  includes  selecting  the  type 
of  ammunition  to  be  used,  and  the  type  of  fuse;  also  the 
method  of  fire,  whether  by  salvo,  volley  fire,  or  volley  fire 
sweeping.  These  are  the  usual  methods  employed  in  fire 
for  effect.*  Zone  fire  is  obtained  by  using  volley  fire,  or 
volley  fire  sweeping,  at  successive  ranges. 

(d)  In  observed  fire,  fire  for  effect  is  preceded  by  fire 
for  adjustment,  unless  the  target  has  been  registered  pre- 
viously. The  adjustment  should  be  accomplished  quickly  in 
order  not  to  lose  the  effect  of  surprise.  Rapidity  of  fire, 
without  accuracy,  is  unprofitable ; on  the  other  hand,  accur- 
acy slowly  obtained  frequently  results  in  lack  of  effect,  be- 
cause the  enemy  will  have  time  to  shelter  himself  from  the 
fire.  The  ideal  is  accuracy  combined  with  rapidity,  in  a 
short  intense  burst  of  fire. 

16.  Observation  of  Fire. — (a)  Generally  speaking, 
the  most  dependable  means  of  conducting  observed  fire  is 
by  terrestrial  observation.  Balloon  observation  is  fre- 
quently as  efficient  or  more  so.  Adjustment  with  airplane 
observation  is  slower  and  more  subject  to  interruption,  but 

*A  battery  salvo  consists  of  one  round  fired  by  each  gun  at  in- 
tervals of  three  seconds  or  more.  In  volley  fire,  each  gun  fires  a 
designated  number  of  rounds  in  rapid  succession.  Volley  fire  sweep- 
ing is  the  same,  except  that  after  each  round  the  gun  is  traversed  to 
move  the  point  of  impact  to  the  left  20  to  25  yards. 


IX— 16-17 


154  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

is  invaluable  for  adjustment  on  targets  when  terrestrial  or 
balloon  observation  is  not  possible  or  very  poor. 

(b)  Terrestrial  observation  should  be  provided  near 
enough  to  the  bring  battery  to  insure  efficient  and  uninter- 
rupted communication.  It  is  an  additional  advantage  to 
have  the  battery  position  visible  from  the  observation  post. 
With  the  observing  instruments  provided,  proximity  to  the 
front  lines  is  not  essential  except  in  cases  in  which  the 
safety  of  friendly  troops  or  long  ranges  are  involved.  It  is 
well,  however,  to  push  observation  posts  as  far  forward  as 
conditions  admit.  Frequently  the  best  observation  may  be 
had  from  a point  in  rear  of  a firing  battery. 

(c)  In  country  where  .observation  is  considerably  re- 
stricted, a battery  seldom  has  one  fixed  observation  post, 
but  changes  its  point  of  observation  for  almost  every  tar- 
get that  is  fired  upon.  For  the  reason  that  animate  tar- 
gets for  artillery  are  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule  in 
modern  warfare,  and  that  defensive  works  are  carefully  con- 
cealed or  camouflaged,  artillery  targets  usually  are  limited 
to  points  on  the  terrain  where  the  enemy  is  known  or  sus- 
pected to  be. 

(d)  Battery  observation  posts  are  seldom  manned  after 
dark  or  during  weather  that  makes  observation  impossible, 
though  battery  observation  posts  may  be  established  under 
these  conditions  for  the  sole  purpose  of  watching  for  pyro- 
technic signals.  By  special  arrangement,  in  stabilized  sit- 
uations, battalion  observation  posts  may  be  employed  by  the 
batteries  for  registration  or  special  adjustments,  establish- 
ing communication  between  the  firing  battery  and  the  bat- 
talion observation  post  usually  through  the  battalion  tele- 
phone net. 

(e)  The  technical  relation  of  observation  to  the  con- 
duct of  fire  is  discussed  in  Chapter  V. 

17.  Map  Firing. — (a)  The  technical  employment  of 
map  of  topographic  firing  is  discussed  in  Chapter  V.  It  is  of 
immense  importance  for  firing  upon  targets  when  observed 
fire  is  impracticable.  It  may  be  employed  at  night  or  in 
fog  or  rain,  but  should  never  take  the  place  of  observed  fire 
when  the  latter  is  feasible.  The  object  of  fire  adjustment 
is  to  place  the  center  of  impact  as  close  to  the  target  as 


IX— 17 


TACTICAL— TECHNICAL  EMPLOYMENT— BATTERY  155 

possible.  In  map  firing,  an  attempt  to  place  the  center  of 
impact  upon  the  target  is  made  by  calculations,  the  accur- 
acy of  which  usually  cannot  be  verified  during  the  progress 
of  the  shoot.  On  the  other  hand,  in  observed  fire  the  center 
of  impact  generally  may  be  placed  very  close  to  the  target. 

(b)  The  most  accurate  map  firing  is  based  upon  a pre- 
liminary registration  by  observed  fire  with  a particular  lot 
of  ammunition,  upon  some  well-defined  objective  within  the 
enemy's  lines.  A transposition  of  the  trajectory  then  is 
made  to  the  desired  target,  based  upon  its  difference  in  top- 
ographic location  with  respect  to  the  registration  point 
and  the  battery  position  (see  Chapter  V).  Without  pre- 
liminary registration,  map  firing  seldom  can  be  depended 
upon  for  greater  effect  than  neutralization,  no  matter  how 
accurate  the  maps  and  meteorological,  data  may  be. 

(c)  Map  firing,  and  the  topographic  preparation  of 
firing  data  for  observed  fire,  must  not  be  confused.  In  the 
latter,  the  map  or  other  topographic  means  are  employed 
for  calculating  the  firing  data  for  the  first  shot  on  a parti- 
cular target.  After  the  first  shot,  salvo  or  volley  is  fired, 
and  its  impact  observed,  corrections  are  made  in  the  usual 
manner  until  the  correct  data  are  determined.  The  topo- 
graphic preparation  of  firing  data  gained  great  importance 
during  The  World  War,  and  the  fire  efficiency  of  any  battery 
will  be  increased  greatly  by  knowing  its  topographic  loca- 
tion with  respect  to  its  observation  post  and  its  targets.  If 
this  cannot  be  determined  by  means  of  an  accurate  map,  the 
necessary  locations  with  respect  to  each  other  may  be  deter- 
mined by  means  of  triangulation  and  traverses  made  by  the 
instrument  men  of  the  battery  detail  under  the  direction  of 
the  reconnaissance  officer. 


X— 1-2 


CHAPTER  X 

Tactical  Employment  of  the  Battalion 


Paragraphs 

Light,  Medium  and  Heavy  Artillery  Battalions 1 

General  Functions  of  the  Battalion 2 

General  Functions  of  the  Battalion  Commander 3 

Keeping  the  Battalion  Intact 4 

Formations  of  Battalion * 5 

Reconnaissance  (See  also  Chapter  VI)  6 

Selection  of  Positions  (See  also  Chapter  VI) 7 

Security  8 

Communication 9 

Observation  10 

Ammunition  Supply 11 

Changes  of  Position 12 

Supporting  the  Infantry  __  13 

Battalion  Orders  14 

Conditions  Affecting  the  Efficacy  of  Battalion  Employment  15 

Offensive  Employment r 16 

Defensive  Employment  17 

Disposition  of  the  Batteries 18 

Disposition  of  Combat  Train  (See  Chapter  VI) 19 

Provisional  Battalion 20 


1.  Light,  Medium  and  Heavy  Artillery  Battalions. 
— The  tactical  employment  of  light,  medium  and  heavy  ar- 
tillery battalions  is  so  similar  that  it  is  deemed  unnecessary 
to  consider  the  three  types  of  artillery  separately.  The 
following  discussion,  therefore,  may  be  taken  as  applica- 
ble to  either  light,  medium  or  heavy  artillery,  unless  dis- 
tinctions are  stated  specifically. 

2.  General  Functions  of  the  Battalion. — The  bat- 
talion is  a unit  for  the  immediate  command  of  a number  of 
batteries ; it  is,  above  all  a tactical  unit.  The  functions  of 
the  battery  and  the  battalion  are  distinct,  and  are  best  ex- 
plained by  repeating  the  definitions  of  the  terms  conduct  of 
fire  and  fire  direction  as  used  in  the  artillery.  Conduct  of  fire 
is  “the  employment  of  the  technical  means  necessary  to 
cause  fire  of  the  desired  nature  to  be  brought  to  bear  upon 
the  target.”  Fire  direction  is  “the  tactical  direction  of  one  or 
more  fire  units  with  a view  of  bringing  their  fire  to  bear 
at  the  right  place  at  the  right  time.”  Conduct  of  fire  “is 
the  function  of  battery  commanders ;”  fire  direction  “is  the 


156 


X— 2-5 


TACTICAL  EMPLOYMENT  OF  BATTALION  157 

function  of  battalion  commanders.”  Conduct  of  fire  by  a 
battalion  commander  is  very  rare,  and  endeavor  should  be 
made  to  have  such  tactical  dispositions  that  this  will  be  un- 
necessary. 

3.  General  Functions  of  the  Battalion  Com- 
mander.— The  battalion  commander  devotes  his  efforts 
mainly  to : 

Keeping  in  touch  with  the  tactical  situation  of  our  own  and 
hostile  troops. 

The  advance  selection  and  preparation  of  areas  or  positions 
to  be  occupied  by  his  batteries,  and  the  routes  thereto,  in  con- 
formity to  orders  received  from  higher  authority. 

The  assignment  of  clear  and  specific  tasks  to  his  batteries  in 
furtherance  of  the  tactical  plan  of  the  commander. 

The  supervision  of  ammunition  supply  and  expenditure. 

The  supervision  and  assistance  of  battery  commanders  in 
their  execution  of  assigned  missions,  by  giving  additional  infor- 
mation from  time  to  time  or  by  corrective  measures  when  clearly 
necessary.  He  avoids  interfering  with  battery  commanders, 
but  allows  them  the  fullest  possible  initiative  consistent  with  his 
responsibility  for  the  results  accomplished. 

4.  Keeping  the  Battalion  Intact. — Since  the  bat- 
talion is  the  smallest  distinctly  tactical  unit  in  the  artillery, 
it  preferably  should  be  kept  together  and  well  in  hand,  in 
order  that  its  maximum  effectiveness  may  be  developed. 

5.  Formations  of  Battalion. — (a)  On  the  March. — 
The  marching  formation  of  the  battalion  is  the  section  col- 
umn. The  major  and  his  headquarters  are  at  the  head  of 
the  column.  Under  a tactical  situation,  the  batteries  habi- 
tually march  immediately  in  rear  of  the  battalion  headquar- 
ters. The  battalion  combat  train  marches  in  rear  of  the 
column  of  firing  batteries,  often  separated  therefrom  by 
units  of  other  arms.  A corporal  of  the  combat  train  re- 
ports to  the  major  as  agent,  taking  with  him  such  additional 
men  as  may  be  required  for  this  duty. 

If  action  is  imminent,  the  major  may  direct  the  bat- 
tery commanders,  with  their  details,  to  march  immediately 
in  rear  of  his  own  headquarters.  The  major  himself,  with 
a small  staff,  may  march  ahead  of  his  column,  particularly 
with  his  regimental  commander,  if  the  regiment  is  together, 
or  with  the  infantry  commander  with  whom  he  is  directly 
associated.  This  subject  is  covered  more  in  detail  in  Chap- 
ter XII. 


X— 5-7 


158  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(b)  In  Action. — For  action,  the  firing  batteries  and 
battalion  combat  train  are  posted  in  positions  designated 
by  the  major.  The  major  selects  his  post,  having  in  view 
effective  command  of  his  batteries  as  well  as  proximity  to 
the  infantry  commander  with  whom  he  is  directly  asso- 
ciated. If  both  of  these  considerations  can  be  fulfilled  by 
the  same  location,  it  is  ideal ; if  this  is  not  possible,  the  major 
must  choose  for  sure  and  effective  command  of  his  batteries, 
making  the  communication  with  the  infantry  commander 
as  short  and  reliable  as  possible. 

6.  Reconnaissance. — (a)  Reconnaissance  is  one  of 
the  most  important  duties  of  the  battalion  commander,  and 
enters  into  most  of  the  functions  of  the  battalion  in  a tac- 
tical situation.  Reconnaissance  is  necessary  in  selecting 
routes,  in  occupying  or  changing  position,  in  the  selection 
of  a position,  and  for  the  immediate  security  of  the  battalion 
in  action  or  on  the  march.  The  battalion  headquarters  per- 
sonnel is  reasonably  complete  for  this  purpose.  Although 
exceptional  cases  may  necessitate  augmenting  the  battalion 
headquarters  personnel  from  the  battery  details,  this  prac- 
tice is  to  be  avoided;  battery  details  should  be  left  for  the 
exclusive  use  of  battery  commanders.  The  basic  object  of 
reconnaissance  is  to  insure  the  prompt  and  orderly  carrying 
out  of  assigned  missions  by  the  guns  themselves;  it  follows 
that  reconnaissance  must  be  timely  and  must  be  made  suf- 
ficiently in  acl  ance  to  insure  that  the  guns  are  not  delayed 
or  hampered. 

(b)  The  reconnaissance  of  a route  is  made  in  the  same 
manner  as  for  the  battery.  The  Signal  Corporal  No.  1 is 
charged  with  the  details  of  marking  the  route  selected. 
There  is  no  personnel  provided  exclusively  for  marking  the 
route.  In  the  selection  of  the  route,  the  scouts  are  employed 
to  examine  and  report  upon  various  prospective  routes  and 
similar  missions. 

7.  Selection  of  Positions. — In  the  reconnaissance  of 
positions,  the  major  examines  the  terrain  in  view  of  the 
orders  he  has  received,  making  such  use  of  his  staff,  parti- 
cularly the  reconnaissance  officer,  as  is  expedient.  He  se- 
lects positions  for  the  batteries  with  an  exactness  depending 
on  the  time  available.  He  selects  a post  for  the  battalion 


TACTICAL  EMPLOYMENT  OF  BATTALION 


159 


combat  train,  or  merely  indicates  its  general  location  and 
leaves  its  selection  to  the  commander  of  the  combat  train. 
The  combat  train  agent  usually  accompanies  the  battalion 
commander  on  his  reconnaissance.  The  major  selects  his 
own  post  early  and  takes  prompt  measures  to  observe  the 
hostile  dispositions  and  movements.  He  may  be  accom- 
panied on  his  reconnaissance  by  the  battery  commanders, 
in  which  case  he  assigns  them  positions  as  selected.  If  the 
battery  commanders  or  battery  reconnaissance  officers  are 
not  present,  the  major  communicates,  by  means  of  the  bat- 
tery agents,  the  necessary  orders  for  the  occupation  of  the 
position  selected,  or  he  may  send  for  the  battery  comman- 
ders and  communicate  his  orders  in  person,  either  during  or 
upon  the  completion  of  his  reconnaissance.  The  major’s 
reconnaissance  should  be  completed  sufficiently  early  to  ena- 
ble the  battery  commanders  to  make  their  own  reconnais- 
sance without  delaying  the  batteries. 

8.  Security. — Security  on  the  march  and  in  action  is 
provided  by  the  major  by  disposing  scouts  so  as  to  guard 
against  surprise  by  small  hostile  parties.  He  may  assign 
missions  to  batteries  in  this  connection. 

9.  Communication. — See  Chapter  VII. 

10.  Observation. — The  major  habitually  establishes  an 
observation  post.  Depending  on  the  situation,  this  post 
may  be  at  or  near  the  battalion  command  post ; in  any  event, 
the  two  posts  are  connected  by  telephone.  The  principal 
needs  of  a battalion  observation  post  are  for  information 
and  fire  direction.  By  special  arrangement,  in  stabilized 
situations,  battalion  observation  posts  may  be  employed  by 
the  batteries  for  registration  or  special  adjustments. 

11.  Ammunition  Supply. — The  ammunition  supply  is 
from  the  rear  forward;  the  artillery  brigade  ammunition 
train  supplies  the  battalion  combat  train,  the  combat  trains 
supply  the  batteries  by  exchanging  caissons  or  transferring 
ammunition.  One  platoon  of  the  combat  train  usually  sup- 
plies a particular  battery,  though  exceptions  to  this  proce- 
dure may  be  necessary.  The  commander  of  the  battalion 
combat  train  directs  the  ammunition  supply  of  all  of  the 
batteries.  When  a position  for  action  has  been  selected,  the 
combat  train  agent  with  the  major  operates  between  the 


X— 11-12 


160  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

combat  train  and  the  major,  keeping  the  latter  informed  as 
to  the  state  of  ammunition  supply,  and  insuring  that  the 
necessary  ammunition  is  brought  up.  Batteries  habitually 
call  for  ammunition  directly  upon  the  combat  train,  the 
major  supervising  both  the  consumption  and  supply. 

12.  Changes  of  Position. — (a)  The  initial  occupation 
of  a position  for  action,  either  on  the  offensive  or  defensive, 
ordinarily  is  relatively  simple  as  compared  with  a change 
of  position  during  an  action.  The  latter,  under  certain  con- 
ditions may  be  hazardous,  and,  in  nearly  all  cases,  speed  is 
essential  in  order  that  the  artillery  may  be  out  of  action  a 
minimum  of  time.  In  retiring  or  advancing  a given  distance, 
the  fewer  positions  occupied  the  longer  the  pieces  are  in  ac- 
tion, since  there  is  always  a certain  loss  of  time  in  leaving  or 
occupying  a position  and  in  organizing  it.  In  an  advance,  how- 
ever, the  use  of  but  a few  positions  results  in  the  range  used 
just  before  changing  position  being  very  long,  which  in- 
volves inaccuracy  of  fire,  long  communications,  consequent 
difficulty  in  supporting  the  infantry,  and  more  distant  ob- 
servation. In  retiring,  similar  difficulties  arise,  due  to  the 
long  range  used  when  a position  is  first  occupied.  Thus 
there  are  considerations  for  and  against  frequent  changes 
of  position,  and  the  procedure  actually  used  must  be  a com- 
promise between  these  conflicting  considerations,  based  on 
the  situation ; no  rigid  rule  can  be  laid  down.  The  disadvan- 
tages of  frequent  changes  of  position  can  be  lessened  by 
rapid  and  skillful  selection  and  occupation  of  position.  Full 
advantage  should  be  taken  of  lulls  in  the  action  or  of  dark- 
ness to  improve  the  artillery  dispositions. 

(b)  It  is  obviously  desirable  to  effect  changes  of  posi- 
tion by  echelon,  in  order  that  the  infantry  may  have  some 
artillery  support  at  all  times.  In  the  case  of  a small  artil- 
lery force,  say  a battalion,  changes  of  position  by  battery 
practically  always  are  advisable.  In  the  case  of  a regi- 
ment or  larger  artillery  unit,  the  tendency  should  be  toward 
changing  position  by  a battalion  at  a time.  This  is  primarily 
because,  as  previously  stated,  the  battalion  is  the  smallest 
distinctly  tactical  unit  and  develops  its  maximum  effective- 
ness only  when  it  is  well  in  hand  as  far  as  command  is  con- 
cerned. If  a battery  of  a battalion  changes  position,  it  tern- 


X— 12-13 


TACTICAL  EMPLOYMENT  OF  BATTALION  161 

porarily  leaves  the  control  of  the  major;  the  loss  of  control 
is  increased  when  the  second  battery  changes;  and  if  the 
progress  of  the  action  is  rapid,  it  is  doubtful  whether  the 
battalion  thereafter  will  be  in  action  as  a unit.  In  many  sit- 
uations it  will  be  practicable  for  the  support  missions  of  a 
battalion  to  be  taken  over  by  another  battalion  sufficiently 
to  permit  changes  of  position  to  be  made  by  battalion,  in 
which  case  the  battalion  is  at  all  times  entirely  under  the 
control  of  the  major. 

13.  Supporting  the  Infantry. — (a)  The  artillery 
battalion  is  an  important  unit  in  supporting  the  infantry. 
Successful  support  is  dependent  on  continuous  knowledge 
of  the  situation  and  needs  of  the  supported  infantry.  This 
information  is  obtained  by  the  artillery  battalion  keeping 
in  close  touch  with  the  command  posts  of  the  supported  in- 
fantry, either  by  the  various  means  of  communication  or  by 
the  actual  presence  of  artillery  officers  at  these  command 
posts,  or  both.  The  artillery  habitually  maintains  its  own 
means  of  communication  for  this  purpose,  using  the  infan- 
try communications  only  in  emergency.  These  artillery 
communications  are  available  for  use  by  the  infantry  in 
case  their  own  means  are  interrupted. 

(b)  As  already  stated,  the  major  takes  his  command 
post  in  action  with  the  supporting  infantry  commander, 
provided  he  can  command  his  guns  effectively  from  this 
post,  otherwise  he  sends  a liaison  officer  to  the  infantry 
command  post.  In  case  the  artillery  battalion  supports  an 
infantry  regiment,  the  major’s  endeavor  would  be  to  post 
himself  with  the  infantry  regimental  commander.  But 
habitually  it  would  be  incumbent  on  the  major  to  establish 
direct  artillery  communication  with  the  front  line  infantry 
battalions,  independently  of  infantry  communications.  The 
major’s  staff  includes  a liaison  officer.  If  the  major  were 
with  the  infantry  regimental  commander,  the  liaison  officer 
would  be  sent  to  the  front  line  battalion  commander ; if  there 
were  two  front  line  battalions,  it  would  be  proper  to  detail 
an  additional  liaison  officer.  Similarly,  if  the  major  could 
not  be  with  the  infantry  regimental  commander,  an  addi- 
tional liaison  officer  would  be  necessary.  The  liaison  officer 
is  accompanied  by  certain  enlisted  personnel,  not  provided 


x— 13-14 


162  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

specifically,  including  usually  a non-commissioned  officer  as 
assistant  and  relief  and  the  necessary  personnel  for  com- 
munication. 

(c)  The  liaison  officer  may  be  said  to  have  a triple 
role.  First,  he  transmits  the  needs  of  the  infantry  to  the 
major  and  acts  as  advisor  to  the  infantry  commander  on 
artillery  matters.  Second,  he  gathers  artillery  intelligence 
data.  Third,  he  keeps  himself  prepared  to  assist  the  artil- 
lery in  the  identification  and  verification  of  targets  and  in 
the  actual  conduct  of  fire  that  cannot  be  handled  by  battery 
observation.  The  first  named  function  is  the  primary  and 
most  important  one.  The  liaison  officer  joins  the  infantry 
unit  to  which  assigned  as  early  as  possible  and  remains 
with  it  during  the  continuance  of  the  arrangement  which 
caused  his  assignment.  The  periodical  but  not  too  frequent 
relief  of  liaison  officers  is  advisable,  in  order  that  they  may 
be  in  close  touch  with  the  artillery  which  they  represent. 
Liaison  officers  must  be  active,  and  alert,  professionally 
capable,  tactful,  and  personally  acceptable  to  the  infantry 
commanders  to  whom  assigned. 

(d)  Batteries  ordinarily  do  not  establish  relations  with 
the  supported  infantry,  though  this  may  be  necessary  in 
some  situations.  Heavy  artillery  battalions,  as  a rule,  do 
not  maintain  separate  direct  communications  with  the  in- 
fantry in  this  manner,  but  utilize,  when  necessary  those  of 
the  most  convenient  light  artillery  battalion. 

(e)  Regardless  of  whether  the  major  is  with  the  sup- 
ported infantry  commander,  and  whether  the  artillery  bat- 
talion is  in  support  or  attached,  the  major  must  maintain 
active  personal  touch  with  the  supported  infantry  com- 
mander, advise  him  on  artillery  matters,  and  endeavor  to 
meet  his  wishes  in  every  way  possible;  this  perhaps  is  the 
most  important  single  element  in  their  successful  coopera- 
tion. 

14.  Battalion  Orders. — The  orders  of  the  major  are 
usually  verbal;  frequently  they  are  not  issued  formally  or 
to  all  battery  commanders  at  the  same  time,  though  this 
is  desirable.  Verbal  orders  by  the  major  may  be  accom- 
panied by  tables,  marked  maps,  or  charts  prepared  by  higher 
artillery  or  other  commanders.  The  major's  orders,  verbal 


X — 14-15 


TACTICAL  EMPLOYMENT  OF  BATTALION  16? 

or  written,  follow  the  form  prescribed  for  field  orders  in 
general.  The  following  points,  if  pertinent  in  the  particu- 
lar situation,  would  be  covered  in  paragraph  3,  under  the 
paragraphs  for  the  individual  batteries  or  in  subparagraph 
(x): 

Positions  to  be  occupied. 

Routes  and  order  of  march. 

Missions,  including  sectors  of  fire,  special  fire,  reference 
points,  etc. 

Time  for  occupying  position  and  of  opening  fire. 

Instructions  as  to  observation. 

Cooperation  with  infantry  or  other  elements  without  the  bat- 
talion. 

Organization  of  positions,  security,  dispositions  of  machine 
guns  and  automatics. 

Instructions  as  to  the  limbers,  if  any  are  given. 

Other  necessary  instructions. 

The  combat  train  and  sanitary  personnel  are  covered  in 
paragraph  4,  which  may  contain,  also,  instructions  to  the 
field  train  if  with  the  battalion,  and  as  to  supply,  cooking, 
water,  etc.  Communications  and  command  are  covered  in 
paragraph  5 in  the  usual  manner. 

15.  Conditions  Affecting  the  Efficacy  of  Battal- 
ion Employment. — (a)  The  great  power  of  the  battalion, 
its  abundant  technical  means,  its  numerous  special  person- 
nel, and  its  mobility,  make  it  a unit  well  adapted  to  meet 
the  changing  requirements  of  the  various  technical  situa- 
tions which  may  arise.  The  burden  of  making  the  battalion 
thoroughly  effective  falls  principally  on  the  major;  if  he 
fails  to  grasp  the  situation  properly,  much  of  the  power  of 
the  battalion  will  be  lost. 

(b)  The  amount  of  latitude  and  initiative  allowed  the 
major  in  handling  his  battalion  tactically,  varies  with  the 
size  of  the  artillery  command  and  with  the  situation.  If 
the  battalion  were  the  only  artillery  with,  say,  an  advance 
guard,  the  major,  in  conjunction  with  the  advance  guard 
commander,  could  exercise  a maximum  of  initiative  and 
would  have  a corresponding  responsibility.  When  acting 
as  an  element  of  an  artillery  brigade,  the  missions  of  the 
battalion  ordinarily  would  be  much  more  circumscribed. 
In  the  more  open  and  rapidly  moving  situations,  the  major 
might  have  wide  responsibility,  while,  in  a stabilized  situa- 
tion, his  missions  probably  would  be  prescribed  within  nar- 
row limits  by  higher  authority. 


X— 16 


164  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

16.  Offensive  Employment. — (a)  In  offensive  ac- 
tions, the  character  of  the  fire  of  the  battalion  may  be  either 
of  two  classes : first,  that  according  to  a prearranged  sched- 
ule of  time  and  objectives,  such  as  barrages  or  succes- 
sive concentrations;  and  second,  that  on  objectives  actually 
encountered  by  the  infantry  as  it  advances,  calling  for  off- 
hand artillery  support.  In  the  first  case,  the  battalion  or- 
dinarily receives  detailed  instructions  from  higher  author- 
ity and  acts  largely  as  an  executive  agency  in  carrying  out 
these  instructions.  Situations  may  arise  in  this  case,  how- 
ever, which  were  not  foreseen  and  which  call  for  prompt 
action  on  the  part  of  the  local  infantry  commander  and  the 
major.  In  the  second  class  of  action,  the  prior  dispositions  of 
the  major  must  be  confined  largely  to  the  assignment  of 
zones  of  action  to  the  batteries,  the  thorough  registration  of 
the  terrain,  as  far  as  the  situation  permits,  and  the  establish- 
ment of  good  observation  and  reliable  communications  with 
the  infantry.  Then,  when  the  infantry  actually  calls  for 
fire,  it  will  be  delivered  with  a maximum  of  promptness. 
Even  in  this  case,  the  major,  in  cooperation  with  the  sup- 
ported infantry  commander,  should  select  certain  points 
as  most  likely  to  offer  resistance,  and  cause  fire  to  be  deliv- 
ered on  these  points  until  the  resistance  is  located  more  de- 
finitely, subject  to  the  limitations  of  ammunition  available. 
The  battalion  should  not  be  idle  for  lack  of  a definite  tar- 
get. The  responsibility  for  this  rests  with  the  major  and 
his  battery  commanders  and  not  with  the  infantry  com- 
mander. Frequently,  on  account  of  lack  of  time  or  com- 
munications to  consult  with  the  infantry,  the  major  must 
act  according  to  his  best  judgment  based  on  what  he  sees, 
or  on  his  batter  knowledge  of  what  the  artillery  can  do. 

(b)  In  such  cases  of  offhand  artillery  support,  a trou- 
blesome feature  is  the  time  the  fire  is  to  continue  on  a given 
point.  A number  of  methods  are  feasible.  The  infantry 
may  call  for  fire  beginning  and  ending  at  certain  times,  ar- 
ranged in  consultation  with  the  artillery ; or  the  call  may  be 
for  fire  of  a fixed  duration  to  be  delivered  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble ; or  the  fire  may  be  delivered  at  a given  time  or  as  soon 
as  possible  and  lifted  or  terminated  upon  signal  (usually 
pyrotechnic)  by  the  assault  unit  or  artillery  personnel  with 


X— 16-17 


TACTICAL  EMPLOYMENT  OF  BATTALION  165 

it ; or  the  fire  may  be  placed  and  lifted  by  means  of  the  ar- 
tillery observation.  None  of  these  methods  can  be  stated 
as  the  most  effective;  that  by  artillery  observation  is  the 
method  to  be  preferred  in  all  cases  when  observation  is 
possible  and  is  coupled  with  good  communications.  It  has 
been  suggested  that  conventional  combinations  of  fire  sup- 
port be  arranged  between  the  infantry  and  artillery  and  be 
designated  by  number  or  otherwise.  This  would  have  the 
advantage  of  simplifying  messages  calling  for  artillery  sup- 
port, and  of  habituating  the  infantry  to  certain  typical 
forms  of  fire  support.  But  the  necessity  for  close  coopera- 
tion and  communication  between  the  infantry  and  artillery, 
and  for  prompt  response  by  the  artillery,  still  would  be 
present. 

(c)  It  is  evident  that  offhand  artillery  support  calls 
for  more  advanced  positions  of  the  artillery  than  prear- 
ranged support;  this  is  particularly  true  of  rapidly  moving 
situations  in  which  elaborate  communications  are  not  feasi- 
ble ; the  extreme  case  is  that  of  accompanying  batteries  and 
accompanying  guns. 

17.  Defensive  Employment. — In  defensive  situa- 
tions, prearranged  artillery  support  must  be  worked  out  in 
great  detail;  provision  must  be  made  also  for  offhand  sup- 
port. While,  in  an  organized  defensive  position,  the  orders 
from  higher  authority  ordinarily  would  prescribe  in  some 
detail  the  missions  of  the  artillery  battalion,  the  major,  nev- 
ertheless, has  important  duties  in  this  connection.  He,  and 
the  supported  infantry  commander,  must  study  the  ground 
together  and  in  detail,  and  arrange  the  exact  points  on  which 
the  artillery  support  may  be  placed  to  best  advantage.  It 
is  important  that  the  dispositions  of  the  other  auxiliary 
wea!pons  be  considered  in  this  connection.  Provision  should 
be  made  for  the  various  contingencies  that  can  be  antici- 
pated. When  time  permits,  the  dispositions  made  should 
be  tested  and  practiced  by  calls  from  the  infantry  and  such 
responses  from  the  artillery  as  may  be  practicable.  The 
major  must  give  careful  attention  to  the  organization  of 
his  observation,  a factor  of  prime  importance  on  the  de- 
fensive. 


X — 18-20 


166  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

18.  Disposition  of  the  Batteries. — The  battery  posi- 
tions, on  the  defensive,  ordinarily  differ  materially  from 
those  on  the  offensive.  On  the  offensive,  the  batteries  us- 
ually are  well  advanced  consistent  with  concealment,  and 
relatively  close  together.  A defensive  position  has  depth, 
and  artillery  support  must  be  more  or  less  continuously 
available  throughout  this  depth.  Rarely  will  a single  posi- 
tion for  the  battalion  fulfill  these  conditions,  and  the  echel- 
onment  of  the  battalion  in  depth  usually  is  necessary.  It 
is  desirable  that  the  maximum  fire  power  be  developed  in 
front  of  the  foremost  element  of  the  position  (outpost  sys- 
tem), but  it  is  essential  that  this  maximum  power  also  be 
developed  in  defense  of  the  main  defensive  position.  These 
are  conflicting  considerations,  since,  frequently,  positions  in 
rear  of  the  main  defensive  position  cannot  reach  the  fore- 
most elements  of  the  outpost  system.  The  solution  lies  in 
placing  certain  batteries,  rarely  complete  battalions,  in  ad- 
vance of  the  main  defensive  position,  and  making  careful 
arrangements  for  their  timely  withdrawal  in  rear  of  this 
position.  The  number  of  batteries  which  can  be  placed  ini- 
tially in  advance  of  the  main  defensive  position,  depends  on 
the  terrain,  particularly  the  routes  available  for  movement 
of  artillery,  and  the  situation;  ordinarily  it  will  not  exceed 
one  battery  per  battalion,  exceptionally  two  per  light  artil- 
lery battalion.  Positions  in  rear  of  the  main  defensive  posi- 
tion may  be  well  advanced  with  respect  to  this  position, 
with  the  batteries  of  the  battalion  reasonably  close  together. 

19.  Disposition  of  the  Combat  Train. — See  Chapter 
VI. 

20.  Provisional  Battalion. — In  some  cases,  particu- 
larly in  view  of  an  attack,  the  supporting  artillery  is  rein- 
forced, sometimes  by  an  equal  amount.  Rather  than  dis- 
rupt the  existing  assignments,  it  is  customary  to  attach 
the  reinforcing  artillery  by  battalion  or  battery  units  to  the 
artillery  already  in  position.  A battalion  thus  may  be  rein- 
forced by  a battalion  or  several  batteries.  The  temporary 
unit  thus  formed  sometimes  is  called  a provisional  battalion. 
Its  tactical  functions  are  the  same  as  the  battalion,  although 
a re-distribution  of  missions  will  be  necessary.  The  com- 


X— 20 


TACTICAL  EMPLOYMENT  OF  BATTALION  167 

mand  generally  remains  with  the  major  already  in  position, 
regardless  of  the  relative  rank  of  the  two  majors,  unless  the 
supported  infantry  is  relieved  by  the  infantry  of  the  rein- 
forcing artillery,  in  which  case  the  command  of  the  provi- 
sional battalion  may  pass  to  the  incoming  major. 


XI— 1-2 


CHAPTER  XI 

Tactical  Employment  of  the  Regiment 
and  Brigade 

Paragraphs 


Section  I. — The  Regiment  1-15 

Section  II. — The  Artillery  Brigade 16-22 


Section  I 
The  Regiment 

Paragraphs 


Composition  1 

General  Functions  2 

The  Rear  Echelon 3 

The  Regiment  on  the  March 4 

Disposition  of  the  Regiment  in  Action 5 

Sectors  of  Fire 6 

Troops  to  be  Supported 7 

Enemy  Batteries 8 

Movements  from  Position  to  Position 9 

Regimental  Headquarters  10 

The  Service  Battery 11 

Reconnaissance  (See  also  Chapter  VI)  12 

Communications  (See  also  Chapter  VII)  13 

Observation  14 

Regimental  Orders 15 


1.  Composition. — A regiment  of  field  artillery,  in  our 
service,  is  organized  for  the  use  in  battle  of  24  guns  or  howit- 
zers. Its  composition,  for  the  various  types  of  materiel, 
is  discussed  in  Chapter  I.  Full  information  as  to  its  or- 
ganization is  to  be  derived  from  a study  of  the  Tables  of 
Organization. 

2.  General  Functions. — (a)  The  artillery  regiment  is 
both  an  administrative  and  a tactical  unit. 

(b)  To  the  colonel  falls  the  broad  direction  of  tactical 
employment,  based  on  orders  from  higher  sources,  drawn 
to  secure  coordination  and  cooperation  with  the  troops  that 
the  regiment  is  to  support.  The  details  of  tactical  employ- 
ment are  handled  by  the  executive  officer  who  apportions  the 


168 


XI— 2 


THE  REGIMENT  169 

tasks,  as  they  belong,  to  the  various  sections  of  the  regi- 
mental headquarters,  and  then  follows  up  their  development 
in  order  to  see  that  proper  coordination  is  actually  secured 
within  the  working  time  available.  Thus  the  regimental 
commander  is  freed  to  make  decisions  on  important  matters 
and  to  effect  a more  intimate  personal  liaison  with  his  own 
artillery  commander  and  with  the  commander  of  troops  that 
his  regiment  supports. 

(c)  The  principal  functions  of  the  regimental  comman- 
der and  his  headquarters  may  be  summarized  as  follows : 

(1)  Tactical  control  over  the  battalions,  in  the  allotment  of 
missions  to  carry  out  the  tasks  assigned  to  the  regiment;  desig- 
nation of  the  location  of  battalion  positions,  sectors  to  be  cov- 
ered, troops  to  be  supported,  enemy  batteries  to  be  neutralized 
or  destroyed,  other  special  objects  of  attack,  and  movements  to  be 
made  from  one  position  to  another. 

(2)  Intelligence.  Gathering  information  of  technical  or  tac- 
tical value  from  the  battalions  and  from  all  other  sources,  and 
disseminating  this  information  wherever  it  can  be  employed. 
Distribution  of  maps  within  the  regiment. 

(3)  Connection  with  supported  troops. — (a)  The  regimen- 
tal commander  is  usually  able  to  devote  more  personal  time  and 
effort  to  this  important  detail,  tactically,  than  can  his  battalion 
commanders,  whose  efforts  will  largely  be  absorbed,  in  battle, 
in  fire  direction.  In  the  infantry  division,  this  tactical  connec- 
tion, by  the  light  artillery  regimental  commander,  is  made  mainly 
with  an  infantry  brigade,  but  may  extend  to  the  commanders  of 
the  infantry  regiments  which  his  battalions  are  supporting.  The 
most  cordial  relations  and  mutual  understanding  between  in- 
fantry and  supporting  light  artillery  should  be  fostered  by  as- 
sociating1 as  far  as  possible  the  same  units  in  both  training  and 
combat. 

(b)  When  it  is  necessary  to  reinforce  the  light  artil- 
lery which  is  supporting  an  infantry  unit,  the  reinforcing 
artillery  is  frequently  included  in  a provisional  battalion, 
or  ‘‘groupment/’  with  the  artillery  already  assigned  to  the 
support  of  the  infantry. 

(4)  Communications.  General  supervision  over  signal  com- 
munications throughout  the  regiment,  lending  as  much  assis- 
tance as  possible  toward  the  maintenance  thereof  by  the  battal- 
ions. 

(5)  Ammunition  Supply.  General  supervision  over  ammu- 
nition supply  and  expenditures. 

(6)  Supply,  Replacements,  Evacuation  and  Burials.  A close 
supervision  over  the  supply  of  rations,  equipment  and  clothing; 
the  distribution  of  replacement  personnel;  the  replacement  and 
repair  of  disabled  guns  and  other  important  materiel;  the  evacu- 
ation and  replacement  of  animals  and  motor  vehicles;  care  of 
the  wounded  and  burial  of  the  dead. 

(7)  Training  of  the  Headquarters  Company,  so  as  to  insure 
uniformity  in  the  work  of  technical  personnel. 

(8)  Morale  and  Efficiency.  As  an  administrator,  the  regi- 
mental commander  is  responsible  for  the  morale  and  esprit  de 
corps  of  the  regiment,  for  the  assignment  and  transfer  of  officers 


XI— 2-4 


170  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

from  one  unit  to  another,  for  war  diaries,  field  orders  and  other 
records.  He  is  responsible  for  the  efficiency  of  his  battalions 
and  for  the  establishment  of  uniform  methods  and  policies  that 
will  make  his  regiment  a coordinated  whole.  In  this  connection 
he  should  give  his  battalion  commanders  as  much  latitude  and 
play  of  initiative  as  possible;  but,  finding  one  battalion  less  re- 
sourceful or  less  efficient  than  another,  he  should  strive  to  bring 
it  up  to  a higher  standard. 

3.  The  Rear  Echelon. — (a)  Where  battle  movement 
becomes  sluggish,  it  is  manifest  that,  automatically,  a sys- 
tem will  be  evolved  which  relegates  to  more  or  less  safe 
distances  those  whose  presence  is  not  actually  needed  in 
the  combat  lines.  The  establishment  of  a local  colony  of 
these  non-combatants,  which  was  thus  brought  into  being 
during  The  World  War,  was  termed  the  “rear  echelon.” 

(b)  It  grew  around  the  service  battery  for  conven- 
ience. Here,  most  of  the  administrative  details  were  at- 
tended to,  and  it  became  a location  for  general  repairs  that 
could  be  completed  within  the  regiment  and  a place 
of  collection  for  the  sick  and  wounded  animals  that  did 
not  require  evacuation.  Here,  also,  were  to  be  found  such 
detachments  and  vehicles  of  the  batteries  ais  were  not 
needed  with  the  firing  batteries  and  combat  trains.  Though 
its  present  development  is  an  outgrowth  of  conditions  our 
army  met  in  Europe,  a similar  procedure  in  essence  must 
be  expected  in  the  future  in  moving  situations,  if  for  no 
other  purpose  than  clearing  the  battle  lines  of  those  whose 
important  duties  are  not  actual  combat. 

4.  The  Regiment  on  the  March.— Though  a regiment 
of  artillery  frequently  marches  in  one  column,  the  battalion 
is  essentially  the  marching  unit.  When  marching  with 
other  troops’,  and  an  engagement  is  imminent,  the  combat 
trains  may  be  a mile  or  more  in  rear  of  the  regiment,  and 
small  detachments  of  regimental  and  battalion  headquar- 
ters, and  of  the  battery  details,  are  pushed  ahead  of  the 
regiment  in  the  column,  in  order  to  insure  an  early  recon- 
naissance. With  an  engagement  impending,  the  regimental 
commander  of  the  leading  artillery  regiment  in  the  column, 
in  most  cases,  would  be  with  the  commander  of  the  infan- 
try brigade  that  his  regiment  is  to  support.  It  would  be 
desirable  for  him  to  have  his  battalion  commanders  with 
him  or  near  at  hand. 


XI— 5 


THE  REGIMENT  171 

5.  Disposition  of  the  Regiment  in  Action. — (a) 
Tire  regimental  commander  often  has  opportunities  to  ex- 
hibit tactical  skill.  Such  opportunities  are  disclosed  in  his 
reconnaissance.  His  subsequent  orders  should  be  such  as 
to  insure  maximum  fire  power  from  his  battalions,  efficient 
communication  therewith,  and  subsequent  surety  of  com- 
mand. 

(b)  Excessive  dispersion  of  the  battalions  should  be 
avoided  in  order  to  conserve  the  integrity  of  communica- 
tion, dependent  upon  the  modifying  influence  of  the  selec- 
tion of  the  most  favorable  localities  for  normal  and  even- 
tual fire  support. 

(c)  The  terrain  and  tactical  situation  always  determine 
the  local  employment  of  the  artillery,  but  there  are  general 
principles  which  will  apply.  Offensively,  it  is  advanta- 
geous to  select  positions  far  forward  in  order  that  the 
battalions  may  continue  their  fire  support  as  long  as  pos- 
sible, without  interruption,  until  forward  displacement  be- 
comes necessary.  Due  to  the  flat  trajectory  of  the  75-mm. 
gun,  it  cannot  fire  effectively  from  a position  of  flash  de- 
filade at  targets  close  to  the  guns.  Since  the  masked  posi- 
tion is  usual,  the  guns  must  not  be  placed  too  close  to  their 
targets.  Moreover,  difficulties  in  entering  advanced  posi- 
tions in  daylight,  without  undue  exposure  and  the  atten- 
dant casualties,  always  must  receive  the  most  careful  con- 
sideration. This  minimum  range,  to  initial  targets  in  the 
enemy’s  front  line,  can  hardly  be  expected  to  be  found  much 
less  than  the  elastic  limit  of  1500  yards.  Reduced  charges, 
with  their  more  curved  trajectory,  allow  the  enemy  to  be 
approached  several  hundred  yards  closer,  whence  positions 
may  be  still  selected  for  flash  defilade  if  the  terrain  per- 
mits. The  difficulties  of  unobserved  entry  (except  at  night) , 
and  the  fact  that  such  positions  are  well  within  the  limits 
of  machine  gun  and  small  arms  fire,  preclude  the  idea  of 
their  occupation,  however. 

(d)  As  for  the  medium  howitzer,  its  approach  within 
the  same  distance  is  even  more  dangerous  (except  at  night 
or  other  peculiarly  advantageous  conditions,  such  as  very 
favorable  terrain  for  an  approach)  since  it  offers  a larger 
and  more  slowly  moving  target.  Due  to  its  very  curved 


XI— 5 


172  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


trajectory  however,  it  may  find  more  readily  a suitable 
mask. 

(e)  Based  on  these  considerations,  we  may  expect, 
roughly,  the  regimental  commander  to  limit  his  initial  re- 
connaissance for  battalion  locations  to  positions  at  a 
greater  distance  than  1500  yards  from  the  enemy. 

(f)  Looking  at  the  situation  from  the  other  viewpoint, 
i.e.,  ease  of  fire  direction,  fire  control,  and  the  technique  of 
the  battery,  there  are  many  advantages  to  be  found  in  posi- 
tions farther  to  the  rear.  In  and  around  3000  yards  from 
the  hostile  lines,  it  is  easy,  in  average  terrain,  to  find  posi- 
tions that  give  reasonable  cover ; and,  even  if  the  observing 
station  necessarily  is  situated  in  the  immediate  vicinity 
of  the  guns,  the  range  is  such  that  excellent  observation 
often  can  be  obtained  with  the  telescopic  instruments  in 
use.  So  it  is  safe  to  assume  that  the  regimental  comman- 
der generally  will  select  localities  for  his  battalions  within 
the  very  elastic  limits  of  from  1500  to  3000  yards  from  the 
enemy  front  lines,  when  practicable. 

(g)  The  next  point  to  consider  is  the  character  of  fire 
support  that  each  battalion  will  be  called  upon  to  render, 
and,  having  determined  it,  to  locate  the  battalions  accord- 
ingly. Since  every  tactical  situation  may  present  more  than 
a single  solution,  it  is  obviously  impossible  to  refer  to  but 
a few  brief  points  that  may  be  illustrated  herewith.  They 
should,  it  is  believed,  indicate  that  grave  tactical  responsi- 
bility falls  on  the  regimental  commander. 

(1)  1st  Case. — Open  Warfare. — Contact  has  been  made  and 
deployment  effected.  Line  of  departure  from  AB  at  a desig- 
nated time.  The  advance  is  along  one  side  of  a river  valley. 
The  spurs  at  right  angles  to  the  general  flow  of  the  river  and 
found  between  the  smaller  lateral  tributaries,  form  a series  of 
long  ridges  which  afford  the  artillery  cover  and  observation  sta- 
tions near  the  guns.  Suppose,  in  this  case,  the  colonel  makes 
an  assignment  of  battalion  locations  well  to  the  front,  broad  in 
extent  and  slight  in  depth,  which  in  effect  puts  the  regiment  in 
line  of  battalions;  we  will  have  the  situation  illustrated  as  “1st 
Case.” 

(a)  Advantages. — Battalions  being  well  forward,  effec- 
tive fire  power  remains  longest  before  forward  displace- 
ment is  required. 

If  the  position  is  likely  to  be  occupied  some  hours,  or 
during  the  night,  a single  regimental  ammunition  distribu- 
ting point  may  be  so  conveniently  located,  sometimes,  as  to 
permit,  temporarily,  direct  supply  to  batteries  without  the 
intermediate  need  of  combat  trains. 


XI— 5 


THE  REGIMENT  173 

The  locations  may  be  such  that  the  regimental  com- 
mander can  be  in  close  touch  with  the  infantry  brigade  com- 
mander, and,  at  the  same  time,  occupy  an  observing  station 
not  distant  from  those  of  the  battalion  commanders,  and  see 
things,  tactically,  as  they  see  them. 

Due  to  the  slight  depth  of  the  formation,  wire  is  saved 
as  well  as  the  time  necessary  to  lay  it. 

Data  computed  for  one  battery  can  be  quickly  trans- 
posed for  use  in  an  adjacent  battery. 

It  facilitates  a forward  displacement  by  battalion  in 
line,  thus  limiting  exposure  on  ridges  to  a minimum  of 
time. 

Wide  lateral  dispersion  of  the  batteries  will  facilitate  at- 
tack of  hostile  targets  by  allowing  them  the  minimum  of 
dead  space. 

(b)  Disadvantages. — Enemy  counter  battery  fire  can 
be  readily  shifted  to  an  adjacent  battery  after  once  effec- 
tively laid. 

Case 


174 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


If  the  enemy  uses  diagonal  fire  he  is  not  obliged  to  make 
an  exact  range  adjustment.  A change  in  deflection  from 
time  to  time  will  insure  hits  from  directions  most  disconcert- 
ing to  the  cannoneers. 

If  a flank  movement  be  made,  to  reach  a longitudinal 
road  for  a forward  move,  and  the  battalions  are  restricted 
to  narrow  passages  when  moving  out  from  cover,  a single 
carriage  in  trouble  may  delay  an  appreciable  part  of  the 
regiment. 

(c)  Simple  orders  place  the  regiment  in  such  a forma- 
tion. For  instance:  “Location  for  regiment,  immediately 
north  of  grid  line  349;  1st  Battalion  east  of  such  point  (or 
line),  and  2d  Battalion  west  of  the  same.” 

(2)  2d  Case. — Open  Warfare. — Contact  established  and  an 
advance  ordered  within  limits  indicated.  A natural  feature  of 
the  terrain  at  A indicates  the  probability  of  our  2d  Infantry 
advance  being  slowed  at  that  point.  It  is  so  close  to  the  route 
of  advance  of  the  1st  Infantry  that  the  advance  of  the  latter  also 

2°  Case 


XI— 5 


THE  REGIMENT  175 

will  be  delayed.  For  the  actual  support  of  the  1st  Infantry,  it 
may  be  better,  for  a time,  to  fire  on  a target  in  the  zone  of  ad- 
vance of  the  2d  Infantry.  The  responsibility  for  the  locations 
of  the  battalions,  so  they  may  properly  cooperate  in  this  task, 
is  one  that  falls  to  the  colonel  of  the  1st  Field  Artillery,  which  is 
supporting  the  1st  Brigade.  The  battalions  preferably  are  placed 
well  to  the  front,  wide  apart,  and  on  either  side  of  the  strong 
terrain  feature  to  be  attacked.  This  insures  diagonal  fire  on  all 
parts  of  the  target,  the  possibility  of  both  flank  and  diagonal  fire 
simultaneously  on  some  parts  of  the  target,  and  the  smallest  pos- 
sible dead  space  in  rear  of  the  target.  It  also  aids  our  infantry 
in  their  flank  attacks. 

(3)  3d  Case. — Open  Warfare. — Assume  that  the  tactical 
conditions  are  such  that  it  will  be  desirable,  in  an  attack,  for  a 
certain  battalion  to  be  displaced  forward  rapidly  via  a longi- 
tudinal road,  where  the  terrain  features  are  such  as  to  prevent 
any  but  short  movements  off  the  road.  It  is  evident  that  the 
regimental  commander  can  indicate  the  position  in  such  a manner 
that  each  battery  in  the  battalion  probably  will  be  able  to  have  its 

3d  Case 


XI— 5 


176  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


own  route  to  the  longitudinal  road  and  thus  prevent  a single 
battery  in  misfortune  holding  up  the  access  of  the  remaining 
batteries  to  the  route  forward.  Thus  it  is  seen,  even  before  any 
displacement  tables  are  issued,  the  regimental  commander  has  in 
his  power  the  opportunity  to  select  the  battalion  locations  so 
that,  if  rapid  displacement  forward  be  the  paramount  considera- 
tion, he  can  force,  within  limits,  his  battalions  taking  up  suitable 
formations  without  giving  lengthy  orders  on  the  subject.  In  this 
case  he  would  indicate  a deep,  narrow  area  adjacent  to  the  route 
of  advance. 

(4)  4th  Case. — The  cases  so  far  illustrated  have  presupposed 
conditions  under  which  the  battalions  can  render  the  best  sup- 
port to  their  infantry  by  operating  within  their  respective  sec- 
tors. This  is  not  always  possible  for  the  best  fire  effect.  En- 
filade fire  is  particularly  valuable.  Aside  from  its  effect  on  mor- 
ale it  has  the  advantage  that  an  error  in  range  will  still  produce 
results.  Probable  errors  in  deflection  are  always  small.  In  the 

4 th  Case 


XI— 5 


THE  REGIMENT  177 

attack  of  a prepared  position  or  defensive  zone,  enfilade  fire  is 
sought. 

In  the  case  in  question,  assume  the  attack  of  the  front  line  of 
a prepared  position.  The  1st  Battalion  1st  Field  Artillery  sup- 
ports the  1st  Infantry  and  the  2d  Battalion  1st  Field  Artillery 
supports  the  2d  Infantry.  Enfilade  fire  is  desirable  initially.  This 
can  be  arranged  by  having  the  1st  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery, 
placed  in  the  2d  Infantry  subsector  and  the  2d  Battalion  1st 
Field  Artillery  placed  in  the  1st  Infantry  subsector;  or,  the  1st 
Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery  may  remain  in  its  own  subsector 
and  support  the  2d  Infantry  up  to  a stated  time  or  until  it 
reaches  a certain  line,  and  the  2d  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery 
may  take  similar  action  in  regard  to  the  infantry  it  is  to  support. 

These  dispositions  sometimes  might  be  required,  in  order 
to  gain  maximum  fire  effect;  tactically  they  present  weaknesses 
which  must  be  considered.  These  weaknesses  are: 

(a)  When  the  battalions  are  placed  in  opposite  sub- 
sectors, the  battalion  commander,  in  order  to  remain  near 
his  battalion,  cannot  also  be  near  the  commander  of  the  unit 
that  he  supports,  and  is  dependent  on  long  lines  to  his  liaison 
officer,  which  may  be  shot  away  at  any  time. 

(b)  The  supporting  of  one  unit  up  to  a certain  time  or 
place,  followed  by  a change  in  the  supporting  units,  is  weak 
in  that  the  advance  may  not  meet  the  exact  schedule  as 
planned,  and  the  full  support  depends  on  the  initial  plans 
being  realized.  The  initial  situation  is  best  controlled  by 
progressive  concentrations  or  similar  action  but  these  may 
become  so  restrictive  in  their  application  that  they  do  not 
meet  emergencies. 

(5)  5th  Case . — Assume  a stabilized  situation  as  outlined  in 
the  sketch.  The  artillery  regiment  is  to  support  a holding  at- 
tack made  by  the  right  infantry  brigade,  while  the  left  infantry 
brigade  is  advanced.  Indications  are  that  a hostile  counter  at- 
tack may  be  launched  from  the  direction  indicated  by  the  arrows. 
One  battalion  must  be  located  so  as  to  fire  as  far  to  the  north 
as  possible  and  one  must  respond  to  eventual  calls  in  the  left 
brigade  sector.  How  may  the  artillery  regimental  commander 
meet  this  situation  in  locating  his  battalions  and  at  the  same 
time  support  the  infantry  brigade  with  which  associated,  in  case 
of  a counter  attack,  assuming  the  general  arrangement  of  sub- 
sectors as  shown  on  the  sketch?  It  is  evident  that,  if  both 
battalions  of  light  artillery  are  placed  in  the  northern  part  of 
the  sector,  they  may  be  subject  to  enfilade  fire  and  will  be  poorly 
disposed  to  meet  a possible  enemy  counter  attack.  By  locating 
the  forward  battalion  to  give  fire  as  far  to  the  north  as  possible, 
and  also  to  give  eventual  fire  in  the  left  brigade  sector,  one  condi- 
tion is  met;  the  rear  battalion  of  field  artillery  will  be  available 
to  meet  a counter  attack  and  can  assist  the  advanced  battalion 
in  fire  delivered  to  the  north.  The  loss  in  range  for  this  latter 
contingency  can  be  compensated  for,  in  a large  degree,  by  the 
use  of  a supply  of  type  “D”  shells  for  the  rear  battalion.  (These 
shells  give  additional  range.) 

(h)  The  above  are  but  a few  situations  to  emphasize 
the  fact  that  the  regimental  commander  does  and  must 
exercise  important  tactical  direction  over  his  battalions. 
These  tactical  opportunities  are  met  more  frequently  in 


XI— 5 


178  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


5th  Case 

\ 


open  warfare  situations  because  of  greater  dispersion;  but, 
since  these  opportunities  are  often  fleeting,  due  to  the  com- 
bination of  the  elements  of  mobility  and  limited  time,  much 
training  is  required  in  this  branch  of  the  art,  not  only  to 
rqcognize  the  situation  when  it  appears,  but  also  promptly 
to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity  offered.  In  general, 


XI— 5-6 


THE  REGIMENT  179 

the  principles  applicable  to  moving  situations  also  are  ap- 
plied to  the  stabilized  situations,  the  difference  being  that, 
in  the  latter  case,  there  is  usually  much  more  time  for*  a 
mechanical  solution  to  be  effected  and  it  is,  in  consequence, 
an  easier,  but  more  detailed  problem. 

(i)  The  most  favored  positions  for  the  medium  howit- 
zer battalions  normally  will  be  somewhat  farther  to  the 
rear  than  those  of  the  75-mm.  guns,  since  they  are  less 
mobile,  more  easily  pinned  to  the  ground  by  counter  battery 
fire,  and,  if  placed  too  far  to  the  front,  are  an  easier  target 
for  a hostile  balloon  to  spot.  Roughly  speaking,  in  an  at- 
tack, their  positions  may  be  expected  to  be  found  in  a belt 
2000  to  3000  yards  from  the  enemy’s  front  lines.  Due  to 
the  advantages  of  curved  fire,  and  the  fact  that  the  range 
of  the  155-mm.  howitzer  is  longer  than  that  of  the  75-mm. 
gun,  the  tactical  dispositions  of  the  howitzer  battalions  do 
not  offer  quite  as  great  variations  as  are  to  be  met  in  the 
75-mm.  regiments. 

(j)  When  the  number  of  battalion  positions  is  lim- 
ited, since  the  forward  displacement  of  the  75s  is  a very 
important  matter  in  the  attack,  it  may  be  expected  that 
they  will  be  allotted  to  the  forward  locations  and  the  155s 
emplaced  rather  more  toward  the  rear.  Bearing  these  fea- 
tures in  mind,  it  may  happen  that  the  locations  for  the  less 
mobile  medium  howitzers  may  be  reserved  for  them  by  the 
artillery  brigade  commander  and  the  regimental  comman- 
der of  a light  regiment,  in  consequence,  will  be  restricted 
as  to  the  possibilities  of  tactical  dispositions  for  his  bat- 
talions. 

(k)  A defensive  position  demands,  as  a rule,  some  dis- 
persion in  depth.  In  such  a case,  the  regiment  usually  is 
echeloned  by  battalion,  one  battalion  in  position  behind  the 
other ; or,  the  battalions  may  be  placed  in  line  with  the  bat- 
teries of  the  battalions  disposed,  with  respect  to  each  other, 
so  as  to  give  the  depth  desired. 

6.  Sectors  of  Fire. — (a)  A reference  to  the  plan  of 
the  dispositions  of  the  artillery  battalions,  shown  in  the  last 
sketch,  will  indicate  how  the  sectors  of  fire  are  important. 
It  is  the  duty  of  the  regimental  commander,  in  the  attack 
and  defense,  to  insure  the  covering  of  the  front  assigned; 


XI— 6-9 


180  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

also,  he  must  consider  the  support  of  adjacent  units  in  emer- 
gency. His  battalions  should  be  so  disposed  as  to  give  the 
greatest  sector  of  fire  possible  to  obtain,  consonant  with 
other  conditions. 

(b)  When  time  permits,  a very  important  study  to  be 
made  is  that  of  dead  spaces  formed  in  the  sectors  of  light 
regiments,  with  a view  to  reporting  them  to  artillery  bri- 
gade headquarters,  in  order  to  insure  their  being  covered 
by  the  curved  fire  of  the  howitzers. 

7.  Troops  to  be  Supported. — This  arrangement  is  made 
by  the  artillery  regimental  commander  with  the  commander 
of  the  unit  to  be  supported.  The  division  order  probably 
will  be  brief  and  direct;  for  instance,  “The  1st  FA  will 
support  the  1st  Brig  from  the  vicinity  of  Two  Taverns.,, 
How  this  support  will  be  given,  will  depend  on  the  division 
plan  and  how  the  infantry  brigade  commander  intends  to 
apply  his  force  locally.  This  all  should  be  thoroughly  un- 
derstood by  the  artillery  regimental  commander,,  if  possible, 
before  he  is  obliged  to  select  localities  for  his  battalions. 

8.  Enemy  Batteries. — (a)  These  are  to  be  neutral- 
ized or  destroyed.  Assignments  of  this  kind  frequently 
fall  to  the  155-mm.  howitzers  (which  may  be  associated  with 
the  division)  on  account  of  their  very  accurate  fire  com- 
bined with  their  great  crushing  power,  although  75-mm. 
units  may  receive  such  missions. 

(b)  When  several  hostile  batteries  have  been  located, 
and  assigned  to  the  regiment  as  targets,  it  will  be  the  duty 
of  the  artillery  regimental  commander  to  apportion  them  to 
his  respective  battalions  and  indicate  also  the  sequence  of 
attack. 

9.  Movements  From  Position  to  Position. — Since 
such  movements  are  ordinarily  made  by  battalion,  when  the 
situation  permits,  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  regimental 
commander  to  supervise  and  direct  such  changes.  Where 
there  is  plenty  of  time,  in  a thoroughly  prepared  assault, 
tables  of  displacement  (sometimes  by  battery)  will  be  de- 
veloped beforehand;  in  fact,  the  movements  of  the  bat- 
talions may  be  taken  up  in  detail  by  the  artillery  brigade 
commander,  and  the  regimental  commander  will  be  called 


XI— 9-10 


THE  REGIMENT  181 

upon  to  see  that  these  displacements  actually  are  effected 
at  the  time  scheduled. 

10.  Regimental  Headquarters.  — (a)  These  duties 
are  outlined  under  “Functions”  as  given  in  the  Type  Or- 
ganization sheets  issued  by  these  Schools.  More  should 
be  said  in  regard  to  the  Plans  and  Training  section. 

(b)  In  action,  this  section  will  be  very  busy.  In  addi- 
tion to  the  field  orders  that  it  prepares,  it  must  maintain, 
for  the  use  of  the  regimental  commander,  a situation  map 
that  is  based  on  the  constant  reports  that  are  received, 
through  the  intelligence  officer  and  liaison  officers  in  par- 
ticular, and  actually  is  kept  up  to  the  minute. 

(c)  Frequently  it  will  be  engaged  in  duties  that  re- 
quire quite  accurate  drafting.  When  the  artillery  brigade 
commander  sends  a tracing,  showing  a barrage  that  is  to  be 
fired,  he  frequently  transmits  only  the  regimental  task 
(though  for  coordination  the  brigade  task  may  be  indicated 
also).  This  must  be  divided  between  the  battalions  and 
a sketch  of  their  particular  tasks  be  sent  to  each  of  them. 
The  Plans  and  Training  section  does  this  under  the  gen- 
eral instructions  of  the  colonel  or  executive.  It  is  the  same 
for  the  parcelling  out  of  successive  concentrations  that  may 
be  ordered. 

(d)  When  full  latitude  is  left  the  artillery  regimental 
commander,  in  the  preparation  of  barrages  and  concentra- 
tions of  a local  nature,  this  section  is  very  busily  involved 
in  details. 

(e)  It  must  not  be  assumed  that  the  Plans  and  Train- 
ing section,  in  the  attack,  has  finished  its  duties  when  it 
prepares  the  details  of  the  fire  support  necessary  for  the 
advance.  The  possibility  of  local  stoppages  of  our  infan- 
try must  be  provided  for,  and  a study  must  be  made  as  to 
where  these  embarrassing  situations  are  liable  to  occur; 
the  study  of  these  possible  emergency  situations  is  of  the 
greatest  importance. 

(f)  When  opportunities  allow,  battalion  commanders, 
in  action,  send  frequent  reports  to  regimental  headquarters 
as  to  their  firing  and  its  effect,  and  frequently,  a report 
when  each  battery  commences  and  completes  its  mission. 
This  allows  the  regimental  commander  at  all  times  to  know 


XI— 10-13 


182  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

how  many  batteries  there  are  in  action.  He  usually  will 
have  battery  as  well  as  battalion  positions  entered  on  the 
situation  map,  and,  while  firing,  each  battery  so  doing  may 
be  represented,  say,  by  a red  pin;  the  instant  it  becomes 
silent,  on  the  completion  of  its  mission,  it  will  be  indicated, 
maybe,  by  a blue  pin.  At  a glance  the  regimental  comman- 
der can  see  what  batteries,  if  any,  are  available  for  an 
emergency  call  or  to  meet  “eventual”  duty. 

11.  The  Service  Battery. — (a)  Tactically,  it  should 
be  observed  that  this  organization  automatically  can  take 
care  of  those  situations  in  which  single  battalions  are  de- 
tached, the  appropriate  sections  of  the  service  battery  ac- 
companying the  detached  battalion. 

(b)  When  the  regiment  is  operating  as  part  of  a divi- 
sion in  active  service,  the  battery  always  remains  under 
the  administrative  control  of  the  regimental  commander, 
but  works  very  closely  with  the  G4  office  of  the  division,  and 
receives  instructions  therefrom,  direct,  in  matters  relating 
to  the  drawing  of  supplies,  certain  movements  associated 
therewith,  and  some  other  similar  matters. 

(c)  It  is  thus  seen  that  the  service  battery  must  oper- 
ate, to  a great  extent,  some  distance  in  rear  of  the  battle 
positions  of  the  troops. 

12.  Reconnaissance. — Frequently  the  position  to  be 
occupied  by  a regiment  is  very  narrowly  circumscribed. 
The  regimental  commander  habitually  should  go  over  the 
terrain  and  assure  himself,  by  actual  reconnaissance,  of  the 
most  suitable  locations  for  his  battalions  within  the  limits 
imposed.  He  selects  the  general  locations  of  his  battalions, 
to  carry  out  known  or  anticipated  missions,  and  leaves  the 
more  detailed  reconnaissance  to  his  battalion  commanders. 
For  a more  detailed  discussion  of  reconnaissance,  see  Chap- 
ter VI. 

13.  Communications. — The  normal  procedure  is  for 
the  regiment  to  establish  communication  with  its  battalions, 
but  frequently  the  reverse  is  more  expedient  and  may  be  so 
ordered  by  the  regimental  commander.  When  a regiment 
can  establish  an  axis  of  communications,  the  battalions  may 
be  required  to  run  a telephone  line  to  the  nearest  switch- 


XI — 13-15 


THE  REGIMENT  183 

board  on  this  axis.  For  a detailed  discussion  of  communica- 
tions see  Chapter  VII. 

14.  Observation. — In  combat,  one  or  more  organized 
observation  posts  may  be  essential  to  the  regimental  com- 
mander both  for  intelligence  and  command.  The  habitual 
use  of  the  battalion  observation  posts,  by  the  regimental 
commander  or  his  staff,  is  strongly  condemned,  since  it  puts 
an  unnecessary  burden  on  the  battalion  lines  of  communica- 
tion, crowds  the  space  needed  by  battalion  headquarters, 
hampers  the  battalion  commander,  and  places  the  burden 
of  upkeep,  and  repair,  as  a rule,  on  the  battalion  with  inci- 
dent ill  feeling  in  consequence.  The  regimental  intelligence 
service,  in  so  far  as  terrestrial  observation  is  concerned, 
depends  largely  upon  the  battalion  observation  posts. 

15.  Regimental  Orders. — (a)  These  are  generally  in 
the  written  five-paragraph  form,  with  tables,  diagrams  and 
maps  enunciating  in  detail  the  plan  of  fire  action  and  scheme 
of  maneuver  for  the  regiment  as  a whole,  and  for  each  bat- 
talion thereof. 

(b)  The  five  paragraphs  of  the  artillery  regimental 
order  include  all  or  part  of  the  following,  as  the  situation 
demands:  (See  “Combat  Orders”) 

Par.  1. — Information  of  the  enemy  and  of  our  supporting 
troops.  Zones  of  action  by  description  or  reference  to  an  at- 
tached map  or  tracing.  Location  and  missions  of  artillery  units 
with  which  cooperation  is  necessary. 

Par.  2. — General  plan  for  the  employment  of  the  regiment. 

Par.  3. — Instructions  to  the  different  battalions  of  the  regi- 
ment— a separate  lettered  subparagraph  to  each  battalion  giving 
positions  to  be  occupied,  routes  of  advance  to  the  initial  posi- 
tions when  necessary,  unit  or  sector  to  be  supported,  other  tac- 
tical instructions.  In  case  a new  groupment  is  organized,  give 
its  composition  and  commander.  Much  of  this  information  may 
be  shown  by  attached  maps  or  tracings. 

Subparagraph  (x)  contains  instructions  applicable  to  all 
units  of  the  regiment,  such  as  the  details  of  the  artillery  prepara- 
tion and  accompanying  fire  in  case  of  attack;  and,  in  case  of  de- 
fense, the  details  of  counter  preparations  and  other  defensive 
fires,  and  the  conditions  under  which  they  are  to  be  delivered. 
Instructions  as  to  the  kind  and  quantity  of  ammunition  to  be 
used,  especially  the  employment  of  special  shell,  instructions 
regarding  the  assignment  of  accompanying  batteries  and  accom- 
panying guns,  advance  of  artillery  in  case  of  attack  or  retirement 
in  defense,  time  to  be  ready  to  fire,  and  restrictions  as  to  hours 
of  firing. 

Par.  U. — Designation  of  collecting  station  and  ammunition 
distributing  point.  When  necessary,  instructions  relative  to  the 
field  and  combat  trains  and  regimental  service  battery. 


XI— 15-17 


184  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


Par.  5. — Plan  of  signal  communications. 

Axis  of  signal  communications:  That  of  the  regiment, 

and  of  such  other  units  as  may  be  necessary. 

Command  posts:  of  the  regiment,  of  the  battalions  and 
of  other  artillery  and  infantry  units  with  which  the 
regiment  is  directly  concerned. 

(c)  In  moving  situations,  the  regimental  orders  are 
generally  dictated  or  verbal,  and  often  very  fragmentary. 
They  are  supplemented  whenever  possible  with  tables,  dia- 
grams, and  marked  maps  or  tracings. 


Section  II 

The  Artillery  Brigade 

Paragraphs 


Composition  16 

Headquarters  of  a Field  Artillery  Brigade 17 

General  Functions 18 

Tactical  Employment  of  the  Brigade 19 

Sectors  of  Fire  20 

Regimental  Principles  Applicable  to  Brigade 21 

Summary  of  Battle  Functions 22 


16.  Composition. — This  is  discussed  in  Chapter  I;  for 
further  details  see  Tables  of  Organization. 

17.  Headquarters  of  a Field  Artillery  Brigade. — 

(a)  This  is  outlined  in  the  Tables  of  Organization;  for  a 
study  of  the  arrangements  for  its  interior  operation,  see  list 
of  the  functions  of  each  section  as  set  forth  in  the  table  is- 
sued by  these  Schools  showing  the  “Type  Organization/’ 

(b)  This  unit  is  partially  motorized.  Riding  horses 
are  provided  for  mounted  reconnaissance,  messenger  ser- 
vice and  telephone  details. 

(c)  The  Intelligence  Section,  and  the  Plans  and  Train- 
ing Section,  ordinarily  will  require  a great  deal  of  drafting 
to  be  done  under  certain  battle  conditions,  hence  the  detail 
of  specially  trained  warrant  officers  in  these  sections  to  per- 
form this  duty,  some  of  which  requires  very  accurate  execu- 
tion. 


XI— 17-18 


THE  ARTILLERY  BRIGADE  185 

(d)  The  enlisted  detachment  is  organized  very  much 
like  that  of  artillery  regimental  headquarters,  discussed  in 
a previous  paragraph. 

18.  General  Functions. — (a)  The  artillery  brigade 
is  a tactical  unit.  In  the  division,  its  commander  is  at  the 
head  of  an  organic  group  assigned  as  the  artillery  of  the 
division.  He  is  responsible  for  the  training,  fighting  effi- 
ciency, and  morale  of  this  group,  and,  at  the  same  time,  is 
the  artillery  advisor  of  the  division  commander.  He  is, 
therefore,  both  a commander  of  troops  and  a staff  officer  of 
the  division,  hence  his  staff  and  headquarters  must  be  or- 
ganized to  assist  him  in  both  capacities.  His  staff  depart- 
ments must  function  in  close  association  with  the  corres- 
ponding staff  sections  and  services  of  division  headquarters. 

(b)  The  brigade  headquarters  should  be  the  guiding 
element  in  the  artillery  command.  It  should  be  so  organ- 
ized and  trained  that  it  functions  automatically,  giving  the 
brigade  commander  frequent  opportunities  to  leave  his  com- 
mand post  and  division  headquarters  to  visit  his  regiments, 
individual  batteries  and  observation  posts,  keeping  in  close 
touch  with  the  situation  in  front  and  the  performance  of  his 
units,  as  well  as  in  touch  with  division  headquarters. 

(c)  In  addition  to  controlling  the  policy  and  perfor- 
mance of  the  artillery  within  the  division,  brigade  head- 
quarters must  keep  in  close  touch  with  supporting  corps 
and  army  artillery  units,  with  the  artillery  of  adjacent  divi- 
sions, and  with  the  corps  artillery  information  service. 

(d)  Through  the  brigade  munitions  officer  it  controls 
and  is  responsible,  in  coordination  with  G4  of  the  division, 
for  supply  of  artillery  ammunition. 

(e)  The  brigade  commander,  through  his  communica- 
tions officers,  must  exercise  a strict  control  over  artillery 
signal  communications,  especially  the  artillery  telephone 
net,  to  prevent  the  waste  of  equipment  and  duplication  of 
energy  that  would  result  were  subordinate  units  to  put  in 
too  many  independent  lines.  Normally  the  brigade  lays  the 
telephone  lines  for  communication  with  the  regiments,  but, 
in  many  cases,  the  brigade  will  establish  an  axial  line,  and 
require  the  regiments  to  lay  lines  to  the  nearest  brigade 
switchboard. 


XI— 18 


186  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(f)  The  brigade  commander  controls  the  disposition 
of  his  regiments  to  carry  out  the  plan  of  action  in  accor- 
dance with  the  orders  of  the  division  commander.  He  may 
indicate  on  the  map,  to  the  regimental  commanders,  merely 
the  general  area  to  be  occupied  by  the  regiment  and  the 
general  dispositions  of  the  battalions  or  batteries  thereof, 
relying  upon  the  regimental  commanders  to  make  a de- 
tailed reconnaissance  of  the  areas  assigned;  but,  whenever 
possible,  the  brigade  commander  should  go  over  the  ground 
himself  so  as  to  have  a full  appreciation  of  the  suitability 
of  the  terrain  for  artillery  positions. 

(g)  He  exercises  supervision  over  the  connection  with 
infantry  units,  and  the  support  thereof  by  the  artillery  units 
of  his  brigade,  especially  when  mutual  support  must  be  pro- 
vided for  between  one  sector  and  another. 

(h)  As  stabilization  develops,  he  establishes  the  policy 
for  the  organization  of  battalion  observation  posts  so  as 
to  distribute  them  over  as  wide  a front  as  possible.  When 
observation  is  limited,  and  but  few  points  are  available  to 
the  division  artillery  as  observation  posts,  the  brigade  com- 
mander makes  an  allotment  of  these  locations. 

(i)  Field  Orders. — 

(1)  The  field  orders  issued  by  the  artillery  brigade  com- 
mander to  his  command  are  more  often  written  than  verbal.  In 
combat,  the  initial  order  is  supplemented  by  other  written  or 
verbal  orders  made  necessary  by  unforeseen  developments  of  the 
engagement. 

(2)  The  brigade  commander  and  his  Plans  and  Training 
Section  assist  the  division  staff  in  preparing  such  parts  of  a divi- 
sion field  order  as  relate  to  artillery  employment.  The  Plans 
and  Training  Section  depends  on  the  Intelligence  Section  for  a 
great  deal  of  information,  much  of  which  may  be  plotted  and  will 
include  locations  of  hostile  batteries,  enemy  works,  movements 
within  the  enemy  lines  and  much  similar  information.  The  plan 
of  action  of  the  division  being  understood,  the  tasks  are  appor- 
tioned to  the  various  regiments  and  battalions  through  the  Plans 
and  Training  Section.  This  often  requires  accurate  drafting. 
When  barrages  are  used,  the  regimental  tasks  are  transmitted 
by  sketches  showing  the  time  each  part  is  to  be  laid.  A similar 
system  is  used  for  concentrations. 

(3)  When  an  artillery  annex  is  needed  within  a division  field 
order,  to  give  more  details  of  the  artillery  employment,  the  ar- 
tillery brigade  field  order  is  used  as  this  annex  (see  “Combat 
Orders”) . 

(4)  (a)  The  following  extract  from  Instruction  Memoran- 
dum No.  1,  Sept.  15,  1920,  General  Service  Schools,  should  receive 
careful  consideration  in  connection  with  plans  and  orders  for 
artillery,  as  setting  forth  the  school  policy  with  respect  to  same. 


XI— 18 


THE  ARTILLERY  BRIGADE  187 

Plans  of  action  for  tactical  commands  versus  separate 
plans  for  each  combat  arm:  Separate  plans  of  action  for 

each  combat  arm  (infantry-artillery-tactical  air  service,  etc.) 
have  no  place  in  the  organization  (especially  in  open  war- 
fare situations)  and  in  considerations  of  higher  comman- 
ders. The  plan  should  be  based  on  tactical  units  and  the 
arms  comprised  therein  employed  in  combination. 

One  of  the  most  dangerous  procedures  developed  in  the 
stabilized  warfare  of  the  western  front  was  the  formulation 
of  separate  plans  of  action  for  each  combat  arm.  In  study- 
ing some  of  the  important  battles  which  occurred  between 
1915  and  1918,  and  especially  the  plans  of  action  of  division 
commanders,  it  is  found  that  they  frequently  comprised  an 
infantry  plan — an  artillery  plan — an  air  service  plan,  etc. 
These  various  plans  were  published  by  the  commanders  of 
each  separate  arm  and  showed  a lack  of  the  proper  employ- 
ment of  the  combined  arms.  The  organization  of  the  divi- 
sion into  separate  infantry  and  artillery  commands  and  long 
periods  of  inactivity  prompted  this  procedure. 

The  scheme  indicated  in  the  foregoing  is  most  injurious 
to  sound  tactics  as  it  tends  to  an  independent  and  uncoordi- 
nated employment  of  the  infantry,  artillery,  tactical  air  ser- 
vice, etc.  From  the  viewpoint  of  the  division  commander, 
such  a thing  as  a separate  infantry  plan  and  a separate  ar- 
tillery plan  should  never  enter  into  his  consideration.  He 
should  frame  a divisional  plan  which  combines  all  arms  in 
a predetermined  scheme  of  maneuver.  While  this  scheme 
of  maneuver  is  based  primarily  on  the  infantry  action  there 
should  be  no  separate  infantry  plan. 

Likewise,  subordinate  infantry  commanders  should  not 
limit  their  considerations  solely  to  a purely  infantry  plan. 
Aside!  from  machine  guns,  tanks,  and  other  special  infantry 
weapons,  the  infantry  commander  must  make  certain  of  use- 
ful assistance  by  his  supporting  artillery.  At  the  same  time, 
commanders  of  divisional  artillery  units  should  include  in 
their  considerations  and  plans  the  action  contemplated  by 
the  infantry  units  they  are  to  support. 

While  each  commander  must  necessarily  evolve  a plan 
for  the  employment  of  his  command,  and  consider  therein  the 
part  to  be  played  by  all  units  of  his  command,  and  those 
associated  therewith,  his  final  and  accepted  plan  is  issued 
in  the  form  of  field  orders  and  not  as  a plan.  Therefore,  the 
policy  of  the  Schools  does  not  recognize  the  formation  and 
issuance  of  plans  by  separate  arms  of  service  as  “infantry 
plans,  artillery  plans,  tactical  air  service  plans,  etc.”  The 
policy  is  that  the  commander  of  each  tactical  unit  (whether 
it  comprises  all  arms  or  only  one)  must,  after  formulating 
a plan  of  action  to  carry  out  the  mission  assigned  by  higher 
authority,  announce  the  accepted  plan  in  the  form  of  field 
orders.  Therefore,  instead  of  infantry  plans,  artillery  plans, 
etc.,  there  should  be  army,  corps,  division,  brigade,  regi- 
ments, battalions  and  detachment  field  orders  (see  Combat 
Orders ).  There  must  be  divorced  from  all  minds  any 
thoughts  of  “going  it  alone”  by  the  infantry  or  the  artillery, 
and  there  must  be  uppermost  in  all  minds  that  all  plans  and 
field  orders  are  based  on  the  plans  of  the  commanders  and  not 
of  separate  arms.  The  plans  of  these  commanders  should  seek 
to  secure  proper  combined  employment  of  all  the  arms. 


XI— 18-19 


188  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

With  the  foregoing  in  view,  chiefs  of  combat  arms  on 
the  staffs  of  commanders  have  no  tactical  command  of  troops 
of  their  arms  in  lower  units  and  do  not  give  tactical  orders 
thereto.  All  tactical  orders  are  given  to  unit  commanders 
and  in  accordance  with  the  hierarchy  of  unit  command  and 
not  of  arm  of  the  service. 

(b)  However,  there  should  be  direct  communication  be- 
tween army,  corps  and  division  field  artillery  commanders; 
not  for  the  purpose  of  transmitting  orders,  but  to  secure  a 
closer  cooperation  of  the  three  classes  of  artillery  in  carry- 
ing out  existing  orders.  Artillery  of  one  class  frequently 
will  call  on  artillery  of  another  class  to  assist  it  in  its  mis- 
sion. This  assistance  frequently  can  be  rendered  without 
detriment  to  the  accomplishment  of  its  own  normal  mission. 

19.  Tactical  Employment  of  the  Brigade. — (a)  It 
is  the  duty  of  the  artillery  brigade  commander  to  determine 
the  areas  from  which  his  regiments  can  accomplish  their 
missions.  In  the  selection  of  regimental  areas,  the  two  ex- 
tremes of  congestion  and  over-extension  are  to  be  avoided. 
Congestion  limits  subordinates  in  their  choice  of  battalion 
areas  and  battery  positions.  Over-extension  adds  to  the 
difficulties  of  command,  coordination  and  supply.  The  ar- 
tillery brigade  commander’s  versatility  in  the  selection  of 
regimental  areas  is  measured  by  his  ability  to  meet  existing 
conditions  by  a skillful  compromise  between  these  two  ex- 
tremes. 

(b)  For  the  purpose  of  illustrating  a few  of  the  tacti- 
cal dispositions  of  the  regiments  of  field  artillery  operating 
within  a division,  the  following  cases  are  presented. 

In  each  case,  it  is  assumed  that  a regiment  of  medium 
howitzers  is  attached  to  the  division. 

1.  Case  6.  Open  Warfare. — The  1st  Field  Artillery  is  sup- 
porting the  1st  Brigade  and  the  2d  Field  Artillery  is  supporting 
the  2d  Brigade.  The  101st  Field  Artillery  (medium  howitzers)  is 
held  in  general  support  of  the  division.  Contact  with  the  enemy 
has  developed  as  indicated.  See  the  sketch.  It  is  not  drawn  to 
scale  and  is  intended  only  to  illustrate  the  principle.  For  obvious 
reasons,  the  area  to  be  assigned  the  1st  Field  Artillery  should  be 
more  advanced  than  the  2d  Field  Artillery  area.  This  leaves  a 
gap  between  the  two  areas,  and,  if  the  terrain  permits,  allows  the 
medium  howitzer  regiment  to  be  placed  in  a central  location.  This 
permits  it  to  cover  the  entire  front  of  the  division  at  long  ranges. 
This  also  allows  deep  penetration  of  the  infantry  before  forward 
displacement  of  the  howitzers  is  required.  Moreover,  if  a con- 
venient longitudinal  road  net  exist,  the  howitzer  regiment  may  se- 
cure its  own  route  forward,  unhampered  by  the  rear  elements 
of  the  light  regiments. 

Such  simple  conditions  as  are  indicated  in  Case  6 can- 
not always  be  found. 


XI— 19 


THE  ARTILLERY  BRIGADE  189 


Case -6 


2.  Case  7. — (a)  Since  the  light  guns  are  more  mobile  and 
more  easily  concealed  than  the  howitzers,  it  may  frequently  occur 
that  the  more  favored  positions  will  go  to  the  heavier  weapon 
and  the  75s  will  be  forced  to  take  whatever  may  be  left. 

(b)  In  this  case,  the  general  situation  is  similar  to  that 
presented  in  Case  6.  Here,  however,  a high  ridge  affords  con- 
venient howitzer  shelter,  and  is  favorably  located  with  respect 
to  roads.  In  such  a case,  it  may  be  expected  that  the  artillery 
brigade  commander  will  recommend  to  the  division  comman- 
der a reservation  of  the  positions  indicated  for  the  medium 
howitzers.  This  will  require  the  light  regiments  to  conform 
to  the  situation  as  represented.  The  75s,  in  this  case,  still 
would  have  the  protection  afforded  by  the  upper  slopes  of 
the  ridge,  if  such  positions  were  desirable. 


Direction  of 
A d vance 


XI— 19 


190  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


Case  7 


3.  Case  8. — (a)  Sometimes  the  howitzer  battalions  may  be  ao 
assigned  that  one  is  associated  with  one  75-mm.  regiment  and  on« 
with  the  other,  leaving  a third  for  emergencies  and  general  sup- 
port. Since  this  last  named  howitzer  battalion  must  give  gen- 
eral service  under  all  conditions,  both  for  fire  within  the  division 
sector  and  possibly  for  eventual  missions  in  the  area  of  adjacent 
divisions,  it  is  probable  that  the  best  location  will  be  reserved 
for  it. 


X* 


XI— 19-20 


THE  ARTILLERY  BRIGADE  191 


(b)  In  a large  attack,  when  batteries  from  the  army  and 
corps  artillery  are  intermingled  with  those  of  the  division 
artillery,  reservations  for  the  former  should  be  made  and  in- 
dicated to  the  division  commander.  He  then  knows  what 
area  remains  to  him  for  the  sole  use  of  his  organic  artillery 
brigade.  In  such  an  attack,  most  of  the  division  artillery 
will  be  moved  into  more  advanced  positions  at  some  time 
prior  to  the  assault.  Timely  advice  as  to  specific  reservation 
of  areas  for  corps  and  army  artillery  is  important.  It  saves 
useless  work  in  making  later  changes  in  division  artillery 
locations. 

(c)  The  figure  is  intended  to  illustrate  the  case  just  pre- 
sented. 

20.  Sectors  of  Fire. — (a)  Dead  spaces  often  are  found 
in  the  sectors  of  fire  assigned  to  75-mm.  regiments.  When 
important  areas  are  included  in  such  dead  spaces,  missions 


XI— 20-22 


192  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

within  those  areas  are  assigned  to  the  attached  howitzers, 
if  any.  As  the  situation  becomes  more  stabilized,  this  fea- 
ture is  more  minutely  examined,  and  charts  of  areas  of  all 
dead  spaces  are  calculated  carefully  so  that  the  tactical  dis- 
positions can  be  regulated  accordingly. 

(b)  When  the  situation  permits,  artillery  regimental 
commanders  determine  and  designate  the  sectors  of  fire 
for  the  normal  supporting  missions,  reporting  their  deci- 
sions to  the  artillery  brigade  commander.  Artillery  regi- 
mental commanders  confer  directly  with  the  commanders 
of  the  troops  supported  in  regard  to  this  subject. 

(c)  Sectors  of  eventual  fire  for  artillery  regiments 
should  be  prescribed  by  the  artillery  brigade  commander, 
who  arranges  for  a scheme  of  lateral  artillery  support,  all 
in  furtherance  of  a complete  coordination  with  the  plan  of 
action  adopted  by  the  division  commander. 

21.  Regimental  Principles  Applicable  to  Brigade. 
— The  general  principles  relating  to  the  regiment  are,  in  sub- 
stance, applicable  to  the  brigade.  Hence,  they  are  not  re- 
peated. 

22.  Summary  of  Principle  Battle  Functions  of 
Unit  Commanders  Within  the  Brigade. — This  chapter 
has  been  utilized  to  emphasize  the  fact  that,  within  the  field 
artillery  brigade,  there  are  important  matters  of  interior 
tactics  that  must  be  solved  in  battle,  and  that  these  matters 
are  intimately  connected  with  the  exterior  or  supporting 
tactics  which  has  been  discussed  in  Chapter  VIII.  Exclu- 
sive of  the  important  matters  of  training,  marching,  com- 
munications, reconnaissance,  ammunition  supply,  etc.,  which 
must  be  directed  by  the  respective  commanders  concerned, 
there  are  certain  battle  functions  of  the  unit  commanders 
that  are  typical  and  serve  better  to  define  the  sphere  of 
artillery  effort  in  action.  They  are  as  follows : 

Battery  Commander:  Fire  technique  and  fire  control. 

Battalion  Commander:  Fire  direction;  technical  location  of 
batteries  to  render  effective  fire  support. 

Regimental  Commander:  Battalion  locations;  fire  direction; 
tactics  of  fire  support  and  movement.  Administrative 
and  technical  assistance  to  battalions. 

Brigade  Commander:  Fire  direction;  tactics  of  fire  support 
and  movement;  general  locations  of  regiments;  staff  offi- 
cer for  division  commander. 


XII— 1 


CHAPTER  XII 

Artillery  on  the  March  and  its  Entry 
into  Action 

Paragraphs 


Disposition  on  the  March 1 

Subdivisions  of  Artillery  on  the  March 2 

Artillery  Headquarters  on  the  March  3 

Conduct  of  Marches 4 

Rates  of  March 5 

Distances  6 

Reconnaissance  on  the  March 7 

Communications 8 

Entry  Into  Action  From  the  March 9 


1.  Disposition  on  the  March. — (a)  The  order  of 
march,  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  is  controlled  by  tacti- 
cal considerations.  The  artillery  is  so  disposed  in  the  col- 
umn or  columns,  with  respect  to  other  troops,  as  best  to 
meet  the  anticipated  needs. 

(b)  (1)  The  artillery  with  the  advance  or  rear  guard  is  usually 
in  the  proportion  of  one  battery  of  light  artillery  to  each  battal- 
ion of  infantry,  or,  expressed  in  terms  of  larger  units,  one  bat- 
talion of  light  artillery  to  each  regiment  of  infantry.  This  pro- 
portion is  subject  to  wide  variation,  and  depends  entirely  upon 
tactical  considerations.  In  a pursuit,  or  in  a retreat,  this  pro- 
portion might  be  increased  considerably,  whereas,  in  an  advance 
at  night,  it  would  be  unusual  to  have  any  artillery  with  the  ad- 
vance guard. 

(2)  In  a cavalry  division,  there  is  but  one  battalion  of  ar- 
tillery, hence  the  proportion  of  artillery  with  the  advance  guard 
usually  would  be  less1  than  in  the  infantry  division. 

(c)  In  order  to  expedite  its  entry  into  action,  artillery 
generally  is  placed  near  the  head  of  the  main  body,  but  it 
must  be  preceded  by  sufficient  infantry  (or  cavalry)  to  pro- 
vide for  its  security.  The  distance  to  the  leading  element 
of  the  advance  guard  must  be  such  that  the  artillery  will 
not  come  under  hostile  artillery  fire  while  still  in  column. 
For  this  reason,  artillery  in  the  advance  guard  usually  is 
placed  at  or  near  the  tail  of  the  reserve.  Artillery  with  the 
advance  guard  is  under  the  direct  orders  of  the  advance 
guard  commander.  When  march  conditions  cease,  advance 
guard  artillery  automatically  reverts  to  the  control  of  the 


193 


XII— 1-2 


194  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

commander  of  the  artillery  unit  from  which  it  was  detached, 
unless  otherwise  ordered. 

(d)  When  contact  with  the  enemy  is  expected,  columns 
are  closed  up  and  march  on  broad  fronts,  taking  advantage 
of  all  parallel  roads  or  routes  across  country  that  permit 
good  lateral  communication.  In  such  a formation  the  sub- 
division of  artillery  generally  is  made  so  that  artillery  units 
are  with  the  infantry  (or  cavalry)  units  that  they  habitually 
support. 

(e)  Placing  artillery  and  infantry  in  the  same  column 
is  taxing  upon  both  the  artillery  and  upon  the  foot  troops. 
This  disposition  should  not  be  resorted  to  except  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  enemy.  Marches  of  concentration,  such  as  the 
march  of  one  division  to  relieve  another  division  in  the  line, 
should  be  so  conducted  as  to  enable  both  horse-drawn  and 
motorized  artillery  to  march  independently  of  each  other 
and  of  columns  of  foot  troops. 

(f)  Good  marching  requires  careful  preparation  and 
strict  discipline.  In  the  division,  the  march  of  all  units  is 
conducted  in  accordance  with  a march  order.  When  units 
march  independently  the  march  order  usually  contains  a 
march  table,  prescribing  the  time  of  departure,  route,  rate 
of  march,  and  destination  of  each  marching  unit.  For  a 
march  in  column  or  columns,  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy, 
the  march  order  prescribes  the  order  of  march,  and,  when 
necessary  to  avoid  confusion,  the  route  of  each  unit  to  enter 
the  column.  The  time  of  departure  necessary  to  reach  the 
column  at  the  proper  time  is  a responsibility  of  subordinate 
commanders. 

2.  Subdivision  of  Artillery  on  the  March.— (a) 
The  battalion  is  the  principal  marching  unit.  When  a bri- 
gade or  regiment  is  in  column,  the  march  is  conducted  as 
the  march  of  so  many  successive  battalions,  over  which  bri- 
gade and  regimental  commanders  exercise  a certain  amount 
of  supervision.  This  supervision  usually  is  limited  to  in- 
spections and  to  prescribing  the  time  and  length  of  halts, 
when  not  fixed  by  the  orders  of  the  higher  commands. 

(b)  Unless  marching  independently,  or  as  part  of  an 
advance  or  rear  guard,  a battalion  combat  train  seldom 
marches  immediately  in  rear  of  the  batteries.  The  road 


XII— 2-4 


ARTILLERY  ON  MARCH— ENTRY  INTO  ACTION  195 

space  that  would  be  occupied  by  the  combat  train  is  given  to 
troops  needed  in  action  before  a re-supply  of  ammunition 
to  the  firing  batteries  can  be  necessary. 

(c)  On  the  march  with  other  troops  in  the  presence  of 
the  enemy,  the  artillery  regimental  service  batteries,  or  the 
parts  thereof  attached  to  battalions  or  independent  bat- 
teries, march  with  the  field  trains  of  the  other  troops.  Grain 
for  one  day  is  carried  on  the  horses,  and  frequently,  addi- 
tional grain  and  some  hay  is  carried  on  the  artillery  car- 
riages of  both  the  firing  batteries  and  combat  trains. 

(d)  Adequate  provision  must  be  made  for  gasoline  and 
oil  supply,  as  well  as  for  minor  repairs  to  motor  vehicles,  for 
all  subdivisions  of  motorized  units  on  the  march. 

3.  Artillery  Headquarters  on  the  March. — In  an 
advance,  when  contact  with  the  enemy  is  expected,  parts 
of  the  headquarters  of  the  artillery  brigade,  regiments,  bat- 
talions and  batteries  are  pushed  sufficiently  forward  in  the 
column  to  enable  the  reconnaissance  to  be  completed  and 
communications  established  before  the  batteries  arrive  at 
their  firing  positions.  As  a general  principle,  artillery  re- 
connaissance should  be  expedited  so  that  it  may  not  be 
necessary  to  halt  artillery  columns  while  waiting  for  a re- 
connaissance to  be  completed.  Otherwise  traffic  congestion 
is  almost  bound  to  result. 

4.  Conduct  of  Marches. — (a)  Artillery  on  the  march 
requires  strict  discipline  and  close  supervision.  For  this 
reason,  non-commissioned  officers  ride  where  they  can  sup- 
ervise the  march  of  the  units  they  command;  and  officers 
must  be  distributed  along  the  column. 

(b)  It  is  difficult  for  moifnted  troops  or  motor  vehicles 
in  a long  column  to  maintain  a uniform  gait  throughout. 
Even  when  the  head  of  an  artillery  column  is  not  dependent 
upon  other  troops  and  can  maintain  what  may  appear  to  be 
a uniform  rate  of  march,  rear  elements  will  be  continually 
changing  gait  or  even  halting  at  times  unless  the  column  is 
broken  by  frequent  intervals. 

(c)  There  is  no  greater  evidence  of  the  training  and 
discipline  of  artillery  than  its  conduct  on  the  march.  In  a 
well  trained  organization,  vehicles  keep  well  to  the  right  of 
the  road;  mounted  men  seldom  if  ever  ride  to  the  left  of 


XII— 4 


196  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

the  left  line  of  wheels ; when  a carriage  must  be  taken  out 
of  column  for  adjustment  or  repair,  its  driver  notifies  the 
driver  of  the  carriage  in  rear  and  then  moves  his  carriage 
well  out  to  the  right  of  the  road.  When  a carriage  is  taken 
out  of  the  column,  the  battery  commander  is  notified  at 
once. 

(d)  As  soon  as  the  carriage  is  able  to  resume  the 
march,  it  is  placed  in  column  wherever  possible,  and  resumes 
its  normal  place  in  column  only  after  the  column  has  halted, 
and  then  only  in  case  traffic  is  travelling  in  one  direction. 
At  halts,  artillery  pulls  off  well  to  the  right  of  the  road,  and 
keeps  the  road  clear  to  the  left  of  the  left  line  of  wheels. 

(e)  The  time  and  length  of  halts  must  be  known  in 
order  that  full  advantage  may  be  taken  to  dismount  the 
drivers,  to  rest  and  water  the  animals,  and  to  make  adjust- 
ments and  repairs. 

(f)  When  marching  with  other  troops,  or  in  long  col- 
umns, artillery  must  depend  upon  buckets  for  watering  ani- 
mals at  the  halts.  Before  the  prescribed  halts,  canvas  water 
buckets  are  made  ready,  and  as  many  animals  as  possible 
watered  at  each  halt  when  water  is  obtainable  within  a rea- 
sonable distance. 

(g)  Short  columns  of  artillery,  such  as  a battalion, 
marching  independently,  may  take  advantage  of  watering 
places.  Either  the  entire  column  may  halt  for  water,  or  if 
watering  places  are  small,  platoons  or  batteries  are  dropped 
out  of  the  column  from  the  rear  at  each  successive  watering 
place.  After  watering  the  animals,  each  platoon  or  battery 
will  continue  the  march  without  increasing  the  gait,  and 
usually  will  catch  up  to  the  element  ahead  about  the  time 
the  latter  completes  watering.  In  this  way  the  column  is 
quickly  reformed. 

(h) 

(1)  The  principles  for  conducting  the  march  of  motorized 
artillery  are  essentially  the  same  as  those  for  horse-drawn  or- 
ganizations. However,  it  is  much  more  difficult  for  motorized 
artillery  to  march  in  the  same  column  with  foot  troops.  It  is 
far  preferable  to  place  motorized  artillery  in  the  interval  be- 
tween the  main  body  and  the  field  trains,  or  on  a parallel  road 
so  that  it  can  move  forward  by  successive  bounds. 

(2)  It  is  difficult  for  a regiment  of  motorized  artillery  to 
march  (even  by  itself)  as  a unit.  Tractors,  trucks,  automo- 
biles and  motorcycles,  all  have  different  speeds  and  cannot  be 


XII— 4-7 


ARTILLERY  ON  MARCH— ENTRY  INTO  ACTION  197 

moved  readily  together.  If  possible,  a truck  column  should 
march  separately,  and  automobile  and  motorcycles  with  the  trac- 
tor column  be  towed  or  allowed  to  move  by  bounds. 

5.  Rates  of  March. — (a)  When  marching  in  a mixed 
column,  the  rate  of  march  of  artillery  is  governed  by  that 
of  the  troops  with  which  it  is  marching.  For  light  artil- 
lery marching  independently,  the  rates  of  march  are  given 
in  the  organization  tables  issued  at  the  General  Service 
Schools.  These  rates  include  halts,  and  must  be  taken 
merely  as  a general  guide: 

Good  roads:  31  miles  per  hour. 

Mediocre  roads:  3 miles  per  hour. 

Poor  roads:  21  miles  per  hour. 

Motorized  artillery  of  medium  caliber  may  be  assumed  to 
march  at  the  same  rate  as  horse-drawn  units. 

Of  course  the  above  rates  can  be  considerably  increased, 
particularly  in  the  case  of  small  units.  They  are  given  as 
average  rates  for  marches  of  one  or  more  days. 

(b)  The  rates  for  marching  and  maneuvering  off  the 
roads  vary  so  greatly  with  the  terrain  that  estimates  would 
be  futile.  The  maneuvering  gait  for  light  artillery  is  the 
trot.  In  training,  animal-drawn  artillery  is  gaited  as  fol- 
lows: 


Walk  4 miles  per  hour. 

Trot  8 miles  per  hour. 

Gallop  12  miles  per  hour. 


6.  Distances. — (a)  The  distance  that  motorized  ar- 
tillery may  march  is  limited  only  by  the  rate  of  march  pos- 
sible and  the  marching  time  available.  For  horse-drawn  ar- 
tillery, the  distance  is  affected  by  the  condition  of  the  ani- 
mals, the  weather,  the  condition  of  the  roads,  and  the  num- 
ber of  successive  days  that  a march  must  be  continued.  Mo- 
torized artillery  may  halt  anywhere,  whereas  horse-drawn 
artillery  must  bivouac  near  water,  and,  if  possible,  where 
horses  can  be  sheltered,  and  grazed. 

(b)  Portee  artillery  has  a much  greater  daily  march- 
ing radius,  when  suitable  roads  are  available,  than  has  trac- 
tor-drawn artillery.  For  that  reason,  it  is  assigned  to  the 
G.H.Q.  artillery. 

7.  Reconnaissance  on  the  March. — (a)  The  com- 
mander of  the  artillery  with  the  advance  guard  must  be 


XII— 7 


198  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

with  the  advance  guard  commander,  whenever  contact  with 
the  enemy  is  expected.  This  usually  will  place  him  well 
ahead  of  his  guns.  He,  as  well  as  all  other  artillery  officers, 
must  study  the  ground  and  the  map  as  the  march  pro- 
gresses. He  must  know  the  ground  he  has  passed  over  for 
considerable  distances  on  both  sides  of  the  road,  the  way 
this  ground  lends  itself  to  artillery  employment,  and  all 
routes  to  possible  positions.  In  selecting  routes,  the  im- 
portance of  covered  approach  must  be  remembered,  also 
the  advantage,  where  possible,  of  using  a road  that  will  be 
free  of  other  troops.  His  formal  reconnaissance  commences 
as  soon  as  he  has  received  instructions  from  the  advance 
guard  commander  as  to  the  desired  employment  and  loca- 
tion of  his  guns.  If  he  is  a battalion  commander,  he  must 
take  with  him  on  his  reconnaissance  either  the  battery  com- 
manders, the  battery  reconnaissance  officers,  or  the  battery 
agents. 

(b)  The  reconnaissance  by  artillery  units  attached  to 
infantry  brigades,  regiments,  or  battalions,  is  conducted 
in  a similar  manner. 

(c) 

(1)  Reconnaissance  by  division  artillery  is  progressive,  as  it 
is  with  smaller  units,  and  commences,  when  possible,  with  the 
brigade  commander.  He  may  make  a partial  reconnaissance  on 
the  ground,  or  merely  a map  reconnaissance,  and  send  instruc- 
tions to  his  regimental  commanders  by  messages.  He  may  as- 
semble his  regimental  commanders  for  reconnaissance,  or  he 
may  start  his  reconnaissance  without  delay,  sending  word  to  his 
regimental  commanders  to  meet  him  at  a designated  rendezvous 
point. 

(2)  Whatever  may  be  the  method  of  his  reconnaissance,  its 
object  is  to  indicate  to  the  regimental  commanders  the  general 
disposition  of  the  brigade  with  respect  to  the  terrain  and  with 
respect  to  the  other  units  of  the  division. 

(3)  Regimental  commanders  select  general  locations  for 
their  battalions,  leaving  to  the  battalion  commanders  as  much 
latitude  as  possible  in  the  actual  selection  of  the  battery  posi- 
tions. 

(d)  Prior  to  making  a reconnaissance  artillery  * com- 
manders must  have  as  complete  a knowledge  as  possible  of 
the  plan  of  artillery  employment  desired  by  the  superior 
command. 

(e)  For  a more  detailed  discussion  of  artillery  recon- 
naissance see  Chapter  VI. 


XII— 8-9 


ARTILLERY  ON  MARCH— ENTRY  INTO  ACTION  199 

8.  Communications. — (a)  On  the  march,  and  prior  to 
actual  contact  with  and  resistance  by  the  enemy,  communi- 
cation is  maintained  by  motorcycle  and  mounted  couriers. 
When  necessary,  the  employment  of  radio  may  be  resorted 
to;  and,  very  exceptionally,  visual  signal  stations.  When 
available,  the  commercial  telephone  system  is  utilized. 

(b)  After  contact  has  been  gained  with  the  enemy, 
the  establishment  of  telephone  communication,  and  the 
building  up  of  an  artillery  telephone  net  commences  simul- 
taneously with  the  reconnaissance.  Radio  communication 
is  established  as  soon  as  the  command  posts  of  battalions, 
regiments  and  the  brigade  are  selected.  See  also  Chapter 
VII. 

9.  Entry  Into  Action  From  the  March. — (a)  When 
the  march  forward  is  stopped  by  sufficient  hostile  resistance 
to  require  the  employment  of  artillery,  the  efficiency  of  the 
artillery  is  gauged  by  the  promptness  with  which  it  is  able 
to  deliver  an  effective  fire.  This  requires  a rapid  reconnais- 
sance, and  an  almost  immediate  occupation  of  positions  by 
the  artillery  with  the  advance  guard.  The  advance  guard 
commander  decides  when  the  artillery  shall  open  fire.  When 
fire  is  desired,  it  is  the  duty  of  artillery  to  be  able  to  deliver 
it  at  once,  and  to  deliver  it  effectively. 

(b)  At  least  one  battery  should  be  placed  in  position 
not  far  from  its  location  when  the  column  is  stopped,  pro- 
vided, of  course,  it  is  able  to  deliver  an  effective  fire  from 
such  a position.  Even  though  the  range  may  be  somewhat 
longer  than  desired,  the  prompt  opening  of  fire  by  our  ar- 
tillery has  a considerable  moral  effect  upon  the  infantry, 
and  tends  to  inspire  confidence.  There  will  be  cases,  how- 
ever, when,  due  to  lack  of  nearby  observation  facilities,  con- 
siderable time  necessarily  will  be  consumed  in  establishing 
observation  posts  and  lines  of  communication.  Part  of 
this  time  may  be  used  in  pushing  the  battery  to  a more  ad- 
vanced position  instead  of  having  it  quickly  occupy  a nearer 
position  with  a resultant  period  of  idleness.  Having  estab- 
lished fire  with  one  battery,  others  may  be  moved  further 
forward,  under  cover  of  its  fire,  into  positions  selected  after 
a more  thorough  reconnaissance.  When  these  advanced 


XII— 9 


200  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

batteries  have  opened  fire,  the  first  battery  in  action  then 
may  be  moved  to  a more  suitable  position. 

(c)  In  meeting  engagements,  artillery  officers  must 
realize  that  time  is  the  important  element ; that  moving  bat- 
teries over  considerable  distances  across  country,  or  along 
roads  congested  by  other  troops,  involves  delays;  and  that 
it  is  better  to  open  fire  from  inferior  positions,  and  open 
fire  promptly,  than  to  hold  batteries  inactive  during  a long 
and  exhaustive  reconnaissance. 

(d)  If  the  enemy  resistance  is  considerable,  and  espe- 
cially if  the  hostile  artillery  has  a superiority  of  fire  over 
the  artillery  of  the  advance  guard,  the  artillery  with  the 
main  body  cannot  be  too  prompt  in  going  to  its  support. 
Such  a condition  may  require  the  leading  elements  of  the 
artillery  with  the  main  body  to  take  up  positions  near  their 
location  in  the  column  at  the  time  the  column  is  halted.  Such 
positions  usually  will  require  very  long  ranges,  and  must 
be  considered  merely  temporary  positions,  employed  to  sup- 
port the  advance  guard  artillery,  and  to  support  the  advance 
of  the  other  batteries  with  the  main  body  into  more  favor- 
able positions  well  to  the  front. 

(e)  These  rear  positions  may  serve  another  useful 
purpose.  In  case  of  a reverse,  or  in  case  it  is  necessary  to 
withdraw  the  advance  guard  to  a position  in  rear  of  that 
which  it  originally  occupied,  the  fire  from  these  rear  posi- 
tions will  aid  the  withdrawal,  and  may  save  the  command 
from  a serious  defeat.  Therefore,  until  the  strength  of  the 
enemy  is  sufficiently  determined,  artillery  must  be  well 
echeloned  to  the  rear.  As  soon  as  a superiority  of  fire  is 
definitely  established,  the  artillery  is  closed  up  toward  the 
front,  for  it  must  be  remembered  that,  with  certain  limita- 
tions, the  effectiveness  of  artillery  fire  is  inversely  propor- 
tional to  the  range. 

(f)  To  summarize:  In  its  entry  into  action  from  the 

march,  the  positions  occupied  by  and  the  employment  of  the 
artillery  depend  upon  the  plan  of  attack  or  defense  decided 
upon  by  the  commander  of  troops.  The  entry  into  action 
is  usually  progressive,  but  with  a minimum  delay  once  the 
plan  of  action  is  definitely  determined.  The  prompt  estab- 
lishment of  a superiority  of  fire  is  an  important  considera- 


XII— 9 


ARTILLERY  ON  MARCH— ENTRY  INTO  ACTION  201 

tion.  If  the  action  is  to  be  aggressive,  as  many  batteries 
as  possible  should  be  pushed  forward  to  good  positions 
prior  to  the  deployment,  and  support  by  a superiority  of 
fire,  the  deployment  of  the  infantry,  its  advance  and  fire 
attack  to  a line  of  departure,  the  assault  against  the  hostile 
positions,  and  subsequent  phases  of  the  engagement.  The 
latter  generally  requires  a forward  displacement  of  the  ar- 
tillery and  sometimes  the  assignment  of  accompanying  bat- 
teries. For  defense,  the  artillery  is  generally  disposed  in 
greater  depth. 

(g)  In  a retreat,  batteries  hold  positions  as  long  as 
it  is  expedient  to  do  so,  and  frequently  may  be  sacrificed  for 
the  purpose  of  holding  the  enemy  as  long  as  possible  at  im- 
portant points.  Batteries  or  battalions  withdraw  succes- 
sively under  cover  of  the  fire  of  other  batteries  or  battalions 
occupying  positions  further  in  rear,  and,  in  their  turn,  occu- 
py positions  to  support  the  withdrawal  of  other  artillery 
units,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  assist  the  troops  of  other 
arms  in  checking  the  enemy.  The  long  range  of  artillery 
may  be  made  extremely  useful,  in  retreat,  by  forcing  hostile 
deployment  at  great  distances,  thus  delaying  pursuit. 


XIII— 1 


CHAPTER  XIII 


Accompanying  Batteries  and 
Accompanying  Guns 


Defined  

General  Purpose  

Historical  

When  Used 

Duration  of  Mission,  Orders 

Command  of  Accompanying  Artillery 

Missions  

Handling  and  Maneuver  of  Accompanying  Artillery 
Units  From  Which  Accompanying  Artillery  Should  be 

Detailed  

Moral  Effect  of  Attached  Artillery 

Attached  Artillery  Drawing  Fire 

Equipment  of  Accompanying  Artillery 

Suitability  of  75-mm.  Gun 

Necessity  for  Combined  Training 


Paragraphs 

1 

2 

3 

4 


6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 


1.  Defined. — (a)  The  artillery  employed  for  infantry 
support  is  of  two  categories,  depending  on  its  system  of 
command  and  method  of  functioning  tactically,  i.e.,  sup- 
porting artillery  and  attached  artillery.  Accompanying 
batteries  and  accompanying  guns  are  forms  of  attached  ar- 
tillery especially  used  in  connection  with  an  attack  against 
a defensive  zone  and  in  other  situations  in  which  the  at- 
tack involves  continuous  fighting  over  a considerable  depth 
and  in  which  the  supporting  artillery  alone  would  not  yield 
the  maximum  effectiveness.  Accompanying  batteries  are 
batteries  attached  to  subordinate  infantry  units,  ordinarily 
the  brigade  or  regiment.  Accompanying  guns  are  single 
pieces  attached  ordinarily  to  infantry  assault  battalions. 
Thus  they  are  distinct  from  the  mass  of  supporting  artillery 
usually  present  in  such  situations.  Accompanying  artillery 
refers  to  accompanying  batteries  and  accompanying  guns 
only. 

(b)  While  accompanying  batteries  and  accompanying 
guns  are  forms  of  attached  artillery,  it  by  no  means  follows 
that  all  attached  artillery  is  either  accompanying  batteries 


202 


XIII— 1-3 


ACCOMPANYING  BATTERIES— GUNS  203 

or  accompanying  guns.  For  example,  artillery  may  be  at- 
tached to  infantry  commands  in  advance  and  rear  guards, 
pursuits,  retreats,  in  defensive  situations,  and  even  in  at- 
tacks. In  such  cases,  the  terms  accompanying  batteries  and 
accompanying  guns  would  not  be  applicable,  strictly  speak- 
ing, although  the  methods  of  the  latter  might  be  appropriate 
with  little  modification.  The  term  “accompanying  gun”  is  not 
applicable  to  the  infantry  auxiliary  weapons,  such  as  the 
light  trench  mortar  and  the  37-mm.  gun. 

2.  General  Purpose. — It  is  a well  recognized  fact 
that,  no  matter  how  powerful  the  general  artillery  and 
other  fire  support  in  attack  may  be,  some  elements  of  the 
hostile  resistance,  particularly  automatic  weapons,  will  re- 
main in  action  to  a certain  extent  and  will  be  encountered 
by  the  advancing  infantry.  Advance  provision  for  attack- 
ing these  targets  cannot  be  made,  except  in  a general  way,, 
since  their  location  is  not  known  beforehand.  When  they 
actually  are  encountered,  it  frequently  is  possible  for  the  in- 
fantry to  overcome  them  with  rifle  fire  and  movement  alone, 
but  usually  this  procedure  results  in  undue  losses,  and  is 
productive  of  delay.  Again,  it  may  be  possible  to  employ  suc- 
cessfully the  special  infantry  weapons,  the  machine  gun, 
the  light  mortar,  and  the  37-mm.  guns;  but  on  the  other 
hand,  these  may  prove  to  be  inadequate  in  power.  In  this 
latter  case,  recourse  may  be  had  to  the  supporting  artillery ; 
but  this  expedient  may  prove  unsatisfactory,  due  to  long 
and  faulty  communications,  lack  of  observation,  difficulties 
of  target  designation  at  a distance,  and  inaccuracy  of  long 
range  fire.  In  general,  the  problem  of  meeting  these  unex- 
pected resistances  is  to  bring  into  play  a fire  action  of  suf- 
ficient power  in  a minimum  of  time,  in  order  to  save  the  in- 
fantry time  and  losses.  To  augment  the  power  of  the  spe- 
cial infantry  weapons  and  to  reduce  the  delay  and  inaccur- 
acy of  the  fire  response  of  the  supporting  artillery,  accom- 
panying batteries  and  accompanying  guns  were  introduced. 

3.  Historical. — (a)  Accompanying  guns  appear  to 
have  been  the  earliest  form  of  mobile  artillery,  and  their 
use,  as  such,  is  historically  recorded  as  early  as  nearly  four 
hundred  years  ago.  The  historical  references  which  fol- 
low relate  to  The  World  War. 


XIII— 3 


204  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(b)  The  Germans  made  more  extensive  use  of  accom- 
panying batteries  and  accompanying  guns  than  did  the  al- 
lied armies.  In  some  cases,  the  guns  were  taken  from  the 
division  light  artillery.  In  others,  the  guns  were  formed  in 
independent  batteries ; the  latter  were  armed  with  materiel 
of  various  types,  such  as  the  77-mm.  gun  on  low  wheels,  the 
76-mm.  Russian  gun,  the  75-mm.  and  the  77-mm.  mountain 
guns,  and  57-mm.  naval  guns.  A captured  document  of 
about  September  1,  1918,  states  that  the  guns  “must  en- 
gage at  short  range  the  enemy  with  whom  the  infantry  is 
fighting  at  close  quarters.  By  reason  of  their  proximity  to 
the  infantry,  they  can  be  fired  at  the  right  moment  and  on 
the  right  target  more  easily  than  the  artillery  in  the  rear. 
Also,  being  at  close  range,  they  can  fire  on  objectives  which 
cannot  be  observed  from  the  rear.” 

(c)  The  British  conception  is  similar.  To  quote  from 
an  official  document : 

“The  fighting  throughout  August  and  September 
(1918)  has  confirmed  previous  experience  regarding  the 
vital  necessity  for  closely  supporting  the  advance  of  the 

leading  infantry  with  field  guns Sections  (platoons) 

of  18-pounder  batteries,  rather  than  single  guns,  should  be 
allotted  to  assaulting  battalions.” 

(d)  In  our  operations,  accompanying  guns  were  used 
first  in  the  St.  Mihiel  operations,  in  obedience  to  instructions 
from  the  Commander-in-Chief,  but  to  a negligible  extent; 
their  use  was  more  extensive  in  the  Meuse-Argonne  opera- 
tions. The  experiences  varied  greatly,  the  greater  part  of 
the  cases  resulting  in  failure  to  accomplish  the  mission,  and 
with  occasional  losses  of  personnel,  animals  and  materiel. 
As  a result,  extensive  opposition  to  the  use  of  such  guns 
developed,  based  on  various  contentions ; and  the  discussion 
was  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  relative  importance  of  the 
guns  in  the  general  artillery  scheme.  A study  of  our  ex- 
perience however  shows  the  following : 

(1)  In  all  but  a few  cases,  both  the  young  artillery  officers 
commanding  the  guns,  and  the  infantry  commanders  with  whom 
they  worked,  had  little  or  no  training  in  the  use  of  such  guns,  and 
knew  little  of  the  purpose  or  tactics. 

(2)  They  were  used  in  situations  wftich  were  not  appropriate. 

(3)  In  many  cases,  they  were  mishandled  to  such  an  extent, 
due  to  both  the  artillery  and  the  infantry,  that  failure  was  almost 
a foregone  conclusion. 


XIII— 3 


ACCOMPANYING  BATTERIES— GUNS  205 

(e)  A mere  tabulation  of  successes  and  failures  is, 
therefore,  no  criterion  of  the  value  of  such  guns  when  pro- 
perly employed.  The  Chief  of  Artillery,  1st  Army,  A.E.F., 
stated:  “There  have  been  repeated  instances  on  the  pres- 

ent front  of  their  effective  use ; of  their  abuse  and  of  their 
neglect.,,  Under  date  of  December  11,  1918,  the  Inspector 
General,  A.E.F.,  reported  in  part  as  follows:  “According 

to  the  energy  of  the  artillery  officer  handling  the  accom- 
panying guns,  the  experience  under  fire  of  the  infantry  bat- 
talion commander,  the  liaison  between  the  two,  and  the  ter- 
rain, they  were  used  with  varying  successes.  In  one  divi- 
sion (the  82d)  one  accompanying  gun  with  the  assault  bat- 
talion destroyed  eight  pill  boxes  in  one  day  which  at  vari- 
ous times  held  up  the  infantry  advance.”  Later  in  the  same 
report:  “ — th  Division:  In  the  — th  Infantry  Brigade,  one 
platoon  of  Battery  A,  — th  Field  Artillery,  was  assigned  as 
the  accompanying  guns  to  one  of  the  assaulting  battalions 
of  this  brigade.  The  guns  went  forward  during  the  night 
31  Oct.-l  Nov.,  1918.  Twelve  horses  were  killed  by  shell 
fire  and  machine  guns.  This  platoon  was  relieved  2 Nov. 
1918,  having  accomplished  nothing.  Those  with  the  — th 
Infantry  fell  back  behind  the  assault  battalion  but  fired 
about  175  rounds  against  machine  gun  nests  with  good 
effect.”  A staff  officer  who  witnessed  the  action  of  this 
same  di  ision  on  November  2,  1918,  reported:  “We  encoun- 
tered an  infantry  company  commander  whose  company  was 
held  up  before  the  village  0f  * * * * According  to  his 
statements,  he  was  using  all  the  fire  power  at  his  disposal 
to  overcome  a very  strong  machine  gun  resistance  but 
seemed  doubtful  as  to  whether  he  could  make  a go  of  it.  We 
asked  him  why  he  did  not  call  for  artillery  support.  He  re- 
plied that  he  was  trying  to  get  artillery  support  but  could 
not  get  communication,  although  he  thought  it  might  come 
later.  We  passed  through  artillery  brigade  headquarters 
several  hours  later  and  General  * * * * * then  mentioned 
that  the  infantry  was  calling  for  artillery  fire  near  (same 
village).”  This  village  could  have  been  attacked  by  artil- 
lery at  short  range  with  perfect  observation,  and  with  the 
position  and  its  approaches  completely  under  cover ; the  ar- 
tillery was  not  there  however,  but  was  considerably  to  the 
rear  and  out  of  communication. 


XIII— 4 


206  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

4.  When  Used. — (a)  In  deciding  to  use  batteries  or 
guns  attached  to  infantry,  it  must  be  remembered  that  their 
detachment  from  the  mass  of  supporting  artillery  weakens 
the  latter.  They  are  removed  from  that  organization  of 
command  and  supply  which,  in  the  general  case,  is  designed 
to  employ  the  artillery  with  greatest  effectiveness;  an  or- 
ganization with  which  they  are  perhaps  best  trained  and 
most  accustomed  to  Work  and  with  which  they  receive  the 
supervision  and  assistance  of  more  experienced  artillery 
commanders. 

(b)  The  use  of  accompanying  artillery  is  justified  only 
in  prevision  of  a probable  failure  of  the  supporting  artil- 
lery in  some  later  phase  of  the  action.  Such  failures  more 
often  ensue  when  the  penetration  into  the  hostile  lines  is 
rapid  and  deep.  These  failures  may  be  due  to  any  of  the 
following  causes : loss  of  mobility  on  account  of  casualties, 
poor  roads  or  traffic  congestion;  loss  of  observation;  inef- 
fectiveness of  long  range  fire ; severance  of  communications ; 
etc.  Unless  such  failure  is  foreseen  with  reasonable  certain- 
ty, accompanying  artillery  is  not  used.  It  follows,  there- 
fore, that  supporting  artillery  is  the  rule,  accompanying 
artillery  the  exception.  The  ratio  of  accompanying  artil- 
lery to  supporting  artillery  usually  is  small. 

(c)  In  the  case  of  an  attack  against  a single  prepared 
position,  it  may  be  expected  that  the  artillery  positions  are 
well  forward  with  ranges  short.  Observation  is  organized, 
communications  are  established,  firing  data  are  prepared 
for  a large  number  of  points,  some  adjustment  of  fire 
doubtless  has  been  made,  artillery  liaison  officers  are  with 
infantry  commanders;  there  is  therefore  no  reason  to  ap- 
prehend delay  or  ineffective  fire,  in  response  to  calls  for 
artillery  fire,  even  on  unexpected  resistances.  Hence,  the 
supporting  artillery,  in  general,  should  be  kept  intact. 

(d)  In  an  attack  against  a defensive  zone  of  two  or 
more  prepared  positions,  the  first  position  presents  the  same 
aspects  as  a single  prepared  position.  As  far  as  this  posi- 
tion is  concerned,  the  integrity  of  the  supporting  artillery 
ordinarily  should  be  maintained.  Conditions  are  different 
for  the  second  position.  It  must  be  expected  that  the  at- 
tacking infantry  will  have  lost  their  formations  to  a cer- 


XIII— 4 


ACCOMPANYING  BATTERIES— GUNS  207 

tain  extent  when  they  arrive  at  this  position;  the  position 
will  be  out  of  effective  range  of  the  initial  artillery  positions, 
and  the  artillery  in  general  must  advance  shortly  after  the 
first  position  is  captured;  observation  will  be  possible,  but 
will  not  be  organized,  communications  will  be  established 
hurriedly  and  imperfectly ; a certain  portion  of  the  artillery 
may  not  have  arrived  yet  at  the  new  positions.  For  the  sec- 
ond position,  the  attack  will  have  lost  some  of  its  cohesion 
and  crushing  power,  and  the  supporting  artillery  will  be 
less  effective;  yet  the  attack  has  acquired  momentum  and 
must  be  pushed  without  allowing  the  enemy  time  to  reor- 
ganize. Moreover,  between  the  first  and  second  positions, 
the  enemy  will  have  isolated  strong  points,  centers  of  resis- 
tance, intermediate  and  switch  positions,  and  other  organ- 
ized areas,  which  will  tend  to  slow  up  the  attack  and  disor- 
ganize it.  Many  of  these  points  cannot  be  known  before- 
hand. It  is  to  be  expected,  then,  that  the  infantry  will  feel 
the  need  of  artillery  constantly  close  at  hand  when  they  at- 
tack the  second  position;  and  probably  not  long  after  they 
pass  the  first  position,  depending  on  conditions.  How  much 
artillery  thus  is  needed  will  depend  still  more  on  conditions. 
The  second  position  ordinarily  will  require  fairly  complete 
artillery  support,  and  strong  endeavor  will  be  made  to  have 
the  supporting  artillery  available  at  this  time.  In  case  little 
resistance  is  anticipated  at  the  second  position,  and  the  artil- 
lery is  likely  to  be  delayed  in  crossing  the  first  position,  it 
might  be  advisable  to  employ  accompanying  batteries  at 
the  rate  of  one  battery  per  infantry  regiment  in  front  line, 
or  one  light  battalion  per  infantry  brigade  in  line.  Accom- 
panying guns  might  be  taken  from  this  quota  if  desirable. 
An  infantry  brigade  commander  having  more  than  one  ac- 
companying battery  is  at  liberty  to  pass  them  on  to  his  regi- 
ments. 

(e)  For  the  attack  of  the  third  position  or  after  pass- 
ing the  last  organized  hostile  position,  the  conditions  which 
make  attached  artillery  advisable  before  attacking  the  sec- 
ond position  obtain  to  a still  greater  extent.  The  supporting 
artillery  may  keep  up  with  the  infantry  with  difficulty ; some, 
particularly  the  medium  and  heavy  artillery,  may  lag  be- 
hind; the  attack  develops  into  a series  of  local  combats, 


XIII— 4-5 


208  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

more  or  less  detached;  and  the  infantry  commander  con- 
cerned must  handle  them  on  his  own  initiative  and  be  re- 
sponsible for  results.  Such  cases  call  for  accompanying  bat- 
teries, used  as  such  or  as  accompanying  guns. 

(f)  In  general,  there  is  no  fixed  practice  in  the  use  of 
accompanying  artillery ; its  proper  employment  is  a phase 
of  the  artful  handling  of  artillery.  While  the  foregoing  dis- 
cussion of  the  attack  against  a defensive  zone  illustrates 
situations  which  might  call  for  accompanying  batteries  and 
accompanying  guns,  their  use  is  not  restricted  to  this  parti- 
cular case.  The  same  necessities  could  arise  in  situations 
where  the  elements  of  a defensive  zone  are  lacking;  these 
necessities  may  be  local  or  general ; they  may  be  incident  to 
open  operations  as  well  as  a stabilized  situation.  The  use  of 
accompanying  artillery  in  appropriate  cases  is  to  be  encour- 
aged. But  as  stated  previously,  the  practice  is  an  exception 
to  the  usual  procedure  of  supporting  artillery,  and  should  be 
justified  by  conditions  as  they  exist  or  as  they  can  be  fore- 
seen. 

5.  Duration  of  Mission  of  Attached  Artillery. — 
Orders. — (a)  There  were  cases  in  France  in  which  accom- 
panying guns,  assigned  initially  for  a particular  operation, 
remained  absent  from  their  batteries  for  several  days, 
during  which  time  the  operations  and  the  situation 
changed  completely,  and  the  guns  were  idle  most  of  the 
period.  This  is  faulty  procedure.  Since  the  use  of  accom- 
panying artillery  is  exceptional  for  special  situations,  such 
pieces  should  revert  to  their  proper  organizations  imme- 
diately on  completion  of  the  missions  contemplated,  or  when 
they  no  longer  are  useful.  Orders  should  be  as  explicit 
as  possible  as  to  the  period  of  attachment ; but  if  the  orders 
are  indefinite  in  this  respect,  the  commanders  immediately 
concerned  should  initiate  measures  to  return  the  artillery 
when  it  is  no  longer  useful.  Ammunition  and  other  supplies 
are  obtained  with  difficulty  by  detached  and  scattered  artil- 
lery units. 

(b)  Accompanying  artillery  might  well  be  used  for  a 
particular  day  only,  on  the  assumption  that,  during  the  suc- 
ceeding night,  the  supporting  artillery  can  be  advanced  so 
as  to  make  it  unnecessary  thereafter.  Or  the  orders  might 


XIII— 5-6 


ACCOMPANYING  BATTERIES— GUNS  209 

call  for  such  batteries  or  guns  during  a particular  phase  of 
the  operation,  as  after  the  capture  of  such  a position,  etc. 

(c)  Situations  might  arise  during  an  operation  in 
which  a supporting  artillery  commander  would  employ  some 
of  his  artillery  in  the  manner  of  accompanying  batteries  or 
accompanying  guns,  though  the  technical  formalities  of  or- 
ders and  commands  would  be  lacking.  Such  a case  would 
be  the  sending  of  a platoon  or  piece  to  take  a particularly 
favorable  position  for  a certain  mission,  as,  for  example, 
firing  on  a moving  hostile  column ; the  platoon  to  return  on 
completion  of  the  mission. 

(d)  In  an  attack  from  stabilization,  it  usually  is  neces- 
sary to  detail  accompanying  guns,  if  used,  before  the  at- 
tack on  the  first  position,  though  their  use  is  not  contem- 
plated until  later.  Otherwise  there  may  be  difficulty  in 
overtaking  and  finding  the  infantry  unit  to  which  a gun  is 
attached,  after  this  unit  has  advanced  a considerable  dis- 
tance. In  such  a case,  the  guns  usually  do  not  participate 
in  the  initial  preparation  and  general  fire  support  for  the 
attack  of  the  first  position.  This  advance  detachment  would 
be  less  necessary  in  the  case  of  accompanying  batteries,  for, 
as  a rule,  they  are  not  needed  as  early  in  the  attack. 

(e)  It  is  advantageous  to  indicate  the  assignment  of 
accompanying  artillery  at  the  earliest  moment  practicable 
in  order  to  secure  the  opportunity  for  the  artillery  comman- 
der to  conduct  visual  reconnaissance,  to  estimate  his  tasks, 
to  make  any  preparations  to  overcome  engineering  difficul- 
ties, or  to  compute  firing  data  when  it  appears  that  the  guns 
may  be  used  from  their  initial  position.  This  gives  the  in- 
fantry commander  also  an  opportunity  to  fit  the  accompany- 
ing artillery  into  his  local  plans. 

6.  Command  of  Accompanying  Artillery. — (a)  Ac- 
companying batteries  and  accompanying  guns,  for  the  time 
being,  are  detached  completely  from  their  artillery  com- 
mand, and  are  exclusively  under  the  commander  of  the  in- 
fantry unit  to  which  they  are  attached.  Faulty  exercise  of 
this  command,  usually  through  lack  of  understanding  of 
the  employment  of  such  artillery,  may  lessen  or  destroy 
their  usefulness.  In  general,  the  best  results  will  be  ob- 
tained when  the  infantry  commander  indicates  or  assigns 


XIII— 6-7 


210  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

a mission  from  time  to  time,  and  leaves  to  the  artillery  com- 
mander all  possible  latitude  and  initiative  in  the  technical 
execution  of  this  mission.  Moreover,  such  a procedure  will 
relieve  the  infantry  commander  of  much  of  the  burden  which 
otherwise  would  be  imposed  upon  him,  and  for  which  he  has 
not  time.  Unless  conditions  make  it  inadvisable,  the  artil- 
lery commander  should  be  given  orders  sufficiently  general 
to  permit  him  to  attack  favorable  targets  on  his  own  initia- 
tive; this  will  not  prevent  the  assignment  of  specific  mis- 
sions by  the  infantry  commander  at  any  time,  and  may 
avoid  keeping  the  guns  idle  for  lack  of  an  assigned  mis- 
sion. 

(b)  Although  it  is  desirable  to  allow  the  artillery  com- 
mander full  latitude  in  details,  the  infantry  commander 
should  feel  free  to  give  corrective  instructions  at  all  times, 
even  though  contrary  to  the  views  of  the  artillery  comman- 
der. 

7.  Missions. — (a)  The  missions  properly  assigned  to 
an  accompanying  battery  include  those  ordinarily  incident 
to  the  support  of  infantry  by  light  artillery;  the  only  limi- 
tation is  that  the  extent  of  the  mission  should  be  within  the 
capabilities  of  the  amount  of  artillery  available;  on  this 
point,  the  infantry  commander  always  can  secure  the  advice 
of  the  artillery  commander.  Ammunition  cannot  be  ex- 
pended in  the  lavish  manner  ordinarily  possible  for  the  divi- 
sion artillery  as  a whole ; this  usually  precludes  firing  at 
other  than  definite  targets;  barrages  and  the  searching  of 
large  areas  are  too  costly  in  ammunition. 

(b)  The  accompanying  gun  must  be  used  still  more 
sparingly;  not  only  is  its  ammunition  supply  limited,  but 
its  advanced  position  makes  it  extremely  vulnerable.  When 
once  it  opens  fire,  it  must  obtain  effect  rapidly  or  it  probably 
will  be  silenced  and  possibly  destroyed.  It  is,  in  fact,  an 
emergency  weapon,  to  be  used  for  those  targets  requiring 
its  power  and  which  cannot  be  attacked  successfully  by  the 
infantry  weapons.  It  should  not  be  spared,  however,  at 
the  expense  of  infantry  casualties.  Typical  targets  would 
be  hostile  strong  points,  machine  guns,  single  field  guns, 
anti-tank  guns,  and  tanks  used  in  counter  attacks. 


XIII — 7-8 


ACCOMPANYING  BATTERIES— GUNS  211 

(c)  From  the  purpose  of  accompanying  batteries  and 
accompanying  guns,  it  is  evident  that  their  targets  ordin- 
arily should  be  those  hostile  elements  immediately  opposing 
the  infantry  advance.  The  idea  that  they  fire  habitually  on 
targets  which  are  beyond  the  range  of  the  infantry  special 
weapons  is  erroneous. 

(d)  Accompanying  artillery  is  detailed  for  special  use 
in  the  attack,  but  may  become  an  important  element  in  the 
temporary  local  defense  when  the  attack  loses  its  driving 
power,  particularly  to  assist  in  stopping  a counter  attack. 
In  this  case,  the  facility  for  close  observation  of  the  enemy’s 
attack  affords  an  opportunity  for  the  accompanying  artil- 
lery to  secure  very  prompt  and  accurate  fire,  sometimes  more 
quickly  and  probably  more  effectively,  than  can  be  delivered 
by  the  supporting  artillery. 

8.  Handling  and  Maneuvering  of  Accompanying 
Artillery. — (a)  The  handling  of  both  accompanying  bat- 
teries and  accompanying  guns  puts  to  the  severest  test  the 
skill  of  the  officers  and  the  training  of  the  units.  Prime  re- 
quisites are  reconnaissance,  mobility,  skill  and  rapidity  in 
firing,  and,  at  all  times,  boldness  without  rashness.  Move- 
ment over  exposed  areas  and  difficult  terrain  is  unavoida- 
ble, but  delay  and  danger  from  hostile  fire  can  be  lessened 
by  timely  reconnaissance  and  suitable  gaits  and  formations. 
Accompanying  guns  can  be  bolder  than  accompanying  bat- 
teries; vulnerability  increases  and  mobility  decreases  with 
the  size  of  the  unit.  It  is  desirable  to  occupy  positions  as 
far  advanced  as  possible ; but  the  extent  to  which  this  will 
be  possible  will  depend  on  various  factors,  such  as  the  diffi- 
culty of  the  terrain  and  the  cover  it  affords,  the  resistance 
offered  by  the  enemy,  particularly  in  artillery  fire,  and  the 
conditions  of  visibility.  Accompanying  guns  ordinarily  can 
push  farther  forward  than  accompanying  batteries.  Changes 
of  position  should  be  as  few  as  possible,  compatible  with 
close  support. 

(b)  In  some  cases,  readiness  for  close  support  is  ob- 
tained by  taking  advantage  of  cover  in  the  terrain  in  the 
locality  of  the  assaulting  battalion;  in  others,  it  must  be 
obtained  by  seeking  cover  for  the  gun  farther  to  the  rear 
and  by  running  forward  wire  lines  for  use  from  a temporary 


XIII— 8 


212  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

observing  station  nearer  the  assaulting  troops,  care  being 
taken  not  to  allow  the  wire  line  (which  is  apt  to  be  cut  by 
projectiles  at  any  moment)  to  become  too  long.* 

(c)  In  firing,  observation  is  essential,  preferably  from 
a point  as  near  as  possible  to  the  pieces,  so  the  guns  can  be 
commanded  by  voice.  The  artillery  commander  must  be 
where  he  can  command  his  guns  or  gun  effectively;  in  addi- 
tion, it  is  desirable  that  he  be  with  the  infantry  commander ; 
if  both  conditions  cannot  be  fulfilled,  he  remains  with  his 
guns  and  connects  with  the  infantry  commander  by  tele- 
phone, or  other  means,  and  by  liaison  agents.  If  communi- 
cations are  allowed  to  become  long  and  complicated,  or  if 
the  observation  is  distant  from  the  guns,  they  lose  their 
peculiar  effectiveness,  have  little  or  no  advantage  over  the 
supporting  artillery  and  have  some  disadvantages. 

(d)  For  accompanying  batteries,  indirect  laying  from 
concealed  positions  is  the  rule,  but  not  an  invariable  one; 
there  are  instances  of  batteries  going  into  action  in  the  open 
with  excellent  effect  and  without  losses.  The  catchy  French 
saying,  “A  battery  seen  is  a battery  lost,”  is  not  always 
true ; it  depends  on  who  sees  it  and  to  what  extent  he  is  in 
a position  to  inflict  damage.  Accompanying  batteries  or- 
dinarily should  be  able  to  fire  at  ranges  of  less  than  2500 
yards.  Positions,  when  initially  occupied,  may  be  very  ad- 
vanced, there  being  instances,  in  our  operations,  of  as  much 
as  a battalion  of  light  artillery  taking  position  considerably 
less  than  1000  yards  behind  the  infantry  front  line.  Ac- 
companying guns  are  kept  concealed  as  far  as  possible  at 
all  times ; occasionally  during  movement,  and  frequently  in 
firing,  they  must  be  exposed.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  such 
exposure  will  draw  hostile  artillery  fire,  and  the  gun  must 
be  moved  to  cover  quickly  and  a new  position  used  for  sub- 
sequent firing.  The  range  usually  is  short,  say  under  1500 
yards,  and  the  elevation  so  small  that  very  little  defilade  is 
possible,  even  if  it  were  desirable  to  use  indirect  laying.  In 
some  cases,  the  speed  and  simplicity  of  direct  laying  makes 

*A  conception  that  “by  accompanying  guns  is  understood  a gun 
carried  along  with  or  nearly  with  the  infantry  first  wave”  is  errone- 
ous, and,  in  The  World  War,  resulted,  in  several  cases,  in  the  gun 
being  put  out  of  action  promptly. 


XIII— 8-9 


ACCOMPANYING  BATTERIES— GUNS  213 

its  use  advisable.  Whichever  method  of  laying  is  used,  the 
defilade  is  little  or  nothing. 

(e)  Accompanying  batteries  use  shell  or  shrapnel,  de- 
pending on  the  missions.  Many  missions  of  accompanying 
guns  also  would  call  for  the  use  of  shrapnel ; the  shell  seemed 
to  be  preferred  in  service,  however,  because  of  the  simplic- 
ity and  speed  of  handling  it.  A few  well  placed  projectiles 
of  either  type  ordinarily  will  be  effective. 

(f)  In  using  accompanying  guns,  it  often  is  neces- 
sary to  use  man  power  in  assisting  them  over  bad  places.  As 
a rule  there  will  be  sufficient  artillery  personnel  for  this 
purpose.  At  times,  however,  it  may  be  necessary  to  call  on 
neighboring  troops  for  assistance. 

9.  Units  From  Which  Accompanying  Artillery 
Should  be  Detailed. — (a)  When  there  is  ample  light  ar- 
tillery from  which  to  choose,  the  question  may  arise  as  to 
whether  to  detail  accompanying  artillery  from  that  belong- 
ing to  the  division  which  employs  it,  or  whether  to  detail  it 
from  other  available  sources.  The  objection  to  breaking 
up  the  organic  artillery  of  the  division  is  that  the  perman- 
ent team  is  partially  destroyed : on  the  other  hand,  the  ad- 
vantage in  so  doing  is  that  the  accompanying  artillery  thus 
obtained  (which  should  be  but  a relatively  small  propor- 
tion) remains  to  fight  with  units  with  which  it  has  already 
trained,  and  this  permits  a closer  cooperation  with  the  in- 
fantry to  which  it  is  attached.  The  latter  method  is  recom- 
mended in  the  general  case. 

(b)  Accompanying  batteries  and  accompanying  guns 
should  be  provided  with  a full,  or  extra,  quota  of  specialists 
for  information  (scouts).  While  the  artillery  commander 
should  have  access  to  all  information  possessed  by  the  infan- 
try commander,  frequently  this  information  is  inadequate 
from  the  artillery  point  of  view.  Artillery  scouts,  and  sim- 
ilar personnel,  should  be  employed  freely  as  far  forward  as 
the  infantry  front  line ; this  personnel  is  also  necessary  for 
reconnaissance  before  or  during  movements  of  the  artillery. 

(c)  Cases  may  arise  in  which  it  is  foreseen  that  accom- 
panying artillery  will  be  needed  when  the  infantry  reach 
a certain  stage  of  the  advance.  In  such  cases,  the  general 
practice  should  be  to  send  accompanying  batteries  forward, 


XIII— 9-12 


214  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

as  such,  with  orders  to  report,  at  a definite  time  or  place,  to 
the  proper  infantry  commander.  If  accompanying  guns 
be  used,  they  should  be  detached  ordinarily  from  the  ac- 
companying battery,  as  required,  accepting  the  principle 
that  it  is  easy  to  detach  the  smaller  unit  from  the  larger 
one,  whereas  it  would  be  difficult  to  assemble  dispersed  guns 
into  an  accompanying  battery,  if  such  were  considered  to 
be  the  tactical  unit  momentarily  desired. 

(d)  Cases  may  develop  in  which  an  accompanying  bat- 
tery may  detail  a single  gun  or  platoon  to  attend  to  a very 
local  situation,  with  orders  for  such  detached  part  to  rejoin 
immediately  on  the  execution  of  its  mission. 

10.  Moral  Effect  of  Attached  Artillery. — The 

moral  effect  of  accompanying  artillery  on  infantry  is  a fac- 
tor to  be  considered.  The  Chief  of  Artillery,  1st  Army,  A. 
E.  F.,  stated:  “The  mere  presence  of  accompanying  pieces 

frequently  has  a moral  effect  upon  the  infantry  quite  dis- 
proportionate to  the  services  they  actually  render.  Infantry 
which  has  been  ably  supported  by  artillery  soon  gets  a feel- 
ing of  confidence  in  the  mere  proximity  of  that  arm,  which 
has  a direct  reaction  on  their  own  performances.  Such  a 
feeling  is  worth  a great  deal.” 

11.  Attached  Artillery  Drawing  Fire. — There  have 
been  instances  in  which  infantry  commanders  objected  to 
the  presence  of  artillery,  and  similar  special  weapons,  on 
the  ground  that  they  drew  hostile  fire  to  the  infantry.  It 
should  not  be  difficult  to  dispose  infantry  reserves  so  as  to 
avoid  close  proximity  to  these  weapons;  in  this  case,  fire 
received  by  the  artillery  should  save  the  infantry  casualties, 
to  say  nothing  of  losses  inflicted  on  the  enemy  by  these 
weapons. 

12.  Equipment  of  Accompanying  Artillery. — The 
difficulties  encountered  in  moving  accompanying  guns,  and 
of  supplying  them  from  the  rear,  together  with  the  animal 
casualties  to  which  they  are  subjected,  usually  make  it  ad- 
visable to  equip  them  specially.  The  following  equipment 
has  been  used : 

1 gun. 

2 caissons. 

1 extra  team,  6-horse. 

Ample  telephone,  visual  signal,  and  pioneer  equipment. 


XIII— 12-14 


ACCOMPANYING  BATTERIES— GUNS  215 

Accompanying  batteries  ordinarily  carry  only  the  us- 
ual equipment. 

13.  Suitability  of  75-mm.  Gun  for  Accompanying 
Gun. — The  objection  frequently  is  raised  that  the  75-mm. 
gun  is  not  adapted  for  use  as  an  accompanying  gun,  and 
that  a more  suitable  type  should  be  introduced.  A self-pro- 
pelled 75-mm.  gun  on  a caterpillar  mount  has  been  sug- 
gested; in  other  words,  an  unarmored  tank,  as  far  as  ma- 
teriel is  concerned.  At  the  time  the  armistice  was  signed, 
preparations  were  actually  in  progress  to  use  the  service 
75-mm.  mountain  gun  as  an  accompanying  gun.  Since  the 
accompanying  gun  is  used  only  exceptionally,  and,  in  using 
it,  the  limitations  of  the  materiel  can  be  taken  into  consid- 
eration, it  hardly  seems  warranted  to  introduce  a special 
type  of  materiel  for  this  purpose,  particularly  as  long  as 
the  infantry  has  special  weapons  as  at  present.  More  pow- 
erful infantry  weapons  might  obviate  the  necessity  for  ac- 
companying guns  from  the  artillery,  at  least  to  some  ex- 
tent. The  presence  of  tanks  influences  the  necessity  for  us- 
ing accompanying  guns,  but  the  two  weapons  are  by  no 
means  alike  in  their  capabilities,  at  least  at  present. 

14.  Necessity  for  Combined  Training. — The  full 
effectiveness  of  accompanying  batteries  and  accompanying 
guns  cannot  be  developed  merely  through  a high  state  of 
individual  knowledge  and  training  on  the  part  of  the  infan- 
try and  artillery;  a teamplay  is. necessary  which  can  be  at- 
tained only  by  the  two  arms  working  together.  This  com- 
bined training  should  be  acquired  in  the  training  area  rather 
than  on  the  battlefield. 


XIV — 1-2 


CHAPTER  XIV 


Division  Artillery  in  the  Offensive 

Paragraphs 

Section  I.  • — General 1-19 

Section  II.  — Meeting  Engagement 20-28 

Section  III. — Attack  of  Enemy  Deployed  for  Defense 29-80 

Section  IV.  — Attack  of  a Prepared  Position 31-34 

Section  V.  Attack  of  a Defensive  Zone 35-37 


Section  I 

General 

General  1 

Kinds  of  Fire  Support 2 

Tactical  Employment  of  Fire 3 

Preparations  4 

Destruction  — 5 

Observation  6 

Neutralization  7 

During  the  Attack  8 

The  Rolling  Barrage  9 

Successive  Concentrations  10 

Other  Concentrations 11 

Counter  Battery  12 

Interdiction 13 

Fire  on  Transient  Targets 14 

Positions  15 

Forward  Displacement ^ 16 

Missions  17 

Organization  of  Command 18 

Limbers,  Combat  Trains  and  Field  Trains 19 


1.  General. — Important  results  are  obtained  by  the 
artillery  only  when  it  is  employed  in  mass.  Feeble  or  half- 
hearted employment  of  the  artillery  can  help  in  no  way. 
The  “offensive  spirit” — the  desire  to  carry  the  fight  to  the 
enemy,  must  be  felt  by  the  artillery  as  well  as  by  the  infan- 
try. By  reason  of  its  characteristics,  it  assists  the  other 
branches  in  gaining  that  fire  superiority  which  is  so  neces- 
sary for  success  in  battle. 

2.  Kinds  of  Fire  Support. — Support  of  the  infantry,  in 
the  offensive,  is  given  by  means  of: 

(a)  Preparation: 


216 


XIV — 2-3 


GENERAL  217 

(1)  Destruction  of  the  enemy’s  personnel,  weapons,  works, 
organizations,  and  communications. 

(2)  Neutralization  of  the  hostile  personnel,  and  consequently, 
of  his  weapons,  organizations  and  communications. 

(b)  Direct  support  during  the  advance  of  the  infantry 
by: 

(1)  Concentrations  on  critical  points. 

(2)  Rolling  barrage,  covering  the  front  of  the  attacking 
forces. 

(3)  Neutralization  of  more  distant  points  and  of  localities 
which  are  not  to  be  attacked  directly. 

(4)  Neutralization  of  hostile  batteries  by  counter  battery 

fire. 

(5)  Fire  on  transient  targets. 

(c)  Fire  during  the  pursuit: 

(1)  Pursuit  by  fire. 

(2)  Interdiction  of  places  which  the  enemy  must  pass  in  his 
retreat. 

(3)  Close  support  of  the  pursuing  force. 

3.  Tactical  Employment  of  Fire. — (a)  The  tech- 
nique of  the  foregoing  kinds  of  fire  is  discussed  in  Chapter 
V.  The  general  tactical  employment  of  these  different  fires 
will  be  discussed  here,  followed  by  a discussion  of  their  ap- 
plication to  various  situations.  The  multiplication  of  names, 
with  but  slight  differences  in  meaning,  which  came  to  be 
applied  to  artillery  fires,  during  The  World  War,  is  to  be 
regretted.  An  effort  has  been  made,  in  this  discussion,  to 
avoid  that  tendency.  The  infantryman  has  but  little  inter- 
est in  the  name  applied  to  a particular  kind  of  fire.  His 
concern  is  to  get  some  fire  there  quickly  and  efficiently.  The 
probability  that  the  most  efficient  kind  of  fire  will  be  deliv- 
ered, is  greatest  when  the  objective  and  its  location  are  de- 
scribed and  the  choice  of  the  kind  of  fire  is  left  to  the  artil- 
leryman. 

(b)  To  some  extent,  the  technical  methods  of  artil- 
lery firing,  which  developed  during  The  World  War,  were 
peculiar  to  and  because  of  the  special  situation  which 
existed  on  the  western  front  during  the  long  period 
of  stabilization.  A similar  situation  in  future  wars  is  by 
no  means  assured.  The  principle  announced  by  the  War 
Department  and  reiterated  by  The  General  Service  Schools, 
— that  our  training  should  be  based  on  open  warfare  situa- 


XIV— 3-4 

218  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

tions — applies  with  special  force  to  the  field  artillery,  which 
otherwise  might  tend  to  lose  its  mobility  and  flexibility. 
Therefore,  the  open  warfare  situation  is  discussed  first.  As 
the  enemy’s  position  becomes  stronger,  due  to  artificial  de- 
fenses which  he  has  constructed,  the  need  for  artillery  in- 
creases, but  the  technical  and  tactical  methods  which  the 
artillery  employs  are  only  developments  and  refinements  of 
those  used  in  the  open  situation. 

4.  Preparations. — (a)  During  The  World  War,  the 
length  of  time  devoted  to  artillery  preparation  for  an  at- 
tack underwent  marked  changes.  Rapidly  increasing, 
through  earlier  years  of  the  stabilized  situation,  it  reached 
its  height  in  the  attacks  by  the  allies  in  1917.  From  that  time 
to  the  close  of  the  war,  there  was  an  equally  marked  reduc- 
tion— some  attacks  being  made  without  any  preparation 
preceding  the  assault.  The  factors  which  brought  about 
this  change  were: 

(1)  The  opportunity  for  surprise,  which  had  been  abandoned 
by  the  use  of  a long  artillery  preparation,  giving  the  enemy  time 
to  mass  his  reserves  and  artillery  to  meet  the  attack  and  to 
smother  it. 

(2)  The  introduction  and  improvement  of  tanks,  which  over- 
came the  difficulty  of  getting  through  the  wire  and  relieved  the 
artillery  of  much  work. 

(3)  Improvement  in  the  technical  handling  of  artillery  which 
permitted  it  to  open  fire  quickly,  without  revealing  its  presence 
prematurely.  These  technical  methods  have  their  greatest  appli- 
cation in  stabilized  situations. 

(4)  An  increase  in  the  number  of  mobile  batteries  and  in 
the  number  of  rapid  fire  guns,  so  that,  in  a few  hours,  there  could 
be  fired  a quantity  of  ammunition  equal  to  that  which  formerly 
was  fired  over  a period  of  several  days. 

(5)  Improvements  in  and  increased  production  of  gas  shells, 
which  greatly  increased  the  neutralizing  effects  of  artillery  fire. 

(6)  The  proved  incompleteness  of  attempts  at  destruction, 
and  the  substitution  of  neutralization  therefor. 

(b)  The  method  now  having  the  greatest  weight  of 
approval  is  a violent  preparation  of  not  to  exceed  six  hours. 
During  this  time,  the  artillery  attempts  to  destroy  such  ob- 
stacles as  seem  most  likely  to  stop  the  infantry,  especially 
those  just  in  front  of  the  enemy’s  positions,  where  our  in- 
fantry would  be  subjected  to  the  fire  of  the  defenders  (who 
are  at  that  time  released  for  action  by  the  lifting  of  our  ar- 
tillery fire)  and  to  neutralize  the  other  elements  of  his  de- 
fense. 


XIV— 5-9 


GENERAL  219 

5.  Destruction. — Artillery  may  be  required  to  open 
passages  through  the  enemy’s  wire*  and  to  destroy  those 
strong  points  which  are  the  most  important,  or  which  would 
most  impede  the  advance  of  our  infantry.  The  breaches 
through  the  wire  should  form  a wide  furrow  extending 
through  all  the  enemy’s  successive  positions.  To  the  divi- 
sion artillery  are  assigned  the  breaches  in  the  nearer  bands 
of  wire.  The  longer  range  guns  and  howitzers  of  the  corps 
and  army  cut  those  in  the  more  distant  positions.  The  75- 
mm.  field  guns  find  their  best  use  against  wire  which  is  on 
horizontal  ground  or  on  the  forward  slope.  The  howitzers 
are  needed  for  the  breaches  in  wire  on  the  reverse  slopes. 
Because  of  its  accuracy,  its  large  angle  of  fall  and  the  large 
charge  of  high  explosive  carried,  the  155-mm.  howitzer  is  a 
very  effective  piece  for  wire  cutting.  While  firing  on  the 
wire,  the  trenches  just  beyond  also  are  being  subjected  to 
damage. 

6.  Observation. — Destructive  fire  should  be  observed 
whenever  possible.  If  darkness,  fog  or  other  condition  ren- 
ders observation  impossible,  an  increased  allowance  of  am- 
munition and  time  is  made  in  order  to  compensate  partially 
for  the  errors  in  the  fire.  A factor  of  safety  then  is  applied 
to  the  expected  results. 

7.  Neutralization. — Neutralization  of  the  enemy’s 
personnel  is  obtained  by  fire  of  gas,  shell,  or  shrapnel  on  the 
areas  occupied  by  his  command  posts,  batteries,  trenches, 
centers  of  resistance,  machine  gun  nests  and  probable  as- 
sembly places  of  reserves.  The  object  is  to  pin  his  men  to 
the  ground,  force  them  to  wear  their  masks,  break  down 
their  resistance  and  render  them  inactive. 

8.  During  the  Attack. — The  artillery  then  seeks  to 
paralyze  the  defenders,  holding  them  in  position  until  they 
are  struck  by  our  advancing  infantry.  These  fires  com- 
prise the  rolling  barrage  and  successive  concentrations,  as 
well  as  fixed  concentrations  on  points  not  to  be  taken  direct- 
ly by  assault. 

9.  The  Rolling  Barrage. — (a)  This  is  a development 
of  The  World  War,  having  first  been  used  in  1915,  and  has 

*ln  some  cases  it  is  practicable  for  the  assaulting  infantry  to 
pass  over  the  hostile  wire,  as  did  our  troops  at  St.  Mihiel  and  in  the 
Meuse-Argonne. 


XIV— 9 


220  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

its  greatest  application  in  attacks  against  defensive  zones. 
It  required  a great  expenditure  of  ammunition  (about  a day 
of  fire  for  each  2500  yards  of  infantry  advance ; assuming  an 
average  rate  of  advance  and  of  fire) . 

The  present  trend  is  toward  a more  restricted  use  of  this 
form  of  fire.  Having  been  ordered  to  fire  a rolling  barrage, 
the  artilleryman  is  chiefly  concerned  in  his  ammunition  sup- 
ply; the  technical  difficulties  of  firing  such  a barrage  are 
few. 

(b)  The  75-mm.  guns,  firing  percussion  shell,  estab- 
lish the  near  edge  or  line  of  the  barrage,  which  the  infan- 
try follows  at  from  100  to  150  yards.  This  “line”  has  a 
depth  equal  to  the  zone  of  dispersion,  approximately  twenty- 
five  yards  at  1500  yards’  range,  and  one  hundred  at  6000. 
From  fifty  to  a hundred  yards  in  advance  of  this  shell  line,  it 
is  desirable  to  have  a portion,  perhaps  one-third,  of  the  75- 
mm.  guns  fire  shrapnel.  The  barrage  should  be  further 
deepened  to  1000  yards  by  the  howitzers,  which  fire  concen- 
trations on  selected  points  from  three  to  eight  hundred 
yards  beyond  the  line  of  shrapnel.  These  concentrations  are 
for  the  purpose  of  increasing  the  time  to  which  the  enemy 
will  be  subjected  to  the  barrage,  thus  inflicting  casualties 
and  shaking  his  morale,  and  reducing  the  enemy’s  ability  to 
fire  through  the  75s’  barrage.  They  are  fired  best  by  search- 
ing the  area  forward  and  backward,  that  there  may  be  no 
place  within  the  limits  of  the  barrage  free  from  danger. 

(c)  The  density  of  the  barrage,  to  be  effective  for  the 
75-mm.  guns,  should  be  twelve  to  twenty  shots  per  minute 
for  each  one  hundred  yards  of  front.  The  rate  of  advance 
is  fixed  by  the  division  commander  according  to  the  rate 
of  advance  expected  of  the  infantry;  one  hundred  yards  in 
from  three  to  ten  minutes,  depending  on  the  expected  re- 
sistance and  the  terrain.  The  bounds,  in  range  of  the  guns, 
should  be  fifty  yards  to  obtain  the  best  results. 

(d)  The  barrage  furnishes  material  and  moral  assis- 
tance to  the  infantry  but  limits  its  rate  of  advance.  Herein 
lies  one  of  the  greatest  difficulties — to  foresee  the  proper 
rate  of  advance.  Necessarily,  it  cannot  be  uniform  through 
any  considerable  depth,  since  the  conditions  will  vary  so 


XIV— 9-11 


GENERAL  221 

greatly.  Two  general  methods  have  been  used  in  advancing 
the  barrage : 

(1)  Basing  it  on  a time  schedule  made  up  for  the  entire  ad- 
vance. 

(2)  Having  it  move  on  a time  schedule  through  stages  of 
fixed  depth ; halting  upon  definite  lines  until  the  commander  directs 
it  to  proceed  through  the  next  stage,  and  then  moving  again  at 
the  predetermined  rate.  The  first  method  obviates  all  reliance 
on  communications.  The  second  method  gives  the  commander 
control  of  the  barrage,  enables  the  infantry  to  keep  up  with  it  and, 
by  reducing  the  rate  of  fire  during  the  halts,  enables  the  artillery 
the  better  to  maintain  the  desired  density  during  the  periods  of  its 
advance. 

The  first  method  is  the  only  one  advocated  at  present. 

10.  Successive  Concentrations. — By  this  method  of 
support,  only  the  points  in  the  hostile  terrain  which  are 
known  or  suspected  to  be  held  are  subjected  to  fire.  It  is, 
therefore,  much  more  economical  in  the  expenditure  of  am- 
munition. When  possible,  it  should  be  observed  fire.  For 
a given  expenditure,  it  should  secure  greater  material  re- 
sults than  the  barrage.  However,  it  does  not  furnish  the 
moral  support  which  the  barrage  gives  to  the  advancing  in- 
fantrymen. The  concentrations  of  the  75-mm.  guns  should 
be  kept  at  least  150  yards  ahead  of  the  infantry,  by  lifting 
the  fire  to  the  next  objective  when  the  infantry  is  about  to 
enter  the  danger  zone  of  the  first.  The  howitzers  fire  on 
more  distant  objectives,  or  on  those  to  which  their  fire  is 
better  suited.  A schedule  of  these  fires  is  prepared  for  each 
artillery  unit,  showing  the  approximate  time  of  firing  on 
each  point.  The  rate  of  advance  of  the  infantry  will  not  be 
uniform  over  different  parts  of  the  front  or  at  different 
times,  hence  the  actual  time  for  lifting  the  fire  from  any 
objective  is  subject  to  alteration — this  on  signal  from  the 
infantry,  or  by  reason  of  the  results  of  observation  by  the 
artillery  officers.  This  is  not  open  to  the  same  criticism  as 
that  given  above,  on  a barrage  controlled  by  the  infantry 
regiments,  for  the  reason  that  the  successive  concentra- 
tions are  observed  fires,  whenever  possible,  and  the  entire 
front  is  not  covered  by  fire,  leaving  room  for  the  infantry  to 
maneuver  around  the  centers  of  resistance  on  which  the 
concentrations  are  placed.  In  the  great  majority  of  cases, 
successive  concentrations  are  preferable  to  barrage  fire. 

11.  Other  Concentrations. — In  addition  to  those 
fired  successively  in  front  of  the  infantry  advance,  concen- 


XIV— 11-13 


222  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

trations  may  be  required,  for  predetermined  periods,  on 
strong  points  on  the  flanks  of  the  advance.  The  infantry 
causes  the  fall  of  these  points  by  outflanking  them,  and  is 
supported  in  this  by  the  artillery,  which  neutralizes  the 
personnel  occupying  these  localities.  Smoke  may  be  used 
in  this  case  to  blind  hostile  observation  posts.  If  a locality 
is  not  to  be  occupied  by  friendly  troops,  persistent  gas  fur- 
nishes an  efficient  means  for  neutralization. 

12.  Counter  Battery. — If  an  attack  is  to  succeed,  it 
is  necessary  to  gain  fire  superiority.  Especially  must  the 
friendly  artillery  dominate  that  of  the  enemy,  else  the  ad- 
vance of  the  infantry  may  be  stopped  by  hostile  artillery 
fire  alone.  The  mission  of  countering  the  enemy’s  artil- 
lery is  the  function  of  the  corps  artillery,  assisted  by  the 
army  and,  sometimes,  by  the  division  artillery.  If  the  divi- 
sion is  acting  alone,  but  has  attached  a regiment  of  155-mm. 
howitzers,  the  counter  battery  work  would  be  undertaken 
by  that  regiment.  Without  the  howitzers,  this  work  must 
be  done  by  the  75s.  The  employment  of  gas  shells  affords 
a means  of  neutralizing  hostile  batteries,  which  has  re- 
placed the  former  attempts  to  destroy  them  by  high  explo- 
sive shells.  The  neutralization  begins  with  the  preparation 
and  extends  throughout  the  attack.  Each  hostile  battery 
which  discloses  its  position  should  be  taken  under  fire  at 
once,  the  fire  being  continued  until  the  battery  is  silenced. 
For  this  reason,  it  is  necessary  to  have  batteries  avaliable 
to  answer  calls  for  counter  battery  during  the  action. 

13.  Interdiction. — The  purpose  of  this  fire  is  to  dis- 
rupt the  enemy’s  system  of  communications ; both  on  roads 
leading  to  his  rear  areas,  and  on  the  lateral  roads.  Interdic- 
tion is  fired  on  places  which  the  enemy  is  obliged  to  pass, 
such  as  a bridge  or  other  defile ; crossroads ; the  boundary  of 
the  zone  of  action  of  the  troops  making  the  attack,  to  pre- 
vent troops  of  adjacent  sectors  from  reinforcing  the  attack, 
and  sensitive  points  within  the  enemy’s  rear  area,  such  as 
distributing  stations,  ammunition  dumps,  and  camps.  To 
be  effective,  these  fires  should  be  commenced  at  the  begin- 
ing  of  the  preparation  and  be  continued,  intermittently, 
throughout  the  attack.  They  are  fired  suddenly  and  vio- 


Xiv— 13-16 


AMMUNITION  223 

lently  at  irregular  intervals,  and  are  based  on  the  known 
habits  and  dispositions  of  the  enemy.  The  75-mm.  gun  is 
effective  for  interdiction  fires  on  points  within  its  range, 
especially  if  a road  can  be  enfiladed  with  observed  shrap- 
nel fire.  The  more  distant  interdiction  is  done  by  the  heav- 
ier, longer  range  artillery. 

14.  Fire  on  Transient  Targets. — By  transient  tar- 
gets are  meant  those  which  are  moving  or  able  to  move 
quickly.  The  missions  during  the  preparation  and  the  at- 
tack are  fixed,  in  a carefully  prepared  operation,  but  there 
should  always  be  some  artillery  units  available  to  undertake 
the  destruction  of  hostile  troops  discovered  during  the  ac- 
tion. For  this  reason,  some  batteries  or  battalions  are  given 
the  mission  of  responding  to  calls  from  airplanes  for  fire. 
These  fires  consist  of  sudden  and  violent  bursts  in  the  form 
of  zone  fire,  searching  the  area  in  which  the  target  is  re- 
ported. 

15.  Positions. — In  all  offensive  operations,  the  posi- 
tions of  the  artillery  should  be  well  forward.  The  offensive 
implies  an  advance  on  the  part  of  our  forces,  hence,  if  the 
artillery  is  to  render  efficient  support  throughout  the  ad- 
vance, it  is  not  only  necessary  that  the  guns  should  be 
placed  where  they  can  reach  well  into  the  enemy’s  position 
at  the  beginning  of  the  attack,  but  they  also  must  be  pre- 
pared to  move  forward  with  the  advance  and  make  their  sup- 
port continuing.  The  difficulties  inherent  in  this  latter  man- 
euver add  to  the  necessity  for  advanced  positions. 

16.  Forward  Displacement. — (a) 

(1)  The  fire  of  supporting  artillery  becomes  less  effective  as 
the  infantry  advance  progresses  in  a successful  attack.  The 
causes  of  this  decrease  in  effectiveness  are  due  to  increase  in 
range  and  to  the  increased  difficulties  of  ground  observation.  The 
increase  in  range  results  in  an  increased  zone  of  dispersion  and 
an  increased  angle  of  fall.  These  factors  result  in  lessened  ef- 
fect because  of  increased  errors  in  the  time  fuse  and  of  contrac- 
tion of  the  ground  pattern  of  shrapnel,  and  because  of  decreased 
certainty  of  action  of  percussion  shell. 

(2)  The  infantry  has  particular  need  of  efficient  artillery 
support  at  this  time  because  it  is  apt  to  have  become  more  or 
less  disorganized  in  the  course  of  the  successful  advance.  Its 
danger  from  counter  attack  also  is  greater  at  this  stage  of  the 
action. 

(3)  The  artillery  meets  this  need  by  advancing  to  positions 
whence  it  can  continue  an  effective  support  of  the  infantry. 


Xiv— 16-18 


224  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(b)  While  moving  forward,  the  artillery  units  are  out 
of  action.  Therefore,  only  a part  of  the  supporting  artil- 
lery should  move  at  one  time,  while  the  remainder  continue 
their  fire  until  the  first  units  are  again  in  position.  The 
number  of  movements  should  be  reduced  to  a minimum 
consistent  with  effective  fire  support,  therefore,  the  bounds 
should  be  of  as  great  length  as  possible.  The  number  of 
units  sent  forward  is  limited  to  those  for  which  an  adequate 
supply  of  ammunition  is  possible.  Provision  is  made  for 
reconnaissance  of  routes  and  for  overcoming  the  difficulties 
of  a forward  movement  through  the  battle  area.  Engi- 
neers are  attached  to  artillery  units,  when  necessary,  to  as- 
sist in  the  forward  movement. 

(c)  If  a plan  for  the  forward  displacement  has  been 
made  before  the  beginning  of  the  attack,  the  matter  is 
greatly  simplified ; it  needs  then  only  to  be  coordinated  with 
the  progress  of  the  attack  and  with  the  actual  conditions 
as  they  develop  in  the  combat.  The  end  sought  is  to  have 
the  maximum  amount  of  artillery  in  position  to  support 
the  infantry  during  its  hardest  tasks.  In  an  attack  against 
a defensive  zone,  these  are  during  the  assaults  on  the  suc- 
cessive hostile  positions,  which  are  placed  from  3000  to 
6000  yards  apart  for  the  very  purpose  of  necessitating  this 
movement  of  the  attacking  artillery. 

17.  Missions. — The  missions  which  the  division  artil- 
lery is  best  able  to  perform  are : 

(a)  For  the  light  field  guns — destruction  or  neutrali- 
zation of  the  hostile  infantry,  destruction  of  the  lightly  con- 
structed defenses,  cutting  breaches  in  the  nearer  lines  of 
wire,  direct  support  of  the  infantry  by  successive  concen- 
trations or  the  rolling  barrage. 

(b)  For  the  155-mm.  howitzers,  when  attached, — de- 
struction or  neutralization  of  the  hostile  infantry,  destruc- 
tion of  somewhat  more  elaborate  works  of  defense,  wire 
cutting,  counter  battery,  concentrations  beyond  those  of  the 
75s  and  to  deepen  the  rolling  barrage.  They  are  especially 
needed  for  reaching  reverse  slopes  which  the  guns  with 
flatter  trajectories  are  unable  to  strike. 

18.  Organization  of  Command. — (a)  The  artillery 
of  the  division  is  a highly  concentrated  and  powerful  force. 


AMMUNITION 


225 


In  any  concerted  action  of  the  division,  it  is  held  under  the 
control  of  the  division  commander.  To  apportion  it  among 
the  infantry  units,  under  these  conditions,  is  unusual  and, 
in  general,  relatively  ineffective.  The  usual  practice  is  to 
direct  that  one  regiment  of  light  artillery  support  the  at- 
tack of  each  infantry  brigade.  If  the  brigades  attack  with 
regiments  abreast,  this  permits  a further  apportionment  of 
one  battalion  of  light  artillery  to  support  each  infantry 
regiment.  A howitzer  regiment,  if  attached,  usually  sup- 
port s#  the  division  as  a whole. 

(b)  When  the  action  develops  into  isolated  attacks, 
pursuit,  or  other  operation  of  separate  infantry  units,  com- 
mand must  be  decentralized,  hence  the  necessary  artillery 
units  then  are  attached  to  infantry  units  and  come  under 
the  control  of  their  commanders. 

19.  Limbers,  Combat  Trains  and  Field  Trains. — 
Field  artillery  must  remain  mobile  if  it  is  to  carry  out  its 
mission.  The  preservation  of  this  mobility  depends  upon 
the  care  and  protection  from  hostile  fire  given  to  the  means 
of  transportation,  and  upon  their  proximity  to  the  firing  bat- 
teries. The  location  and  formation  of  these  essential  ele- 
ments of  the  artillery  depend  on  the  character  of  the  opera- 
tion and  the  cover  available.  To  secure  the  maximum  cover, 
and  yet  be  able  properly  to  carry  out  their  functions,  are 
the  objects  sought.  In  rapidly  moving  situations,  it  is  es- 
sential that  the  limbers  or  tractors  be  so  placed  that  they 
can  be  concealed  from  hostile  ground  and  aerial  observa- 
tion, and  have  free  and  prompt  access  to  the  gun  positions. 
The  distance  from  the  guns,  therefore,  is  controlled  by  the 
character  of  the  terrain.  The  combat  trains  work  forward 
from  the  ammunition  distributing  point  to  the  battery  posi- 
tions. When  filled,  they  may  be  held  under  cover  until  the 
opportunity  or  need  for  resupplying  the  batteries  arises. 
Their  location  is  governed  by  the  same  considerations  as 
govern  the  location  of  the  limbers,  free  access  to  the  gun  po- 
sitions by  covered  approach  being  of  greater  importance, 
in  this  case,  than  proximity.  Hence,  in  open  warfare  situa- 
tions, the  combat  trains  often  might  be  posted  farther  to 
the  rear  than  the  limbers  or  tractors,  keeping  close  to  the 
roads  which  lead  to  the  front.  The  field  trains  of  artillery 


Xiy— 19-20 


226  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

regiments  are  united  under  the  supply  officer.  Their  loca- 
tion in  combat,  and  on  the  march,  is  controlled  by  G4.  They 
maintain  contact  with  the  regiment  by  agents,  pushing  for- 
ward to  supply  the  troops  when  permitted  to  do  so.  When 
the  situation  becomes  stabilized,  the  necessity  for  having 
the  limbers  and  combat  trains  in  proximity  to  the  battery 
decreases,  while  the  danger  from  hostile  aerial  or  long  range 
artillery  attack  increases.  In  such  situations,  the  limbers, 
combat  trains,  and  field  trains  all  may  be  held  together,  as 
was  the  custom  followed  during  the  stabilized  period  of 
The  World  War.  All  officers  and  men,  not  needed  to 'fight 
the  batteries,  were  held  at  these  rear  positions,  where  all 
administrative  work  was  done. 


Section  II 

Division  Artillery  in  a Meeting  Engagement 

"Paragraphs 


Position  on  the  March 20 

Advance  Guard  Artillery 21 

Plan  of  Attack - 4 22 

The  Development 23 

Counter  Battery  24 

Approach  March  and  Deployment 25 

Advance  to  the  First  Firing  Position 26 

The  Attack  Proper 27 

The  Pursuit  __! 28 


20.  Position  on  the  March. — The  first  phase  of  a 
meeting  engagement  comprises  the  action  of  the  advance 
guard,  and  the  reconnaissance  carried  out  to  secure  that 
information  which  the  commander  requires  before  he  can 
decide  upon  his  general  plan  of  action.  When  combat  is  im- 
minent, the  artillery  with  the  advance  guard  marches  far 
enough  to  the  rear  to  insure  it's  own  protection ; while  that 
of  the  main  body  marches  well  forward  to  insure  its  early 
entry  into  action.  The  commander  of  the  artillery  with 
the  advance  guard  should  be  with  the  advance  guard  com- 
mander, while  the  artillery  brigade  commander  should  be 
near  the  division  commander,  where  their  presence  facili- 
tates the  prompt  receipt  and  exploitation  of  information. 


XIV— 21-23 


DIVISION  ARTILLERY— MEETING  ENGAGEMENT  227 

21.  Advance  Guard  Artillery. — When  contact  with 
the  enemy  has  been  gained,  the  artillery  with  the  advance 
guard  should  be  placed  promptly  in  position  to  support  the 
advance  guard  in  its  covering  action  and  reconnaissance, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  to  assist  in  covering  the  advance  of 
the  main  body.  Its  missions  during  this  phase  depend  upon 
the  tactical  mission  assigned  the  advance  guard.  If  that 
mission  be  to  attack  to  secure  favorable  terrain,  the  artillery 
supports  the  advance  of  the  infantry  by  concentra- 
tions on  the  hostile  infantry,  lifting  on  signal  from  the 
friendly  infantry.  If  the  mission  of  the  advance  guard  be 
to  hold  defensively  while  the  main  body  deploys;  or  to  re- 
tire to  a more  favorable  position,  the  artillery  supports  the 
action  of  the  advance  guard  as  in  the  defense  or  in  a retreat, 
both  of  which  situations  are  discussed  in  the  next  chapter. 
In  any  case,  the  main  targets  will  be  the  infantry  and  ma- 
chine guns  of  the  hostile  covering  force,  either  deployed 
or  moving  in  small  columns  to  positions — transient  tar- 
gets. Prompt  occupation  of  positions,  skillful  conduct  of 
fire,  by  battery  officers  who  are  trained  to  select  and  apply 
the  technical  methods  appropriate  to  the  situation,  good 
fire  discipline  on  the  part  of  the  enlisted  personnel  and  co- 
ordination with  the  infantry  are  essential  to  success. 

22.  Plan  of  Attack. — Based  upon  the  information  ob- 
tained from  his  advance  guard  and  other  sources,  the  com- 
mander of  the  column  decides  upon  his  plan  of  action.  This 
being  a consideration  of  the  offensive,  this  plan  is  assumed 
to  be  to  attack,  hence  would  include  the  form  and  time  of  the 
attack,  and  the  general  employment  of  the  artillery. 

23.  The  Development. — A decision  having  been 
reached  as  to  the  plan  of  attack,  the  column  is  developed, 
clearing  the  roads  so  that  the  artillery  with  the  main  body 
may  move  promptly  into  position.  The  early  entry  of  the 
artillery  into  the  action  not  only  covers  the  development  and 
advance  of  the  infantry,  but  also  helps  to  clear  up  the  situa- 
tion regarding  the  enemy’s  dispositions  and  intentions.  The 
positions  should  be  well  advanced.  It  may  be  necessary, 
however,  to  place  some  of  the  artillery  units  in  action  at 
once  in  order  to  bring  some  fire  to  bear  on  the  enemy  and  to 


XIV— 23-26 


228  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

support  the  forward  movement  of  the  other  artillery  units. 
These  units  would  be  advanced  to  more  forward  positions 
at  the  first  opportunity.  The  reconnaissance  of  routes  and 
positions  is  started  during  the  action  of  the  advance  guard, 
and  the  movement  into  positions  otherwise  is  expedited  in 
every  way.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  artillery  moves 
forward  at  an  excessive  speed,  but  that  by  the  proper  re- 
connaissance, the  establishment  of  communications  and 
the  preparation  of  firing  data,  fire  can  be  opened  as  soon  as 
the  guns  arrive  in  position. 

24.  Counter  Battery. — It  is  probable  that  during  the 
development,  the  hostile  artillery  will  reply  to  the  fire  of 
our  advance  guard  artillery,  or  will  open  effective  fire  on  our 
infantry.  Thus  arises  the  early  need  for  counter  battery. 
If  the  division  is  acting  alone,  some  of  its  batteries  will  have 
to  undertake  this  work.  The  155-mm.  howitzer  is  an  excel- 
lent counter  battery  weapon,  and,  when  attached  to  a divi- 
sion, is  used  for  this  purpose.  If  no  howitzers  are  available, 
the  75s  are  used  to  neutralize  the  fire  of  such  hostile  bat- 
teries as  are  inflicting  losses  on  our  infantry.  However, 
the  hostile  infantry  is  usually  the  more  important  target. 

25.  Approach  March  and  Deployment. — During 
these  stages,  the  artillery  preparation  continues  as  during 
the  development.  All  artillery  units  will  have  been  assigned 
to  support  definite  parts  of  the  attack,  and  will  have  occu- 
pied their  positions,  prepared  to  assist  in  the  concerted  blow 
of  the  division.  If  the  attack  takes  the  form  of  an  en- 
velopment, the  artillery  units  supporting  the  secondary  and 
main  attacks  should  be  so  placed  that  they  can  assist  each 
other.  In  this  way,  the  division  commander  is  able  to  shift 
the  fire  of  the  entire  artillery  to  the  points  which  appear 
vital  to  the  success  of  the  attack. 

26.  Advance  to  the  First  Firing  Position. — (a) 
While  the  infantry  is  advancing  to  its  first  firing  position, 
the  artillery  completes  its  preparation.  It  seeks  to  destroy 
any  obstacles  impeding  the  forward  movement  of  the  in- 
fantry. In  a true  meeting  engagement,  there  are  few  of 
these  obstacles,  for  the  enemy  has  the  opportunity  to  con- 
struct nothing  more  than  hasty  entrenchments.  There  may 
be  rubble-stone  or  adobe  walls,  or  hedges,  in  which  the  ar- 


Xiv— 26-28 


DIVISION  ARTILLERY— MEETING  ENGAGEMENT  2 23 

tillery  can  make  openings  and  thus  facilitate  the  advance. 
The  main  part  of  the  preparation,  however,  consists  in  neu- 
tralizing the  hostile  infantry,  machine  guns  and  batteries ; 
using  shrapnel,  shell  and  gas  for  this  purpose.  The  use  of 
gas  depends  on  the  route  of  advance  to  be  taken  by  our 
troops,  and  the  time  which  will  elapse  before  they  reach 
the  gassed  area.  The  use  of  smoke  shells,  to  blind  the  ene- 
my’s observatories  during  the  preparation  for  the  attack, 
may  prove  very  efficacious.  A few  minutes  before  the  in- 
fantry advances  from  its  first  firing  position,  the  artillery 
increases  its  rate  of  fire  and  a heavy  bombardment,  by  all 
the  division  artillery,  is  placed  on  the  enemy’s  front  line 
infantry  and  machine  guns,  in  order  to  shake  their  morale 
and  to  pin  them  to  the  ground  during  the  advance  of  the 
friendly  infantry. 

(b)  The  time  available  for  the  foregoing  artillery  pre- 
paration usually  is  limited  to  the  time  required  by  the  in- 
fantry to  deploy  and  advance  to  its  first  firing  position. 
Necessarily,  it  is  comparatively  short.  A prompt  decision 
by  the  commander,  and  an  equally  prompt  execution,  are 
requisite  for  success  in  such  a situation,  hence  a prolonged 
artillery  preparation  is  unnecessary  and  undesirable. 

27.  The  Attack  Proper. — During  the  attack,  the  ar- 
tillery, by  concentrations  ahead  of  the  advancing  infantry, 
or  by  a rolling  barrage,  assists  in  overcoming  the  remain- 
ing resistance,  and  prevents  the  enemy  from  bringing  up 
reserves,  or  from  launching  a counter  attack.  The  infantry 
attacks  by  fire  and  movement;  the  artillery,  attacking  by 
fire  alone,  assists  in  gaining  that  fire  superiority  which  ena- 
bles the  infantry  to  reach  a position  from  which  it  can  make 
the  assault.  The  decision  as  to  whether  successive  concen- 
trations or  a rolling  barrage  is  to  be  used  rests  with  the 
commander  of  the  force,  and  depends  on  the  character  of 
the  defense,  the  front  to  be  covered,  and  the  number  of 
guns  and  amount  of  ammunition  available.  See  par.  10. 

28.  The  Pursuit. — When  the  enemy  is  driven  from  his 
position,  artillery  units  sometimes  are  needed  for  attach- 
ment to  the  pursuing  force.  Here  decentralization  of  com- 
mand is  necessary,  hence  these  units  act  under  the  direct 
orders  of  the  commander  of  the  pursuing  force.  The  re- 


XIV— 28-30 


230  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

maining  artillery  units  pursue  by  fire,  placing  concentrations 
on  the  hostile  troops  wherever  seen,  interdicting  roads  over 
which  the  enemy  must  retreat,  and  supporting  the  pursuing 
force  by  firing  on  the  hostile  rear  guard. 


Section  III 

Attack  Against  an  Enemy  Deployed  for  Defense 

Paragraphs 


The  Situation I 29 

Artillery  Action 30 


29.  The  Situation. — In  this  case,  the  enemy  will  have 
had  more  time  to  select  his  position  and  to  strengthen  it  and 
will  cover  his  main  position  by  outposts.  His  artillery  will 
be  in  position,  with  arrangements  made  for  the  resupply  of 
ammunition,  and  will  be  prepared  to  fire  on  points  on  the 
ground  over  which  the  attacking  forces  must  pass. 

30.  Artillery  Action. — (a)  The  attacker's  artillery 
is  placed  promptly  in  positions  from  which  it  can  reach  well 
into  the  enemy’s  territory,  in  order  to  support  the  action  of 
the  advance  guard,  in  driving  in  the  enemy’s  outposts,  and 
to  combat  hostile  artillery  which  opposes  the  approach  and 
deployment  of  the  friendly  infantry. 

(b)  The  increased  strength  of  the  enemy’s  position 
renders  the  task  of  the  attackers  more  difficult,  thus  neces- 
sitating a more  deliberate  attack  and  more  carefully  planned 
details.  This  applies  to  all  branches.  The  artillery  prepara- 
tion may  be  longer  and  more  methodical,  but  still  will  con- 
sist largely  in  neutralizing  the  hostile  forces  and  weapons, 
and  in  preventing  the  enemy  from  further  strengthening 
his  position.  During  the  attack  proper,  the  artillery  fires 
successive  concentrations  or  a rolling  barrage.  The  need  for 
the  latter  method  of  support  increases  with  the  increase 
of  strength  in  the  enemy’s  position,  mainly  because  of  the 
undeniable  moral  support  the  barrage  gives  to  the  attack- 
ing infantry.  The  ammunition  supply,  however,  must  be 


XIV — 30-33 


ATTACK  AGAINST  PREPARED  POSITION  231 

one  of  the  points  considered  by  the  commander  in  deciding 
on  the  method  of  artillery  support. 


Section  IV 

An  Attack  Against  a Prepared  Position 

Paragraphs 


Situation  _ 31 

Preliminary  Action 32 

Artillery  Preparation 33 

The  Attack — 34 


31.  Situation. — The  characteristics  of  this  situation, 
which  distinguish  it  from  the  preceding  ones,  are  that  the 
enemy  has  been  longer  in  position  and,  so  far  as  possible, 
has  strengthened  the  natural  advantages  of  the  terrain.  He 
will  have  constructed  more  and  stronger  field  works,  in- 
cluding several  belts  of  wire ; his  dispositions  will  have  been 
made  in  greater  depth;  more  complete  provision  will  have 
been  made  for  his  ammunition  supply;  and  his  covering 
forces  will  have  been  pushed  farther  to  the  front  and  en- 
trenched. A powerful  and  concerted  blow  is  essential  to 
success  in  attacking  such  a position.  Such  a blow  is  possi- 
ble only  after  careful  and  deliberate  preparation. 

32.  Preliminary  Action. — During  the  action  of  the 
advance  guard,  in  driving  in  the  covering  forces  and  recon- 
noitering  the  position,  it  may  be  necessary  to  reinforce  the 
advance  guard  artillery  to  support  the  reconnoitering  forces 
and  assist  in  clearing  up  the  situation.  During  this  pre- 
liminary action,  the  troops  of  the  main  body  are  brought 
forward  and  massed  under  cover,  awaiting  the  time  for 
the  attack.  This  gives  additional  time  for  the  reconnais- 
sance and  occupation  of  positions  by  the  main  part  of  the 
artillery.  In  order  that  the  artillery  fire  may  reach  to  the 
rear  of  the  hostile  position,  it  is  necessary  to  place  the  artil- 
lery in  positions  well  forward. 

33.  Artillery  Preparation. — (a)  In  the  usual  case, 
the  artillery  preparation  begins  with  the  development  of  the 


XIV — 33-34 


232  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

infantry  and  continues  until  the  time  set  for  the  attack  pro- 
per, thus  supporting  the  infantry  during  their  approach 
march,  deployment,  and  advance  to  the  first  firing  position. 
The  commander  of  the  attacking  forces  decides  as  to  the 
duration  and  intensity  of  the  preparation,  basing  his  deci- 
sion on  the  general  plan  of  attack,  the  character  of  the  de- 
fense, and  the  ammunition  supply.  The  opportunity  to 
strike  quickly,  which  offers  success  in  a meeting  engage- 
ment, is  not  so  apparent  here.  However,  the  commander 
may  keep  the  enemy  in  doubt  as  to  the  time  and  direction 
of  his  main  blow,  and,  to  assist  in  this  element  of  surprise, 
he  may  limit  the  artillery  preparation  to  light  harassing  and 
interdiction  fires,  with  a brief  but  violent  preparation  im- 
mediately before  the  attack  proper.  Or,  if  tactical  and  other 
conditions  warrant  the  delay,  he  may  wait  for  the  cover 
of  darkness  to  advance  his  infantry  to  the  line  of  depar- 
ture for  the  attack.  In  this  case,  the  advantages  of  keep- 
ing the  positions  of  the  bulk  of  his  artillery  concealed  from 
the  enemy,  may  cause  him  to  limit  the  artillery  prepara- 
tion. 

(b)  During  the  artillery  preparation,  the  missions  of 
the  division  artillery  are  the  destruction  of  the  enemy’s 
light  trenches  and  wire  (tanks  also  are  used  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  wire),  and,  above  all,  the  neutralization  of  the  hostile 
infantry  and  machine  guns.  Again,  if  the  division  is  act- 
ing alone,  some  batteries  will  be  needed  for  counter  battery 
work,  to  neutralize  the  hostile  artillery. 

34.  The  Attack. — When  the  infantry  advances  from 
its  first  firing  position,  it  is  preceded  by  a rolling  barrage  or 
by  successive  concentrations  of  artillery  and  machine  gun 
fire.  If  the  front  is  too  great  to  be  covered  effectively  by  a 
rolling  barrage,  it  may  be  advisable  to  fire  a barrage  in 
front  of  the  main  attack  with  a majority  of  the  guns  while 
the  others  place  concentrations  in  front  of  the  holding  or 
secondary  attack. 


Xiv— 35-36 


ATTACK  AGAINST  DEFENSIVE  ZONE  233 

Section  V 

An  Attack  Against  a Defensive  Zone 


Paragraphs 


Situation  35 

Artillery  Action  __ 36 

Continuing  the  Support 37 


35.  Situation. — In  this  situation,  which  is  the  one 
which  prevailed  on  the  western  front  throughout  the  greater 
part  of  The  World  War,  the  enemy's  system  of  defense  con- 
sists of  two  or  more  positions,  averaging  about  three  thou- 
sand yards  part,  each  position  consisting  of  several  lines 
of  trenches  and  wire,  strong  points  and  centers  of  resis- 
tance being  organized  between  these  main  positions.  These 
positions  are  strengthened  by  all  available  means;  troops 
are  disposed  in  depth  throughout  the  zone ; elaborate  means 
of  communications  are  established;  and  provision  is  made 
for  an  ample  supply  of  ammunition.  The  attack  of  such 
a position  is  more  difficult  than  that  of  one  less  highly  or- 
ganized and  requires  more  careful  and  detailed  planning. 
The  attacking  infantry  is  assumed  to  be  able  to  form  for 
battle  in  its  own  trenches  or  under  other  cover  near  the  ene- 
my's first  position,  or  to  be  moved  to  such  a position  under 
cover  of  advance  troops  and  darkness.  The  reconnaissance 
proceeds,  perhaps  for  several  days  prior  to  the  attack.  After 
the  artillery  preparation,  the  infantry  assaults  the  first  po- 
sition, fights  its  way  through  the  intervening  area,  assaults, 
the  second  position,  and  continues  thus  until  the  zone  has. 
been  broken  through,  or  until  the  attack  has  been  brought 
to  a halt  by  the  defenders. 

36.  Artillery  Action.— (a)  The  fires  executed  by 
the  artillery  are: 

(1)  Preparation — destruction  or  neutralization  of  the  ene- 
my’s defensive  works  and  weapons. 

(2)  During  the  attack — successive  concentrations  or  rolling 
barrage. 

(3)  During  the  pursuit — concentration  on  hostile  covering 
forces,  and  on  retreating  bodies  of  the  enemy,  and  interdiction. 

(4)  Or,  defensive  fire,  during  the  organization  of  the  new 
position.  Throughout  the  entire  combat,  the  artillery  will  have 
counter  battery,  interdiction,  harassing  and  transient  target  mis- 
sions. 


Xiv— 36-37 


234  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(b)  The  details  of  these  fires  are  planned  ahead  so  far 
as  human  foresight  is  able  to  suggest.  Schedules  are  pre- 
pared, accompanied  by  maps  or  tracings,  which  show  the 
objectives  for  each  artillery  unit,  the  time  at  which  the  fire 
on  each  is  to  be  delivered,  the  number  of  rounds,  the  rate 
of  fire,  and  the  kind  of  projectile.  The  details  for  the  roll- 
ing barrage  are  worked  out  by  each  lower  unit  so  that  each 
gunner  has  before  him  a sheet  showing  the  data  for  each 
shot  he  will  fire  during  the  advance,  and  the  time  and  rate 
of  fire.  Time  is  available  for  employing  all  possible  refine- 
ments in  calculating  the  data  and  in  laying  the  pieces. 
Large  quantities  of  ammunition  are  brought  forward  and 
placed  near  the  guns.  A schedule  of  forward  displacement 
is  drawn  up,  and  missions  from  the  new  positions  may  be 
assigned.  These  plans  may  prove  to  be  impossible  of  exe- 
cution, especially  that  of  the  forward  displacement  and  sub- 
sequent missions.  To  modify  a prearranged  plan  is  rela- 
tively simple.  To  develop  a new  plan,  during  the  course  of 
battle,  and  to  acquaint  all  concerned  with  its  details,  is  rel- 
atively difficult.  Hence  the  necessity  for  well  developed 
plans,  conceived  in  prevision  of  the  probable  course  of  the 
action.  However,  preconceived  ideas  never  are  allowed  to 
prevent  such  changes  of  plan  as  are  dictated  by  changes 
in  the  situation. 

37.  Continuing  the  Support. — It  is  not  sufficient  to 
take  the  hostile  first  positions  only,  for  then  the  blow  be- 
comes imbedded  and  the  situation  is  favorable  for  hostile 
counter  attacks.  To  secure  the  full  benefit  of  the  operation, 
the  hostile  rear  position  must  be  broken  through  and  the 
enemy’s  withdrawal  closely  followed  and  exploited.  For 
this  reason,  the  infantry  attacks  in  depth,  permitting  the 
rear  units  to  pass  through  those  which  have  become  worn 
and  depleted,  and  to  continue  the  advance.  During  the 
assault  on  the  rear  position,  which  is  the  critical  phase  of 
the  attack,  the  artillery  must  continue  to  do  its  part  by  fur- 
nishing fire  support  to  the  infantry.  The  carefully  planned 
support  which  they  were  able  to  give  from  their  initial  po- 
sitions, is  now  no  longer  possible,  the  infantry  having  ad- 
vanced beyond  the  range  of  the  guns.  Moreover,  the  at- 
tacking force  will  not  be  uniformly  successful  along  the  en- 


Xiy— 37 


ATTACK  AGAINST  DEFENSIVE  ZONE  235 

tire  front.  A part  of  the  infantry  will  push  forward  more 
rapidly  than  others  and  will  assist  in  advancing  the  remain- 
der of  the  line  by  taking  the  points  of  greater  resistance 
in  flank  or  in  reverse.  These  units  require  artillery  sup- 
port operating  under  the  direct  control  of  the  local  infantry 
commander.  If  a sufficient  number  of  guns  is  available, 
some  artillery  units  may  be  directed  to  begin  their  advance 
as  soon  as  the  infantry  starts  from  the  line  of  departure, 
while  the  others  support  the  attack  with  the  rolling  bar- 
rage and  other  fire.  Some  or  all  of  the  former  units  would 
participate  in  the  artillery  preparation,  depending  on  the 
local  conditions  and  necessities.  As  previously  stated, 
those  units  which  support  the  attack  are  pushed  forward  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  after  completion  of  that  duty,  to  insure 
artillery  support  during  the  attack  on  the  rear  positions. 
But,  in  order  to  insure  artillery  support  for  the  local  com- 
bats above  mentioned,  accompanying  batteries  and  ac- 
companying guns  often  are  required.  Their  employment  is 
discussed  in  Chapter  XIII. 


XV— 1 


CHAPTER  XV 

Division  Artillery  in  the  Defensive 

Paragraphs 


Section  I.  — General  _> 1-  9 

Section  II.  — Defense  in  a Meeting  Engagement 10-11 

Section  III. — Deployed  Defense — Defensive  Position 12 

Section  IV.  — Defensive  Zones 13 

Section  V.  — Withdrawal  and  Retreat i 14 


Section  I 

General 

Paragraphs 


General  Duties  and  Principles + 1 

Methods  of  Support 2 

Tactical  Employment  of  Artillery  Fire 3 

The  Defensive  Barrage 4 

Counter  Preparation  5 

Defensive  Concentrations  6 

Deployment  7 

Missions  8 

Organization  of  the  Command 9 


1.  General  Duties  and  Principles. — (a)  An  active 
defense  seeks  a favorable  opportunity  to  strike  a decisive 
counter  blow;  a passive  defense  seeks  to  deny  the  enemy 
a decision.  In  either  case,  the  first  step,  in  attaining  its 
object,  is  to  stop  the  advance  of  the  enemy  on,  or  in  front 
of  the  defensive  line  or  area  chosen  by  the  commander. 
Failing  in  this,  the  defense  seeks  to  stop  the  enemy’s  ad- 
vance as  quickly  as  possible,  to  regain  the  lost  position,  to 
establish  itself  in  a new  position  for  defense,  or  to  withdraw 
— following  this  latter  by  an  orderly  retreat,  if  necessary, 
in  order  to  free  itself  from  the  pursuing  forces. 

(b)  The  general  purpose  of  the  artillery,  in  the  de- 
fensive, is  the  same  as  in  the  offensive — to  support  the 
other  branches,  especially  the  infantry. 

(c)  The  supporting  fire  of  field  artillery,  on  the ‘de- 
fensive, is  fully  as  effective  as  on  the  offensive.  It  even 
may  be  more  so,  as  instances  have  been  noted  in  which  a 


236 


XV— 1-3 


DIVISION  ARTILLERY  IN  THE  DEFENSIVE  237 

hostile  advance  has  been  stopped  by  artillery  fire  alone; 
whereas,  good  infantry  cannot  be  driven  from  a position  by 
artillery  fire  alone. 

(d)  The  principles  of  employing  artillery  fire  in  mass, 
quickly,  and  with  precision,  are  the  same  as  on  the  offensive. 

2.  Methods  of  Support. — The  artillery  supports  the 
infantry  in  defense. 

(a)  From  the  time  when  contact  is  first  gained  by: 

(1)  Fire  on  transient  targets, 

(2)  Interdiction  fire, 

(3)  Harassing  fire, 

(4)  Destruction  or  neutralization  of  hostile  batteries. 

(b)  During  the  hostile  preparation  for  the  attack  by 
counter  preparation,  consisting  of: 

(1)  Fire  on  hostile  forming  up  places,  and  on  probable  posi- 

tions of  hostile  reserves, 

(2)  Destruction  or  neutralization  of  enemy’s  works,  obser- 

vation posts,  communications, 

(3)  Counter  battery, 

(4)  Interdiction. 

(c)  During  the  attack  proper  by: 

(1)  Defensive  concentrations  and  barrages; 

(2)  Concentrations  against  advancing  infantry,  tanks  and 

accompanying  weapons; 

(3)  Counter  attack  barrages  or  concentrations  supporting 

counter  attack. 

(d)  During  the  withdrawal  and  retreat  by: 

(1)  Counter  preparation  against  each  phase  of  the  attack; 

(2)  Concentrations  against  the  most  advanced  or  most 

threatening  elements  of  the  hostile  troops; 

(3)  Interdiction. 

3.  Tactical  Employment  of  Artillery  Fire. — The 
employment  of  the  above  mentioned  kinds  of  fire  does  not 
differ  in  principle  from  that  of  the  offensive.  Rolling  bar- 
rages and  successive  concentrations  are  used  by  the  defen- 
ders in  making  counter  attacks,  which  are  conducted  ac- 
cording to  the  general  principles  of  the  offensive.  The 
kinds  of  fire  peculiar  to  the  defense  are  the  defensive  or 
protective  barrage,  counter  offensive  preparation  (or  sim- 
ply counter  preparation)  and  concentrations  after  the  enemy 
has  broken  through  the  covering  force. 


XV— 4 


238  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

4.  The  Defensive  Barrage. — (a)  Before  The  World 
War,  it  was  recognized  that  artillery  on  the  defensive  should 
take  advantage  of  every  opportunity  to  prepare  data  for 
fire  on  the  probable  routes  of  the  enemy’s  approach  to  the 
chosen  position.  During  the  winter  of  1914-1915,  the  op- 
posing lines  on  the  western  front  were  very  close  to  each 
other.  The  probable  routes  of  the  enemy’s  approach  cov- 
ered practically  the  entire  front,  though  an  advance  by 
some  routes  naturally  was  more  probable  than  by  others. 
The  hostile  attacks,  therefore,  came  quickly  and  at  many 
different  points.  To  break  up  these  attacks,  there  was 
needed  artillery  fire  which  could  be  placed  immediately  upon 
the  point  from  which  the  attacking  infantry  started.  To 
meet  this  need,  the  defensive  barrage  was  originated.  Each 
battery  of  the  division  artillery  is  given  a definite  location 
upon  which  to  place  its  normal  barrage  upon  call  from  the 
infantry  defending  that  part  of  the  front.  To  cover  the  re- 
mainder of  the  front,  batteries  are  assigned  one  or  more 
eventual  barrage  lines.  Barrages  at  first  were  placed  on 
the  hostile  trenches,  but  later  were  drawn  back  and  placed 
at  about  150  yards  in  front  of  the  line  to  be  defended,  these 
lines  having  been  withdrawn,  where  necessary,  to  gain  suf- 
ficient distance  from  the  hostile  line.  The  front  to  be  cov- 
ered at  one  time,  by  a defensive  barrage  fired  by  a battery 
of  75-mm.  guns,  should  not  be  greater  than  250  yards.  If 
less,  the  fire  can  be  made  correspondingly  more  dense  and 
effective.  200  yards  may  be  taken  as  the  proper  front  un- 
der average  conditions.  An  effective  rate  of  fire,  on  such 
a front,  is  six  rounds  per  gun  per  minute  for  the  first  four 
minutes,  followed  by  two  rounds  per  gun  per  minute  for 
two  minutes,  or  other  suitable  combination.  The  rate  and 
duration  of  fire  are  prescribed  in  orders.  The  barrage  must 
come  down  immediately  on  call  from  the  infantry.  For 
this  reason,  the  batteries  charged  with  these  fires  are  kept 
laid  on  their  normal  barrage  when  not  engaged  in  carrying 
out  other  suitable  missions.  An  efficient  system  of  visual 
signals  and  telephone  communication,  between  the  front 
line  infantry  and  its  supporting  artillery,  is,  therefore,  of 
utmost  importance. 

(b)  An  attempt  to  secure  the  safety  of  the  entire  front, 
by  means  of  simultaneous  barrages,  results  in  weakness  at 


XV— 4-5 


DIVISION  ARTILLERY  IN  THE  DEFENSIVE  239 

all  points.  Hence,  sensitive  points  between  or  in  front  of 
the  centers  of  resistance  are  covered  by  the  normal  barrages, 
while  the  remainder  of  the  front  is  covered  by  machine  guns, 
rifles,  and  other  infantry  weapons,  and  by  eventual  artillery 
barrages. 

(c)  While  the  division  artillery  is  firing  the  barrage, 
the  heavy  and  medium  field  artillery  fire  on  critical  points 
beyond  the  enemy’s  front  line,  such  as  command  posts,  road 
crossings  and  trench  junctions,  and  continue  whatever 
counter  battery  fires  may  be  undertaken. 

(d)  In  high  repute  during  the  winter  of  1914-1915,  the 
defensive  barrage  declined  in  prestige  thereafter.  From 
the  experience  gained  in  1916  and  1917,  it  became  evident 
that  the  barrage,  effective  only  when  fired  immediately  on 
call,  rarely  included  the  advance  elements  of  the  hostile  at- 
tack. Moreover,  having  a depth  equal  only  to  the  zone  of 
dispersion,  it  may  be  shown  that  the  probability  of  becom- 
ing a casualty  by  going  through  such  a fire  is  not  great.* 
Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  fire  upon  the  enemy  while  he 
is  forming  for  the  attack  and,  also,  after  he  has  reached  our 
first  line.  For  this  reason  the  counter  preparation  and 
(after  the  enemy  has  broken  through  our  covering  forces) 
the  concentrations  were  developed  and,  to  a great  extent, 
replaced  the  defensive  barrage.  Its  future  use  depends  on 
the  situation.  When  the  lines  become  stabilized  for  some 
time,  it  seems  probable  that  it  may  have  frequent  use,  but 
defensive  concentrations  will  have  much  more  general  ap- 
plication. 

5.  Counter  Preparation. — (a)  Broadly  speaking,  all 
fire  of  the  defenders  during  the  preparation  of  the  attack 
may  be  called  counter  preparation;  including  a systematic 
bombardment  of  the  hostile  troops  from  the  time  they  are 
first  within  range  of  the  guns,  counter  battery,  neutraliza- 
tion and  destruction  of  whatever  cover  the  enemy  have. 
During  The  World  War,  the  term  counter  preparation  was 
used,  in  a more  limited  sense,  to  apply  to  the  fires  delivered 
to  break  up  the  hostile  attack  formations  near  the  enemy’s 
front  lines.  By  subjecting  his  troops  to  fire  during  the  time 

* Under  average  conditions  of  rate  of  fire,  and  rate  of  infantry 
advance,  the  probability  is  about  11  per  cent. 


XV— 5-6 


240  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

he  is  forming  for  attack,  his  dispositions  are  broken  up  and 
the  morale  of  the  attacking  force  impaired  before  the  at- 
tack can  be  launched.  Therefore,  these  fires  are  placed  on 
his  front  line  trenches,  on  woods  and  ravines  which  offer 
cover  for  assembled  troops,  and  on  all  points  probably  occu- 
pied by  his  formations.  For  every  hostile  fire  put  down  by 
the  enemy  in  preparation  for  his  attack,  an  equal  and  cor- 
responding fire  is  placed  on  a point  within  the  enemy’s  lines 
opposite  the  probable  point  of  attack.  For  defense  against 
local  attacks,  partial  counter  preparation  is  fired,  covering 
only  the  threatened  points ; if  a general  attack  appears  pro- 
bable, a general  counter  preparation,  covering  the  entire 
division  front,  is  needed.  Tables  or  plans  for  these  counter 
preparations  are  prepared,  based  on  all  probable  methods  of 
attack,  and  are  given  a designation  by  number  or  letter. 
These  fires  are  held  on  the  designated  points  for  the  period 
prescribed  in  the  plans — usually  about  fifteen  minutes.  They 
must  be  precise,  quickly  brought  down,  and  of  sufficient  in- 
tensity to  accomplish  the  purpose.  The  average  rate  of  fire 
is  two  rounds  per  gun  per  minute  for  75s  and  from  30  to 
40  rounds  per  gun  per  hour  for  155-mm.  howitzers.  After 
firing  the  counter  preparation,  batteries  must  be  able  to 
change  quickly  to  the  defensive  barrage,  when  that  method 
of  fire  is  to  be  used. 

(b)  When  the  division  is  part  of  a corps  or  larger  force, 
the  corps  and  army  artillery  are  given  the  more  distant 
missions  in  the  counter  preparation. 

6.  Defensive  Concentrations. — During  all  of  his 
advance,  both  before  and  after  reaching  the  position  held 
by  the  defenders’  outposts,  the  enemy  must  be  subjected  to 
all  possible  artillery  fire.  Between  the  defenders’  centers 
of  resistance,  there  will  be  lanes  through  which  the  enemy 
will  advance  more  rapidly  than  at  other  points.  To  cover 
these  lanes  of  advance  up  to  the  main  line  of  defense,  con- 
centrations are  prepared.  They  are  fired  when  the  friendly 
infantry,  or  observation,  indicates  that  the  enemy  is  in  the 
predetermined  locality.  These  fires  must  have  sufficient 
depth  to  include  all  of  the  advancing  element,  not  merely  the 
heads  of  the  columns.  If  the  attack  penetrates  the  main  line 
of  resistance  of  the  defenders,  these  fires  are  continued  on 


XV— 6-8 


DIVISION  ARTILLERY  IN  THE  DEFENSIVE  241 

the  lost  ground,  care  being  taken  to  coordinate  them  with 
any  counter  attack  which  may  be  launched.  Whenever  pos- 
sible, observed  fire  will  be  used  in  such  defensive  concentra- 
tions. 

7.  Deployment. — The  basic  principle  which  governs 
the  selection  of  positions  for  artillery,  in  all  situations,  is 
that  it  be  able  to  carry  out  the  mission  assigned  it.  In  the 
offensive,  that  mission  being  to  support  the  infantry  ad- 
vance against  the  hostile  position,  the  artillery  is  placed 
generally  well  forward.  In  the  defensive,  the  mission  is  to 
assist  the  other  arms  in  stopping  the  enemy’s  advance.  The 
commander  having  chosen  the  line  or  lines  to  be  defended, 
all  the  artillery  is  placed  in  rear  of  these  lines  to  assist  in 
their  defense.  The  desire  to  bring  the  full  power  of  all  the 
artillery  to  bear,  in  the  defense  of  the  main  line  of  resis- 
tance, and  to  continue  this  defense  without  interruption, 
after  the  enemy  has  driven  in  or  broken  through  the  cov- 
ering forces,  tends  toward  a selection  of  positions  in  rear  of 
this  main  line  of  resistance.  On  the  other  hand,  the  out- 
posts must  be  covered  by  artillery  fire,  the  defensive  bar- 

• rage  and  counter  preparation  missions  must  be  carried  out, 
and  some  batteries  must  be  able  to  reach  well  into  the  ene- 
my’s lines  to  break  up  his  formations,  counter  his  bat- 
teries and  interdict  his  lines  of  supply  and  communication. 
The  conflicting  considerations  lead  to  a deployment  of  the 
artillery  in  depth;  applicable  to  division,  corps  and  army 
artillery.  Such  dispositions  also  permit  the  advance  ele- 
ments of  the  artillery  to  be  withdrawn,  should  the  necessity 
arise,  under  cover  of  the  fire  of  the  units  farther  to  the 
rear.  The  most  advanced  elements  should  be  those  which 
have  the  greatest  mobility,  so  far  as  the  proper  assignment 
of  missions  will  permit. 

8.  Missions. — The  missions  properly  assigned  to  the 
division  artillery  are: 

(a)  For  the  75s — defensive  barrages  in  front  of  the 
outpost  and  other  lines,  counter  preparation  to  a depth  of 
1500  yards  in  rear  of  the  enemy’s  front  line,  defensive  con- 
centrations on  the  areas  between  the  position  of  the  cover- 


242  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

in g force  and  the  main  line  of  resistance,  counter  attack  con- 
centrations and  barrages,*  and  fire  on  transient  targets. 

(b)  For  155-mm.  howitzers,  if  attached — same  as  for 
the  75s,  deepening  the  beaten  zone  within  the  enemy’s  line 
to  a depth  of  5000  yards  or  .such  other  extension  as  the 
power  of  the  howitzer  justifies. 

9.  Organization  of  the  Command. — The  necessity  for 
concentrating  the  fire  of  all  or  a part  of  the  division  artil- 
lery, and  the  opportunity  afforded  for  establishing  an  effi- 
cient system  of  communication,  indicates  the  desirability 
of  retaining  the  artillery  brigade  under  command  of  the 
division  commander.  Artillery  support  must  be  given 
promptly  to  the  different  infantry  units.  Therefore,  the 
75  regiments  usually  are  assigned  to  support  particular 
infantry  brigades,  regiments  or  portions  of  the  line  to  be 
defended.  The  howitzer  regiment,  if  attached,  usually  is 
placed  in  general  support  of  the  entire  position.  Calls  for 
fire  from  infantry  units  (battalions  or  regiments)  are  made 
direct  to  the  supporting  artillery  unit.  The  latter  furnishes 
the  desired  support  or  calls  on  a reinforcing  artillery  unit. 
Liaison  officers  from  the  artillery  are  sent  to  infantry  bri- 
gades, regiments  and  battalions : it  is  through  those  officers 
that  calls  for  support  should  be  made. 


Section  II 

The  Defense  in  a Meeting  Engagement 

Paragraphs  • 


Situation  10 

Action  of  the  Artillery 11 


10.  The  Situation. — (a)  When  contact  with  the  ene- 
my has  been  gained,  the  artillery  of  the  advance  guard 
is  placed  promptly  in  position  to  assist  in  carrying  out  the 
mission  of  that  covering  force.  This  mission  is  based  on  the 
orders  or  intentions  of  the  division  commander,  and,  as  we 
have  seen  in  the  offensive,  may  be : 


♦The  rolling  barrage  as  in  the  offensive. 


XV— 10-11 


DEFENSE  IN  MEETING  ENGAGEMENT  243 

(1)  To  advance  and  seize  favorable  terrain,  upon  which  the 
division  will  make  its  defense; 

(2)  To  hold  defensively  the  terrain  then  occupied;  or 

(3)  To  delay  the  enemy  while  withdrawing  to  a position 
farther  to  the  rear. 

(b)  In  the  first  case,  the  local  action  is  an  offensive  op- 
eration and  is  conducted  on  the  principles  which  govern  in 
such  combat.  In  the  third  case,  the  action  is  similar  to  that 
in  a withdrawal  or  retreat,  which  is  discussed  later.  The 
second  case,  being  purely  defensive,  will  be  discussed  here. 

11.  Action  of  the  Artillery. — (a)  In  this  situation, 
the  artillery  of  the  advance  guard  is  so  placed  as  to  cover 
not  only  the  immediate  front  of  the  chosen  position,  but 
also  to  reach  well  into  the  enemy's  terrain  to  cover  his  lines 
of  approach,  cause  early  deployment  and  delay  the  hostile 
advance,  and  break  down  the  attack  of  the  hostile  covering 
force,  if  one  be  made.  This  requires  a deployment  in  depth 
within  the  unit  itself.  Missions  and  sectors  of  fire  must  be 
assigned  promptly  to  the  smaller  artillery  units.  During 
the  development  of  the  defenders,  the  artillery  marching 
with  the  main  body  is  placed  in  position.  It  may  be  advisa- 
ble to  hold  a part  of  the  artillery  in  positions  in  readiness 
or  in  observation  until  the  direction  of  the  hostile  attack  be- 
comes known.  In  this  case,  energetic  reconnaissance  and 
preparation  for  probable  situations  should  be  pushed.  Artil- 
lery regiments  are  assigned  general  localities  for  positions 
and  given  the  mission  of  supporting  certain  infantry  units 
or  portions  of  the  defensive  line.  The  principle  of  deploy- 
ment in  depth  is  adhered  to.  When  communications  are  dif- 
ficult, and  command  is  of  great  importance,  as  they  are  in 
this  case,  it  is  well  to  echelon  the  battalions,  keeping  the 
batteries  of  each  battalion  fairly  close  together.  The  longer 
the  position  is  occupied,  the  more  the  batteries  within  the 
battalion  will  be  echeloned. 

(b)  The  decision  to  assume  the  defensive,  generally, 
though  not  necessarily,  is  taken  to  indicate  an  inferiority  in 
strength,  including  an  inferiority  in  artillery.  The  hostile 
attack  can  have  no  decisive  success  if  the  advance  of  the 
infantry  can  be  stopped.  Therefore,  the  defenders'  divi- 
sion artillery  should  be  used  against  the  hostile  infantry, 
cavalry,  tanks  and  accompanying  weapons,  and  should  not 


XV— 11 


244  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

allow  itself  to  be  drawn  into  an  unequal  contest  with  super- 
ior artillery  strength.  If  enough  guns  are  available,  some 
may  be  assigned  the  duty  of  replying  to  the  hostile  batteries 
and  neutralizing  their  fire,  but  the  principal  target  for  the 
artillery  on  the  defensive,  especially  the  division  artillery, 
is  that  portion  of  the  enemy’s  attack  which  most  threatens 
our  position, — usually  the  advancing  troops  with  their  ac- 
companying weapons. 

(c)  The  time  for  opening  fire  depends  on  the  enemy’s 
advance.  It  is  prescribed  in  the  orders  of  the  artillery  com- 
manders. It  may  be  desirable  to  withhold  the  fire  of  some 
batteries,  especially  if  the  enemy  is  much  superior  in  ar- 
tillery, until  the  attack  has  reached  a more  vulnerable  stage 
in  its  deployment  and  approach.  In  the  situation  under  dis- 
cussion, no  opportunity  will  have  been  offered  for  the  pre- 
paration of  fires  before  the  beginning  of  the  action.  Within 
its  sector  of  fire*  each  artillery  unit  seeks  to  inflict  casual- 
ties upon  and  to  stop  the  advance  of  the  enemy  during  his 
approach  march,  deployment  and  advance  to  his  first  firing 
position.  Each  unit  should  be  able  to  fire  in  the  adjacent 
sectors  thus  enabling  artillery  brigade,  regimental  and  bat- 
talion commanders  to  coordinate  the  fires  of  their  command, 
or  concentrate  them  on  the  most  threatening  part  of  the  ad- 
vancing force.  When  the  enemy  begins  the  advance  from 
his  first  firing  position,  it  is  especially  important  that  the  ar- 
tillery direct  its  fire  against  the  advance  waves  of  the  at- 
tack. This  fire  should  be  placed  short  enough  to  include  the 
leading  elements,  and  also  should  have  sufficient  depth  to  in- 
clude the  local  supports  and  reserves.  Coordination  with  the 
friendly  infantry  is  necessary  during  its  withdrawal  from 
the  covering  or  advance  positions.  If  the  attack  breaks 
through  the  position,  the  artillery  continues  to  fire  on  ad- 
vancing hostile  infantry,  assists  in  counter  attack,  or  covers 
the  withdrawal. 


xv— 12-13 


DEPLOYED  DEFENSE— DEFENSIVE  POSITION  245 
Section  III 

Deployed  Defense — Defensive  Position 

Paragraph 

Deployed  Defense — Defensive  Position *_ 12 


12.  Deployed  Defense. — Defensive  Position. — When 
on  the  defensive,  every  opportunity  is  grasped  to  strengthen 
the  natural  defensive  features  of  the  terrain,  and  to  prepare 
systematic  plans  for  the  defense  of  the  position.  The  artil- 
lery does  this  by  preparing  firing  data  and  registering  fire 
on  points  on  the  ground  over  which  the  enemy  must  advance 
to  the  attack,  by  getting  forward  the  necessary  supply  of 
ammunition,  by  establishing  systems  of  communications 
by  all  possible  means,  by  concealing  its  position  by  natural 
and  artificial  means,  and  by  constructing  cover  for  the  per- 
sonnel, ammunition,  and  guns.  The  degree  of  refinement 
to  which  these  preparatory  measures  are  carried,  depends 
on  the  plan  of  the  commander,  the  energy  and  resource- 
fulness of  the  artillery  personnel,  and  the  time  available 
between  the  selection  of  the  position  and  the  hostile  attack. 
When  there  has  been  time  merely  to  deploy,  these  arrange- 
ments are  meager:  when  ample  time  is  available,  the  posi- 
tion may  develop  into  a defensive  zone,  the  artillery  making 
correspondingly  detailed  preparations.  Between  these  two 
extremes,  there  are  many  variations ; the  employment  of  the 
artillery  varies  in  the  same  way. 


Section  IV 
Defensive  Zone 

Paragraph 

Artillery  Positions 13 


13.  Artillery  Positions. — (a) 

(1)  The  positions  assigned  the  division  artillery  are  such 
that  it  can  support  the  defense  both  of  the  main  line  of  resistance 
and  of  the  outpost  line. 


XV— 13 


246  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(2)  The  following  are  the  factors  which  determine  the  limits 
within  which  the  division  artillery  is  placed: 

(a)  The  forward  limit  is  determined  by  the  fact  that  the 
75s  are  most  effective  when  not  closer  than  1500  yards  to 
the  line  to  be  defended.  This  is  because  of  the  flat  trajec- 
tory. With  reduced  charges,  this  distance  can  be  reduced  to 
800  yards. 

(b)  The  rear  limit  is  determined  by  the  fact  that  counter 
preparation  is  essential  to  a depth  of  1500  to  2000  yards 
within  the  enemy’s  lines.  Hence  the  guns  are  placed  not 
more  than  5000  yards  in  rear  of  the  outpost  line  of  observa- 
tion. 

(b)  The  general  location  of  the  artillery  having  been 
decided  upon,  battalions  and  batteries  are  so  located  as  to 
take  full  advantage  of  the  terrain  in  that  vicinity.  Units 
are  echeloned  in  depth  so  as  best  to  carry  out  the  missions 
assigned  them,  and  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the  more  for- 
ward units,  should  that  become  necessary.  Some  guns  from 
each  battery  usually  are  placed  in  forward  positions  to  carry 
out  the  more  distant  missions  during  the  time  of  compara- 
tive inactivity  prior  to  the  attack.  When  it  is  apparent  the 
attack  is  about  to  begin,  the  guns  usually  are  withdrawn  to 
normal  positions  if  practicable.  Batteries  often  are  prohib- 
ited from  firing  from  their  normal  positions  except  in  case 
of  a serious  attack,  in  order  to  keep  those  positions  hidden 
from  the  enemy  and  prevent  the  destruction  or  neutraliza- 
tion of  the  batteries  by  the  hostile  artillery.  Alternative 
positions,  500  yards  or  more  from  the  normal  positions,  are 
reconnoitered  and  prepared  for  use  in  case  the  normal  posi- 
tions are  neutralized.  Single  pieces,  for  defense  against 
tanks  sometimes  are  detached  and  posted  well  forward, 
covering  routes  of  approach.  During  periods  of  relative 
inactivity,  other  pieces,  called  roving  guns,  are  sent  from 
place  to  place  to  conduct  fire,  thus  carrying  out  assigned 
missions  and,  at  the  same  time,  deceiving  the  enemy  as  to 
the  exact  amount  and  location  of  the  artillery. 


XV— 14 


WITHDRAWAL  AND  RETREAT  247 

Section  V 

Withdrawal  and  Retreat 

Paragraphs 


General  Discussion 14 

Fires  15 


14.  General  Discussion. — Because  of  its  range,  artil- 
lery is  particularly  valuable  in  a withdrawal  and  in  a re- 
treat. Because  of  its  close  relation  to  the  infantry,  its 
mobility,  and  the  rapidity  with  which  it  can  open  fire  from 
a new  position,  much  of  this  duty  devolves  upon  the  divi- 
sion artillery.  Some  artillery  units  are  attached  to  the  force 
which  covers  the  withdrawal,  the  others,  from  positions  far- 
ther in  rear,  support  the  covering  force  and  cover  its  later 
withdrawal.  The  movements  of  the  artillery  are  based  upon 
the  general  plan  of  maneuver  and  are  coordinated  with 
the  movements  of  the  infantry.  Its  displacements  may  be 
made  on  direct  orders  of  the  commander  of  the  force,  or, 
preferably,  on  a prearranged  plan.  A plan  of  withdrawal, 
when  the  necessity  therefor  can  be  foreseen,  is  even  more 
necessary  than  one  for  a forward  movement,  because  the 
execution  of  such  a maneuver  is  more  difficult,  owing  to  the 
lack  of  communications  and  the  decreased  morale.  This 
plan  should  be  supplemented  by  a detailed  reconnaissance 
of  routes  and  positions,  which  can  be  made  readily,  since 
the  terrain  lies  within  one’s  own  lines.  The  extent  to  which 
such  a plan  should  be  communicated  beforehand  to  subor- 
dinates must  be  such  that  it  will  not  result  in  lowering  the 
morale  or  causing  a premature  movement.  The  changes  of 
position  are  made  by  echelon — frequently  by  separate  bat- 
teries within  the  battalion.  Command  is  decentralized  be- 
cause of  the  lack  of  communications  and  the  rapidly  chang- 
ing situation.  For  the  purpose  of  command,  it  is  essential 
that  artillery  command  posts  be  located  near  the  firing  bat- 
teries; for  the  purpose  of  coordination  with  the  infantry, 
and  the  prompt  and  efficient  exploitation  of  information, 
these  command  posts  should  be  near  those  of  correspond- 
ing infantry  commanders.  These  two  requirements,  some- 
times conflicting,  must  be  adjusted.  The  infantry  can  as- 


XV— 14-15 


248  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

sist  in  this  by  keeping  the  artillery  in  mind  when  locating 
its  command  posts.  Observation  posts  must  be  as  near  the 
batteries  as  the  terrain  will  permit. 

15.  Fires. — (a)  The  fires  conducted  by  the  artillery, 
during  a withdrawal  and  retreat,  are  intended  for  the  de- 
struction of  enemy  personnel  and  delay  of  hostile  pursuit 
and  consist  of  counter  preparations  for  each  position  occu- 
pied during  the  retreat,  concentrations  on  each  attack  which 
may  be  launched,  and  interdiction  to  prevent  the  resupply 
of  food  and  ammunition  to  the  enemy.  Establishing  a 
new  defensive  barrage  line  for  each  successive  position  is 
not  practicable.  Most  of  the  objectives  will  be  transient 
targets — small  groups  of  the  enemy  which  filter  through 
the  points  of  least  resistance.  The  artillery,  by  observation, 
must  place  its  fire  upon  the  enemy  and  not  upon  ground  he 
does  not  occupy.  The  preparation  of  firing  data  for  probable 
routes  of  advance,  however,  will  enable  the  fire  to  be  shifted 
promptly  and  placed  as  conditions  require.  The  opportunity 
for  this  never  is  neglected.  Persistent  gas  is  used  to  the 
maximum. 

(b)  The  artillery  exerts  every  effort  to  obtain  infor- 
mation concerning  the  immediate  situation  rather  than 
wait  for  this  information  and  for  calls  for  fire  to  be  given 
to  it  by  the  infantry.  If  fire  is  withheld  until  called  for,  it 
is  probable  that  its  effect  on  the  operation  will  be  small. 

(c)  In  covering  a retreat,  it  is  sometimes  necessary  for 
artillery  to  be  sacrificed.  When  the  occasion  demands, 
there  should  be  no  hesitation  in  taking  such  action. 


XVI— 1-2 


CHAPTER  XVI 

Artillery  Combat  Orders 

Paragraphs 


Artillery  Provisions  of  Army  and  Corps  Orders 1 

Artillery  Subparagraph  of  a Division  Field  Order 2 

Field  Order  of  the  Field  Artillery  Brigade 3 

Artillery  Annex  to  the  Division  Order 4 

Orders  of  Regiments  and  Subordinate  Units 5 

Use  of  Maps  and  Charts 6 


1.  Artillery  Provisions  of  Army  and  Corps  Orders. 
— Army  orders  covering  any  deliberate  attack  or  defense 
normally  are  accompanied  by  an  artillery  annex  (with  ap- 
propriate maps,  charts,  and  tables)  fixing  the  missions  of 
the  army  and  corps  artillery,  and  allotting  additional  artil- 
lery units  to  the  several  corps,  according  to  requirements. 
The  artillery  paragraph,  with  its  annex,  prescribes  the  de- 
tails essential  to  successful  cooperation  between  the  army 
artillery  and  that  of  the  several  corps,  and  fixes  their  mis- 
sions, target  areas,  and  general  locations.  In  like  manner, 
each  corps  issues  a corresponding  annex,  in  which  the  re- 
quirements, in  the  artillery  paragraph,  are  developed  so  as 
to  establish  fully  the  character  of  all  artillery  support 
within  the  corps,  provide  for  counter  battery  work,  provide 
for  cooperation  between  the  corps  artillery  and  that  of  the 
divisions,  and  provide  for  mutual  support  to  be  afforded  by 
the  artillery  of  adjacent  divisions.  When  necessary,  the 
corps  artillery  brigade  issues  a brigade  field  order,  which 
is  an  order  to  the  units  of  that  brigade  only. 

2.  Artillery  Subparagraph  of  a Division  Field  Or- 
der.— (a)  In  general,  the  artillery  paragraph  of  the  divi- 
sion order  is  written  with  a view  to  giving  the  infantry  com- 
manders all  necessary  information  in  regard  to  the  contem- 
plated artillery  action  and  support.  Furthermore,  this 
paragraph  is  sufficiently  definite  and  complete  to  afford  the 
artillery  brigade  commander  a basis  upon  which  to  formu- 
late his  detailed  order. 


249 


XVI— 2 


250  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(b)  The  artillery  brigade  commander,  as  the  artillery 
advisor  of  the  division  commander,  generally  is  consulted 
in  drafting  this  paragraph;  but,  when  issued,  it  comes  to 
him  as  a commander  of  artillery,  and  is  his  authority  for 
his  brigade  order,  just  as  the  infantry  paragraphs  are  the 
authority  upon  which  the  infantry  commanders  act. 

(c)  This  subparagraph  (of  paragraph  3)  normally 
contains  instructions  as  to  assignments,  general  missions 
and  fires  to  be  executed,  general  artillery  locations,  special 
duties,  and  the  use  of  smoke  and  gas  (in  case  they  are  to 
be  employed).  There  may  be  some  caution  as  to  prepara- 
tion for  future  movements.  In  case  of  movements  actually 
ordered — such  as  movements  to  initial  positions — routes  are 
designated  or  the  responsibility  for  selection  of  routes  de- 
finitely fixed. 

(d)  As  an  illustration,  the  following  is  given  as  a form 
that  might  be  used  in  an  attack  order : 

(c)  (1)  The  1st  FA  Brig,  with  the  101st  FA  attached,  will  support  the 
attack:  the  1st  FA  supporting  the  1st  Brig  from  positions 
near ; the  2d  FA  supporting  the  2d  Brig  from  po- 
sitions north  of ; the  101st  FA  supporting  both 

brigades  from  positions  in  the  vicinity  of . Sup- 

port will  be  by  (successive  concentrations,  or  other  fires). 
Special  attention  will  be  paid  to  (support  of  certain  friendly 
units — or  their  sectors — or  designated  important  points  in 
hostile  territory). 

(2)  An  artillery  bombardment  of  enemy  front  lines,  participated 

in  by  all  available  guns,  will  begin  at . Prior  to 

this,  artillery  fire  will  be  (reduced  to  a minimum,  confined  to 
registration  and  light  harassing,  etc.).  Fire  on  front  lines 
will  be  lifted  (infantry  signal  or  stated  time). 

(3)  Smoke  and  non-persistent  gas  will  be  used (areas). 

The  use  of  smoke  (gas)  along boundaries  will  be 

regulated  by  (commanders1  concerned) . 

(4)  For  further  details  see  Annex  No.  1.  (In  case  an  artillery 

annex  is  issued.) 

(e)  The  above  is  about  the  average  amount  of  detail 
found  in  an  order  for  an  attack  in  a normal  (warfare  of 
movement)  situation.  In  case  of  an  attack  on  short  notice, 
say  as  a result  of  a meeting  engagement,  this  subparagraph 
will  be  more  brief.  In  case  of  a more  elaborate  attack,  it 
might  be  more  comprehensive,  but,  since  an  annex  often  is 
issued  under  such  circumstances,  reference  to  this  annex 
obviates  increasing  the  length  of  the  order.  This  applies 
likewise  to  orders  for  defensive  action. 


XVI — 2-3 


ARTILLERY  COMBAT  ORDERS  251 

(f)  In  case  of  a division  order  for  defense,  (2)  of  the 
above  subparagraph  might  cover  the  placing  of  artillery 
units  to  carry  out  certain  missions;  such  as  covering  the 
outpost,  protecting  a certain  flank,  or  participating  in  coun- 
ter attacks. 

3.  The  Field  Order  of  the  Field  Artillery  Brigade. 
— (a)  This  order  is  issued  in  compliance  with  the  artillery 
subparagraph  of  the  division  field  order.  The  details  are 
worked  out  with  full  knowledge  of  the  intentions  of  the  divi- 
sion commander,  ascertained  through  G3.  The  artillery  fire 
is  employed  to  insure  the  success  of  the  division  as  a whole. 

(b)  Its  form  is  similar  to  that  of  other  field  orders. 
(See  “Combat  Orders”  G.S.S.)  Paragraph  1 generally  is 
more  copious  than  in  the  case  of  infantry  brigades,  since 
the  artillery  support  must  be  considered  from  the  division 
viewpoint,  and  since,  to  render  intelligent  assistance,  artil- 
lery units  must  have  complete  information  as  to  the  plans 
of  the  infantry  units  to  be  supported.  Paragraph  2 should 
be  brief  and  concise.  Paragraph  3 is  divided  into  subpara- 
graphs— usually  one  for  each  regiment.  Missions  directed 
in  the  division  order  are  allotted  to  proper  units  with  more 
details  (when  necessary)  than  are  found  in  the  division  or- 
der. Other  missions  may  be  added  in  accordance  with  the 
division  commander's  plan. 

(c)  Subparagraph  (x)  may  contain  all  or  a part  of  the 
following : 

Details  of  movement  into  position.  These  are  closely  co- 
ordinated with  the  division  plan  in  order  to  avoid  interference 
and  loss  of  time. 

Precautions  as  to  concealment  and  secrecy. 

Details  of  firing,  including  adjustment,  if  any,  preparation  or 
counter  preparation,  fires  to  be  executed  during  an  attack,  and 
necessary  restrictions  in  ammunition  expenditure. 

Instructions  as  to  missions  indicated  by  the  air  service. 

Restrictions  as  to  hours  of  firing  (on  the  defensive) . 

Use  of  gas  and  other  special  shell. 

Displacement  of  artillery,  or,  more  often,  warning  to  be 
prepared  for  rapid  displacement. 

Such  other  instructions  as  may  be  necessary. 

(d)  Paragraphs  4 and  5 are  similar  to  those  of  the  divi- 
sion order.  The  artillery  brigade  axis  of  signal  communi- 
cation should  be  announced.  The  artillery  regimental  com- 
mand posts  may  or  may  not  be  announced,  depending  on 


« 


XVI— 3-4 

252  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

the  situation.  Their  announcement  tends  to  avoid  confu- 
sion, but  may  hamper  the  regimental  commanders,  even 
though  the  locations  are  those  recommended  by  them  prior 
to  issuance  of  the  order. 

(e)  The  distribution  should  include  the  general  staff, 
the  division  signal  officer,  and  supported  infantry  comman- 
ders. 

4.  The  Artillery  Annex  to  the  Division  Order. — 

(a)  When,  in  the  opinion  of  the  division  commander,  it  is 
necessary  to  give  the  infantry  more  complete  information 
of  the  artillery  than  can  be  included  in  the  division  field  or- 
der, the  artillery  brigade  field  order  may  be  issued  as  an 
annex  to  the  division  order.  In  this  case,  the  artillery  bri- 
gade field  order  will  have  the  following  additional  caption : 

“ANNEX  No—  to  FO  No—,  DIVISION 

ARTILLERY” 

(b)  It  is  seldom  necessary  to  issue  this  order  as  an 
annex.  The  need  may  arise  in  stabilized  situations,  in  at- 
tacks from  stabilization,  and  in  defensive  situations.  Ordin- 
arily, the  infantry  can  be  given  sufficient  artillery  informa- 
tion in  the  division  field  order. 

(c)  In  open  warfare  situations,  the  artillery  brigade 
field  order  seldom  or  never  is  issued  as  an  annex  to  the  divi- 
sion field  order. 

(d)  Paragraphs  4 and  5 are  similar  to  those  of  the 
division  order.  The  artillery  brigade  axis  of  signal  com- 
munication should  be  announced.  The  artillery  regimental 
command  posts  may  or  may  not  be  announced,  depending 
on  the  situation.  Their  announcement  tends  to  avoid  con- 
fusion, but  may  hamper  the  regimental  commanders,  even 
though  the  locations  are  those  recommended  by  them  prior 
to  issuance  of  the  order.* 

(e)  The  distribution  should  include  the  general  staff, 
the  division  signal  officer,  and  supported  infantry  comman- 
ders. 

(f)  (1)  The  artillery  annex,  when  issued,  has  a dual 
function.  It  gives  the  supported  troops  more  complete  in- 
formation than  can  be  found  in  the  artillery  subparagraph 
of  the  division  field  order,  and  it  is  a field  order  for  the  ar- 
tillery brigade. 


ARTILLERY  COMBAT  ORDERS 


253 


(2)  Usually  it  will  be  more  comprehensive  than  other 
artillery  brigade  field  orders,  particularly  in  prescribing 
methods  of  procedure;  that  is,  in  giving  rules  for  the  gui- 
dance of  subordinate  units  in  the  accomplishment  of  desig- 
nated missions. 

(3)  It  will  be  issued  only  when  the  situation  cannot  be 
met  through  the  artillery  subparagraph  of  the  division  or- 
der and  an  ordinary  artillery  brigade  field  order. 

5.  Orders  of  Regiments  and  Subordinate  Units. — 

(a)  When  time  permits,  regimental  orders  are  written. 
When  written,  they  are  similar  in  form  and  substance,  to 
brigade  field  orders.  Paragraph  1 contains  about  the  same 
information  as  is  found  in  that  paragraph  of  the  field  order 
of  the  supported  unit — normally  an  infantry  brigade.  As 
a rule,  there  are  battalion  subparagraphs  in  paragraph  3. 
Instructions  to  the  service  battery  are  given  in  paragraph 
4. 

(b)  It  often  is  necessary  for  a regimental  commander 
to  issue  verbal  orders,  which  should  conform  to  the  arrange- 
ment of  the  five-paragraph  written  order. 

(c)  Battalion  and  battery  orders  may  be  written,  but 
usually  are  not  issued  as  formal  field  orders.  Often  they  are 
in  message  form,  short  written  instructions  to  subordinate 
commanders.  When  oral,  the  remark  above  as  to  arrange* 
ment  applies. 

(d)  For  a more  detailed  discussion  of  the  ground  to 
be  covered  in  battalion  and  regimental  orders,  see  Chapters 
X and  XI  respectively. 

6.  Use  of  Maps  and  Charts. — (a)  In  all  artillery  or- 
ders and  annexes,  free  use  is  made  of  explanatory  maps, 
tracings,  or  charts. 

(b)  Artillery  locations  or  positions,  schedules  of  fire, 
artillery  zones,  sectors  of  supported  units,  tables  of  displace- 
ment, targets,  etc.,  can  be  shown  more  clearly  on  a map 
than  by  description.  The  written  part  of  the  order  can  thus 
be  made  much  shorter.  In  case  of  especially  important  in- 
structions, the  possibility  of  error  is  minimized  by  the  use 
of  both  map  and  written  instructions. 

(c)  Whenever  maps  are  made  a part  of  an  order,  care 
is  taken  to  employ  an  easily  understood  legend,  and  to  have 
proper  references  in  the  written  part  of  the  order. 


XVII— 1-2 


CHAPTER  XVII 

Corps  and  Army  Artillery 

Paragraphs 


Introduction  1 

Unity  of  Fire  Direction  in  the  Combat  Unit 2 

The  Division  Artillery 3 

Corps  Artillery 4 

Summary  of  Corps  Artillery  Missions 5 

Organic  Artillery  of  the  Corps 6 

Front  Covered  Determines  Assignment : 7 

Mission  Determines  Location  of  Guns 8 

General  Character  of  Corps  Types  of  Weapons 9 

Army  and  Corps  Field  Orders 10 

Army  Artillery 11 

New  Army  Artillery  Organization  12 

Organization  Into  Brigades,  Training,  Etc. 13 

Railway  Artillery 14 

General  Scheme  of  Artillery  Support  and  Assignment 15 

Percentage  of  Guns — Division  and  Army 16 


1.  Introduction. — This  chapter  presents,  in  outline, 
the  subject  matter  of  Volume  II  of  this  work.  The  neces- 
sity for  Corps  and  Army  Artillery  is  shown  by  brief  ex- 
planations of  their  general  functions  and  of  their  relation 
to  Division  Artillery — this  in  preparation  for  the  study  of 
Larger  Units. 

2.  Unity  of  Fire  Direction  in  the ‘Combat  Unit. — 
(a)  Artillery  has  no  independent  role  on  the  field  of  battle; 
its  every  mission  is  imposed  with  a view  to  coordinated  ac- 
tion with  one  or  more  combat  units,  in  which  the  decision 
accrues  from  the  success  of  the  infantry  soldier. 

(b)  Prior  to  attack,  artillery  preparation  aims  at  the 
destruction  or  neutralization  of  the  enemy’s  organized  de- 
fenses and  materiel;  this  in  order  to  afford  such  cover  for 
infantry  deployment  as  will  render  the  success  of  the  at- 
tack more  probable.  During  the  attack,  the  development  of 
fire  superiority,  the  intimate  accompanying  firing,  the  blind- 
ing of  observation  posts,  and  the  neutralization  of  battery 
and  machine  gun  emplacements,  all  have  for  their  object 
the  crushing  of  enemy  morale  and  the  raising  of  our  own, 
the  reduction  of  casualties  in  the  advancing  infantry,  and 


254 


XVII— 2-4 


CORPS  AND  ARMY  ARTILLERY  255 

a conservation  of  their  means  of  offensive  action  that  will 
permit  the  final  stages  of  the  action  to  be  carried  out  at 
least  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  opponent. 

(c)  In  defensive  action,  the  infantry  is  supported  by 
guns  which  are  ever  ready  to  crush  an  expected  assault,  to 
check  an  enemy’s  attack  or  to  cooperate  in  a counter  attack 
for  the  purpose  of  ejecting  an  enemy  that  has  penetrated 
our  position. 

(d)  This  combined  action  demands  cordial  coopera- 
tion, and  mutual  appreciation  of  each  others’  needs  and  of 
the  fire  power  that  can  be  developed  by  each.  Above  all 
there  is  need  for  that  artillery  unity  of  fire  direction , within 
the  combat  unit,  that  will  permit  full  development  of  fire 
power  to  neutralize  the  enemy  wherever  he  impedes  the  in- 
fantry progress  or  imperils  its  security. 

3.  The  Division  Artillery. — The  infantry  division  is 
the  great  combat  unit  of  the  combined  arms.  The  division 
artillery  is  a component  part  thereof.  Thus,  when  a division 
operates  alone,  all  artillery  present,  assigned  or  attached 
(regardless  of  numbers  or  calibers)  comes  under  the  Division 
Artillery  Commander,  forming  a single  command  called 
“Division  Artillery.”  Organically,  the  guns  must  be  light 
and  mobile,  limited  in  numbers  to  minimum  requirements, 
and  suited  to  destruction  of  men,  horses,  and  materiel.  They 
should  possess  their  own  means  of  supply  within  the  combat 
area.  They  must  be  organized  for  immediate  fire  support 
of  designated  infantry  units,  and  for  fire  concentration 
along  any  portion  of  the  division  front,  in  accordance  with 
the  development  of  the  action. 

4.  Corps  Artillery. — (a)  In  contrast  to  the  action  of 
a single  combat  division,  consider  that  of  a corps,  with  two 
or  more  combat  divisions  cooperating  in  a single  attack, 
and  with  other  divisions  in  support  or  at  rest.  Each  attack- 
ing or  front  line  division  has  with  it  its  organic  artillery,  re- 
enforced by  such  materiel  as  has  become  available  and  has 
been  assigned  to  it. 

(b)  Why,  then,  do  we  require  additional  fire  support? 
There  are  several  reasons  why  we  require  it,  and  why  it 
should  not,  in  its  entirety,  be  assigned,  even  temporarily, 
to  the  several  divisions. 


\ 


XVII— 4 


256  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

1st. — In  a combined  attack  of  two  or  more  divisions, 
there  must  be  certain  coordination  brought  about  by  a 
higher  commander.  The  divisions  are  limited  to  designated 
zones  of  action.  Questions  as  to  targets  along  a common 
boundary  must  be  settled,  and  areas  may  have  to  be  neutral- 
ized that  belong  to  none  of  the  divisions  engaged.  In  the 
first  instance,  the  situation  can  be  met  by  the  specific  as- 
signment of  such  missions  to  one  of  the  divisions  concerned. 
As  for  the  second,  the  situation  could  best  be  met  by  a sup- 
erior who  has  the  means  and  authority  to  act  and  is  disin- 
terested as  to  the  local  success  of  any  particular  division  ex- 
cept as  to  its  influence  on  the  general  engagement.  If 
there  is  considered  an  enemy  area  between  the  zones  of  two 
adjacent  divisions  engaged  in  cutting  off  a salient,  or  to  the 
area  between  divisions  engaged  in  a combined  frontal  and 
flank  attack,  the  necessity  for  higher  artillery  control  and 
assistance  becomes  clear. 

2d. — Division  artillery  must  possess  great  mobility  and 
simple  supply.  Hence  the  missions  imposed  must  be  met  by 
light  guns  of  medium  range,  aided  by  the  fire  of  howitzers 
upon  dead  spaces  not  covered  by  the  flat  trajectory  pieces. 
Division  artillery  missions  normally  are  limited  to  the  areas 
immediately  in  front  of  the  divisions,  and  to  targets  suited 
to  projectiles  of  light  caliber.  Something  must  come  to 
their  aid  in  attacking  targets  beyond  their  reach,  and  in  fir- 
ing upon  protected  command  and  observation  posts,  pro- 
tected machine  gun  and  battery  emplacements,  and  upon 
strongly  defended  areas  and  fortified  points. 

The  next  higher  unit,  the  corps,  must  step  in  and  take 
over  such  missions,  and  hence  must  possess  guns  and  howit- 
zers appropriate  to  this  work. 

3d. — The  resistance  to  be  encountered  by  a division,  in 
its  advance,  cannot  be  judged  with  certainty.  Sometimes 
the  advance  is  checked  as  foreseen;  at  other  times  these 
checks  come  as  a surprise.  In  either  case,  additional  fire  is 
needed.  Normally,  the  corps  artillery  is  called  upon  for 
this  additional  fire.  In  general,  calls  upon  a neighboring 
division  for  this  additional  fire  are  to  be  avoided,  as  a di- 
minished artillery  support  may  jeopardize  its  success. 


CORPS  AND  ARMY  ARTILLERY 


257 


4th. — Likewise  in  defense,  guns,  in  addition  to  those 
available  in  the  division,  may  be  required  to  check  an  enemy 
attack.  If  the  attack  be  local,  the  artillery  of  adjacent  units 
may  be  called  upon ; but,  if  it  be  general,  assistance  must  be 
sought  from  the  corps,  and  the  corps  must  be  prepared  for 
the  task. 

5th. — The  longer  stabilization  exists,  the  stronger  the 
defensive  organization  and  the  more  essential  the  employ- 
ment of  medium  and  heavy  guns  and  howitzers.  Such  pieces 
form  no  part  of  the  division  artillery,  hence  the  corps  must 
come  to  the  rescue  with  additional  powerful  assistance. 

While  providing  this  means  of  relief,  no  greater  aid 
can  be  afforded  the  division  (nor  can  better  use  be  made  of 
the  corps  artillery)  than  by  taking  up  counter  battery 
work.  This  task  is  routine  with  the  corps. 

6th. — We  have  noted  that,  in  the  rolling  barrage,  the 
guns  of  the  division  support  the  advancing  infantry  to  a 
depth  of  about  one  hundred  yards.  Beyond  this  distance, 
for  another  fifteen  hundred  yards  or  more,  enemy  machine 
guns  and  trench  mortars  can  fire  effectively  upon  the  ad- 
vancing infantry,  if  seen.  The  duty  of  covering  the  addi- 
tional areas  so  as  to  neutralize  such  emplacements,  and  such 
enemy  batteries  as  impede  the  advance  of  the  infantry,  falls 
upon  the  heavier  calibers  temporarily  assigned  the  division 
or  functioning  as  corps  or  army  artillery. 

5.  Summary  of  Corps  Artillery  Missions. — General 
missions  for  corps  artillery  are — 

Neutralization  and  destruction,  in  areas  not  included 
in  division  zones  but  menacing  the  safety  of  advancing 
troops ; 

General  fire  action  over  areas  beyond  those  normally 
assigned  to  the  divisional  artillery — say  beyond  5,000  yards 
from  the  division  front  up  to  about  10,000  yards; 

Counter  battery  work; 

Distant  interdiction  and  harassing  fire  beyond  5,000 
yards  from  the  enemy's  front  line  to  a depth  of  about 
10,000  yards; 

Reinforcing  the  fire  of  division  artilleries  to  meet  tem- 
porarily difficult  situations; 

Covering  targets  inappropriate  for  division  artillery, 
on  account  of  range  or  resistance ; and 


258 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


Deepening  the  counter  preparation  or  the  rolling  bar- 
rage, and  assisting  in  carrying  on  the  latter  when  it  passes 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  75s. 

6.  Organic  Artillery  of  the  Corps. — (a)  Guns  and 
howitzers  of  suitable  calibers  and  range  are  required  to  ac- 
complish the  missions  above  noted.  The  present  organiza- 
tion of  the  corps  artillery  includes: 

3 regiments  of  155-mm.  howitzers, 

1 regiment  of  155-mm.  guns, 

1 observation  battalion  (flash  ranging),  and 
1 ammunition  train. 

There  is  also  an  anti-aircraft  regiment,  not  a part  of 
the  corps  artillery 

(b)  This  artillery  generally  is  increased  by  the  army 
according  to  requirements,  and  any  portion  of  the  whole 
may  be  passed  temporarily  to  the  division  to  meet  a special 
situation. 

7.  Front  Covered  Determines  Assignment. — (a)  It 
is  a principle  that  any  gups  assigned  to  the  corps,  and  re- 
tained under  its  control,  shall  be  able  to  cover  the  fronts  of 
at  least  two  adjoining  divisions.  They  should  have  a range 
of  10,000  to  12,000  yards  to  meet  this  requirement. 

(b)  Within  the  corps  zone,  the  corps  artillery  is  ex- 
pected to  reach  all  enemy  batteries  within  about  10,000 
•yards  of  our  front  lines.  In  attack,  with  the  assistance  of 
army  artillery  if  necessary,  it  should  carry  on  the  barrage 
from  the  limit  of  the  75-mm.  guns  to  the  day’s  final  ob- 
jective, if  within  ita  range. 

8.  Mission  Determines  Location  of  Guns. — Corps 
artillery  guns,  like  those  of  the  division,  are  so  installed  as 
best  to  carry  out  the  missions  assigned.  Consequently,  in 
defense,  some  are  found  well  forward  in  the  light  gun  lines, 
while  others  are  *o  the  rear,  covering  the.  main  defen- 
sive position.  In  attack,  the  mass  of  these  guns  is  pushed 
forward  so  as  to  take  advantage  of  their  long  range.  They 
are  used  in  counter  battery,  in  harassing  and  interdiction 
fire,  and  in  supporting  the  infantry  in  the  later  stages  of 
the  attack. 

9.  General  Character  of  Corps  Types  of  Weapons. 
— Corps  artillery  consists  essentially  of  medium  and  heavy 


XVII— 9-12 


CORPS  AND  ARMY  ARTILLERY  259 

types,  of  which  the  155-mm.  gun  requires  some  time  for  in- 
stallation. They  are  rather  cumbersome,  but  comprise  the 
lightest  guns  that  can  fulfill  the  required  missions.  As  a 
situation  stabilizes,  the  heavier  types  are  brought  in  from 
the  army.  8-inch  and  9.2-inch  howitzers,  240-mm.  mortars, 
and  additional  155-mm.  guns  frequently  are  added  to  the 
corps  artillery,  while  the  75-mm.  portee  artillery,  6-inch 
trench  mortars,  and  possibly  some  155-mm.  howitzers  are 
passed  on  to  the  division  for  temporary  useu 

10.  Army  and  Corps  Field  Orders. — Army  Field  Or- 
ders, with  artillery  annex,  cover  the  following  points : the 
assignment  of  general  locations,  target  areas,  and  missions ; 
the  allotment  of  ammunition,  and  provision  for  supply ; the 
apportionment  of  suitable  army  materiel  to  the  several 
corps ; and  the  arrangements  for  mutual  support.  Likewise, 
the  corps  orders  cover  corresponding  points  for  the  opera- 
tion of  corps  and  division  artillery.  (See  Chapter  XVI.) 

11.  Army  Artillery. — The  need  for  army  artillery  is 
based  on  the  same  principles  of  support,  coordination,  and 
supply,  as  indicate  the  need  for  corps  artillery.  Through 
army  artillery  headquarters,  the  action  of  all  the  artillery 
of  the  army  is  coordinated  and  controlled ; provision  is  made 
for  artillery  fire  on  targets  lying  without  the  areas  of  the 
several  corps;  fire  is  directed  on  targets  beyond  the  range 
of  the  corps  guns ; and,  when  necessary,  the  corps  and  divi- 
sion artilleries  are  reinforced  by  detachments  from  the  army 
artillery.  The  organization  and  composition  of  the  army 
artillery  are  outlined  in  paragraph  23  (c)  (d)  of  Chapter  I. 

12.  New  Army  Artillery  Organization. — Organi- 
cally, the  army  artillery  consists  of  army  artillery  head- 
quarters and  an  ammunition  train.  The  anti-aircraft  artil- 
lery of  the  army  is  not  an  organic  part  of  the  “army  artil- 
lery.” The  army’s  needs  for  additional  artillery  are  met 
by  detachments  from  the  GHQ  Reserve  Artillery.  Accord- 
ing to  the  situation,  GHQ  Reserve  Artillery,  thus  attached 
to  the  army,  may  include  any  or  all  calibers,  from  the  75- 
mm.  gun  to  the  heaviest  types  of  railroad  artillery.  It  is 
upon  the  latter  that  dependence  is  placed  for  fire  beyond  the 
range  of  corps  guns.  Guns  whose  range  is  insufficient  to 
cover  the  front  of  more  than  one  corps,  usually  do  not Tunc- 


XVII— 12-15 


260  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

tion  as  army  artillery  but  are  apportioned  to  the  several 
corps  for  service  with  the  respective  corps  artilleries,  or  for 
attachment  to  the  component  divisions  thereof. 

13.  Organization  into  Brigades. — Training , etc. — 
Army  artillery  may  include,  in  addition  to  batteries  for  im- 
mediate service,  various  types  held  in  reserve,  or  temporarily 
withdrawn  from  the  several  corps,  for  administration,  sup- 
ply, and  training.  When  practicable,  all  such  artillery,  ex- 
cept the  portee  75s,  is  formed  into  brigades,  whose  organi- 
zation is  disturbed  as  little  as  possible.  Independent  groups 
are  avoided,  in  order  to  limit  the  number  of  headquarters, 
special  staffs,  and  communications. 

14.  Railway  Artillery. — The  railway  artillery  that 
may  be  assigned  to  the  army  artillery,  and  generally  re- 
tained for  duty  therein,  comprises  the  following  calibers 
now  on  hand:  7-inch,  8-inch,  10-inch,  12-inch,  and  14-inch 
guns,  and  12-inch  mortars.  Four  regiments  of  railway  ar- 
tillery are  now  organized,  three  of  8-inch  guns,  and  one  of 
12-inch  mortars,  each  regiment  consisting  of  24  pieces. 
Regiments  of  12-inch  and  14-inch  rifles  are  intended  to 
have  but  2 rifles  per  battery,  a total  of  12  per  regiment. 

15.  General  Scheme  of  Artillery  Support  and  As- 
signment.— (a)  While  there  is  no  chain  of  command  from 
the  army  artillery  down  through  the  corps  and  divisions, 
coordination  is  brought  about  through  a strict  definition 
of  routine  duties  and  missions. 

(b)  Furthermore,  as  will  be  noted  in  “Artillery  Combat 
Orders”  (Chapter  XVI)  the  artillery  fire  power  of  the  en- 
tire command  is  regulated,  developed,  and  controlled  by 
each  successive  commander,  so  as  to  secure  maximum  effort 
and  perfect  coordination  of  the  whole. 

(c) 


(1)  The  army  artillery  functions  in  three  ways:  it  under- 
takes distant  missions  requiring  heavy,  long  range  weapons;  it 
uses  its  fire  in  support  of  one  or  more  of  the  several  corps;  or 
it  is  apportioned,  in  whole  or  in  part,  by  attachment  to  the  several 
corps  according  to  their  relative  needs. 

(2)  When  the  army  artillery  includes  weapons  whose  range 
is  too  short  for  general  army  use,  such  weapons  usually  are  at- 
tached to  corps.  Examples  of  such  weapons  are  the  motorized 
75-mm.  guns,  6-inch  trench  mortars,  and  the  8-inch  and  9.2-inch 
howitzers.  In  like  manner  the  corps  apportions  to  its  divisions, 
according  to  their  needs,  such  of  these  weapons  as  are  of  too 
short  range  for  corps  use,  e.g.,  the  motorized  75-mm.  guns,  and 
the  6-inch  trench  mortars. 


XVII— 15-16 


CORPS  AND  ARMY  ARTILLERY  2GJ 

(d)  The  same  general  idea  is  carried  out  as  to  army, 
corps  and  division  employment  of  artillery  materiel  of  other 
types,  that  may  be  assigned  the  army  from  the  GHQ  Re- 
serve, or  become  subject  to  army  control  in  particular  situa- 
tions. 

16.  Percentage  of  Guns  in  a Division  and  in  an 
Army. — In  the  present  organization  there  are  a limited 
number  of  guns  organically  with  divisions  and  corps,  about 
5 or  6 per  1000  rifles ; but  with  an  army,  possessing  its  quota 
of  GHQ  reserve  materiel,  this  number  is  increased  three- 
fold, giving  about  the  amount  provided  for  in  the  major 
operations  at  Saint  Mihiel,  and  in  the  Argonne  during  the 
last  stages  of  the  war. 


XVIII— 1 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

The  Artillery  Information  Service 

Paragraphs 


Origin,  Development  and  Characteristics 1 

Organization  2 

Sources  of  Information 3 

Information  From  the  Air  Sevice 4 

Army  and  Corps  Artillery  Information  Service 5 

Functions  of  Division  Artillery  Information  Service 6 

Regimental  Artillery  Information  Service 7 

Battalion  and  Battery  A I S 1 8 

Operations  Under  Varying  Conditions 9 


1.  Origin,  Development  and  Characteristics. — (a) 
The  organized  Artillery  Information  Service  had  its  origin 
during  The  World  War,  when  the  Service  des  Renseigments 
de  VArtillerie  was  established,  early  in  1916,  in  every  army 
and  corps  artillery  headquarters  of  the  French  Army.  Prior 
to  this  time,  information  had  been  gathered  by  observation 
and  reconnaissance  conducted  by  the  lower  units — batter- 
ies, battalions  and  regiments,  but  very  little  of  this  infor- 
mation reached  the  higher  headquarters.  With  the  devel- 
opment of  aerial  reconnaissance,  air  photographs,  and  sound 
and  flash  ranging,  the  higher  headquarters  acquired  valu- 
able sources  of  information,  whereby  their  information  be- 
came of  as  much  value  to  the  artilleryman  as  that  obtained 
at  the  front  by  subordinate  units.  It  became  necessary 
to  establish  channels  for  disseminating  this  information  in 
both  directions,  and  systematic  means  for  collating,  record- 
ing, and  utilizing  information  to  a maximum  advantage. 

(b)  The  Artillery  Information  Service  was  an  offspring 
of  the  Intelligence  Section  of  the  General  Staff.  They 
worked  hand  in  hand,  employing  both  common  and  inde- 
pendent sources  of  information  and  assisting  each  other  in 
every  possible  way. 

They  did  not  become  rival  services,  for  the  reason  that 
their  purposes  were  essentially  dissimilar.  The  main  ob- 
ject of  the  Artillery  Information  Service  was  to  insure  the 
effective  accomplishment  of  the  artillery  fire  missions  by 


262 


XVIII— 1-2 


ARTILLERY  INFORMATION  SERVICE  263 

accurately  locating  objectives  for  the  guns  to  fire  on,  es- 
pecially hostile  artillery.  The  work  of  the  Intelligence  Sec- 
tion of  the  General  Staff  was  “to  collect,  collate,  and  dis- 
seminate information  of  the  enemy,  including  his  organiza- 
tion and  strength,  his  position,  armament  and  equipment, 
his  morale  and  habits,  in  order  that  his  intentions  might  be 
foreseen  and  his  future  actions  defeated  ” The  Artillery 
Information  Service  is  concerned  principally  with  the  tech- 
nical information  that  can  be  utilized  by  the  batteries  while 
the  Intelligence  Section  is  concerned  principally  with  infor- 
mation of  tactical  value,  such  as  identifications,  enemy 
strength,  activity,  movements,  and  data  from  which  the 
enemy's  intentions  may  be  deduced. 

(c)  The  importance  and  efficiency  of  the  Artillery  In- 
formation Service  increased  with  the  increasing  needs  for 
accurately  locating  hostile  batteries.  Because  its  purpose 
was  counter  battery  work,  the  service  became  highly  or- 
ganized at  the  headquarters  of  the  army  and  corps  chief  of 
artillery  while,  in  the  division  artillery  brigades,  it  was 
comparatively  neglected.  Later  it  was  demonstrated  that, 
in  moving  situations,  the  highly  organized  services  in  the 
higher  headquarters  failed  to  operate  with  the  same  effi- 
ciency as  under  more  stabilized  conditions,  and  that  the  divi- 
sion artillery  became  almost  the  sole  source  of  artillery  in- 
formation. The  service  now  extends  down  to  include  the 
headquarters  of  battalions  and  even  batteries. 

(d)  In  open  warfare,  the  army  and  corps  artillery  in- 
formation services  continued  to  function  as  best  they  could, 
digesting  the  information  received  from  the  division  artil- 
lery, and  from  other  sources,  and  keeping  the  higher  com- 
manders fully  informed  as  to  the  artillery  situation  of  both 
sides.  But,  under  conditions  involving  rapid  movement, 
their  information  bulletins  were  of  very  limited  value  to 
the  division  artillery  because  the  information  therein  con- 
tained usually  was  received  too  late  to  be  utilized. 

2.  Organization. — (a)  Theoretically,  every  individual 
of  an  artillery  command  is  a member  of  the  information  ser-  , 
vice,  but  only  a limited  personnel  of  each  artillery  head- 
quarters, as  provided  for  by  the  Tables  of  Organization,  is 
charged  specifically  with  collecting,  collating  and  dissemin- 


XVIII — 2-3 


264  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

ating  the  information  gathered  from  all  available  sources. 
On  the  staff  of  each  chief  of  artillery,  and  of  the  commander 
of  each  artillery  unit,  from  the  brigade  down  to  include 
battalions  or  even  batteries,  there  are  one  or  more  officers 
who  have  direct  charge  of  the  Artillery  Information  Service 
of  the  headquarters  or  unit  to  which  they  belong.  A small 
enlisted  personnel  also  is  provided  for  clerical  work  and 
records.  At  the  headquarters  of  brigades  and  smaller  units, 
these  officers  are  called  Intelligence  Officers.  At  the  head- 
quarters of  an  army  or  corps  chief  of  artillery  they  are 
called  Artillery  Information  Officers. 

(b)  Artillery  liaison  officers  and  attached  personnel, 
on  duty  with  infantry  and  cavalry  units,  are  for  the  pur- 
pose of  securing  cooperation  rather  than  information.  They 
are  not  members  of  the  Artillery  Information  Service  of 
their  units,  but  constitute  one  of  the  sources  of  information 
upon  which  this  service  relies.  Organically,  the  artillery 
information  service  of  an  artillery  headquarters  pertains 
only  to  the  staff  of  that  headquarters  and  has  no  direct 
control  or  supervision  over  this  service  in  the  headquarters 
of  subordinate  units,  except  as  may  be  directed  by  the  com- 
manding officer  of  the  higher  unit.  In  practice,  the  artil- 
lery information  services  of  the  various  artillery  headquar- 
ters work  in  close  cooperation  with  each  other  and  with 
G2,  actually  operating  as  a centralized  system. 

3.  Sources  of  Information. — With  the  exception  of 
sound  and  flash  ranging  sections,  the  officers  of  the  artillery 
information  service  seldom  have  direct  control  over  the 
sources  from  which  information  is  derived.  The  principal 
sources  of  information  are: 

(a)  Reconnaissance  on  the  march  and  in  moving  situa- 
tions. 

(b)  Artillery  officers  and  observing  parties  with  front 
line  units. 

(It  may  be  argued  that  all  information  required  should 
be  sent  back  by  the  infantry  for  general  dissemination. 
Theoretically,  this  may  be  so,  but  experience  has  shown  that 
the  artillery  must  maintain  its  own  agencies  of  information 
in  the  front  line,  and  with  the  headquarters  of  infantry 
units.) 


XVIII— 3-4 


ARTILLERY  INFORMATION  SERVICE  265 

(c)  Observation  posts.  All  artillery  observation  posts 
are  charged  with  reporting  immediately  all  information 
of  value,  but  observation  posts  actually  constituting  part  of 
the  artillery  information  system  are  limited  to  those  es- 
tablished by  the  headquarters  of  battalions  and  higher  units, 
and  those  established  by  flash  ranging  sections. 

(d)  Air  Service  (balloons,  airplanes,  photographs) . 

(e)  Exchange  with  G2,  and  with  information  services 
of  other  arms  and  other. artillery  headquarters. 

(f)  Radio  interception.  By  intercepting  messages 
from  a hostile  airplane  to  a ground  receiving  station,  and 
knowing  the  hostile  batteries  pertaining  to  this  station,  our 
counter  batteries  often  can  be  warned  before  the  enemy 
opens  fire,  so  that  prompt  neutralization  may  be  effected. 
Applicable  to  periods  of  long  stabilization. 

(g)  (1)  Shell  fragments , fuses  and  unexploded  shells. — Un- 
its of  ail  arms  subject  to  hostile  artillery  fire  should  furnish,  to  the 
nearest  artillery  intelligence  officer,  immediate  information  as  to 
the  time  and  direction  of  such  fire,  and  of  the  number,  kind  and 
caliber  of  shells  falling  in  their  vicinity.  With  this  information, 
enemy  batteries  frequently  can  be  connected  with  their  habitual 
objectives  and  hence  the  efficiency  of  counter  battery  work  in- 
creased. 

(2)  When  complete  information  cannot  be  supplied,  frag- 
ments of  shells  and  fuses  should  be  sent  to  the  nearest  artillery 
intelligence  officer,  or  a sketch  of  an  unexploded  shell  made  show- 
ing dimensions,  color,  markings,  fuse,  number  and  size  of  rota- 
ting bands  and  the  number  of  grooves  cut  in  them  by  the  rifling. 

(3)  Any  unit  subjected  to  a hostile  gas  bombardment  should 
notify  at  once  the  nearest  artillery  headquarters,  and  keep,  as 
accurately  as  possible,  a count  of  the  number  of  rounds  fired. 
An  immediate  investigation  by  a chemical  officer,  or  by  an; 
artillery  intelligence  officer  specially  trained  in  gas  employ- 
ment, may  result  in  obtaining  valuable  technical  or  tactical  in- 
formation. 


(h)  Flash  ranging  (see  Volume  II).  There  is  one  ob- 
servation (flash)  battalion  with  each  army  corps. 

(i)  Sound  ranging  (see  Volume  II) . Units  from  GHQ 
reserve  are  attached  to  army  artillery  for  installation  and 
control. 

4.  Information  From  the  Air  Service. — (a)  When 
visibility  is  good,  and  when  ample  protection  is  afforded  by 
anti-aircraft  artillery  and  airplanes,  balloons  furnish  a great 
part  of  the  information  concerning  enemy  activity,  such  as 
batteries  in  action,  circulation  on  roads  and  railroads,  work- 


XVIII— 4-5 


266  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— -ARTILLERY 

ing  parties,  troop  movements,  etc.  Much  of  this  informa- 
tion is  phoned  at  once  to  appropriate  batteries  so  that  fire 
may  be  opened  without  delay  on  fleeting  objectives  or  hos- 
tile batteries  in  action.  Under  favorable  road  and  weather 
conditions,  balloons  may  follow  an  advance  and  keep  close 
track  of  the  hostile  artillery.  In  stabilized  sectors,  bal- 
loon observers  submit  daily  reports  to  the  corps  artillery 
information  service,  which  is  responsible  that  balloon  ob- 
servers have  the  necessary  telephone  communication  for 
transmitting  artillery  information,  and  that  they  under- 
stand what  information  is  desired  and  to  whom  it  is  to  be 
transmitted. 

(b)  Air  photographs  furnish  the  surest  means  of  posi- 
tively identifying  the  locations  of  enemy  batteries,  but,  in 
moving  situations,  they  generally  are  received  too  late  to 
be  of  value.  Applications  to  have  air  photographs  made  are 
submitted  to  G2.  Air  photographs  of  interest  to  the  ar- 
tillery may  be  divided  into  three  classes : 

(1)  Photographs  of  front  line  trenches,  machine  gun  em- 
placements, observation  posts,  etc.,  including  oblique  photographs 
taken  from  a low  altitude.  These  are  of  interest  chiefly  to  divi- 
sion artillery,  and  are  distributed  to  include  the  headquarters  of 
regiments. 

(2)  Photographs  of  the  zone  from  immediately  in  rear  of 
the  first  enemy  position  to  about  5000  yards  in  rear  of  this. 
This  zone  includes  most  of  the  enemy  batteries,  and  is  of  interest 
chiefly  to  the  corps  artillery  information  service. 

(3)  Photographs  of  the  zone  in  rear  of  (2)  to  include  the 
extreme  range  of  the  army  artillery’s  heaviest  guns.  Of  interest 
chiefly  to  army  artillery. 

5.  Army  and  Corps  Artillery  Information  Ser- 
vices.— (a)  These  are  the  information  services  pertaining 
to  the  artillery  headquarters  of  the  army  and  corps  respec- 
tively. Their  functions  are  generally  similar.  Both  have 
artillery  units  to  which  direct  information  is  furnished,  and 
the  reports,  records,  maps,  charts,  and  office  routine  are 
substantially  the  same. 

(b)  The  army  artillery  information  service  consoli- 
dates the  artillery  information  received  from  the  various 
army  corps,  verifies  and  completes  it,  and  disseminates  this 
consolidated  information  in  the  form  of  bulletins  and  maps. 
It  collects,  records,  and  supplies  information  necessary  to 
the  operation  of  the  army  artillery.  It  sees  that  the  artil- 


XVIII— 5-6 


ARTILLERY  INFORMATION  SERVICE  267 

lery  information  services  in  the  subordinate  units  are  uni- 
formly conducted.  It  exercises  tactical  control  over  the 
sound  ranging  companies,  delegating  the  operation  and  utili- 
zation within  corps  zones  to  the  respective  corps  artillery 
information  services. 

(c)  A detailed  discussion  of  the  army  and  corps  in- 
formation services  will  be  found  in  Volume  II. 

(d)  The  usefulness  of  counter  batteries  depends 
largely  upon  the  efficiency  of  the  artillery  information  ser- 
vice, the  experience  and  judgment  of  the  counter  battery 
officer,  and  his  knowledge  of  the  hostile  batteries  to  be  at- 
tacked. 

(e)  In  the  army,  the  counter  battery  officer , under  the 
army  chief  of  artillery,  directs  the  counter  battery  work  of 
the  army  artillery,  and  also  that  of  one  corps  artillery 
against  hostile  batteries  in  the  zone  of  another  corps.  He 
coordinates  the  work  of  the  corps  counter  batteries  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  army  plan  of  action. 

(f)  In  neither  the  corps  nor  the  army  can  the  same 
officer  handle  both  the  artillery  information  and  the  counter 
battery  work.  The  functions  of  each  are  too  important  and 
the  time  required  too  much  for  such  consolidation. 

6.  Functions  of  Division  Artillery  Information 
Service. — (a)  The  intelligence  officers  of  the  headquarters 
of  brigades,  regiments  and  battalions  have  three  distinct, 
but  closely  related  functions : 

(1)  They  are  agents  of  the  artillery  information  service  of 
the  next  higher  artillery  headquarters. 

(2)  They  are  charged  with  the  information  service  of  the 
headquarters  to  which  they  belong,  and  exercise  such  supervision 
and  control  over  the  information  services  of  subordinate  units 
as  may  be  directed  by  the  commanding  officer. 

(3)  They  are  agents  of  the  division  G2,  and  bear  the  same 
relation  to  him  as  the  intelligence  officers  of  other  arms. 

(b)  The  Artillery  Information  Service  of  a Divi- 
sion Artillery  Brigade  comprises  the  following  personnel : 
1 captain,  1 lieutenant,  1 warrant  officer  (draftsman)  ; 1 
corporal  (clerk)  and  attached  couriers.  The  duties  are  as 
follows : 

(1)  To  collect,  collate  and  verify  information  from  all  sources 
available,  including  the  study  of  air  photographs.  Though  par- 
ticular attention  is  given  to  information  of  special  value  to  the 


XVIII— 6 


268  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

division  artillery,  the  information  gathered  must  include  all  that 
is  of  use  to  any  military  service. 

(2)  (a)  To  disseminate  information,  sending  that  origina- 
ting within  the  brigade  to  the  corps  artillery  information  service 
and  division  G2,  and  information  received  from  all  sources  to 
the  regiments  of  the  brigade. 

(b)  Information  of  particular  or  immediate  importance  is 
transmitted,  to  the  units  or  services  concerned,  by  telephone,  radio 
or  courier.  A daily  information  report  is  rendered  to  the  corps 
AIS  and  a copy  sent  to  division  G2.  The  form  of  this  report 
used  in  The  World  War  is  inserted  in  this  chapter.  Its  use  is 
applicable  primarily  to  periods  of  long  stabilization. 

(c)  GHQ,  army,  and.  corps  information  bulletins,  including 
those  of  the  GHQ,  army  and  corps  chiefs  of  artillery,  usually 
are  distributed  to  include  artillery  regimental  headquarters. 

(3)  To  keep  the  artillery  brigade  commander  and  his  staff 
thoroughly  informed  on  all  matters  of  information  in  which 
they  may  be  interested. 

(4)  To  exercise  such  control  and  supervision  over  the  artil- 
lery information  service  in  the  subordinate  units  as  may  be 
directed  by  the  artillery  brigade  commander. 

(5)  To  supervise  the  establishment  and  maintenance  of  bri- 
gade posts  (brigade  observation  posts  are  generally  established 
for  the  personal  use  of  the  brigade  commander,  especially  in 
moving  situations.  They  are  seldom  established  as  part  of  the 
artillery  information  system). 

A.  I.  S.  Form  3 

(c)  Daily  report  of  division  A.  I.  O. 

Division F.A.  Brigade 

Visibility:  AM 

PM 

Enemy  Artillery  Activity 


Date  Hour  | 

Battery 

Region 

Cal 

No.  of  Source  of 

Shells  Information 

Objectives 

Remarks 

| 

1 

!• 

Total  Shots:  (Grouped  by  calibers) 


General  Information 

Infantry  activity: 

Aeronautics : 

Airplanes : 

Balloons : 

Movements : 

Troops : 

Trains : 

Works: 

Miscellaneous: 

General  impressions  of  the  day: 
Enemy  activity: 

Own  activity: 

Aeronautics : 

Visibility: 


XVIII— 6-8 


ARTILLERY  INFORMATION  SERVICE  269 


Firing  of  the F.A.  Brigade 


Date 

Hour 

Battery 

No.  of 
Shots 

Kind  of 
Projectile 

Objective 

Observed 

by 

Effect 

7.  Regimental  AIS. — (a)  The  intelligence  officer  at 
the  headquarters  of  a division  artillery  regiment  is  a first 
lieutenant.  He  is  assisted  by  a sergeant  in  the  capacity  of 
clerk.  Scouts,  observers  and  other  personnel  of  regimental 
headquarters  are  utilized  by  the  intelligence  officer  under 
authority  of  the  regimental  commander  or  adjutant. 

(b)  The  duties  of  the  regimental  intelligence  officer 
are  almost  identical  with  those  of  the  brigade  intelligence 
officer,  except  that  he  is  a link  between  the  artillery  informa- 
tion service  of  the  battalions  and  that  of  the  brigade.  He 
sends  daily  to  the  brigade  intelligence  officer  a written 
summary  of  information  for  incorporation  in  the  report 
prepared  for  the  corps  artillery  information  service  (see 
preceding  paragraph). 

(c)  Regimental  observation  posts  may  be  established 
to  supplement  the  work  of  the  battalion  observation  posts 
in  gathering  information,  but,  more  frequently,  they  are 
established  for  the  personal  use  of  the  regimental  com- 
mander, especially  in  moving  situations. 

8.  Battalion  and  Battery  AIS. — (a)  The  intelligence 
officer  at  the  headquarters  of  a battalion  is  a first  or  second 
lieutenant.  He  has  charge  of  the  observer  (or  instrument) 
detail,  and  utilizes  this  personnel  to  establish  and  main- 
tain one  or  more  observation  posts.  The  battalion  observa- 
tion posts  are  one  of  the  main  sources  of  information  util- 
ized by  the  artillery  information  service.  All  information 
obtained  is  transmitted  to  the  battalion  liaison  officers  and 
other  personnel  attached  to  the  headquarters  of  infantry 
units,  to  battalion  scouts  and  reconnaissance  parties,  and 
to  the  batteries,  including  their  observation  posts  and  re- 
connaissance details. 

(b)  The  duties  of  a battalion  intelligence  officer  are 
very  similar  to  those  of  the  brigade  and  regimental  intel- 
ligence officers  already  discussed,  except  that  the  battalion 


XVIII— 8-9 


270  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

intelligence  officer  actually  gathers  a very  large  proportion 
of  the  information  utilized  by  the  artillery  information  ser- 
vice, while  the  intelligence  officers  of  the  higher  headquar- 
ters handle  the  collation,  verification  and  distribution. 

(c)  The  battery  reconnaissance  officers,  in  addition  to 
their  many  other  duties,  are  virtually  (though  not  organi- 
cally) agents  of  the  battalion  intelligence  officer.  Batteries 
cannot  avoid  gathering  a large  amount  of  information  of 
value  to  other  units,  as  well  as  to  the  higher  commanders. 
The  importance  of  prompt  transmittal  of  information,  of 
known  or  possible  value,  should  not  be  lost  sight  of  by  bat- 
tery commanders  and  other  battery  personnel. 

9.  Operation  Under  Varying  Conditions. — The  fore- 
going paragraphs  are  a compilation,  mostly  from  the  Regu- 
lations for  the  Artillery  Information  Service  issued  at  Gen- 
eral Headquarters,  A.E.F.,  France,  in  August,  1918.  The 
organization  and  methods  prescribed  therein  were  those 
found  to  give  the  greatest  efficiency  under  the  conditions 
of  position  warfare.  Many  features  of  the  system  will  break 
down  in  passing  to  warfare  involving  rapid  movement.  To 
what  extent  this  will  occur  will  depend  on  the  particular 
situation  and  on  the  measures  that  are  taken  beforehand  to 
meet  the  changed  conditions.  But  whatever  temporary  in- 
terruption to  any  part  of  the  system  may  be  caused  by 
rapid  movements,  it  must  be  in  readiness  to  re-establish 
itself  as  soon  as  conditions  stabilize,  even  momentarily. 


XIX — 1-2 


CHAPTER  XIX 

Anti-Aircraft  Service 

Paragraphs 


General  1 

Function  of  Coast  Artillery  Corps 2 

Materiel  and  Missions 3 

Tactical  Employment  4 

Organization  * 5 

Technique  6 


1.  General. — (a)  Troops  for  anti-aircraft  defense  are 
army  and  corps  troops  which  function  normally  under  in- 
structions and  orders  from  headquarters  higher  than  a divi- 
sion. On  certain  occasions,  as  in  a march  forward  in  the 
presence  of  the  enemy,  certain  elements,  such  as  the  machine 
guns,  may  be  attached  temporarily  to  divisions. 

(b)  The  subject  of  anti-aircraft  defense  is  treated  more 
in  detail  in  Volume  II,  Tactics  and  Technique,  Artillery. 
This  chapter  is  limited  to  a general  discussion  of  the  em- 
ployment of  the  elements  of  the  defense,  the  subject  being 
treated  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  officer,  serving  with  a 
division,  who  finds  anti-aircraft  elements  located  and  func- 
tioning in  the  division  area. 

2.  Function  of  Coast  Artillery  Corps. — (a)  The 
duty  of  providing  anti-aircraft  defense,  in  the  military  es- 
tablishment, is  a function  of  the  Coast  Artillery  Corps. 

(b)  The  anti-aircraft  defense  of  the  corps  and  the 
army  are  handled  by  the  respective  commanders  of  the 
corps  regiments  and  army  brigade  of  anti-aircraft  troops. 
These  officers,  in  addition  to  being  tactical  commanders, 
are  heads  of  the  anti-aircraft  service  at  the  respective  head- 
quarters, and,  as  such,  are  staff  officers  of  the  corps  and 
army  commanders.  In  the  accomplishment  of  its  missions, 
the  anti-aircraft  service  is  more  intimately  related  to  the 
air  service  than  to  any  other  branch  of  the  military  estab- 
lishment. In  combatting  enemy  air  activity,  its  role  is  de- 
fensive, whereas  that  of  the  air  service  is  offensive. 


271 


XIX— 3-4 


272  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

3.  Materiel  and  Missions. — (a)  Anti-aircraft  defense 
employs  artillery,  machine  guns  and  searchlights. 

(b)  Missions  of  anti-aircraft  artillery  are: 

(1)  To  prevent  enemy  aircraft  flying  at  such  heights  over 
our  positions  that  they  can  observe  and  photograph,  direct  artil- 
lery fire,  attack  our  balloons,  drop  bombs  with  accuracy,  or  at- 
tack troops  with  machine  guns. 

(2)  To  prevent  enemy  aircraft  dropping  bombs  on  vital 
points  behind  our  lines. 

(3)  To  compel  enemy  aircraft,  flying  in  formation,  to  lose 
their  formation  and  thus  render  them  more  vulnerable  to  at- 
tack by  our  own  airplanes. 

(4)  To  furnish  information  of  enemy  aerial  activity. 

(5)  While  the  ideal  is  actually  to  destroy  enemy  aircraft, 
the  real  efficacy  of  anti-aircraft  artillery  should  be  judged  by  its 
ability  to  disturb  the  morale  of  the  aviator,  to  force  him  to 
change  continuously  his  course  and  altitude,  and  to  fly  so  high 
that  he  will  be  beyond  the  range  of  good  visibility.  If  these  aims 
are  accomplished,  it  will  be  impossible  for  the  enemy  aviators 
to  make  accurate  observations;  airplanes  directing  artillery  fire, 
as  well  as  those  making  photographs,  will  work  under  extreme 
difficulties;  bombing  planes  will  be  ineffective  because  of  the  great 
altitude  at  which  they  must  fly,  and  hostile  fighting  airplanes 
will  be  prevented  from  carrying  on  their  combat  missions  against 
troops,  aircraft  and  observation  balloons. 

(6)  Since  the  vulnerable  part  of  an  airplane  consists  of  less 
than  two  cubic  yards,  very  few  direct  hits  can  be  expected.  There- 
fore, it  must  be  the  endeavor  to  establish  a danger  zone  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  airplane.  “The  greatest  and  most  effective  dan- 
ger zone  is  established  by  using  high  explosive  shell  of  the  largest 
caliber  consistent  with  the,  necessary  rapidity  of  fire.” 

(c)  Missions  of  anti-aircraft  machine  guns  are: 

(1)  Defense  of  our  front  against  low  flying  planes. 

(2)  Close  defense,  particularly  against  - bombing  of  head- 
quarters, railheads,  dumps,  etc. 

(d)  Searchlights  are  used  for  illumination  of  targets 
for  artillery  ground  fire,  and  for  air  service  pursuit. 

4.  Tactical  Employment. — (a)  The  tactical  employ- 
ment of  the  elements  of  this  defense  falls  under  two  general 
classifications : 

(1)  Front  line  defense. 

(2)  Seacoast  and  back  area  defense. 

(b)  The  employment  of  the  various  anti-aircraft  ele- 
ments in  the  front  line  defense  are: 

(1)  Machine  guns  in  two  lines;  guns  in  groups  of  2 or  4; 
not  over  2000  yards  between  groups  and  lines;  first  line  of  guns 
within  2000  yards  of  our  front  lines.  These  anti-aircraft  ma- 
chine gun* battalions  should  not  be  confused  with  the  anti-air- 
craft machine  gun  elements  of  other  units,  such  as  those  with 
field  batteries  or  with  observation  balloons. 


XIX— 4-6 


ANTI-AIRCRAFT  SERVICE  273 

(2)  Artillery,  in  batteries  of  4 guns  each,  in  two  lines;  from 
4000  to  7000  yards  between  batteries;  first  line  normally  about 
4000  yards  behind  front  line,  but  placed  to  protect  line  of  resis- 
tance, first  battle  position.  Batteries  mutually  supporting. 

(3)  Searchlights  in  gun  battery  groups;  normally  four,  in 
the  form  of  a square  not  more  than  3000  yards  to  a side;  the 
center  of  the  group  approximately  coincident  with  the  gun  bat- 
tery it  supports. 

(4)  Subparagraphs  (1),  (2),  and  (3)  above,  describe  the 
gun  area  of  the  anti-aircraft  defense,  in  which  fire  from  the 
ground  is  normal. 

(5)  In  rear  of  the  gun  area,  there  is  normally  an  airplane 
area  consisting  of  one  or  more  lines  of  searchlights  (placed 
singly  or  in  pairs)  ; the  lights,  or  groups,  being  from  2500  to 
4000  yards  apart  in  each  line,  and  the  lines  from  3000  to  6000 
yards  apart.  Pursuit  and  combat  by  the  air  service  is  normal  in 
this  area. 

(6)  In  rear  of  this  airplane  area,  there  may  be  other  gun 
areas.  The  formation  of  a line  of  batteries  across  the  armv 
front,  in  these  back  gun  areas,  usually  is  omitted  in  favor  of  artil- 
lery and  machine  gun  defense  of  special  localities,  such  as  head- 
quarters, railheads,  depots,  parks  and  dumps. 

5.  Organization. — (a)  The  basic  organization  of  anti- 
aircraft troops  is  the  regiment,  as  follows : 

(1)  Regimental  headquarters  and  headquarters  battery. 

(2)  Service  battery. 

(3)  One  gun  battalion  comprising  a battalion  headquarters 
and  combat  train,  one  searchlight  company  of  12  lights,  and  three 
batteries  of  4 anti-aircraft  guns  each  (75-mm.  or  greater). 

(4)  One  machine  gun  battalion  comprising  a battalion  head- 
quarters and  four  companies,  motorized,  of  12  guns  each  (caliber 
30  or  50). 

(b)  One  regiment  is  organically  a part  of  the  corps. 
Normally  it  is  able  to  provide  the  gun  area  defense  in  the 
corps  area.  Also  it  may  assist  in  the  airplane  defense,  al- 
though the  elements  for  this  defense  normally  come  from 
the  army.  One  brigade  of  three  regiments  is  organically 
a part  of  the  army.  Normally  it  is  able  to  provide  the  air- 
plane area  defense  and  the  defense  of  such  gun  areas,  in 
rear  of  corps  rear  boundaries,  as  may  be  necessary  in  the 
combat  zone.  The  anti-aircraft  regiments  in  GHQ  reserve 
are  provided  in  order  to  allow  the  headquarters  of  the  the- 
ater of  operations,  or  the  communications  zone,  to  under- 
take the  defense  of  such  rear  localities  as  require  installa- 
tions of  a permanent  nature,  thus  allowing  the  armies  and 
corps  to  advance  their  elements  as  the  advance  progresses. 

6.  Technique. — (a)  The  normal  employment  of  bat- 
teries and  machine  gun  groups,  in  the  defense  of  localities, 


XIX— 6 


274  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

is  in  triangular  or  ring-shaped  formation  about  the  place 
defended.  No  battery  should  be  within  2000  yards  of  * 
place  defended. 

(b)  (1)  A separate  and  complete  communication  net  is  neces- 
sary. There  should  be  telephone  service  between  all  batteries, 
searchlights  and  observation  balloons  within  range,  battalion 
and  higher  headquarters.  Batteries  connect  with  adjacent  bat- 
teries. Radio  communication  between  battalions  and  the  air 
service  headquarters  is  very  essential  for  air  service  coopera- 
tion. 

(2)  There  are  three  uses  of  this  communication  net:  (a) 
usual  tactical  command,  (b)  necessity  for  closest  cooperation  of 
all  adjacent  elements,  (c)  lookout  duties.  Tactical  command  con- 
sists of  assignment  of  targets  and  missions.  Machine  guns,  for 
targets  flying  with  altitude  less  than  1500  yards,  use  one  round 
of  tracer  in  five  and  one  round  of  armor-piercing  in  five.  Artil- 
lery, using  shell,  is  employed  against  targets  at  greater  alti- 
tudes. At  night,  targets  are  located  by  listening  apparatus,  il- 
luminated by  searchlight,  and  taken  under  fire  by  artillery,  and 
by  machine  guns  if  within  range.  Pursuit  by  air  service  is  nor- 
mal in  an  airplane  area,  or,  by  previous  agreement,  in  a gun 
area,  after  warnings  to  ground  troops.  Besides  the  above  co- 
operation with  the  air  service,  the  following  signals  are  used; 
daytime  by  three  shots  in  direction  of  hostile  plane;  night-time 
by  searchlight  code. 

(c)  The  following  are  the  lookout  duties:  reporting 
all  enemy  air  activity  back  through  battalion  headquarters 
to  air  service ; reporting  night  raids  to  army  headquarters ; 
warning  all  balloons  within  range;  cooperating  with  air 
patrol  and  pursuit. 

(d)  Anti-aircraft  defense  is  essentially  to  protect  other 
ground  forces  from  overhead  reconnaissance  and  attack; 
hence  its  elements  conform  to  movements  and  disposition 
of  the  forces.  Lights  and  guns  must  be  mobile. 

(e)  For  front  line  defense,  locations  are  temporary, 
elements  moving  to  conform  to  movements  of  army.  In 
seacoast  and  back  area  defense,  elements  are  permanent  in 
comparison.  Seacoast,  being  a first  line  for  the  country, 
must  have  elements  permanently  located  in  harbors.  How- 
ever, elements  should  be  as  mobile  in  character  as  possible. 
During  war,  cities,  industrial  plants,  headquarters,  depots, 
railroad  yards,  regulating  stations,  lines  of  communica- 
tions, etc.,  require  such  permanent  defense.  Here  captive 
balloons  frequently  are  used  as  obstacles. 


XX— 1-2 


CHAPTER  XX 

Coast  and  Harbor  Defense 

Paragraphs 


Section  1. — Introduction  1 

Section  II. — General  Description 2-3 

Section  III. — Forces  Employed : 4-14 

Section  IV. — Forms  of  Attack 15-23 

Section  V. — Submarine  Mines  in  Relation  to  Coast  De- 
fense   24-30 


Section  I 

Introduction 

Paragraph 

Introduction  1 


1.  Introduction. — (a)  It  is  impracticable  and  un- 
necessary, in  these  schools,  to  take  up  in  detail  the  tactics 
and  technique  of  coast  artillery.  This  is  a subject  for  study 
at  the  Special  Service  School  at  Fort  Monroe. 

(b)  It  is  desirable,  however,  to  give  the  other  branches 
of  the  service  a general  outline  of  the  work  of  the  Coast 
Artillery  Corps,  especially  in  view  of  the  new  policy  for 
the  defenses  of  the  United  States,  with  which  other 
branches  of  the  service  are  as  much  concerned  as  is  the 
Coast  Artillery  Corps.  Furthermore,  wherever  corps  and 
armies  are  organized,  there  will  be  found  coast  artillery 
troops  forming  an  auxiliary  service  of  some  nature. 


Section  II 

General  Description 

Paragraphs 


General  Description  2 

Modifications  Since  World  War 3 


2.  General  Description. — (a)  A distinction  must  be 
made  between  the  terms  “Coast  defense”  and  “Harbor  de- 
fense.” 


275 


XX— 2-3 


276  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(1)  Coast  Defense  includes  dispositions  and  operations  hav- 
ing for  their  object  the  meeting  of  hostile  attack  upon  any  por- 
tion of  the  seacoast  of  the  continental  United  States,  the  Panama 
Canal,  or  the  Insular  Possessions.  The  elements  that  enter  into 
coast  defense  comprise  the  naval  forces,  the  harbor  defense  and 
the  mobile  forces  of  the  Army. 

(2)  Harbor  Defense  includes  dispositions  and  operations  for 
the  defense  of  a limited  portion  of  the  sea  coast,  ordinarily  con- 
fined to  important  harbors.  Such  dispositions  generally  include 
fixed  armament,  mobile  armament,  controlled  submarine  mines, 
and  the  troops  and  accessories  required  for  their  employment  and 
local  defense.  The  harbor  defenses  will  be  considered  as  units 
of  fixed  or  sector  artillery  having  a definite  mission  over  sea 
and  land  areas,  and,  as  such,  form  an  important  part  of  the 
sector  garrison.  The  term  coast  defense  is  applied  to  the  tac- 
tical and  administrative  unit  comprising  the  Coast  Artillery 
troops  assigned  to  the  harbor  defense  of  a particular  locality. 
The  relation  of  coast  defense  commanders  to  the  sector,  sub- 
sector, and  other  commanders,  is  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  other 
commanders  of  tactical  and  combatant  units. 

(b)  Our  harbors,  if  undefended,  would  be  the  weakest 
'points  in  our  defense;  since  they  are  of  the  greatest  value 
to  the  enemy,  it  is  important  that  these  points  be  strength- 
ened by  more  complete  fortifications  than  other  parts  of 
the  line. 

(c)  For  command  and  other  purposes,  the  seacoast 
areas  are  divided  into  sectors,  which  usually  include  both 
defended  and  undefended  areas.  The  limits  of  the  differ- 
ent sectors  are  prescribed  by  the  War  Department.  A de- 
fense sector  comprises  the  entire  sea  frontier  within  its 
limit,  of  which  the  harbor  defenses  are  strong  points,  not 
isolated  points  to  be  defended.  A major  sector  is  a sector 
of  such  magnitude  as  to  require  a sector  reserve  of  a divi- 
sion or  more  and  not  susceptible  of  reinforcement  except 
from  the  general  strategical  reserve  or  by  transfer  from 
another  sector.  A minor  sector  is  a sector  of  such  magni- 
tude that  the  sector  reserve  may  be  less  than  a division  and 
yet  so  situated  as  to  make  it  inexpedient  to  organize  it  as 
a subsector.  A minor  sector  is  not  susceptible  of  reinforce- 
ment except  from  the  general  strategical  reserve  or  by  trans- 
fer from  another  sector.  A subsector  is  part  of  a major  or 
minor  sector  but  forms  a separate  tactical  command  with 
its  own  reserve,  under  the  sector  command  and  susceptible 
of  reinforcement  from  the  sector  reserve. 

3.  Modifications  Since  World  War. — (a)  The  World 
War  materially  modified  our  ideas  as  to  land  and  coast  de- 


XX— 3 


GENERAL  DESCRIPTION  277 

fense  by  the  introduction  and  development  of  new  means 
and  methods  of  combat  on  sea,  on  land,  and  in  the  air,  so 
that  it  has  become  necessary  to  revise  all  existing  defense 
projects  and  plans. 

(b)  Existing  plans  have,  in  general,  been  based  upon 
the  idea  of  defending  important  seaports,  naval  bases,  etc., 
by  the  occupation  of  selected  covering  positions.  With  our 
present  increased  resources  in  materiel,  personnel,  and  war 
experience,  a more  aggressive  defense  is  warranted. 

(c)  A properly  organized  system  of  beach  defense 
(of  favorable  landing  places  near  all  vitally  important  ob- 
jects) will  secure  the  United  States  against  invasion  from 
the  sea,  even  should  the  command  of  the  sea  in  both  oceans 
be  lost. 

(d)  A successful  invasion  of  the  United  States  must 
be  directed  against  certain  vital  areas.  Defense  against 
invasion  from  the  sea  is  effective  if  large  landing  opera- 
tions are  prevented  in  those  seacoast  sectors  which  cover 
these  vital  areas. 

(e)  Within  any  particular  seacoast  sector,  only  a limi- 
ted portion  of  the  coast  is  favorable  for  landing  operations, 
and,  among  beaches  favorable  for  landing  operations,  only 
a limited  number  are  favorably  located  with  reference  to 
important  military  objectives.  A proper  system  of  coast 
defense  then  resolves  itself  into  the  defense,  not  of  the  en- 
tire coast  line,  but  of  the  limited  number  of  favorable  land- 
ing places  included  in  critical  strategical  areas.  The  basic 
idea  is ; that  the  enemy  must  be  denied  access  to  any  landing 
place  upon  which  he  could  quickly  establish  himself  in 
force,  but  it  is  not  necessary  to  defend  places  where  a 
landing  would  be  so  difficult  that  an  enemy  would  be  unable 
to  land  in  sufficient  strength  before  our  reserves  could  be 
brought  up  in  numbers  adequate  to  dislodge  him. 

(f)  Harbor  defenses  (coast  defense  commands)  are 
merely  strong  points  in  the  line  of  resistance.  They  differ 
in  no  material  respect  from  fortified  towns  along  an  inter- 
ior border. 

(g)  Our  line  of  defense  will  consist  of: 


XX— 3-6 


278  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(1)  Harbor  defense. 

(2)  More  or  less  highly  organized  beach  defenses  lying  be- 
tween the  harbor  defenses. 

(3)  Areas  considered  impracticable  for  enemy  landings  in 
force.  These  areas  will  be  kept  under  observation,  merely. 


Section  III 
Forces  Employed 

Paragraphs 


Forces  Employed  for  the  Defense 4 

Naval  Forces  : 5 

Land  Forces  6 

Missions  7 

Armament  8 

Organization  9 

Projectiles  10 

Trend  of  Development 11 

Mounts  and  Emplacements 12 

Fire  Control  System 13 

Security  and  Information 14 


4.  Forces  Employed  for  Defense. — In  its  true  sense, 
coast  defense  involves  the  use  of  both  naval  and  land  forces. 
All  branches  and  arms  of  the  service  have  their  proper 
function  to  perform  in  coast  defense. 

5.  Naval  Forces  for  Defense. — The  naval  forces  in- 
clude : 

(a)  The  active  fleet,  whose  primary  function  is  to  carry 
out  aggressive  operations  with  a view  to  destroying  the 
enemy's  fleet,  thereby  obtaining  command  of  the  sea.  Suc- 
cessful action  on  the  part  of  these  forces  would  prevent 
any  overseas  operations  of  the  hostile  land  forces. 

(b)  The  naval  coast  defense  forces  assigned  to  naval 
districts  for  the  purpose  of  controlling  the  sea  communica- 
tions therein. 

(c)  The  Marine  Corps,  in  exceptional  cases  required 
by  the  national  interest,  may  be  used  for  coast  defense,  in 
the  continental  United  States  and  insular  possessions,  in  the 
way  described  for  the  army. 

6.  Land  Forces  for  Defense. — The  land  forces  in- 
clude: 


xx— 6-8 


FORCES  EMPLOYED  279 

(a)  The  coast  artillery  troops,  who  are  charged  with 
the  care  and  use  of  the  fixed  and  movable  elements  of  the 
seaward  and  landward  defense  of  the  coast  fortifications, 
including  guns,  mortars,  submarine  mines,  and  torpedoes. 

Coast  artillery  troops  within  harbor  defenses  have  a 
dual  role.  Their  primary  one  is  the  operation  of  their  guns 
against  hostile  ships ; the  secondary  one  is  the  operation  of 
all  mobile  armament  and  such  of  the  fixed  armament  as  can 
be  brought  to  bear  against  land  attacks.  All  coast  artil- 
lery troops  are  considered  available  for  the  immediate  de- 
fense of  their  individual  batteries. 

(b)  The  coast  artillery  supports,  which  consist  of  small 
bodies  of  coast  artillery  or  mobile  troops  assigned  to  the 
defense  of  the  fortifications  against  attack  by  raiding  par- 
ties; they  are  under  the  orders  of  the  coast  defense  com- 
manders. 

(c)  The  beach  defense,  which  will  consist  of  local 
troops  organized  for  initial  defense  of  available  landing 
places  within  the  defense  sector. 

(d)  Divisions,  corps  or  armies  which  will  be  concen- 
trated at  strategic  centers  throughout  the  country,  and  will 
be  available  for  reinforcing  any  beach  defense  which  may 
be  overcome  by  hostile  attack.  This  will  enable  our  main 
forces  to  be  kept  out  of  action  until  the  intentions  of  the 
enemy  are  made  known. 

7.  Missions  of  Harbor  Defenses. — The  missions  of 
harbor  defenses  are  as  follows: 

(a)  To  deny  the  enemy  possession  of  the  position  and 
its  facilities. 

(b)  To  prevent  destruction  or  serious  injury  by  bom- 
bardment of  the  harbor  utilities. 

(c)  To  provide  an  area,  off  the  entrance,  in  which 
naval  vessels  and  merchant  shipping  will  be  protected  as 
far  as  possible  against  all  forms  of  enemy  attack. 

8.  Armament. — The  armament  of  harbor  defense  areas 
is  divided  into: 

(a)  Fixed  armaments : Guns,  howitzers,  and  mortars 

mounted  in  permanent  emplacements,  incapable  of  being 
moved  or  readily  transferred,  and  designed  to  fire  over 


xx— 8-9 


280  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

limited  areas.  The  fixed  armament  is  classified  as  major, 
intermediate  and  minor,  depending  on  the  caliber. 

(1)  Major  armament  consists  of  12,  14,  and  16-inch  guns, 
16-inch  howitzers,  and  12-inch  mortars. 

(2)  Intermediate  armament  consists  of  6,  8,  and  10-inch  guns. 

(3)  Minor  armament  consists  of  guns  of  caliber  less  than 
6-inch. 

(b)  Mobile  Armament:  Guns,  howitzers,  and  mor- 

tars on  movable  mounts,  capable  of  being  readily  moved 
or  transferred.  The  mobility  possessed  by  armament  of 
this  class  is  limited  by  the  type  of  mount,  and  may  be  class- 
ified as  strategical  and  tactical  mobility.  For  example,  all 
types  of  railway  armament  possess  strategical  mobility,  but 
the  tactical  mobility  of  certain  types  is  limited,  due  to  the 
characteristics  of  the  mount.  The  mobile  armament  is 
classified  as  primary  and  secondary,  depending  on  the  cali- 
ber. 

(1)  Primary  armament  consists  of  12  and  14-inch  guns,  16- 
inch  howitzers,  and  12-inch  mortars  on  railway  mounts. 

(2)  Secondary  armament  consists  of  7,  8,  and  10-inch  guns  on 
railway  mounts,  and  6-inch,  155-mm.  G.P.F.,  8 and  9.2-inch  and 
240-mm.  howitzers,  on  caterpillar  mounts  or  tractor-drawn. 

(c)  Anti-aircraft  armament:  3 and  4.7-inch  and  75- 
mm.  guns  on  fixed  and  mobile  mounts. 

(d)  Submarine  mines:  Shore  controlled  mines,  mine 

planters,  and  accessories. 

(e)  Coast  defense  aircraft:  Observation  units,  lighter 
and  heavier  than  air  types. 

(f ) Accessories : Searchlights,  coast  defense  radio,  fire- 
control  installations,  etc. 

9.  Organization. — The  elements  above  indicated  are 
organized  at  present  as  follows : 

(a)  Gun  Defense:  (1)  Battery  commands,  consisting 
of  one  or  more  guns,  howitzers,  or  mortars,  commanded 
directly  by  a single  individual,  together  with  all  structures, 
equipment,  and  personnel  necessary  for  their  emplacement, 
protection,  and  service.  (2)  Fire  commands  consisting  of 
two  or  more  battery  commands,  the  additional  fire  control 
stations  and  accessories  and  the  personnel  assigned  thereto. 
The  senior  officer  present  for  duty  is  the  fire  commander. 

(b)  Mine  defense:  Mine  commands,  consisting  of  such 


XX— 9-11 


FORCES  EMPLOYED  281 

portions  of  the  mine  defense  as  can  be  controlled  advan- 
tageously by  a single  individual.  The  senior  officer  present 
for  duty  is  the  mine  commander. 

(c)  Fort  commands,  consisting  of  all  the  means  of 
seaward  and  landward  defense,  including  both  personnel  and 
materiel,  located  at  any  coast  fort.  Unless  otherwise  di- 
rected by  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  senior  coast  artillery 
officer  present  for  duty,  other  than  the  coast  defense  com- 
mander, is  the  fort  commander. 

(d)  Coast  defense  commands,  consisting  of  a group 
of  fort  commands  provided  for  the  defense  of  a harbor  or 
point  of  the  coast.  The  senior  coast  artillery  officer  pres- 
ent for  duty  is  the  coast  defense  commander. 

10.  Projectiles. — (a)  All  projectiles  of  12-inch  cali- 
ber and  above,  for  the  attack  of  naval  targets  are  armor- 
piercing shot,  designed  to  perforate  armor  at  maximum 
oblique  impact. 

(b)  All  projectiles  less  than  12-inch  caliber,  for  the 
attack  of  naval  targets  are  common  steel  shell  with  suffi- 
cient strength  to  perforate  the  plates  of  light  armored 
vessels  before  bursting. 

11.  Trend  of  Development. — (a)  Although  seacoast 
forts  in  the  United  States  date  back  to  the  Revolutionary 
War,  the  first  coordinated  study  of  our  harbor  defenses 
was  undertaken  about  1885  by  the  Endicott  Board.  The 
effectiveness  of  these  defenses  was  limited  by  the  caliber, 
range  and  power  of  existing  armament.  A great  variety 
of  calibers  has  been  manufactured  in  the  past,  intended 
for  the  attack  of  different  types  of  ships.  In  many  of  our 
important  harbor  defenses,  there  is  still  a large  assortment 
of  calibers,  such  as  3Tinch,  5-inch,  6-inch,  10-inch,  and  12- 
inch,  although  the  present  tendency  is  toward  the  simplifi- 
cation of  calibers. 

(b)  The  artillery  has  sought  constantly  for  guns  which 
would  deliver,  at  the  extreme  range,  a heavier  projectile 
and  bursting  charge  than  could  be  sent  by  any  opposing 
navy,  and  has  striven  to  secure  armament  which  would 
pierce  the  heaviest  armor  on  battleships.  Hence,  as  the 
capabilities  of  our  Ordnance  Department  have  developed, 
and  the  battle  ranges  have  increased,  together  with  the  de- 


XX— 11-12 


282  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

velopment  of  armor  and  gun-power  of  battleships,  our 
harbor  defense  guns  likewise  have  increased  in  caliber  and 
range,  until  we  now  (1922)  have  16-inch  guns  mounted 
and  in  service. 

12.  Mounts  and  Emplacements. — (a)  Practically  all 
of  the  heavy  guns  above  6-inch  caliber,  mounted  prior  to 
1917,  and  some  of  the  6-inch  guns,  are  on  disappearing 
carriages,  using  direct  or  indirect  laying  as  conditions  re- 
quire, while  mortars  are  emplaced  in  pits,  using  indirect 
laying  only.  This  mounting  for  guns  was  for  the  purpose 
of  providing  protection  for  the  personnel,  for,  as  the  prob- 
lem was  solved  at  that  time,  harbor  defense  batteries  had 
to  be  placed  so  as  to  permit  direct  laying,  which,  of  course, 
exposed  the  battery  to  view. 

(b)  Another  reason  for  mounting  guns  on  disappear- 
ing carriages  was  that  ships'  guns  were  so  mounted  that, 
with  their  higher  muzzle  velocity  and  limited  elevation,  it 
was  impossible  to  obtain  a steep  angle  of  fall,  hence  the 
shore  gun  crew  was  protected  fairly  well.  The  navy  since 
has  altered  its  gun  mountings  so  as  to  obtain  greater  angles 
of  elevation  with  correspondingly  greater  angles  of  fall,  so 
the  protection  once  afforded  by  these  parapets  no  longer 
exists. 

(c)  In  the  case  of  mortars,  which  fire  at  elevations  of 
about  45°  only,  all  the  clearance  necessary  is  overhead, 
thereby  permitting  the  entire  side  closing  of  the  pits.  Spec- 
ial types  of  mortar  emplacements  are  constructed  where 
the  conformation  of  the  ground  requires.  In  the  Canal 
Zone,  the  front  parapet  rises  nearly  200  feet  above  the  pit 
floor,  and  at  Fort  Totten,  N.Y.,  the  pits  are  entirely  en- 
closed and  are  reached  by  means  of  tunnels. 

(d)  The  type  of  emplacement,  built  for  our  primary 
armament  on  disappearing  mounts,  is  not  such  as  to  per- 
mit all  around  fire,  hence  these  guns,  in  most  harbor  de- 
fenses, are  not  suitable  for  fire  against  land  targets.  It  is 
understood,  however,  that  an  emplacement  for  all  around 
fire  has  been  planned  for  the  16-inch  gun  on  disappearing 
carriage. 

(e)  The  above  limitation  does  not  apply  to  mortars. 
Their  use  is  contemplated  in  land  defense  plans. 


XX— 12-13 


FORCES  EMPLOYED  283 

(f)  (1)  The  disappearing  carriage,  before  it  was  remodeled, 
permitted  of  the  following  elevations: 


6-inch  -5  +15°. 

8-inch  -5  +12°. 

10-inch  -5  +12°. 

12-inch  -5  +10°. 

14-inch  -5  +15°. 


(2)  The  maximum  ranges  with  long  cap  projectiles  were: 

6-inch  14,500  yards. 

8-inch  12,884  yards.  * 

10-inch  14,201  yards. 

12-inch  13,186  yards. 

(3)  The  disappearing  carriages  for  12-inch  guns  have  been 
remodeled  so  as  to  permit  of  an  elevation  of  15°,  which  gives  a 
range  of  17,300  yards.  There  are  two  types  of  14-inch  guns — 
one  was  34  calibers  long  and  the  other  40  calibers  long.  The 
range  of  the  34-caliber  gun,  at  15°  elevation,  was  16,867  yards 
and  of  the  40-caliber  gun  was  19,244  yards.  The  disappearing 
carriages  for  these  guns  are  being  remodeled  so  as  to  permit  of 
an  elevation  of  20°  which  will  give  a range  of  19,700  yards  for 
the  34-caliber  gun;  and  22,500  yards  for  the  40-caliber.  There 
is  one  type  of  12-inch  barbette  carriage  which  admits  of  an  ele- 
vation of  35°  which  gives  a range  of  26,800  yards  with  a 1070- 
pound  projectile. 

(g)  Further  modification  has  taken  place  so  that  the 
latest  type,  a barbette  carriage,  for  16-inch  gun,  will  have 
65°  elevation,  giving  a range  of  44,850  yards  at  an  eleva- 
tion of  50°  for  a projectile  weighing  2400  pounds.  A table 
is  appended  showing  artillery  suitable  for  coast  and  harbor 
defense. 

(h)  The  emplacements  built,  pursuant  to  the  earlier 
harbor  defense  projects,  are  very  complete  and  elaborate. 
They  include  powder  rooms  or  magazines,  shell  rooms,  plot- 
ting rooms,  and,  in  some  batteries,  living  rooms. 

(i)  Electrical  appliances  are  provided,  in  emplace- 
ments of  more  than  one  story,  for  hoisting  a projectile  from 
the  magazine  floor  to  the  loading  platform  of  the  gun.  Here 
it  is  placed  on  a shot  truck  from  which  it  can  be  rammed 
directly  into  the  breech  of  a disappearing  gun.  With  bar- 
bette guns,  a crane  with  a chain  hoist  is  provided,  or  some 
special  form  of  loading  tray  from  which  it  is  loaded  into 
the  gun. 

.13,  Fire  Control  System. — (a)  Fire  control  is  the 
exercise  of  those  tactical  functions  connected  with  the  con- 
centration and  distribution  of  fire,  including  the  assign- 
ment and  identification  of  targets. 


XX— 13 


284  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(b)  Fire  direction  is  the  application  of  the  methods 
and  training  necessary  to  secure  accuracy  of  fire.  The 
term  “Fire  direction,”  as  used  here,  is  at  variance  with 
the  same  term  as  used  in  par.  2 of  Chapter  X.  Here,  the 
essence  of  the  meaning  is  technique,  in  Chapter  X,  it  is 
tactics . 

(c)  The  appliances  and  materiel  which  are  intended 
for  use  ’in  exercising  fire  control  or  fire  direction  of  any 
unit,  is  called  the  “fire  control  installation”  for  that  unit. 

(d)  As  now  organized,  every  battery  of  guns  above  6- 
inch  caliber,  and  practically  all  6-inch  guns,  have  a separ- 
ate fire  control  installation. 

(e)  The  position  finding  system,  which  is  part  of  these 
fire  control  installations,  may  be  in  either  of  two  forms,  the 
vertical  base  or  the  horizontal  base.  Both  depend  on  the 
trigonometrical  principle  that  knowing  two  angles  and  the 
included  side  of  a triangle,  all  remaining  elements  may  be 
computed. 

(f)  In  the  vertical  base  system  (Fig.  3)  an  observing 
instrument  is  placed  in  a tower,  or  as  much  above  sea  level 
as  convenient.  This  distance  above  sea  level  is  measured 
accurately.  The  angle  made  at  sea  level  by  a vertical  line 
dropped  from  the  center  of  the  observing  instrument  is  a 
right  angle,  it  being  assumed,  for  this  purpose,  that  the 
sea  is  horizontal  or  level.  The  other  angle  necessary,  or 
the  one  at  the  observing  instrument,  is  measured  by  direct- 
ing that  instrument  on  the  target,  a horizontal  wire  within 
the  instrument  being  used  for  laying  on  the  water  line  of 
the  target  and  a similar  vertical  wire  being  directed  on 
some  prearranged  aiming  point  such  as  a mast  or  smoke 
funnel.  Mechanical  means  are  incorporated  in  the  instru- 
ment for  correcting  for  changes  in  tide,  for  abnormal  re- 
fraction, and  for  curvature  of  the  earth.  Having  set  the 
instrument  on  the  target,  instead  of  giving  the  measure  of 
the  angle  required,  the  instrument  is  so  graduated  as  to 
show  directly  the  horizontal  distance,  in  yards,  to  the  tar- 
get, from  the  foot  of  the  vertical  line  dropped  from  the  cen- 
ter of  the  instrument.  The  instrument  is  likewise  gradu- 
ated to  measure  horizontal  angles,  whereby  the  direction 


XX— 13 


FORCES  EMPLOYED  285 

of  the  target  from  the  observing  station  is  obtained  at  the 
same  time. 

(g)  In  the  horizontal  base  system  (Fig.  3),  there  are 
two  observing  stations  in  which  are  placed  instruments  for 
measuring  horizontal  angles.  The  distance  between  these 
two  stations  is  known  accurately.  Observations  on  the  tar- 
get are  made  simultaneously  at  both  stations  every  time  a 
bell,  known  as  the  time  interval  bell,  strikes.  The  angles 
thus  measured  are  telephoned  to  the  plotting  room.  Here 
the  angles,  as  read,  are  laid  off  on  a plotting  board,  which 
reproduces,  on  a small  scale,  the  base  line  and  the  lines  of 
sight  from  the  two  observing  stations.  The  intersection  of 
these  lines  of  sight  then  shows  the  position  of  the  target. 
The  position  of  the  battery  is  also  shown  on  the  plotting 
board,  so  the  direction  and  distance  of  the  target  from  the 
battery  can  be  determined. 

(h)  Corrections  in  range  are  applied  for  variations  in 
muzzle  velocity,  direction  and  velocity  of  the  wind,  varia- 
tion in  temperature  and  pressure  of  the  air  from  the  normal, 
height  of  tide  above  the  datum  plane,  variations  in  the 
weight  of  the  projectile,  travel  of  the  target,  and-  arbi- 
trary corrections  as  the  result  of  observation  of  fire. 

(i)  Lateral  corrections  are  applied  for  the  direction 
and  velocity  of  the  wind,  drift,  travel  of  the  target,  and 
arbitrary  corrections  as  the  result  of  observation  of  fire. 

(j)  These  ballistic  computations  serve  to  bring  the 
center  of  impact  of  the  first  group  of  shots  as  near  the  tar- 
get as  can  be  determined  without  firing.  This  is  an  impor- 
tant factor,  considering  the  small  number  of  rounds  avail- 
able and  the  difficulty  of  replenishment. 

(k)  If  the  first  shots  do  not  fall  near  the  target,  the 
fire  must  be  improved  by  corrections  based  on  observation, 
until  the  group  of  shots  is  placed  around  the  target.  From 
this  point  on,  it  will  be  necessary  to  keep  this  fire  adjusted 
on  the  target  because  of  the  constant  tendency  of  ballistic 
variations  to  cause  changes  in  range,  and,  in  seacoast  fir- 
ing, because  of  the  constant  change  in  range  due  to  the 
movement  of  the  target. 


XX— 13-15 


286  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(l)  All  possible  computation  is  made  by  mechanical 
devices  so  as  to  eliminate  errors  and  to  simplify  the  ob- 
tainment  of  ballistic  corrections. 

(m)  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  coast  ar- 
tilleryman is  restricted  to  the  use  of  these  devices  and 
cannot  function  without  them.  He  is  provided  with  com- 
plete range  tables  and  is  taught  to  use  them,  so  that,  in  case 
of  failure  of  his  fire  control  system,  his  battery  can  continue 
to  function. 

14.  Security  and  Information. — For  harbor  defense, 
the  service  of  security  is  closely  allied  to  the  service  of  in- 
formation. Both  are  accomplished  by  (a)  cooperation  with 
the  navy,  (b)  through  the  activities  of  small  vessels  em- 
ployed as  scouts,  and  (c)  through  observation  on  the  part 
of  fort  commands;  the  fire  commands  observing  princi- 
pally toward  the  sea,  and  the  support  commands  toward 
possible  landward  approaches.  Airplanes,  balloons,  sea 
planes  and  scout  submarines  also  are  employed  when  avail- 
able. 


Section  IV 
Forms  of  Attack 

Paragraphs 


Forms  of  Attack 15 

Characteristics  of  Naval  Targets 16 

Coast  Artillery  Defense 17 

Artillery  Positions 18 

Concentrations  of  Fire  19 

Kinds  of  Fire 20 

Tactics  of  Fire 21 

Night  Attacks 22 

Heavy  Artillery  Available  for  Coast  Defense 23 


15.  Forms  of  Attack. — (a)  There  are  the  following 
eight  general  forms  of  attack  on  the  seacoast,  each  of  which 
may  be  made  either  as  unsupported  or  supported  attacks: 

(1)  Aircraft  attacks  on  seaports. 

(2)  Mine-laying  attacks  off  the  seacoast. 

(3)  Torpedo,  bombing,  and  gunfire  attacks  on  vessels  off  the 

seacoast. 

(4)  Torpedo  fire  into  seaports. 

(5)  Blocking  attacks  on  seaports. 


XX— 15 


FORCES  EMPLOYED  287 

(6)  Bombardment  of  seaports  by  naval  vessels. 

(7)  Penetration  into  a harbor  or  water  area  by  naval  ves- 

sels. 

(8)  Landing  attacks. 

(b)  Enemy  aircraft  attacks  on  our  seaports  can  be 
launched  either  from  a land  base  or  a ship  base.  There 
are  at  present  practically  no  places  in  the  possession  of  a 
probable  enemy  from  which  hostile  air  raids  may  be  launched 
over  the  ocean  at  our  seaports. 

(c)  Mine-laying  attacks  consist  of  laying  mines  for  the 
purpose  of  blocking  entrances  to  ports  and  even  to  whole  sea 
areas.  Mines  are  laid  near  the  entrance  to  enemy  ports, 
both  with  the  object  of  closing  the  entrance  to  the  port  and 
of  inflicting  losses  upon  enemy  naval  vessels  entering  or 
leaving  port.  The  following  naval  craft  can  be  used  to  oper- 
ate against  hostile  mine  layers  and  to  clear  mines  from  the 
approaches  to  ports : submarines,  aircraft,  mine  layers,  mine 
sweepers,  patrol  vessels,  destroyers  and  cruisers. 

(d)  Torpedo , bombing  and  gunfire  attacks  on  vessels 
off  the  seacoast  may  be  made  by  hostile  submarines,  air- 
craft carriers,  destroyers,  light  cruisers  or  battle  cruisers. 

(e)  A torpedo  attack  may  be  made  upon  a harbor  hav- 
ing an  open  and  unrestricted  approach  and  a wide  straight 
entrance.  An  open  roadstead  is  most  favorable.  A suc- 
cessful submarine  torpedo  attack  requires  a depth  of  50 
feet  of  water  up  to  the  entrance.  Torpedo  attacks  during 
daylight,  while  possible  for  submarines,  probably  will  be 
ineffective  if  proper  means  are  taken  to  counter  them ; dur- 
ing darkness,  attacks  by  destroyers,  and  by  submarines  run- 
ning on  the  surface,  are  possible. 

(f)  A blocking  attack  has  for  its  object  the  closing  of 
the  entrance  to  a harbor,  canal,  river  or  water  area.  Only 
very  narrow  entrances  can  be  blocked ; the  operation  can  be 
carried  out  only  under  cover  of  darkness,  which  course  adds 
to  its  difficulty  and  uncertainty.  Blockships  usually  are  es- 
corted by  a naval  force  sufficient  to  protect  them  against  at- 
tacks of  the  naval  vessels  assigned  to  the  local  defense.  Di- 
versions may  be  made  to  distract  the  attention  of  the  de- 
fenders. 

(g)  Bombardment  of  seaports  may  be  effected  by  either 
surface  craft  or  submarines.  A bombardment  may  be  di- 


XX— 15 


288  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

rected  against  the  defense  of  shore  cities,  utilities,  bases, 
etc. ; against  the  cities,  utilities  and  bases  themselves,  or 
against  both  at  the  same  time.  When  bombarding  land  de- 
fenses, the  hostile  ships  probably  will  close  to  the  shortest 
range  possible  without  suffering  undue  loss  from  the  fire  of 
the  land  artillery.  When  bombarding  cities,  bases,  utili- 
ties, etc.,  such  ships  probably  will  fire  from  positions  just 
within  their  limits  of  range,  in  order  to  remain  at  the  great- 
est range  possible  from  whatever  land  artillery  may  be  in 
the  locality.  As  a rule,  bombardment  of  our  ports,  by  sur- 
face craft,  is  possible  only  when  the  enemy  has  control  of 
the  sea;  but  submarines  will  be  able  to  make  such  attacks 
when  their  own  surface  craft  are  held  securely  in  port.  Sub- 
marines will  not  attack  large  and  important  harbors  where 
elaborate  defenses  have  been  prepared.  They  are  limited 
to  raids  on  small  ports,  which  are  usually  undefended,  and 
to  exposed  naval  stations,  such  as  air  stations  and  radio 
stations. 

(h)  (1)  The  operation  of  penetration  into  a harbor  or  water 
area  by  naval  vessels  has  two  general  forms: 

(a)  The  forcing  of  a passage  by  main  force. 

(b)  The  penetration  of  a passage  by  light  craft  by 

stealth. 

(2)  Penetration  into  a harbor  is  a very  difficult  operation 
and  seldom  is  attempted.  The  penetration  of  a narrow  passage, 
such  as  a river  or  strait,  offers  better  chances  of  success. 

(i)  (1)  Landing  attacks  may  assume  either  of  two  general 
forms : 

(a)  Raids  by  small  forces  for  the  temporary-  occupa- 

tion of  positions  on  shore  for  effecting  military 
damage. 

(b)  Attacks  in  force. 

(2)  Raids  may  be  carried  out  by  landing  forces  formed  from 
the  crews  of  naval  vessels,  or  by  small  detachments  of  troops 
carried  on  naval  vessels  or  transports.  They  will  take  the  form 
of  sudden  descents  on  unprotected  or  lightly  protected  areas. 
Coastal  railways,  canals,  telegraph  and  telephone  lines,  shore 
batteries,  seaplane  bases,  etc.,  are  especially  liable  to  such  attacks. 
Secrecy  and  surprise  are  essential  to  success. 

(3)  The  naval  operations  connected  with  landing  operations 
on  a large  scale  consist  of  convoy  duty  and  of  covering  all  landing 
by  fire.  The  armored  ships  endeavor  to  neutralize  or  destroy 
all  land  artillery  that  can  endanger  the  transports,  thus  allowing 
them  to  approach  closely  to  shore,  so  that  the  launches,  and  other 
small  boats  used  in  landing  troops,  will  have  only  short  distances 
to  traverse  in  reaching  the  shore.  The  armed  naval  vessels  at- 
tempt also  to  neutralize  or  destroy  the  land  artillery,  machine 
guns  and  riflemen  firing  on  the  small  boats,  and  to  support,  by 
artillery  fire,  the  advance  of  the  troops  that  succeed  in  landing. 


XX— 16-17 


FORCES  EMPLOYED  289 

16.  Characteristics  of  Naval  Targets. — (a)  To 
give  an  idea  of  the  distinction  between  capital  and  non- 
capital ships,  as  used  in  the  discussion  following,  a brief 
description  of  these  classes  is  given  here. 

(1)  Capital  Ships 


Length  350  to  850  feet. 

Beam  70  to  100  feet. 

Speeds  18  to  35  knots  per  hour. 

(600  to  1200  yards  per  minute.) 

Armor 9 to  12  inches. 

In  some  cases  14  inches. 

Deck  protection 2 to  7 inches. 

Primary  armament 8 to  12  guns — caliber  12  to  18 

inches. 


Maximum  ranges  not  over  30,000  yards  (mostly  under  25,000 
yds). 

Secondary  armament  16  to  25  guns — caliber  5.5  to  7 inches. 

Maximum  ranges  about  15,000  yards. 

It  is  probable  that,  in  later  ships,  the  gun  mounts  will  be  so  al- 
tered as  to  secure  ranges  of  35,000  yards  or  more. 

The  armament  of  earlier  ships  of  this  class  consist  of: 

4 guns  about  12  inches  in  caliber. 

12  to  16  guns — caliber  5 to  10  inches. 

Varying  numbers — 3-inch. 

All  capital  ships  have  torpedo  tubes  and  most  of  them  now  have 
anti-aircraft  guns  as  well. 

(2)  Non-Capital  Ships 

These  are  of  the  greatest  variety.  The  greater  number  of  such 
ships  have  little  or  no  armor,  and  speed  of  less  than  25  knots  per 
hour.  These  ships  may  be  divided  into  armored  and  unarmored  ships. 

Armored  ships  may  have  armor  from  6 to  9 inches  thick.  Their 
armament  may  include  10-inch  guns  and  a relatively  large  number  of 
smaller  guns. 

Destroyers  are  usually  unarmored  and  carry  from  one  to  four 
guns  of  about  6-inch  caliber.  They  may  have  a speed  in  excess  of 
35  knots  per  hour. 

Other  unarmored  ships  may  carry  several  6-inch  or  smaller  guns. 

(3)  Submarines 

Submarines  of  the  earlier  types  were  limited  in  speed  and  cruis- 
ing radius.  Guns,  when  mounted  at  all,  were  few  and  of  small  cali- 
ber. The  latest  submarines  have  a speed  of  about  20  knots  per  hour 
on  the  surface,  and  of  about  12  knots  per  hour  submerged.  They  are 
of  large  size  and  have  a cruising  radius  of  from  3000  to  5000  miles. 
They  mount  one  or  two  guns,  in  some  cases  as  large  as  6 inches  in 
caliber. 

17.  Coast  Artillery  Defense. — (a)  The  action  of 
heavy  artillery  in  harbor  defense  is  essentially  defensive, 
the  mission  generally  being  to  ward  off  the  attack. 

(b)  This  may  be  done  either  by  a show  of  strength,  in 
which  the  hostile  navy  suffers  little  or  no  damage  or  by  a 


XX— 17-19 


290  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

decisive  defeat,  in  which  the  enemy  suffers  heavy  losses. 
This  latter  form  may  be  considered  a form  of  offensive-de- 
fense. It  is  secured  by  conducting  or  withholding  fire  in 
such  a manner  as  to  place  the  enemy  in  a position  most  fav- 
orable to  the  land  guns  and  then  carrying  out  a prepared 
plan  for  his  destruction. 

(c)  The  choice  of  either  of  the  above  two  forms  of  de- 
fense will  depend  upon  the  mission  of  the  commander.  If 
it  is  the  prevention  of  the  bombardment  of  an  important 
city,  he  must  take  the  surest  effective  means,  whether  or 
not  he  inflicts  material  loss  upon  the  enemy.  If  his  own 
forces  are  the  only  point  of  attack,  he  must  weigh  the  ad- 
vantages and  disadvantages  of  both  methods,  and  the  value 
of  the  results  to  be  gained  by  each. 

18.  Artillery  Positions. — (a)  There  are  three  es- 
sential requisites  for  a perfect  artillery  position : 

(1)  It  must  permit  effective  fire  on  the  enemy  throughout 

the  area  in  which  he  can  maneuver. 

(2)  It  must  afford  concealment  from  the  enemy. 

(3)  It  must  afford  material  cover  from  the  enemy’s  fire. 

(b)  The  fixed  armament  already  emplaced  fulfills,  in 
general,  the  first  requisite  and  the  third  to  a large  extent. 
The  guns  are  emplaced  so  as  to  permit  of  direct  aiming; 
consequently,  the  second  requisite  is  not  fulfilled  in  the  case 
of  the  guns,  and  is  fulfilled  to  a limited  extent  only  in  the 
case  of  mortars.  It  will  be  exceptional  if  all  three  requisites 
exist  in  any  one  site.  The  cost  of  providing  effective  ma- 
terial cover,  in  many  cases,  is  prohibitive.  The  natural  cover 
afforded  by  different  sites  is  one  of  the  controlling  factors 
in  deciding  upon  the  location  of  a battery. 

(c)  The  question  of  amount  of  artillery  and  location  of 
batteries  for  coast  defense  is  a study  in  itself  and  does  not 
belong  in  this  paper. 

19.  Concentration  of  Fire. — In  general,  the  fire  of 
land  artillery  should  be  concentrated  on  those  elements  of 
the  enemy's  navy  whose  missions  are  most  imminent  of  ac- 
complishment or  most  effective  in  defeating  the  missions  of 
the  land  artillery.  Fire  should  not  be  concentrated  on  one 
element  of  the  enemy’s  forces  if  such  concentration  would 
leave  another  element  free  to  accomplish  an  important  mis- 


XX— 19-21 


FORCES  EMPLOYED  291 

sion.  The  form  of  attack,  hydrography,  fleet  formation,  etc., 
also  may  influence  the  concentration  of  artillery  fire. 

20.  Kinds  of  Fire. — Fire  for  seacoast  guns  has  been 
classified  as  follows : 

(a)  Neutralization  fire  against  enemy  vessels  attempt- 
ing to  bombard  our  coastal  cities,  bases,  utilities,  etc. 

(b)  Destruction  fire  against  all  types  of  naval  vessels, 
including  transports. 

(c)  Harassing  fire  against  enemy  naval  craft  and 
forces  that  have  succeeded  in  seizing  a harbor  or  landing 
beach. 

(d)  Interdiction  fire  to  prevent  enemy  vessels  from 
passing  certain  lines  at  times  of  poor  visibility. 

21.  Tactics  of  Fire. — (a)  At  long  ranges — about 
25,000  yards. 

(1)  Enemy  vessels  may  appear  within  the  long  range  zone 
of  our  seacoast  cannon  for  the  purpose  of  bombarding  coastal 
cities,  bases,  etc.,  firing  at  land  artillery,  or  denying  entrance  or 
exit  to  our  naval  vessels. 

(2)  When  naval  fire  is  directed  at  land  artillery  only,  the 
effect  will  be  small,  due  to  the  small  target  presented;  and  unless 
the  enemy’s  fire  become  too  effective,  it  generally  is  advisable  to 
reserve  the  fire  of  the  land  batteries. 

(3)  When  the  enemy  is  attempting  to  deny  entrance  or  exit 
to  our  naval  vessels,  or  when  the  enemy  is  engaged  in  bombarding 
coastal  cities,  bases,  etc.,  it  is  necessary,  in  the  general  case,  to 
engage  him  in  the  most  effective  manner  possible. 

(4)  As  the  facilities  for  observation  of  fire  probably  will  not 
permit  the  adjustment  of  each  cannon  separately,  fire  must  be 
conducted  by  salvos  and  adjustment  effected  accordingly. 

(5)  In  general,  no  enemy  vessels,  other  than  capital  ships, 
are  engaged  while  at  long  range,  as  the  armament  they  carry  is 
of  no  effect  against  land  batteries,  cities  or  utilities  at  such 
ranges. 

(b)  At  medium  ranges — 25,000  to  15,000  yards. 

(1)  At  these  ranges,  the  enemy’s  mission  may  be: 

(a)  Bombardment  of  cities,  utilities,  etc.,  protected  by 

the  artillery. 

(b)  Destruction  of  our  naval  vessels  or  hindrance  of 

their  movements. 

(c)  Reconnaissance  of  our  positions. 

(d)  Attack  of  our  artillery  positions  or  outlying  stations 

and  accessories. 

(e)  Removal  of  barriers. 

(2)  In  the  case  of  (a),  (b),  or  (c),  the  employment  of  the 
land  artillery  would  be  much  the  same  as  given  under  long  range 
tactics. 

(3)  In  the  case  of  (d)  and  (e),  it  would  be  best  to  employ 
only  such  armament  as  is  necessary  to  defeat  the  enemy’s  pur- 
pose. 


XX— 21 


292  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(4)  Practically  the  same  system  of  salvo  fire  is  employed  at 
medium  ranges  as  is  employed  at  long  ranges. 

(5)  At  midranges,  the  enemy  is  likely  to  employ  his  forces 
in  two  or  more  divisions,  each  with  its  separate  mission.  Under 
such  circumstances,  it  is  essential,  generally,  that  each  division  be 
denied  its  separate  mission,  even  though  it  be  necessary  to  dis- 
tribute the  fire  of  the  land  artillery  to  such  extent  that  consider- 
ably less  destructive  fire  can  be  brought  to  bear  on  any  one  tar- 
get. 

(6)  In  harbor  defense  operations,  non-capital  ships  should 

not  be  taken  under  fire  at  medium  ranges  by  the  major  or  pri- 
mary armament  unless  they  are  armored  and  are  carrying  land- 
ing parties.  If  intermediate  or  secondary  armament  of’  sufficient 
power  is  available,  that  should  be  used.  The  terms  “primary” 
and  “secondary”  refer  to  the  movable  armament  only;  the  corres- 
ponding designations  for  fixed  armament  are  “major’  and  “inter- 
mediate.” ' 

(7)  In  coast  defense  operations  in  the  intervals  between  for- 
tified harbors  or  other  fortified  areas,  all  armament  having  the 
necessary  range  should  fire  at  transports  within  medium  range. 
In  such  cases,  it  is  desirable  also  to  concentrate  the  fire  of  large 
groups  of  guns  on  one  target  to  insure,  in  so  far  as  possible,  that 
at  least  one  transport  is  sunk  before  it  can  get  away.  Both  pri- 
mary and  secondary  armament  should  be  used  for  this  purpose. 

(c)  At  short  ranges — 15,000  yards  to  0. 

(1)  At  these  ranges,  all  types  of  cannon  would  come  into  use, 
limited  only  by  their  capabilities. 

(2)  If  the  targets  could  not,  or  probably  would  not,  ap- 
proach closer  than  10,000  yards  from  the  fortifications,  the  pro- 
per tactics  is  to  assign  a complete  fire  command,  or  fort  command, 
to  the  same  target;  if  developments  indicate  that  the  full  power 
and  capabalities  of  the  unit  are  not  being  utilized  to  advantage, 
then  two  or  more  targets  should  be  attached  simultaneously. 

(3)  Within  15,000  yards,  the  assignment  of  targets  by  group 
commanders  will  depend  upon  circumstances.  If  the  enemy  must 
confine  his  maneuvers  to  a channel  or  other  restricted  water  area, 
the  entire  fire  unit  should  be  concentrated  on  a single  target, 
regardless  of  the  range. 

(4)  If  the  enemy  can  approach  to  very  close  range  before 
committing  himself  to  a restricted  area,  it  is  better,  in  the  early 
stages  of  close  combat,  to  designate  a separate  target  for  each 
battery,  when  group  control,  by  fire  or  fort  commanders,  becomes 
impracticable. 

(d)  (1)  The  principal  employment  of  the  intermediate , sec- 
ondary, and  minor  armament  is  in  driving  off  destroyers,  traw- 
lers, etc.,  attempting  to  remove  mine  fields  and  other  barriers; 
in  combatting  destroyers,  scouts,  etc.,  cooperating  with  capital 
ships  in  an  attack;  in  combatting  attacks  by  destroyers  and  other 
non-capital  ships;  in  combatting  transports  attempting  to  take 
aboard  troops,  and  in  destroying  the  small  boats  attempting  to 
land  troops  fro  mtransports. 

(2)  In  all  these  cases,  a proper  concentration  of  fire  is  es- 
sential. 

(3)  At  night,  this  armament  is  liable  to  be  called  upon  to 
fire  at  fleeting  targets  illuminated  for  only  a short  time.  In 
such  cases,  units  larger  than  a battery,  as  a general  rule,  are 
difficult  to  handle,  and,  for  this  reason,  fire  is  opened  on  the  ini- 
tiative of  battery  commanders. 


FORCES  EMPLOYED 


293 


(e)  The  use  of  interdiction  fire  may  assume  impor- 
tance in  the  future,  not  only  to  deny  passage  through  a chan- 
nel or  area,  but  to  prevent  raids  by  destroyers,  on  barriers, 
shore  stations,  etc.  Major  and  primary  armament,  if  pro- 
vided with  instantaneous  or  super-quick  fuses,  might  be 
used  to  increase  the  density  of  barrage  ordinarily  under- 
taken by  secondary  armament. 

22.  Night  Attacks. — (a)  Such  attacks,  by  light  craft 
of  high  speed,  are  to  be  expected.  Subaqueous  sound  de- 
tectors give  warning  of  such  approach.  They  probably  will 
be  developed  sufficiently  to  supply  firing  data.  Sound  rang- 
ing apparatus  may  also  be  in  use.  In  either  case,  the  data 
are  not  sufficiently  accurate  or  continuous  to  justify  accurate 
ranging,  so  resort  is  had  to  a large  volume  of  fire  scattered 
over  a certain  area  or  zone.  This  method  of  fire  may  be  pre- 
arranged so  that  it  can  be  brought  down  in  the  most  effec- 
tive manner  and  on  the  shortest  possible  notice. 

(b)  Searchlights  are  brought  into  action  after  the  de- 
fense has  been  assured  by  other  means,  that  the  target  is 
within  searchlight  range.  After  he  is  once  picked  up,  he  is 
at  great  disadvantage.  Except  for  the  use  of  searchlights, 
the  same  defense  is  employed  in  weather  too  foggy  for  dis- 
tant observation.  Channel  entrances  or  narrow  points  in  a 
channel  are  always  critical  points ; hence  they  are  kept  un- 
der the  closest  possible  observation. 

23.  Heavy  Artillery  Available  for  Coast  Defense. 
— The  following  heavy  artillery,  suitable  for  firing  against 
moving  targets,  is  either  on  hand  or  in  project  for  early 
completion  and  supply : 


Cal 

Type 

Cannon 

Type 

Mount 

Angles  of 
Elevation 

Maximum 

Range 

Range 

Classification 

Fixed  Armament  (Major) 

12-inch 

Gun 

Fixed 

— 5 to  + 15 

17300 

Medium 

12-inch 

Gun 

Fixed 

0 to  + 35 

26800 

Long 

14-inch 

Gun 

— 5 to  + 20 

19700 

Medium 

14-inch 

Gun 

— 5 to  + 20 

22500 

Medium 

16-inch 

Gun 

| — 5 to  + 20 

23000 

Medium 

16-inch 

Gun 

— 5 to  + 50 

44850 

Long 

16-inch 

Gun 

— 5 to  + 30 

38800 

Long 

12-inch 

Mortar 

+ 45  to  -j-  65 

19319 

Medium 

12-inch 

Mortar 

+ 45  to  + 65 

16291 

Medium 

16-inch 

Howitzer 

— 5 to  + 48 

24940 

Medium 

16-inch 

Howitzer 

+ 20  to  -f  47 

19860 

Medium 

16-inch 

Howitzer 

1 + 20  to  -f  48 

24940 

Medium 

Fixed  Armament  (Intermediate) 

6-inch 

Gun 

| — 6 to  + 15 

14500 

Short 

6-inch 

1 Gun 

1 — 5 to  + 12 

13000 

Short 

XX— 23 


294  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


Cal 

Type 

Cannon 

Type 

Mount 

Angles  of 
Elevation 

Maximum 

Range 

Range 

Classification 

8-inch 

Gun 

— 6 to  -f  12 

12900 

Short 

8-inch 

Gun 

0 to  + 42 

23950 

Medium 

10-inch 

Gun 

— 5 to  + 12 

14200 

Short 

10-inch 

Gun 

1 

— 7 to  + 15 

16300 

Medium 

Fixed  Armament  (Minor) 

3-inch 

Gun 

— 10  to  + 15 

8950 

Short 

Mobile  Armament  (Primary) 

12-inch 

Gun 

Railway 

+ 16  to  + 38 

27500 

Long 

14-inch 

Gun 

Railway 

0 to  + 30 

30000 

Long 

14-inch 

Gun 

Railway 

0 to  + 60 

41570 

Long 

14-inch 

Gun  (Navy) 

Railway 

f 15 

23000 

Medium 

12-inch 

Mortar 

Railway 

+ 20  to  + 46 

9387 

Short 

16-inch 

Howitzer 

Railway 

4-  20  to  + 47 

19860 

Medium 

16-inch 

Howitzer 

Railway 

+ 20  to  + 48 

24940 

Medium 

Mobile  Armament  (Secondary) 

6-inch 

Gun 

Wheel  car- 

0  to  ■+■  38 

19600 

Medium 

riage 

7-inch 

Gun 

Railway 

— 4 to  -f  16 

16500 

Medium 

7-inch 

Gun 

Caterpillar 

0 to  16 

16900 

Medium 

8-inch 

Gun 

Railway 

0 to  + 42 

23950 

Medium 

155-mm. 

Gun 

Wheel  car- 

0  to  -f  36 

17186 

Medium 

155-mm. 

Gun 

riage 

155-mm. 

Gun 

Caterpillar 

0 to  + 86 

17180 

Medium 

Wheel  car- 

0  to  -f  42 

10940 

Short 

8-inch 

Howitzer 

riage 

Wheel  car- 

0  to  + 46 

12230 

Short 

8-inch 

Howitzer 

riage 

8-inch 

Howitzer 

Caterpillar 

— 0 to  -f  46 

12800 

Short 

9.2-inch 

Howitzer 

Platform 

-f  16  to  -f  46 

10060 

Short 

9.2-inch 

Howitzer 

Platform 

+ 16  to  -f-  46 

13084 

Short 

240-mm. 

Howitzer 

Platform 

— 1 to  4-  44 

14200 

Short 

Caterpillar 

— 1 to  -f  44 

14200 

Short 

240-mm. 

Howitzer 

Anti-Aircraft  Armament 

3-inch 

Gun 

Pedestal 

10000 

Short 

3-inch 

Gun 

Trailer 

14000 

Short 

7 5 -mm. 

Gun 

Truck 

7998 

Short 

FORCES  EMPLOYED 


295 


Fig.  I 


Coast  Defense  Command 


Fort  command 

i — r~n 


* 


I I I I I I I TT 


Fort  command 


Fort  command 


F,<s.  2. 


Fort  Commander 


296 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


horizontal  Base 


South 


South 


South 


XX— 24-26 


SUBMARINE  MINES  RELATION  TO  SEACOAST  297 

Section  V 

Submarine  Mines  in  Relation  to  Seacoast  Defense 

Paragraphs 


Definition  24 

Operated  by  Army 25 

Classification  26 

Location  of  Mines 27 

Components  of  Mine  Defense 28 

Passage  Ways  and  Sailing  Directions 29 

Possible  Future  Development  39 


24.  Definition. — (a)  The  subaqueous  discharge  of 
explosives,  in  actions  against  hostile  naval  craft,  is  effected 
by  means  of  three  types  of  devices,  namely,  the  submarine 
mine,  the  depth  bomb,  and  the  mobile  torpedo.  Each  of  these 
types  consists  essentially  of  a water-tight  case  containing 
explosive,  and  a device  whereby  that  explosive  is  fired  or 
detonated. 

(b)  The  fundamental  difference  ^between  submarine 
mines  and  the  other  two  types  is,  that  the  submarine  mine 
is  designed  to  be  discharged  in  place,  whereas  the  depth 
bomb  and  the  torpedo  both  are  projected  at  the  target. 

(c)  This  chapter  deals  with  submarine  mines  only. 

25.  Operated  by  Army. — In  our  service,  submarine 
mines,  as  such,  always  have  been  operated  by  the  Army. 
This  is  due  to  the  early  recognized  principle  that  they  are 
a part  of  the  seacoast  defense,  require  shore  protection,  and 
are  purely  defensive.  In  some  other  countries,  notably, 
France,  submarine  mines  are  under  the  control  of  the  Engi- 
neer Corps,  but  in  recent  years,  they  have  been  made  an  ad- 
junct of  the  Coast  Artillery  Corps.  This  puts  all  the  ele- 
ments, except  submarine  nets,  under  one  branch  of  the 
army.  Submarine*  nets  are  a navy  defense  against  the  op- 
erations of  the  enemy  submarine. 

26.  Classification. — (a) 

(1)  With  respect  to  their  location  between  the  bottom  and 
the  surface  of  the  water,  mines  are  classified  as: 

Buoyant  mines. 

^Ground  mines. 

(2)  (a)  Buoyant  mines  are  lighter  than  the  displaced  water, 
hence  they  remain  on  the  surface  if  not  held  under  by  some 
mooring.  When  they  break  loose,  they  will  sink,  if  punc- 
tured, otherwise  they  will  float  and  are  normally  harmless. 


XX 


26 


298  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(b)  With  respect  to  their  anchorage,  buoyant  mines 
are  of  two  classes,  viz.:  those  in  which  the  vertical  distance 
from  the  anchor  remains  constant,  except  for  the  swing  of 
the  mine  due  to  the  current  of  the  tide,  and  those  in  which 
this  distance  varies  as  the  tide  rises  and  falls. 

(c)  In  general,  buoyant  mines  should  not  be  placed  in 
water  less  than  30  feet  deep.  The  maximum  depth  at  which 
these  mines  can  be  operated  depends  to  a large  extent  upon 
the  condition  of  the  bottom  and  the  local  currents;  hence  it 
usually  is  determined  by  trial  in  each  instance.  It  is  best 
for  vessels  laying  mines,  to  have  open  and  unrestricted  ap- 
proaches to  the  ports  in  front  of  which  the  mines  are  to  be 
planted.  The  width  of  the  channel  is  not  of  very  great  im- 
portance, except  that  a wide  entrance  requires  more  mines 
and  a longer  time  to  prepare. 

(d)  Currents  cause  a typical  anchored  mine  to  dip  a 
number  of  feet  below  its  anchored  depth,  as  shown: 


Current 

Length  Anchor 

Dip  In 

Mi.  'per  hr. 

Rope  Feet 

Feet 

1 

50 

.2 

2 

50 

1.0 

3 

50 

6.9 

1 

100 

.8 

2 

100 

7.0 

3 

100 

18.0 

There  are  two  kinds  of  currents  to  be  considered,  a 
steady  continuous  current,  running  along  the  coast,  and  the 
current  of  the  tide  which  changes  in  direction  about  every 
six  hours.  The  former  have  very  little  effect  on  the  mines, 
first,  because  they  are  usually  of  very  moderate  speed,  and, 
second,  because  they  are  always  in  the  same  direction — hence 
the  feasibility  of  measuring  their  effect  with  a view  to  mak- 
ing proper  allowances.  The  tidal  currents,,  however,  do  ma- 
terially cut  down  the  effectiveness  of  the  mines  because  of 
their  variation  in  direction,  greater  speed,  and  the  difference 
in  depth  of  water  which  they  cause.  Buoyant  mines,  whose 
mooring  ropes  are  of  fixed  length,  should  be  submerged  to  a 
sufficient  depth  to  prevent  their  being  seen  readily  at  low 
tide;  yet  not  to  such  a depth  as  to  preclude  the  possibility 
of  their  effectiveness  at  high  tide.  This  may  be  impossible  in 
some  places,  in  view  of  the  excessive  rise  and  fall  of  the  tide, 
and  the  depth  of  water.  Inventors  have  been  seeking  for 
many  years  to  obviate  this  difficulty.  A mine  has  been  de- 
veloped which,  by  means  of  a hydrostatic  arrangement  within 
the  mine  case,  keeps  the  distance  constant  between  itself 
and  the  surface.  There  also  has  been  developed  a mine  to 
which  are  attached  one  or  more  “feelers”  or  antennae.  In 
this  case,  the  mine  itself  is  kept  low,  while  the  antennae, 
being  almost  invisible,  are  so  prepared  that  they  float  on 
or  near  the  surface.  Both  of  these  mines  are  still  in  the  ex- 
perimental stage. 

(3)  Ground  mines/  are  heavier  than  the  water  displaced: 
therefore  they  rest  on  the  bottom  without  anchor.  « They  should 
not  be  used  in  water  more  than  30  or  35  feet  deep.  The  term 
“ground  mine”  should  not  be  confused  with  “land  mine.”  All 
ground  mines  come  under  the  head  of  controlled  mines. 


XX— 26-27 


SUBMARINE  MINES  RELATION  TO  SEACOAST  299 

(b)  (1)  Mines  are  further  classified,  with  respect  to  the  means 
used  in  firing  them,  into  mechanical  and  electrical.  The  latter 
again  are  divided  into  controllable,  which  can  be  fired  at  the  will 
of  an  operator  on  shore,  and  uncontrollable,  which  lack  such  con- 
trol— the  mine  being  fired  on  contact  with  the  vessel.  The  me- 
chanical mine  in  uncontrollable.  When  once  set,  uncontrollable 
and  mechanical  mines  are  dangerous  to  all  vessels,  whereas  con- 
trollable mines  may  be  made  safe  for  friendly  vessels  and  danger- 
ous to  enemy  craft.  There  is  usually  a device,  in  connection  with 
controllable  mines,  which  signals  to  an  operator  on  shore  when  the 
mine  is  struck.  Usually  this  device  also  is  arranged  so  that  it 
can  be  set  for  contact  firing,  in  which  case  the  mine  fires  auto- 
matically when  struck  by  any  vessel;  this  is  for  use  during  fog, 
at  night,  or  when  the  enemy  makes  a smoke  screen.  When  mines 
are  so  set,  all  friendly  shipping  is  warned.  As  this  shipping  is 
under  the  control  of  the  Navy,  it  is  not  difficult  to  handle. 

(2)  A position  finding  system,  in  connection  with  the  mine 
defense,  plots  a vessel  within  the  effective  radius  of  a particular 
mine.  At  the  proper  time  the  mine  is  fired  at  the  will  of  the 
operator. 

27.  Location  of  Mines  in  Harbor  Defense. — (a) 
The  object  of  submarine  mines,  as  far  as  harbor  defense  is 
concerned,  is  to  prevent  enemy  ships  from  running  by  for- 
tifications, thereby  occupying  safe  anchorages  from  which 
to  shell  important  centers,  to  capture  seaports,  or  to  defeat 
a locally  inferior  fleet.  Mines  are  auxiliary  weapons,  form- 
ing merely  an  outpost  obstacle  for  a defensive  system. 

(b)  In  the  location  of  the  mine  fields  of  any  harbor, 
many  considerations  must  be  taken  into  account.  In  the 
first  place,  they  are  purely  defensive  (except  those  used  by 
the  Navy)  and  are  also  defenseless.  Therefore  they  must 
be  defended,  else  the  enemy  soon  renders  them  harmless 
by  countermining  or  sweeping.  They  may  be  defended  by 
shore  batteries,  by  ships,  or  by  both.  The  use  of  ships  (ex- 
cept small  craft  meant  for  that  purpose)  takes  away  that 
much  power  from  the  fleet,  hence  is  undesirable.  This  leaves 
their  protection  to  shore  batteries  and  to  certain  small  or 
obsolete  Navy  vessels.  Hence  the  mine  fields  must  be  placed 
within  effective  range  of  the  protective  shore  batteries.  As 
heavily  armed  vessels,  with  which  the  shore  batteries  will 
have  the  most  trouble,  are  of  large  draft,  the  mines  should 
be  placed  in  water  which  is  deep  enough  for  these  vessels 
to  navigate.  In  clear  weather  shore  batteries  should  be 
able  successfully  to  combat  all  ships  of  25-foot  draught  or 


XX — 27 


300  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

less.  Under  this  assumption,  mines  need  be  placed  only 
in  channels  of  a greater  depth  than  25  feet.  However,  under 
adverce  conditions  of  visibility  (night,  fog,  or  smoke  screens) 
mines  are  valuable  in  shallower  channels  to  prevent  small 
vessels  from  running  by  to  safe  anchorages  from  which  they 
could  take  fortifications  in  reverse  or  create  other  havoc. 
This  feature  is  not  now  so  important  as  formerly,  as  such 
anchorages  now  can  be  made  untenable  by  the  employment 
of  submarines  or  mobile  shore  batteries  (railway).  Opera- 
tions against  mine  fields  generally  are  carried  on  at  night 
by  small  craft;  hence  the  mines  should  not  be  placed  be- 
yond the  effective  range  of  the  searchlights;  they  must  be 
far  enough  out,  however,  so  that  the  hostile  ships  will  en- 
counter them  before  their  secondary  armament  becomes 
effective  against  the  shore  batteries.  There  is  now  an 
added  element  in  the  determination  of  the  locations ; this  is 
the  anti-aircraft  defense.  From  this  point  of  view,  the 
mines  would  have  to  be  located  within  available  anti-aircraft 
gun  protection,  i.e.,  within  about  4000  yards  of  available  gun 
positions.  This  is  more  especially  so  in  the  tropics,  where, 
the  water  being  clear  most  of  the  time,  mines  can  be  seen 
from  aircraft  even  when  submerged  to  a considerable  dis- 
tance. From  experiments  in  temperate  waters,  along  the 
Atlantic  seacoast,  it  is  believed  that  mines  cannot  be  located 
by  aircraft  except  under  very  favorable  circumstances  and 
even  then  only  at  low  altitudes.  The  water  must  be  smooth 
and  clear,  the  observer  must  have  a clear  day  with  the  sun 
at  his  back  and  must  not  be  at  a greater  altitude  than  1600 
to  2000  feet.  Even  then  only  a general  location  of  the  mine 
field  can  be  secured,  as  the  individual  mines  are  exceed- 
ingly difficult  to  plot.  It  is  believed,  from  the  above,  that 
the  anti-aircraft  defense  of  the  small  patrol  boats  can  keep 
planes  much  higher  than  is  necessary  to  prevent  the  loca- 
tion of  the  mines.  For  this  reason,  then,  the  anti-aircraft 
defense  feature  has  only  a limited  effect  on  the  location  of 
the  mine  fields  and  probably  should  be  considered  as  a local 
problem. 

(c)  There  are  other  considerations  which  might  be 
deemed  local,  as  they  present,  in  each  case,  a different  prob- 
lem. These  have  to  do  mainly  with  the  channels,  currents, 


XX— 27 


SUBMARINE  MINES  RELATION  TO  SEACOAST  301 

tides,  location  of  shore  batteries,  and  with  the  relative  im- 
portance of  the  harbor. 

(d)  In  view  of  the  present  range  of  searchlights,  and 
the  use  of  patrol  boats  for  watching  mine  fields,  it  is  believed 
that  6500  yards  can  safely  be  given  as  a maximum  range 
for  a mine  field.  The  inner  limit  normally  should  not  be  less 
than  3000  yards  from  the  shore  batteries.  In  general, 
three  lines  of  mines  cover  each  main  channel.  These  should 
be  placed  so  as  to  afford  a passage  to  friendly  vessels,  while, 
at  the  same  time,  closing  the  channel  to  enemy  craft.  Such 
a passage  should  have  as  few  changes  of  direction  as  possi- 
ble. 

(e)  The  individual  mines  must  not  be  placed  too  close 
to  one  another,  since  the  explosion  of  one  may  damage  the 
next  one,  and  so  on  until  the  entire  line  is  exploded.  Neither 
should  they  be  placed  too  far  apart,  because  of  the  limited 
distance  within  which  the  explosive  content  is  effective. 
This  distance  is  controlled  by  the  effective  explosive  radius 
of  the  particular  mine.  Mines  are  not  all  the  same  size  nor 
do  they  all  contain  the  same  amount  of  explosive.  They 
must  be  close  enough  together  so  that  a vessel,  passing  be- 
tween them,  will  not  be  beyond  the  effective  range  of  both. 
The  effect  of  increased  distance  between  the  mines  may  be 
reduced  by  running  a line  of  mines  on  a diagonal  to  the  di- 
rection of  the  channel.  See  figure : 


\ 


\ ' 


XX— 27-29 


302  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

(f)  Mines  preferably  are  laid  in  two  separate  fields, 
one  outside  the  other,  so  that  countermining  and  dragging 
one  field  will  not  touch  or  interfere  with  the  other.  Condi- 
tions of  harbor  permitting,  one  field  of  two  or  three  lines 
should  be  placed  out  about  6000  to  6500  yards,  and  the  inner 
field  of  two  or  three  lines  at  about  3500  to  4000  yards. 

28.  Components  of  the  Harbor  Submarine  Mine 
Defense. — (a)  Submarine  defense,  as  the  term  is  used  in 
our  service,  includes  not  only  the  mines,  but  all  guns,  equip- 
ment, apparatus  and  structures  used  in  connection  with 
loading,  planting,  operating,  guarding  and  protecting  the 
mine  fields.  This  service  has  a special  experimental  and 
purchasing  depot.  The  depot  also  has  a limited  capacity  for 
storage  and  receives  all  requisitions  for  supply  of  subma- 
rine mine  material. 

(b)  Some  idea  can  be  gathered  of  the  extent  of  the 
equipment  of  a mine  command  from  the  following  list : 

Boats  (from  row  boats  to  large  steam  planters),  guns, 
position  finding  systems,  searchlights,  casemates  and  equip- 
ment, gas  engines,  storage  batteries,  miles  of  cable  of  dif- 
ferent kinds,  cable  testing  apparatus,  wharves,  storehouses, 
magazines,  etc.  That  part  of  the  anti-aircraft  defense, 
which  pertains  to  the  mine  defense,  undoubtedly  will  re- 
main with  the  general  anti-aircraft  defense. 

(c)  Late  in  1916,  submarine  nets  were  added  to  this 
defense  and  many  such  nets  were  constructed.  Some  of 
these  nets  were  planted  by  the  Army,  but  they  generally 
were  operated  by  the  Navy.  They  were  designed  princi- 
pally for  defense  against  submarines.  It  is  the  present 
policy  that  all  such  nets  and  all  mines,  other  than  those  con- 
trolled from  shore,  be  installed  and  operated  by  the  Navy. 

29.  Passage  Ways  and  Sailing  Directions. — (a)  The 
passage  ways  and  sailing  directions,  for  use  in  navigating 
mine  fields  by  friendly  vessels,  are  determined  before  the 
mines  are  laid.  There  are  several  determining  factors  con- 
nected with  the  selection  of  these,  first,  from  the  Army  side, 
there  is  considered  the  location  of  the  batteries,  and  of  the 
channel  or  channels,  and  the  depth  of  contiguous  waters. 
From  the  Navy  point  of  view,  there  is  considered  the  direc- 
tion of  the  channel  or  channels,  the  currents,  the  depth  of 


XX— 29-30 


SUBMARINE  MINES  RELATION  TO  SEACOAST  303 

contiguous  waters,  the  possibility  of  closing  some  channels 
by  means  other  than  mines,  the  probability  of  the  main 
channel  being  closed  by  a vessel  sinking  therein,  after  hav- 
ing been  struck  by  a mine,  and  the  difficulties  of  navigation, 
such  as  ranges,  sharp  turns,  etc.  Hence  the  passage  ways 
and  sailing  directions  must  be  determined  by  agreement  be- 
tween the  local  Army  and  Navy  commanders,  in  order  that 
all  elements  may  be  given  due  weight.  The  object,  to  be 
kept  in  mind  at  all  times,  is  to  have  an  effective  barrier  to 
the  enemy,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  interfere  with  our  own 
and  friendly  shipping  as  little  as  possible. 

(b)  Immediately  after  the  declaration  of  war  in  April, 
1917,  the  President  issued  a proclamation  declaring  certain 
“Defensive  Sea  Areas”  as  under  military  control.  These 
defensive  sea  areas  were  specified  water  areas  along  the 
coast,  within  which  all  vessels,  of  whatever  nature,  except 
Army  harbor  boats,  were  under  the  control  of  the  Navy,  who 
issued  regulations  for  all  navigation  therein.  The  water 
areas  of  all  coast  defenses,  within  the  limits  of  the  defen- 
sive sea  areas,  were,  of  necessity,  partially  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  Navy,  hence  there  was  joint  control,  in  a limited 
way,  over  all  mine  fields  that  the  Army  planted  within  such 
areas.  Again,  as  both  the  Army  and  the  Navy  had  boats 
operating  in  the  harbors,  it  was  necessary  for  the  Army  to 
be  kept  well  acquainted  with  any  mines  that  the  Navy  might 
plant.  From  this  it  will  be  seen  that  close  cooperation  is  of 
the  greatest  importance,  hence  information  officers  should 
be  exchanged. 

30.  Possible  Future  Developments.— The  submarine 
mine  has  possibilities  even  beyond  those  developed  in  The 
World  War.  As  compared  with  other  defensive  weapons  it 
is  inexpensive.  It  is  easily  handled,  and,  where  it  can  be 
used  at  all,  is  almost  certain  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  en- 
tering the  harbor  it  protects.  It  can  be  made  very  effec- 
tive against  submarines  as  well  as  against  surface  craft. 


APPENDIX 


Range  Tables 

75-mm.  Gun 
155-mm.  Howitzer 


Charts  Illustrating  Artillery  Fire  . 

The  Protective  Barrage 
Box  Barrage 

Organization  of  Rolling  Barrage 
Counter  Preparation 
Ground  Pattern  of  Shell  Bursts 
(3  Plates) 


Range  Table 

75-mm.  Gun 


American 

Shrapnel 

Weight 

16  lbs. 

M.V.  1755 

f/s,  21 

sec  fuse 

Range 

Elevation 

Mils 

Range 

Angle  of  fall 

Time  of 

Probable 

Error 

meters 

Setting 

flight 

Range 

Defl 

m 

% 

° 

* 

sec 

m 

m 

500 

35 

10 

600 

1 

36 

1 

10 

0 

1000 

1 

14 

22 

1060 

3 

1 

28 

2 

10 

1 

1500 

2 

0 

35 

1540 

5 

2 

36 

3 

10 

1 

2000 

2 

55 

52 

2070 

7 

3 

58 

*5 

10 

1 

2500 

3 

58 

70 

2610 

10 

5 

40 

6 

10 

1 

3000 

5 

9 

91 

3140 

13 

7 

30 

8 

10 

2 

3500 

6 

27 

114 

3680 

17 

9 

35 

10 

11 

2 * 

4000 

7 

54 

140 

4210 

21 

12 

00 

12 

11 

2 

4500 

9 

30 

169 

4720 

26 

14 

40 

14 

12 

2 

5000 

11 

13 

199 

5230 

32 

17 

30 

16 

13 

3 

5500 

13 

6 

233 

38 

20 

35 

18 

15 

3 

6000 

15 

9 

269 

44 

23 

55 

20 

17 

3 

6500 

17 

27 

310 

52 

27 

35 

23 

19 

3 

7000 

20 

2 

356 

61 

31 

35 

26 

23 

4 

7500 

23 

1 

409 

72 

35 

55 

29 

27 

4 

8000 

26 

36 

473 

87 

41 

00 

32 

32 

4 

8500 

31 

27 

559 

109 

47 

25 

37 

39 

4 

304 


APPENDIX 


305 


Range  Table 

75-mm.  Gun 


H.  E. 

Shell 

Weight 

12  lbs. 

M.V.,  1805  f/s,  Short  fuse 

Range 

Elevation 

Range 

Angle  of  fall 

Time  of 

Probable 

Error 

meters 

0 

' 

Mils 

Setting 

flight 

Range 

Defl 

m 

% 

o 

' 

sec 

m 

m 

500 

30 

9 

550 

1 

33 

1 

8 

0 

1000 

1 

8 

20 

1025 

2 

1 

23 

2 

9 

0 

1500 

1 

55 

34 

1550 

5 

2 

32 

3 

10 

0 

2000 

2 

51 

51 

2075 

7 

4 

02 

5 

10 

1 

2500 

3 

58 

70 

2625 

10 

5 

51 

7 

11 

1 

3000 

5 

15 

93 

3200 

14 

7 

58 

8 

12 

1 

3500 

6 

41 

119 

3775 

18 

10 

22 

10 

13 

2 

4000 

8 

20 

148 

4375 

23 

13 

04 

12 

15 

2 

4500 

10 

08 

180 

4950 

29 

16 

04 

14 

16 

2 

5000 

12 

08 

216 

5500 

35 

19 

26 

17 

18 

3 

5500 

14 

26 

257 

43 

23 

07 

19 

20 

3 

6000 

17 

01 

302 

52 

27 

17 

22 

22 

4 

6500 

19 

55 

354 

62 

31 

53 

25 

25 

4 

7000 

23 

08 

411 

76 

37 

03 

28 

28 

5 

7500 

27 

34 

490 

93 

42 

57 

32 

33 

6 

8000 

33 

30 

602 

121 

50 

25 

38 

39 

7 

Range 

Table 

155-mm.  Howitzer 


Long  Steel  Shell  Charge  3 m.  v.  818  f/s,  Short  fuse 


Range 

Elevation 

Angle  of  fall 

Time  of 

Probable 

Error 

meters 

0 

' 

Mils 

% 

° 

/ 

flight 

Range 

Defl. 

' 

sec. 

m 

m 

500 

2 

00 

36 

4 

2 

22 

2 

4 

0 

1000 

4 

21 

77 

8 

4 

49 

4 

5 

0 

1500 

6 

21 

122 

13 

7 

30 

6 

6 

0 

2000 

9 

33 

170 

19 

10 

28 

9 

8 

1 

2500 

12 

30 

223 

24 

13 

44 

11 

9 

1 

3000 

15 

48 

280 

32 

17 

45 

14 

11 

1 

3500 

19 

22 

344 

40 

22 

00 

16 

13 

1 

4000 

23 

20 

415 

50 

26 

34 

20 

16 

1 

4500 

28 

29 

507 

64 

30 

49 

23 

19 

2 

5000 

57 

32 

668 

93 

42 

55 

29 

25 

2 

Range  Table 

155-mm.  Howitzer 

Long  Steel  Shell  Charge  2 M.V.,  728  f/s.  Short  fuse 


Range 

meters 

Elevation 

Mils 

% 

Angle  of  fall 

Time  of 
flight 

Probable 

Range 

Error 

Defl. 

500 

2 

34 

46 

5 

2 

58 

sec. 

2 

m 

4 

m 

0 

1000 

5 

31 

98 

11 

6 • 

00 

5 

5 

0 

1500 

8 

43 

155 

17 

9 

21 

7 

6 

1 

3000 

12 

18 

219 

24 

13 

15 

10 

8 

1 

2500 

16 

20 

291 

33 

18 

07 

13 

10 

1 

3000 

21 

09 

376 

45 

24 

02 

16 

12 

1 

3500 

27 

00 

487 

60 

31 

05 

20 

16 

1 

4000 

35 

37 

633 

86 

40 

33 

26 

21 

2 

306 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


Range  Table 

155-mm.  Howitzer 


Long  Steel  Shell  Charge  1 M.V.,  665  f/s,  Short  fuse 


Range 

meters 

Elevation 

O / 

Mils 

% 

Angle  of  fall 

Time  of 
flight 

Probable 

Range 

Error 

Deft. 

500 

3 

07 

55 

6 

3 

28 

sec. 

3 

m 

3 

m 

0 

1000 

6 

41 

119 

13 

7 

09 

5 

5 

0 

1500 

10 

37 

189 

20 

11 

47 

8 

6 

1 

2000 

15 

06 

268 

29 

16 

21 

11 

8 

1 

2500 

20 

32 

365 

42 

22 

48 

14 

11 

1 

3000 

27 

04 

481 

59 

30 

31 

18 

14 

1 

3500 

37 

54 

674 

90 

42 

00 

25 

20 

2 

Range  Table 

155-mm.  Howitzer 

Long  Steel  Sh&ll  Charge  5 M.v.,  1050  f/s,  Short  fuse 


Range 

meters 

Elevation 

O / 

Mils 

% 

Angle  of  fall 

O 

Time  of 
flight 

Probable 

Range 

Error 

Deft. 

500 

1 

7 

20 

3 

1 

28 

sec. 

2 

m 

6 

m 

0 

1000 

2 

40 

48 

5 

3 

05 

3 

7 

0 

1500 

4 

19 

77 

8 

4 

49 

5 

8 

0 

2000 

6 

02 

107 

12 

6 

47 

7 

9 

1 

2500 

7 

51 

139 

16 

9 

03 

9 

10 

1 

3000 

9 

45 

174 

20 

11 

32 

11 

11 

1 

3500 

11 

45 

209 

25 

14 

08 

13 

13 

1 

4000 

13 

53 

247 

30 

16 

48 

15 

14 

1 

4500 

16 

11 

287 

36 

19 

36 

17 

16 

1 

5000 

18 

41 

332 

42 

22 

41 

20 

18 

2 

5500 

21 

27 

382 

49 

26 

00 

22 

20 

2 

6000 

24 

41 

439 

58 

30 

01 

25 

22 

2 

6500 

28 

45 

512 

70 

35 

05 

29 

25 

2 

7000 

35 

05 

624 

90 

41 

50 

33 

30 

3 

Range  Table 

155-mm.  Howitzer 

• Long  Steel  Shell  Charge  U M.v.,  920  f/s,  Short  fuse 


Range 

meters 

Elevation 

o / 

Mils 

% 

Angle  of  fall 

O 

t 

Time  of 
flight 

Probable 

Range 

Error 

Deft. 

500 

1 

31 

' 27 

3 

1 

54 

sec. 

2 

m 

5 

in 

0 

1000 

3 

27 

62 

7 

3 

59 

4 

6 

0 

1500 

5 

29 

97 

11 

6 

13 

6 

7 

0 

2000 

7 

35 

134 

15 

8 

36 

8 

8 

1 

2500 

9 

48 

174 

20 

11 

08 

10 

9 

1 

3000 

12 

07 

215 

25 

. 13 

50 

12 

11 

1 

3500 

14 

43 

36  2 

30 

16 

52 

14 

12 

1 

4000 

17 

40 

314 

37 

20 

28 

17 

14 

1 

4500 

20 

53 

372 

46 

24 

35 

20 

16 

1 

5000 

24 

33 

437 

56 

29 

14 

23 

19 

2 

5500 

29 

02 

517 

70 

34 

48 

26 

22 

2 

6000 

36 

19 

646 

93 

42 

50 

22 

28 

2 

APPENDIX 


307 


Range  Table 

155-mm.  Howitzer 


Long  Steel  Shell  Charge  7 M.V.,  1420  f/s,  Short  fuse 


Range 

Elevation 

Angle  of  fall 

Time  of 

Probable 

Error 

meters 

0 

' 

Mils 

% 

© 

9 

flight 

Range 

Defl. 

sec. 

m 

m 

500 

26 

8 

2 

51 

1 

9 

0 

1000 

1 

21 

24 

3 

1 

55 

3 

10 

0 

1500 

2 

20 

42 

6 

3 

11 

4 

11 

0 

2000 

3 

24 

61 

8 

4 

39 

5 

12 

0 

2500 

4 

35 

81 

11 

6 

13 

7 

13 

1 

3000 

5 

54 

105 

14 

7 

56 

9 

14 

1 

3500 

7 

17 

130 

17 

9 

49 

10 

15 

1 

4000 

8 

44 

155 

21 

11 

51 

12 

17 

1 

4500 

10 

14 

182 

25 

14 

01 

14 

18 

1 

5000 

11 

50 

211 

29 

16 

19 

16 

19 

1 

5500 

13 

33 

241 

35 

18 

46 

18 

21 

1 

6000 

15 

28 

275 

39 

21 

27 

20 

23 

2 

6500 

17 

36 

314 

46 

24 

29 

23 

25 

2 

7000 

19 

58  , 

, 355 

53 

27 

44 

25 

27 

2 

7500 

22 

36 

402 

60 

31 

04 

28 

30 

2 

8000 

28 

27 

452 

69 

34 

40 

31 

33 

3 

8500 

28 

33 

508 

79 

38 

16 

34 

36 

3 

9000 

32 

34 

579 

92 

42 

32 

38 

40 

3 

9500 

39 

40 

705 

118 

49 

45 

44 

49 

4 

Range  Table 

155-mm.  Howitzer 

Long  Steel  Shell  Charge  6 M.v.,  1312  f/s,  Short  fuse 


Range 

Elevation 

Angle  of  fall 

Time  of 

Probable 

Error 

meters 

° 

' 

Mils 

% 

O 

* 

flight 

Range 

Defl. 

• 

• sec. 

m 

m 

500 

40 

12 

2 

58 

1 

8 

0 

1000 

1 

43 

31 

4 

2 

07 

3 

9 

0 

1500 

2 

49 

51 

6 

3 

27 

4 

10 

0 

2000 

4 

01 

71 

9 

4 

59 

6 

11 

0 

2500 

5 

17 

94 

12 

6 

47 

8 

12 

1 

3000 

6 

42 

119 

16 

8 

49 

9 

13 

1 

3500 

8 

12 

146 

19 

10 

59 

11 

14 

1 

4000 

9 

48 

174 

24 

13 

13 

13 

16 

1 

4500 

11 

29 

204 

28 

15 

27 

15 

17 

1 

5000 

13 

16 

236 

32 

17 

49 

17 

19 

1 

5500 

15 

13 

271 

37 

20 

29 

19 

20 

2 

6000 

17 

25 

308 

43 

23 

24 

21 

22 

2 

6500 

19 

41 

350 

50 

26 

27 

24 

24 

2 

7000 

22 

19 

396 

57 

29 

51 

26 

27 

2 

7500 

25 

17 

450 

66 

33 

31 

29 

30 

2 

8000 

28 

46 

512 

77 

37 

36 

32 

33 

3 

8500 

33 

15 

591 

93 

42 

30 

37 

38 

3 

THE  PROTECTIVE  BAR  RACE 


(Defensive  Situ  a,  iton J 


Legehd:- 

Norma!  Barrages 

Even  tuaf  ( possible  or  rmergenc yj  Barrage 

Machine  Sun  Barrage 

Barrage  Front  = dbout  200 yards  per  battery,  laid 

ISO -200 yards  in  front  of  line  covered, 
according  to  range  of Supporting  guns 


PLATE -1 


APPENDIX 


309 


BOX  BARRAGE 

( J hart  mg  dispersion  of  shells  etc.) 


F/he  /4ccon*>ANYiN&  Raid  (generally  for  capture  of  prisoners) 

1st  Stage-  Genera/  shelling  of  trenches  and  area  involved  in  the  raid 
7S  shell  and  shrapnel  on  area  to  drive  defenders  to  cover 
/55  he//  on  communicating  trenches ; known  occupied  areasj  etc 
and  machine  gun  or  mortar  emplacements . 

2nd  Stage—  The  box  made  by  assigned  barrages , and  fire  for  neutral izaHorr 
on  machine  gun  emplacements  or  areas  from  which  aftac king 
force  mgh!  be  bothered . 

a and b - Routes  followed  by  sub- divisions  of  attacking  party. 

/ - Shrapnel  barrage . 

2 jJTA,  H ~ 7d she//  barra ge . 

6, 7 <5?  9 t 10  ~ IS 5 neutra  hzation  fire  on  machine  gun  emplacements  and 
interdiction  on  trenches 


PL  ATE  - XI 


310 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


Organ /z  at/on  of  the 

Rolling  Barrage. 

Accornpany/ng  the  Infantry  in  its  ac/isam 
Showing  lines  in  rear  of  wh/ oh  f^v/th  reference 
to  7H  She/I  fine/  the  center  of  impact  of  the 
cat/bre  noteat  must  not  be  p/ocect.  As  organ /zed 
here  the  fto/I/ng  Barrage  is  genera  i/y  cai/ect  a 
Dept  B arrage . 


&Hoh//rz  eh 


/SS  Homo. 
SHell 


ftncH.  Gun 
&/SSH  shear' 
/r  u&eo 


75  SHRAP. 


1 75  SHELL 


/ne/hytry 
L/he  roll  on- 

SNG  RaRPASc 


Pl  ATE-XIt 


APPENDIX 


311 


Illustrating  LOCAL  or  PARTIAL^'  Counter  Preparat, on 


7 7777777777 . ltl 

O Lf  R F R O / 


Lear no 

1 

cz> 

Normal  Barrage 
Possible  Barrage 

Counter  Preparation,  75 ‘s 

- 

C P from  adjacent  sub- sector  75s 

Counter  Preparation  !55's 

C.  P from  adjacen  t sub  -sector  155 's 

IX 

Counter  Preparation  t Corps  A a ty  f Put 
donn  on/y  on  special  reqarslj 

-xm 

Plate  I. 

Ground  Pattern 

of 

Shell  Bursts 

A - . L LD/S  TR/B  U T/ON  IN  ROL  L ING  BARRAGE . 

ds  per  gun  per  min.  borrage  advancing  /OO meters  in  3 minuter) 

3-.,  hell  Distribution  Covering  infantry  on  objective 
(1  rd  per  qun  per  min.  for  30  minutes) 

Nod:.  - Chart  A illustrates  the  number  and  distribution  of  shell  bursts  assuming 
one  battery  of  75  s for  all  purposes  per  /OO  meters  of  front  - two  batteries  per 
battalion  firing  shell  on  the  shell  line  and  one  firing  shrapnel  in  advance. 

Arriving  at  an  objective , chart  3 illustrates  the  number  and  distribution  of 
the  bursts  if  alt  75's  engaged*  in  the  barrage  Ere  in  protective  barrage  for  30 
minutes  at  the  rate  of  t rd  per  gun  per  min.  Distance  3000  meters. 


APPENDIX 


313 


plate  H. 

Ground  Pattern 

or 

Shell  Burs  to 


50bz;;sr  °r<r: 

* ‘ n f'r'n9  'Shrapnel  and  two  shell  (latter  only  shown)  * P 


• 

• 

• 

— -i S_ 

• 9 • 

« ^ • 

• 

• • 
• 

• • 
• 

• 

• • 

* • 

• • • 

• 

• 

• • 

— • 

- - 

^ • 

0 

• 



• 

• 

• 

• • 

• 

• 

• • 

• 

4 • 

• • • 

• 

• • 

• • 

, • • 

■* — , • • - 

* 5 

• 

• • "1 

• • 

* i 

© 

— ; — — -I 

« 

• 

• 

~ ~l 

too 


314  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


Plate  IE. 

Ground  Pattern 

of 

Shell  Bursts 

All  75s  in  barrage  line  firing  grounds  per  gun  per  minute  covering  infantry 
advancing  100  meters  m3  minutes  Note  the  increased  protection  and  preparation 
m a stow  advance  as  a proportionate  increase  is  made  in  the  number  of  bursts 
of  all  calibres.  Ho  Shrapnel  is  fmed  at  long  range 


Illustrative  Exercise  No.  1 

THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 

The  School  of  the  Line 
1921-1922 


TERRAIN  EXERCISE  No.  5— Series  I 
(TT  37) 


18  October  1921 


Maps:  General  Map,  Vicinity  of  Leavenworth,  1 inch  = 15  miles. 
Road  Map  of  Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas,  and  Vicinity,  1:62500. 

General  Situation: 

Kansas  (Blue)  and  Missouri  (Red)  have  declared  war. 
A Blue  army  corps  is  preparing  to  force  a crossing  of  the 
Missouri  River  between  Fort  Leavenworth  and  Soldiers' 
Home.  Red  forces  are  concentrating  to  oppose  this  inva- 
sion. 


Special  Situation  (Blue)  : 

On  the  night  of  17-18  October,  the  1st  Battalion,  1st* 
Field  Artillery  bivouacked  at  Glenn  Valley  School  west  of 
Leavenworth.  At  6 :00  AM,  18  October,  Major  E command- 
ing this  battalion,  receives  the  following  verbal  order  from 
his  regimental  commander: 

“The  enemy  occupies  a strong  entrenched  position  along  the 
bluffs  east  of  the  Beverly  Station — East  Leavenworth — Farley 
road.  His  outpost  position  extends  to  the  east  bank  of  the  Mis- 
souri River.  There  are  many  machine  guns  and  a few  field  guns 
on  the  Missouri  River  flats. 

“The  I Corps  forces  a crossing  of  the  Missouri  River  at  3:30 
AM  tomorrow,  to  drive  the  enemy  east  of  Platte  River. 

“The  1st  Field  Artillery  and  the  3d  Battalion,  101st  Field  Ar- 
tillery (155-mm.  howitzers)  support  the  1st  Brigade.  Sectors 
are  shown  on  this  map  (see  map  issued  with  the  exercise). 

“Your  battalion  supports  the  1st  Infantry.  You  will  occupy 
positions  within  the  area  bounded  by  the  Missouri  River,  Corral 
Creek,  Prison  Lane  and  Metropolitan  Avenue.  Have  all  neces- 
sary firing  data  prepared  before  dark.  Movement  to  positions 
will  commence  at  dark. 

“The  3d  Battalion,  101st  Field  Artillery,  is  authorized  to 
occupy  positions  within  the  same  area. 

“The  primary  missions  of  your  battalion  from  the  initial  posi- 
tions will  be  as  follows: 


315 


316 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


“(a)  Support  the  construction  of  two  ponton  bridges  opposite 
the  mouth  of  Corral  Creek,  and  the  crossing  of  troops 
over  these  bridges.  To  assist  in  accomplishing  this  mis- 
sion, one  platoon  will  be  placed  in  position  for  direct 
laying. 

“(b)  Support  by  a rolling  barrage  or  by  successive  concen- 
trations, the  advance  of  the  1st  Infantry  across  the  Mis- 
souri River  flats,  and  the  attack  against  the  hostile  bat- 
tle position. 

“(e)  Beginning  at  1:00  AM,  take  under  fire  the  eight  targets 
numbered  on  this  panoramic  sketch  (see  panoramic 
sketch  issued  with  the  exercise) . Number  of  rounds  and 
order  of  attacking  these  targets  are  at  your  discretion, 
except  that  total  ammunition  expenditure  for  these  tar- 
gets before  daylight  will  not  exceed  1000  rounds. 

“(d)  You  will  be  prepared  to  neutralize  with  smoke  the  most 
likely  points  of  hostile  observation  from  the  bluffs  east 
of  the  C.  B.  & Q.  Railroad  within  the  sector  of  the  1st 
Infantry. 

“Ammunition  distributing  point:  * * * 

“No  reduced  charge  ammunition  is  available. 

“Command  post, •'1st  Field  Artillery:  * * * ” 


Required  : 

(a)  Reconnoiter  and  select  positions  for  the  1st  Battal- 
ion, 1st  Field  Artillery,  that  will  comply  with  the  orders  of 
the  regimental  commander  and  enable  the  assigned  mis- 
sions to  be  accomplished.  Mark  the  positions  selected  on  the 
map  furnished  with  the  exercise. 

NOTE. — To  enable  guns  to  reach  the  east  bank  of  the  Missouri 
River  within  the  sector  of  the  1st  Infantry,  base  assumptions  of  mini- 
mum range  upon  the  following  data: 

Assumed  height  of  river  bank:  780  feet.  Assumed  height  of  bat- 
tery: 830  feet. 

Range  (in  yards)  Minimum  elevation  required 


(b)  Fill  out  the  table  in  the  upper  right  hand  corner  of 
the  map  to  show  the  assignment  of  the  eight  targets  num- 
bered on  the  panoramic  sketch,  to  batteries  or  platoons  of 
the  1st  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery. 

(c)  Assuming  that  the  primary  mission  of  Battery  E, 
101st  Field  Artillery  (155-mm.  howitzers)  is  to  supplement 
the  fire  of  the  1st  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery,  in  the  ac- 
complishment of  its  missions,  select  a position  for  this  bat- 
tery and  mark  the  position  on  the  map. 

Solutions  to  be  turned  in  by  5:00  PM. 


1000 

1500 

2000 

2500 


1°  10' 
2°  25' 
3°  40' 


12' 


Terrain  Exercise  /Vo  . S , Senes  I ( TT 3f) , /Q  October-  /^zj 


349 


Eart  ] 


UTION 


tScaJe  6"  - 1 Mile 


T ~T of  /Jrty  i/o/  X 


Vt/S/dg  us/ 


/ ✓ / y 


1 

- ' v \ t h i wt  tim  > *t  m >m  >u> »»» nw  m 1 Pjj 


_/1  /ssourt/  f^/vs^ 


Note  Sr  Ranges  are  estimated 
or  taken  from  road  niop. 

Ai.  = Approx/ mate  Sector  of  / st  Infantry 
measured  on  the  horizon  . 
tk  At  many  points  atony  river  bank. 


At 

Northeast  Corner 
of  Reservoir 


Terrain  Exercise  /to,  5 

(TT  3?)  /S  Oct /?*/. 


TT  of  Arty.  Vol  I 


. 


Terrain  Exercise  /Vo.  S,  3er,es  I frt3y)J  IS  October  ^ZJ  <Jo/ut,on  /Vo. 


APPENDIX 


317 


An  Approved  Solution 
Part  II 

1.  This  exercise  illustrates  the  reconnaissance  and  se- 
lection of  battery  positions  within  an  assigned  area  for  the 
accomplishment  of  specific  missions. 

2.  When  the  time  element  is  of  great  importance,  suit- 
able positions  are  selected  to  carry  out  the  assigned  or  an- 
ticipated missions,  but  when  time  is  available  for  a thorough 
reconnaissance,  as  in  this  case,  the  best  positions  available 
should  be  selected. 

3.  Except  the  platoon  in  position  for  direct  laying, 
all  guns  should  have  flash  defilade  (4  yards  for  the  75-mm. 
gun).  Concealment  from  terrestrial  observation  is  always 
an  important  consideration,  in  order  to  minimize  the  possi- 
bility of  neutralization  by  hostile  artillery.  Within  the  as- 
signed area,  concealment  of  the  75-mm.  guns  from  aerial 
observation  can  be  secured  only  by  the  use  of  camouflage. 

4.  To  support  the  crossing  of  the  Missouri  River,  at 
least  two  batteries  of  75-mm.  guns  (in  addition  to  the  pla- 
toon in  position  for  direct  laying)  should  be  able  to  fire  on 
the  east  bank  of  the  river.  Positions  with  flash  defilade, 
suitable  for  this  important  mission  cannot  be  found  within 
the  assigned  area  closer  than  1500  yards  from  the  river. 

5.  The  rear  batteries  will  require  long  lines  of  com- 
munication to  the  observation  posts  that  will  be  necessary 
for  observation  along  the  east  bank  of  the  Missouri  River. 
This  is  a disadvantage  that  cannot  be  overcome.  These  bat- 
teries would  establish  auxiliary  observation  posts  in  the  im- 
mediate vicinity  of  the  battery  positions  to  take  care  of  the 
more  distant  observation  should  communication  with  the 
forward  observation  posts  be  interrupted. 

6.  In  this  exercise,  other  important  considerations  in 
the  selection  of  battery  positions  are: 

(a)  Facility  of  approach  and  withdrawal  from  the  positions. 

(b)  Suitability  of  soil  and  slope  of  the  ground  for  the  eun 

sites.  & 

(c)  Favorable  conditions  for  the  resupply  of  ammunition,  in- 
cluding approaches  concealed  from  terrestrial  observation  as  far 
as  possible. 


318 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


7.  Where  the  platoons  of  a battery  are  placed  in  separ- 
ate positions,  it  is  advisable  to  select  positions  within  a rea- 
sonable distance  of  each  other,  to  facilitate  command. 

8.  The  platoon  in  position  for  direct  laying  should  be 
at  some  distance  from  the  point  where  the  ponton  bridges 
are  to  be  constructed.  It  is  very  likely  to  draw  fire,  and 
this  fire  should  not  endanger  the  bridges  and  the  troops 
crossing  them. 

9.  A position  for  155-mm.  howitzers  should  be  such 
that  the  supply  of  ammunition  by  truck  can  be  accomplished 
without  difficulty. 

10.  For  concealment  of  the  flashes  from  terrestrial  ob- 
servation, 155-mm.  howitzers  require  greater  defilade  than 
the  75-mm.  gun.  They  should  be  given  the  greatest  defilade 
possible. 

11.  In  the  approved  solution,  Part  I,  the  assignment  of 
targets  is  based  upon  the  following  scheme:  Battery  B is 
assigned  the  closer  targets  in  the  south  half  of  the  battalion 
sector;  Battery  C those  in  the  north  half.  The  platoon  of 
Battery  A in  a concealed  position,  more  advanced  than  either 
Battery  B or  Battery  C,  is  assigned  the  more  distant  tar- 
gets. 

12.  One  platoon  is  placed  in  a position  for  direct  laying 
for  a specific  purpose.  Until  this  mission  is  accomplished 
other  missions  should  not  be  assigned  except  in  an  emer- 
gency. Otherwise  the  position  may  be  given  away  prema- 
turely and  the  platoon  neutralized  or  destroyed  before  it 
can  accomplish  its  principal  mission. 

Comments  on  Students’  Solutions 

1.  Placing  two  or  more  batteries  of  a battalion  in  one 
line  and  close  together  should  be  avoided  if  possible.  It 
simplifies  counter  battery  for  the  hostile  artillery,  and  is 
liable  to  create  dead  spaces  within  the  battalion  sector  of 
fire  within  which  no  fire  can  bo  delivered  by  the  battalion. 

2.  An  entire  battery  should  not  be  crowded  into  a posi- 
tion that  is  suitable  for  only  one  platoon. 

3.  Except  the  platoon  in  position  for  direct  laying,  all 
guns  should  have  flash  defilade.  (See  par.  3,  An  Approved 


APPENDIX 


319 


Solution,  Part  II.)  Batteries  should  be  concealed  from 
hostile  observation  from  the  flanks  as  well  as  from  the  front. 

(See  Note  after  Comment  No.  4) 

4.  To  support  the  crossing  of  the  Missouri  River,  at 
least  two  batteries  of  75-mm.  guns  (in  addition  to  the  pla- 
toon in  position  for  direct  laying)  should  be  able  to  fire  on 
the  east  bank  of  the  river  (par.  4,  An  Approved  Solution, 
Part  II). 

NOTE. — In  many  solutions  it  is  difficult  to  determine  whether 
Comment  No.  3 or  No.  4 applies  to  a particular  battery  position. 
In  some  cases  this  is  due  to  the  large  conventional  signs  employed, 
and  in  others  to  possible  errors  of  25  to  50  yards  in  indicating  posi- 
tions on  the  map.  In  many  instances  a few  yards  make  considerable 
difference;  if  the  guns  are  sufficiently  in  rear  of  the  covering  crest 
to  secure  flash  defilade  they  cannot  reach  with  their  fire  the  east  bank 
of  the  Missouri  River  and  Comment  No.  4 applies;  on  the  other  hand 
if  the  guns  are  pushed  far  enough  forward  (or  far  enough  back  on  a 
forward  slope)  to  reach  the  east  bank  of  the  Missouri  River,  they 
are  not  concealed  from  hostile  observation  and  Comment  No.  3 ap- 
plies. (This  matter  has  been  given  full  consideration  in  marking 
the  solutions.) 

5.  There  is  no  necessity  for  placing  more  than  one  pla- 
toon in  position  for  direct  laying  within  effective  machine 
gun  range  of  the  enemy. 

6.  In  selecting  battery  positions,  facility  of  approach  is 
an  important  consideration,  especially  as  the  positions  are 
to  be  occupied  at  night.  It  is  also  important  that  there  be 
routes  to  the  battery  positions  favorable  for  ammunition 
supply  (par.  6,  An  Approved  Solution,  Part  II). 

7.  Where  the  platoons  of  a battery  are  placed  in  sep- 
arate positions,  it  is  advisable  to  select  the  positions  within 
a reasonable  distance  of  each  other  in  order  to  facilitate 
command  (par.  7,  An  Approved  Solution,  Part  II). 

8.  The  platoon  in  position  for  direct  laying  should  be 
at  some  distance  from  the  point  where  the  ponton  bridges 
are  to  be  constructed.  It  is  very  likely  to  draw  fire,  and 
this  fire  might  endanger  the  bridges  and  the  troops  crossing 
them  (par.  8,  An  Approved  Solution,  Part  II). 

9.  A position  for  155-mm.  howitzers  should  be  such 
that  the  supply  of  ammunition  by  truck  can  be  accomplished 
without  difficulty.  The  ammunition  is  too  heavy  to  be  car- 
ried by  men  for  any  great  distance.  (Par.  10,  An  Approved 
Solution,  Part  II.) 


320 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


10.  For  concealment  of  the  flashes  from  terrestrial  ob- 
servation, 155-mm.  howitzers  require  greater  defilade  than 
75-mm.  guns.  They  should  be  given  the  greatest  defilade 
possible. 

11.  It  is  preferable  to  assign  targets  in  the  same  lo- 
cality (or  within  a battery  sector  of  fire)  to  the  same  bat- 
tery. This  tends  to  concentrate  rather  than  to  disperse 
the  efforts  of  a battery,  and  minimizes  the  necessity  for 
shifting  the  trails  of  the  guns.  Except  in  the  case  of  split- 
trail  guns,  traverse  on  the  carriage  is  very  limited.  Shift- 
ing the  trails  entails  delays  in  firing. 

12.  One  platoon  is  placed  in  a position  for  direct  laying 
for  a specific  purpose.  Until  this  mission  is  accomplished 
other  missions  should  not  be  assigned  except  in  an  emer- 
gency. Otherwise  the  position  may  be  given  away  pre- 
maturely and  the  platoon  neutralized  or  destroyed  before 
it  can  accomplish  its  principal  mission  (par.  12,  An  Ap- 
proved Solution,  Part  II). 

13.  Targets  1 to  8,  inclusive,  shown  on  the  panoramic 
sketch,  are  all  targets  for  the  1st  Battalion,  1st  Field  Ar- 
tillery [See  Requirement  (b)  ] . 

14.  The  assignment  of  all  of  these  targets  to  one  pla- 
toon or  even  to  one  battery  places  too  great  a burden  upon 
so  small  a unit,  as  1000  rounds  have  been  allotted  for  the 
attack  of  these  targets. 

15.  In  the  assignment  of  targets,  care  should  be  taken 
not  to  assign  a target  to  a battery  that  is  within  the  dead 
space  that  the  battery  cannot  reach  with  its  fire. 

16.  Where  a platoon  is  placed  in  position  for  direct 
laying  on  the  bluffs  overlooking  the  Missouri  River,  it  is 
bound  to  draw  considerable  fire  from  both  artillery  and 
machine  guns.  Therefore  it  is  wrong  to  place  another 
platoon  or  battery  in  very  close  proximity  to  this  platoon, 
even  in  a concealed  position.  It  will  suffer  from  the  fire 
directed  at  the  platoon  in  position  for  direct  laying,  and  may 
be  totally  or  partially  neutralized. 


Illustrative  Exercise  No.  2 


THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 

The  School  of  the  Line 
1921-1922 


TERRAIN  EXERCISE  No.  8 — Series  I — Artillery 
(TT  50) 


October  25,  1921 

Map:  Road  Map  of  Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas,  and  Vicinity. 

General  Situation: 

In  a war  between  Missouri  (Blue)  and  Kansas  (Red) 
the  1st  Blue  Division,  reenforced  by  the  101st  Field  Ar- 
tillery (155-mm.  howitzers)  as  advance  guard  of  the  First 
Blue  Army  is  marching  from  Leavenworth  on  Atchison. 
Early  contact  with  the  enemy  is  expected. 

Special  Situation  No.  1: 

(To  be  issued  at  road  junction  885  on  Atchison  Pike.) 
The  division  advance  guard  consists  of:  1st  Brigade 

(less  2d  Infantry),  1st  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery  and 
Ambulance  and  Sanitary  Companies  No.  1.  Reserve  com- 
position and  order  of  march: 

Headquarters  1st  Brigade 

1st  Infantry  (less  1st  Battalion  and  1 platoon  howitzer 
company) 

1st  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery 

Ambulance  Company  No.  1 and  Sanitary  Company  No.  1. 

As  Major  E,  commanding  1st  Battalion,  1st  Field  Ar- 
tillery, you  are  riding  at  the  head  of  the  reserve,  with  Gen- 
eral B,  advance  guard  commander.  You  are  accompanied 
by  your  battalion  executive,  reconnaissance  officer,  liaison 
officer,  3 scouts,  and  agents  from  each  battery  and  the  combat 
train,  and  a bugler.  The  remainder  of  the  battalion  detail 
immediately  precedes  the  batteries,  which  are  in  the  order 
A-B-C.  Battalion  combat  train  follows  batteries.  Cap- 
tain A,  senior  battery  commander,  is  in  command  of  the  ar- 
tillery column. 


321 


322  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

Reports  of  minor  encounters  have  been  coming  in  from 
the  leading  elements.  A gradually  stiffening  Red  resistance 
is  noted,  but  up  to  1 :30  PM,  October  25,  1921,  no  artillery 
action,  beyond  the  normal  reconnaissance  enroute,  has  been 
required. 

At  1:30  PM  Major  E — at  this  point  (road  junction 
885) — receives  from  General  B the  following  order: 

“The  Reds,  with  about  one  battalion  deployed  across  the 
Atchison  Pike,  have  checked  our  advance  elements.  Our  troops 
now  hold  the  rise  about  1,000  yards  west  of  Frenchman.  So  far 
only  rifle  and  machine  gun  fire  have  been  encountered. 

“I  intend  deploying  on  the  line  now  held  by  our  advance  ele- 
ments, preparatory  to  attacking  with  my  entire  force.  Infantry 
elements  of  the  reserve  will  advance  on  and  south  of  Atchison 
Pike. 

“You  will  cover  the  approach  march  and  be  prepared  to  sup- 
port the  attack,  for  which  orders  will  issue  later. 

“I  will  be  on  this  hill  to  our  north.” 

NOTE: — At  this  time  the  reserve  will  be  assumed  as  temporarily 
halted  on  Atchison  Pike  and  the  street  which  forms  the  north  bound- 
ary of  Leavenworth.  Head  of  artillery  column  on  this  street,  about 
opposite  southeast  corner  of  United  States  Penitentiary  wall. 

Required : 

A statement  of  the  detailed  plan  of  action  decided  upon 
by  Major  E,  at  this  time,  assuming  no  new  developments 
in  the  next  half  hour.  Actual  orders  not  required. 

NOTE: — Solutions  will  be  turned  in  here  (road  junction  885)  at 
3:00  PM. 


An  Approved  Solution 

Upon  receipt  of  General  B’s  order,  Major  E joined  his 
detail,  acquainted  them  with  the  situation,  and  issued  orders 
to  put  into  execution  the  following  plan  of  action : 

1.  Captains  A and  B,  accompanied  by  the  battalion  detail 
and  their  battery  details  to  come  forward  by  route:  road  leading 
north  from  United  States  Penitentiary — trail  leading  westerly 
from  Corral  Creek  to  road  along  railroad — road  crossing  ridge 
along  railroad  cut  near  south  end  Sheridan  Drive.  To  report  to 
Major  E at  road  junction  885.  Batteries  A and  B to  follow  at 
walk  and  trot,  halting  after  the  column  has  cleared  the  ridge. 

2.  Battery  C to  promptly  go  into  action  in  the  old  quarry 
on  the  right  of  Atchison  Pike,  near  the  top  of  the  ridge.  Bat- 
tery commander  station  near  battery.  Direction  of  fire:  Atchi- 
son Pike  west  of  Frenchman.  Battery  to  follow  Battery  B across 
Corral  Creek  and  along  westward  trail,  but  to  take  trail  fork  to 
left,  entering  Atchison  Pike  near  foot  of  ridge.  Captain  C to 
receive  further  orders  upon  arrival  at  designated  position. 


APPENDIX 


323 


3.  Battalion  combat  train  to  follow  the  route  of 'Batteries  A 
and  B to  some  point  near  target  range,  and  there  await  orders. 

4.  Reconnaissance  officer  to  return  to  position  designated  for 
Battery  C,  to  study  the  terrain  until  Captain  C arrives,  then  ac- 
quaint the  latter  with  the  situation  and  direct  him  to  open  fire 
on  any  suitable  targets,  with  particular  observation  for  hostile 
artillery.  Communication  with  the  artillery  battalion  command 
post  which  will  be  established  on  the  hill  north  of  Salt  Creek 
School. 

5.  Battalion  executive  to  establish  observation  post  on  the 
hill  north  of  Salt  Creek  School,  also  command  post  on  same  hill, 
near  that  of  General  B.  To  cause  battery  commander  stations, 
Batteries  A and  B,  to  be  placed  on  same  hill. 

6.  Liaison  officer  to  remain  with  General  B. 

Special  Situation  No.  2: 

(Continuation  of  situation  No.  1.) 

After  giving  the  necessary  orders,  Major  E,  accom- 
panied by  a bugler,  rides  to  reconnoiter  positions  for  Bat- 
teries A and  B. 

Required : 

Route  taken  and  positions  selected  by  Major  E. 

NOTE. — Solutions  to  be  turned  in  at  Frenchman  at  4:30  PM. 

An  Approved  Solution 

Major  E first  rides  forward  to  the  front  line,  noting 
its  position  and  what  can  be  seen  of  the  Red  position.  He 
then  returns  to  that  part  of  Atchison  Pike  lying-  between 
the  hill  designated  for  the  artillery  battalion  station  and 
the  low  crest  just  east  of  Salt  Creek.  Here  are  good  posi- 
tions, but  he  notes  the  difficulty  of  reaching  them  under 
cover.  He  therefore  rides  around  the  north  end  of  the  hill 
north  of  Salt  Creek  School,  inspects  the  terrain  north  of 
this  hill,  and  returns  to  road  junction  885  by  riding  across 
country  east  of  the  hill. 

He  reaches  road  junction  885  ahead  of  his  battery  com- 
manders, and  upon  their  arrival  gives  them  their  orders,  in- 
cluding the  following  selection  of  positions: 

Both  batteries  to  go  into  action  in  the  fields  north  of  the 
hill  used  for  artillery  battalion  stations.  Battery  A on  the 
right,  and  far  enough  north  to  give  Battery  B room  to  go 
in.  Exact  locations  to  be  determined  by  the  battery  com- 
manders. 


324 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


Part  II 

1.  A battalion  (or  other)  commander  of  advance  guard 
artillery,  with  sufficient  personnel  to  take  the  necessary 
preliminary  steps  incident  to  going  into  action,  will  habitu- 
ally ride  with  the  advance  guard  commander. 

He  must  be  in  position  to  receive  the  latter’s  orders 
without  delay,  and  also  to  study  the  situation  and  to  decide 
on  his  plan  while  the  batteries  are  coming  up. 

2.  In  a meeting  engagement  involving  the  use  of  the 
combined  arms,  it  is  important  that  part  of  the  artillery 
be  put  into  action  as  quickly  as  possible. 

This  assists  the  infantry  in  the  initial  phases  of  the 
action,  and  enables  the  remainder  of  the  artillery  to  make 
more  deliberate  selection  of  positions. 

3.  Merely  placing. the  guns  in  position  will  not  enable 
a battery  to  open  fire.  Firing  data  must  be  prepared,  and 
if  this  is  to  be  done  at  a distant  observation  point,  the  time 
necessary  to  select  this  point  and  to  establish  communica- 
tion between  it  and  the  battery  must  be  considered. 

In  the  present  case,  a battery  position  on  the  open 
ground  north  of  Corral  Creek  could  be  more  quickly  occu- 
pied than  the  one  selected.  But  observation  would  neces- 
sarily be  from  the  ridge  in  front,  and  therefore  considerable 
delay  would  result,  for  the  reasons  just  given.  Hence  it  is 
doubtful  whether  from  such  a position  fire  could  be  opened 
more  quickly  than  from  the  more  advanced  one  taken. 

4.  In  a meeting  engagement,  the  artillery  support  must 
be  close,  and  artillery  units  must  be  placed  so  as  to  facili- 
tate future  movements. 

Positions  well  to  the  rear,  while  permissible  (at  times) 
under  conditions  involving  more  deliberate  plans,  would  be 
out  of  place  in  the  situation  pictured. 

5.  In  moving  artillery  on  roads  prior  to  going  into 
position,  whenever  practicable  roads  should  be  selected 
that  are  free  of  other  troops. 

A road  less  direct  and  not  so  good  as  one  in  use  by 
other  troops  may  easily  be  the  quicker  route  for  the  artil- 
lery. 

6.  Verbal  orders  must  be  short,  or  confusion  will  re- 
sult, Hence  when  verbal  orders  are  necessary,  dispositions 


APPENDIX 


325 


must  be  such  that  a single  order  will  not  cover  too  many 
points. 

An  artillery  battalion  commander  can  issue  orders  that 
will  start  his  batteries  forward  and  later  have  the  batteries 
met  by  members  of  his  detail  with  more  complete  instruc- 
tions. 

7.  In  a situation  of  rapid  movement,  an  artillery  com- 
mander should  not  attempt  to  find  the  best  possible  posi- 
tion, but  rather  to  quickly  find  a reasonably  good  position. 

The  time  element  is  of  great  importance. 

8.  Also  in  order  to  avoid  delay,  units  should  not  be 
held  far  to  the  rear  while  all  details  as  to  positions,  etc., 
are  worked  out. 

Much  of  this  work  can  be  done  while  batteries  are 
coming  up. 

9.  Battalion  combat  trains  should  be  pushed  as  far 
forward  as  is  consistent  with  concealment  and  protection. 

Comments  on  Students’  Solutions 

1.  Based  on  his  knowledge  of  the  situation,  the  bat- 
talion commander  should  prescribe  routes  of  advance.  Bat- 
tery commanders  presumably  have  not  had  an  opportunity 
to  learn  of  the  alternate  route,  or  of  the  exposure  incident 
to  following  Atchison  Pike. 

2.  Valuable  time  is  wasted  by  not  starting  batteries 
forward  sooner.  Whenever  possible,  reconnaissance  and 
movement  to  positions  should  be  simultaneous. 

3.  It  is  too  early  to  definitely  decide  upon  all  battery  po- 
sitions; advantage  should  be  taken  by  the  battalion  com- 
mander of  the  time  available  for  reconnaissance  while  the 
batteries  are  coming  up. 

4.  At  least  one  battery  should  be  put  into  action  as 
quickly  as  possible  to  assist  the  infantry  in  the  initial  phases 
of  the  action,  and  to  cover  the  forward  movement  of  the 
remaining  batteries. 

5.  Time  can  be  saved  by  giving  an  initial  position 
farther  forward.  See  paragraph  3,  Part  II  of  approved 
solution. 

6.  To  advance  the  entire  battalion  via  Atchison  Pike 
to  its  initial  position  well  forward  exposes  it  to  hostile  ob- 


326 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


servation  and  perhaps  to  artillery  fire.  This  column  is 
more  than  a thousand  yards  long. 

7.  Route  to  position  selected  rather  exposed. 

8.  Positions  indicated  for  units  too  indefinite. 

9.  Position  selected  rather  exposed. 

10.  Situation  does  not  demand  the  exposure  required 
for  placing  batteries  for  direct  fire. 

11.  A position  in  readiness  not  indicated  by  the  tac- 
tical situation.  See  paragraph  2,  Part  II  of  approved 
solution. 

12.  Considering  present  position  of  Blue  front  line, 
positions  west  of  Salt  Creek  are  too  far  forward.  The  front 
line,  as  yet  but  lightly  held,  is  only  about  a thousand  yards 
beyond  the  creek.  Also  these  positions  are  difficult  to 
reach  at  the  present  time;  crossing  bridge  will  impede  ad- 
vance of  other  troops,  while  preparing  crossings  will  con- 
sume valuable  time. 

13.  The  time  element  of  this  tactical  situation  does  not 
admit  elaborate  arrangements  for  artillery  support. 

14.  Combat  train  unnecessarily  far  to  rear.  In  a situ- 
ation of  rapid  movement,  it  should  be  brought  well  up, 
when  this  can  be  done  without  undue  exposure. 

15.  It  is  better  not  to  locate  combat  train  on  a main 
road.  It  may  interfere  with  the  movements  of  other  troops, 
and  the  presence  of  other  troops  on  the  road  may  delay  the 
sending  forward  of  ammunition. 

16.  The  route  (2d  Situation)  taken  by  the  battalion 
commander  does  not  enable  him  to  view  all  available  posi- 
tions in  the  vicinity. 

17.  A near  view  of  the  front  line  at  this  time  (2d  Situ- 
ation) would  have  probably  aided  Major  E in  the  selection 
of  battery  positions. 

18.  You  have  failed  to  describe  the  route  taken  by  Ma- 
jor E (2d  Situation). 

19.  Requirement  (2d  Situation)  calls  for  route  taken 
by  Major  E and  not  by  batteries. 

20.  Locations  mentioned  not  given  on  road  map. 

21.  Field  of  view  too  restricted  from  this  observation 

post. 


Illustrative  Exercise  No.  3 

THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 

The  School  of  the  Line 
1921-1922 


TERRAIN  EXERCISE  No.  9— Series  I 
(TT  59) 


October  28,  1921 

Maps:  General  Map  Vicinity  of  Leavenworth,  1 inch  = 15  miles. 

Road  Map  of  Fort  Leavenworth,  Kas.,  and  Vicinity,  1:62500 
(Skeleton  Map  of  Fort  Leavenworth  and  Vicinity,  1:21120 
appended) . 

General  Situation: 

Missouri  (Red)  has  declared  war  on  Kansas  (Blue). 
Reds  are  concentrating  in  vicinity  of  Plattsburg  and  Lib- 
erty; Blues  in  vicinity  of  Holton  and  Horton. 

Special  Situation  (Blue): 

On  the  morning  of  28  October,  1921,  the  1st  Division, 
with  101st  Field  Artillery  (155-mm.  howitzers)  attached, 
is  moving  southeast  on  Atchison  Pike  with  mission  to  hold 
the  city  of  Leavenworth  and  secure  -the  Terminal  Bridge  at 
that  place. 

At  7 :00  AM  airplanes  report  that  a force  of  Red  infan- 
try and  artillery,  estimated  to  be  a reinforced  brigade,  is 
crossing  the  Missouri  River;  that  the  bulk  of  its  combat 
elements  are  in  and  about  Leavenworth ; that  rear  elements 
are  still  crossing  and  that  another  Red  force,  estimated  to 
be  a division,  is  approaching  Platte  City  from  the  east. 

At  8:00  AM  the  Blue  advance  guard  encounters  rifle 
and  machine  gun  fire  coming  from  the  high  ground  about 
700  yards  east  and  south  of  Salt  Creek  School. 

At  8:15  AM  the  division  commander  receives,  at 
Frenchman’s,  information  from  his  air  service  that  the 
Red  force  near  Leavenworth  is  taking  up  a position  extend- 
ing generally  from  the  Reservoir  west  to  where  the  Santa 


327 


328 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


Fe  Railroad  crosses  the  858 — 870 — 864  road  (800  yards 
east  of  road  junction  864)  and  thence  southwest  to  the  high 
ground  about  1000  yards  southwest  of  road  junction  864. 

The  division  commander,  after  studying  the  situation 
and  making  a reconnaissance,  decides  to  attack  at  3 :00  PM, 
with  the  object  of  securing  Leavenworth  and  the  bridge  be- 
fore Red  reinforcements  can  arrive.  1st  Brigade  will  at- 
tack west  of  the  line  Sheridan  Drive — Santa  Fe  Railroad 
(both  exclusive) — hill  500  yards  southwest  of  the  U.  S. 
Penitentiary  (inclusive)  ; the  2d  Brigade  east  of  that  line. 
Direction  of  attack  of  the  1st  Brigade  to  be  southeast;  of 
2d  Brigade,  south. 

At  11 :00  AM  the  advance  guard  is  holding  a line  from 
the  hill  1500  yards  west  of  the  U.  S.  Penitentiary  to  a point 
about  300  yards  north  of  Corral  Creek,  on  the  856 — U.  S. 
Penitentiary  road.  It  has  patrols  and  covering  detach- 
ments between  the  latter  point  and  the  Missouri  River.  At 
this  hour  Colonel  F,  commanding  2d  Field  Artillery,  is  near 
the  crossroads  700  yards  northwest  of  Merritt  Lake.  He 
has  just  received  from  General  D,  commanding  1st  Field 
Artillery  Brigade,  orders  which  are  in  part  as  follows : 

A Red  force,  estimated  to  be  a reinforced  brigade,  has  taken 
up  a position  extending  generally  from  the  Reservoir  west  to 
where  the  Santa  Fe  Railroad  crosses  the  858 — 864 — 870  road 
and  thence  southwest  to  the  high  ground  about  1000  yards 
southwest  of  road  junction  864. 

The  division  attacks  this  afternoon  with  1st  Brigade  at- 
tacking west  of  the  line  Sheridan  Drive — Santa  Fe  Railroad 
(both  exclusive) — hill  500  yards  southwest  of  U.  S.  Peniten- 
tiary (inclusive)  and  2d  Brigade  attacking  east  of  that  line. 
Direction  of  attack  of  1st  Brigade  to  be  southeast;  of  2d  Bri- 
gade, south. 

Assault  battalions  of  2d  Brigade  will  cross  Corral  Creek 
at  3:00  PM. 

1st  Field  Artillery  and  1st  Battalion,  101st  Field  Artillery, 
support  the  1st  Brigade;  2d  Field  Artillery  and  2d  * Battalion, 
101st  Field  Artillery,  support  the  2d  Brigade;  3d  Battalion, 
101st  Field  Artillery,  in  general  support  of  the  division. 

Light  artillery  regiments  will  be  located  in  the  zones  of 
action  of  the  brigades  which  they  support. 

Combat  trains  will  advance  to  the  vicinity  of  U.  S.  Discip- 
linary Barracks  where  they  will  pass  to  control  of  the  units  to 
which  they  belong. 

Ammunition  distributing  point  will  be  at  Coffin  School. 

General  D further  informs  Colonel  F: 

(a)  That  General  C,  commanding  2d  Brigade,  has  stated 
that  the  general  plan  for  the  employment  of  the  2d  Brigade  is 


THE  LIBRARY 
OF  THE 

EMVEESITY  RF  HJL1SOB 


APPENDIX 


329 


to  have  the  3d  Infantry,  with  two  battalions  in  line  and  one  in 
regimental  reserve,  attack  east  of  the  main  Leavenworth  t'ort 
Leavenworth  road  and  to  have  the  4th  Infantry  attack  with 
one  battalion  just  west  of  the  main  Leavenworth— Fort  Leaven- 
worth road,  one  battalion  holding  opposite  the  U.  S.  Peniten- 
tiary (and  connecting  with  elements  on  its  flanks)  and  one 
battalion  in  brigade  reserve. 

(b)  That  General  C,  accompanied  by  Major  K,  commanding 
2d  Battalion,  101st  Field  Artillery  will  be  at  the  hill  south  of 
Merritt  Lake  at  11:30  AM. 

NOTES 

1.  With  Colonel  F when  he  receives  these  orders  are  his  Re- 
connaissance Officer,  his  Communications  Officer  and  his  Plans  and 
Training  Officer. 

The  battalion  agents,  1st  and  2d  Battalions,  two  scout  corporals 
and  two  buglers  (all  members  of  the  regimental  commander’s  party) 
are  near  the  road  junction  200  yards  to  the  north. 

2.  The  2d  Brigade,  the  2d  Field  Artillery,  the  2d  Battalion, 
101st  Field  Artillery,  and  the  combat  trains  of  the  latter  two  or- 
ganizations turned  off  Atchison  Pike  at  road  junction  1048  and  are 
marching  on  Fort  Leavenworth  via  the  Millwood  Road.  At  11:00 
AM  the  leading  elements  of  the  2d  Field  Artillery  are  passing  road 
junction  854  (east  of  Coffin  School). 

3.  The  1st  Field  Artillery  is  the  leading  artillery  regiment  of  the 
column.  It  has  one  battalion  with  the  advance  guard. 

Requireme  r£*t  II: 

Actions  taken  by  Colonel  F up  to  12 :00  noon,  including 
a brief  statement  of  missions  assigned  to  the  artillery  that 
is  to  support  the  2d  Brigade,  as  arranged  by  agreement  be- 
tween commanders  concerned  (omit  statement  of  orders  is- 
sued). 

Requirement  II: 

Indicate  on  inclosed  skeleton  map,  the  areas  selected 
by  Colonel  F to  be  occupied  by  each  of  his  battalions. 

Solutions  to  be  turned  in  at  junction  of  Pope  Avenue  and 
Prison  Lane  by  5:00  PM. 

An  Approved  Solution 
Requirement  I: 

Colonel  F sends  the  battalion  agents  with  messages 
directing  the  battalion  commanders  to  report  to  the  regi- 
mental commander,  at  the  hill  south  of  Merritt  Lake,  at 
11:45  AM. 

Accompanied  by  his  reconnaissance  officer,  his  com- 
munications officer,  and  his  plans  and  training  officer,  Col- 


330 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


onel  F goes  to  a point  on  the  south  slope  of  the  hill  just 
north  of  the  target  butts.  He  looks  over  the  ground  and  dis- 
cusses the  situation  with  his  officers. 

Colonel  F decides  to  go  further  towards  the  front.  His 
motor  car  is  left  in  a concealed  position  and  the  officers  pro- 
ceed on  foot,  utilizing  terrain  features  as  cover  and  taking 
pains  to  avoid  getting  on  crests  of  ridges.  They  stop  first 
at  the  hill  west  of  Merritt  Lake  and  then  proceed,  to  the 
hill  south  of  Merritt  Lake.  Colonel  F and  his  officers  ex- 
amine and  discuss  the  details  of  the  ground  in  reference 
to  suitability  for  artillery  positions,  including  considera- 
tions of  cover,  concealment,  approaches,  avenues  for  further 
advance,  observation  facilities,  possibilities  of  fire,  routes 
for  combat  trains  and  communication  routes. 

In  order  to  make  a reconnaissance  of  the  section  of  the 
enemy’s  position  which  is  nearest  the  Missouri  River  the 
party  goes  to  the  wooded  ground  east  of  the  main  Leaven- 
worth— Fort  Leavenworth  road  and  southeast  of  the  hill 
south  of  Merritt  Lake.  Here  Colonel  F makes  note  of  a 
suitable  location  for  an  advanced  observation  post  for  the 
1st  Battalion.  It  may  also  be  used  as  a regimental  observa- 
tion post. 

The'  party  returns  to  the  hill  south  of  Merritt  Lake. 
Here  they  meet  General  C and  Major  K.  General  C,  Col- 
onel F and  Major  K confer.  General  C points  out  features 
on  the  terrain  and  indicates,  by  reference  to  them,  his 
general  plan  for  the  employment  of  auxiliary  weapons. 

It  is  arranged  (a)  that  the  2d  Battalion,  101st  Field 
Artillery,  will  concentrate  its  fires  on  the  U.  S.  Penitentiary, 
using  high  explosive  and  smoke  shells ; one  battery  will  be 
available,  if  required,  to  assist  the  light  artillery  in  attack- 
ing machine  guns  that  may  be  sited  along  the  ravines  lead- 
ing from  the  enemy  position  and  (b)  that  2d  Field  Artillery 
will,  at  the  beginning  of  the  attack,  place  concentrations  on 
the  high  ground  east  and  just  west  of  the  main  Leaven- 
worth— Fort  Leavenworth  road  and  just  west  of  the  U.  S. 
Penitentiary  and  will  support  the  advance  by  attacking  suc- 
cessively objectives  which  are  delaying  the  progress  of  the 
infantry,  actual  targets  being  designated  as  the  attack  de- 
velops them.  Colonel  F and  Major  K discuss  the  areas 


APPENDIX 


331 


which  they  desire  to  occupy  and  coordinate  their  plans  in 
regard  to  them  with  General  C’s  plans  for  organizing  his 
brigade  for  the  attack. 

The  battalion  commanders  have  arrived.  Colonel  F 
outlines  the  situation  to  them,  assigns  1st  Battalion  to 
support  of  3d  Infantry  and  2d  Battalion  to  support  of  4th 
Infantry ; designates  the  areas  which  battalions  will  occupy 
(see  Approved  Solution,  Requirement  II)  and  assigns  their 
missions.  He  points  out  general  routes  for  communica- 
tion lines,  indicates  by  what  routes  and  at  what  time  he 
wishes  battalions  to  go  into  position  and  outlines  his  plan 
for  the  employment  of  combat  trains. 

Requirement  II  (see  attached  map)  : 

Part  II 

The  principles  referred  to  in  the  following  discussion 
should  be  noted. 

( 1 ) An  exact  understanding  of  the  mission  of  the  com- 
bat unit  to  be  supported  and  of  the  plan  of  the  commander 
for  executing  that  mission  is  necessary.  To  arrive  at  such 
understanding  a conference  on  ground  where  good  observa- 
tion is  possible  is  desirable. 

(2)  In  order  that  they  may  be  able  to  effectively  sup- 
port a successful  attack  to  the  maximum  possible  depth, 
guns  should  be  placed  as  far  forward  as  is  practicable  and 
safe.  A displacement  forward,  during  an  attack,  is  a diffi- 
cult and  slow  operation.  The  weakening  of  artillery  sup- 
port that  occurs  during  the  movement  may  happen  at  a 
critical  moment.  The  necessity  for  a movement  should 
therefore  be  avoided  whenever  possible. 

In  a prepared  attack,  terrain  features  are  the  principal 
element,  other  than  safety,  that  influences  the  location  of 
gun  positions.  In  a meeting  engagement  necessity  for  early 
entry  into  action  will  often  require  the  utilization  of  posi- 
tions that  would  not  be  chosen  if  more  time  were  available. 

(3)  Positions  that  afford  adequate  possibilities  of  fire 
combined  with  maximum  concealment  and  cover  should  be 
sought.  Guns  placed  under  trees  are  usually  well  con- 


332  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

cealed  from  airplane  observation  but  it  should  be  kept  in 
mind  that  small  wooded  areas,  in  country  otherwise  open, 
may  be  of  great  assistance  to  the  enemy  in  ranging.  Such 
wooded  areas  may  also  be  easily  gassed.  Positions  repre- 
senting a compromise  between  conflicting  considerations 
must  be  utilized,  as^ideal  ones  will  not  be  found.  The  regi- 
mental commander  does  not  concern  himself  with  the  exact 
location  of  individual  battery  positions.  He  is  interested 
in  selecting  for  his  battalions  general  areas  which  afford 
maximum  advantages. 

(4)  Artillery  when  going  into  positions  in  the  daytime 
must  take  full  advantage  of  approaches  that  afford  conceal- 
ment. Well  concealed  routes  are  available  in  this  situation. 

(5)  Approaches  practicable  for  combat  trains  engaged, 
during  the  action;  in  daylight  resupply  of  ammunition  are 
of  great  importance  in  the  selection  of  positions.  Adequate 
support  requires  that  artillery  units  be  relieved  of  all  proba- 
bility of  exhaustion  of  available  ammunition. 

(6)  Satisfactory  communication  routes  are  essential. 
Detailed  reconnaissance  for  them  is  made  by  communica- 
tions personnel.  Wire  lines  follow  routes  which  combine, 
as  far  as  possible,  protection  for  wires,  facilities  for  quick 
and  easy  laying,  and  cover  and  protection  for  men  who  will 
be  assigned  to  duties  of  maintenance  and  repair. 

Comments  on  Students’  Solutions 

1.  One  of  the  first  actions  of  Colonel  F should  be  to 
send  for  his  battalion  commanders  in  order  that  he  may 
give  them  their  orders  without  unnecessary  delay. 

2.  Advantage  should  be  taken  of  the  opportunity  af- 
forded during  Colonel  F’s  reconnaissance  for  conference  and 
discussion  with  his  staff,  on  the  ground,  with  reference  to 
suitability  of  positions,  cover,  concealment,  routes  of  ap- 
proach and  advance,  observation,  possibilities  of  fire,  etc. 

3.  No  reconnaissance  east  of  Leavenworth — Fort  Leav- 
enworth road  is  noted  in  your  solution. 

4.  While  waiting  for  his  battalion  commanders  Colonel 
F should  take  advantage  of  the  time  available  for  personal 
reconnaissance.  This  should  include  a comprehensive  view 
of  as  much  of  the  front  line  as  possible. 


APPENDIX 


333 


5.  Considerable  time  might  be  saved  by  having  the 
regiment  advance  nearer  the  front  before  halting  to  await 
orders. 

6.  Battalion  commanders  should  not  be  sent  on  recon- 
naissance before  their  areas  have  been  assigned  to  them. 

7.  An  organized  preparation  in  this  situation  is  a divi- 
sion function.  However,  the  artillery  units  as  they  came 
into  position  might  properly  have  begun  fires  of  an  inter- 
dicting or  harrassing  nature  with  a view  to  disorganizing 
enemy  preparations  or  for  purposes  of  registration  or  both. 

8.  In  view  of  the  extent  of  the  front  on  which  the  bri- 
gade was  to  attack  and  the  small  amount  of  smoke  shell  nor- 
mally available  for  division  artillery,  a smoke  screen  would 
not  be  effective.  Smoke  could  profitably  be  used  locally 
for  blinding  effect. 

9.  It  is  not  usual  to  assign  the  batteries  of  a battalion 
of  155-mm.  howitzers — each  to  the  support  of  a separate 
regiment.  The  battalion  here  acts  as  a tactical  unit  in 
general  support  of  the  infantry  brigade.  Often  the  mis- 
sions of  such  battalion  would  include  attack  of  targets 
against  which  the  75s  particularly  needed  assistance. 

10.  Assignment  of  artillery  battalions  to  support  of 
specific  infantry  units  should  be  shown. 

11.  Interdiction  of  the  Leavenworth  Terminal  Bridge 
or  roads  east  of  Missouri  River  would  be  a logical  mission 
of  the  battalion  of  howitzers  assigned  to  general  support 
of  the  division. 

12.  The  use  of  accompanying  guns  or  batteries  is  not 
warranted  in  this  situation.  There  is  ample  time  for  all 
of  the  supporting  artillery  to  take  suitable  positions  and 
establish  communications  and  observation.  Accompanying 
artillery  is  normally  used  when  the  artillery . support  has 
become  disorganized  (due  to  inability  to  keep  up  with  the 
advance,  lack  of  proper  communications  or  observation)  or 
for  the  close  support  of  units  of  other  arms  that  have  been 
assigned  a special  mission. 

13.  155-mm.  howitzers  are  not  suitable  for  use  as  ac- 
companying guns. 

14.  Coordination  of  fire  support  for  the  2d  Brigade  by 
the  supporting  fire  units  (2d  Field  Artillery  and  2d  Bat- 


331  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

talion,  101st  Field  Artillery)  should  be  arranged  by  the  re- 
spective commanders  in  accordance  with  the  missions  of  sup- 
port assigned  to  each.  Decision  as  to  these  missions,  and 
this  coordination,  should  be  made  in  conference  by  General 
C,  Colonel  F,  and  Major  K. 

15.  The  U.  S.  Penitentiary  will  probably  be  used  as 
a strong  point  by  the  enemy  and  might  well  be  assigned  as 
a target  for  the  2d  Battalion,  101st  Field  Artillery. 

16.  In  a situation  of  this  kind  battery  missions  are 
normally  assigned  by  the  battalion  commander;  battalion 
missions  by  the  regimental  commander. 

17.  In  this  situation  counter  battery  work  is  the  pri- 
mary mission  of  the  battalion  of  155  howitzers  in  general 
support  of  the  division.  However,  the  howitzer  battalion 
in  support  of  this  brigade  might  be  used  for  counter  bat- 
tery work  in  an  emergency  but  such  a mission  would  not 
be  assigned  until  the  emergency  arose. 

18.  Gas  is  not  considered  as  available  for  division  ar- 
tillery unless  so  stated  in  the  problem.  (No  cut.) 

19.  This  is  not  a situation  that  calls  for  alternate  posi- 
tions, in  the  sense  in  which  the  expression  is  ordinarily 
used.  Reconnaissance,  for  positions  other  than  those  to 
be  occupied  at  the  outset  of  the  attack,  might  be  made  if 
time  permitted  and  it  appeared  that  additional  positions 
might  be  necessary. 

20.  See  instructor's  remark  at  end  of  your  solution. 

21.  No  cut  is  made  when  officer's  solution  indicates 
that  his  areas  were  chosen  with  a view  to  early  entry  into 
action.  In  this  situation  however,  the  artillery  of  the  ad- 
vance guard  and  the  leading  artillery  elements  of  the  main 
body  would  normally  and  logically  have  been  utilized  as 
the  ones  to  quickly  get  into  positions  from  which  they 
could,  as  soon  as  possible,  bring  fire  upon  the  enemy.  (No 
cut.) 

22.  Fire  missions  not  given  in  sufficient  detail. 

23.  No  missions  for  2d  Bn  101st  Field  Artillery  are 
indicated. 

24.  Features  mentioned  in  solution  do  not  appear  on 
road  map. 


APPENDIX 


335 


25.  Barrage  fire  is  not  applicable  in  this  situation.  It 
would  be  impossible  to  support  the  advance  of  the  2d  Bri- 
gade with  a rolling  barrage.  The  brigade  front  is  about 
3000  yards  long.  The  whole  2d  Field  Artillery  could  cover 
at  best  only  600  yards.  Concentrations  should  have  been 
used  throughout. 

26.  Battalion  commanders  should  join  Colonel  F at  a 
more  advanced  point. 

31.  Regimental  commanders  should  prescribe  an  area 
and  leave  locations  of  batteries  to  battalion  commanders. 

32.  The  area  represented  is  too  small  for  a battalion. 

33.  Areas  for  the  battalion  should  be  shown  rather 
than  the  conventional  sign.  (No  cut.) 

34.  There  are  not  sufficient  suitable  positions  in  the 
area  indicated  for  a battalion. 

35.  At  least  one  battalion  should  be  well  forward. 

36.  There  are  only  two  battalions  in  a 75-mm.  regiment. 

37.  Areas  selected  are  too  far  to  the  rear.  See  com- 
ment No.  2,  Part  II,  of  the  approved  solution. 

38.  The  flats  east  of  the  Missouri  Pacific  depot  are  not 
suitable  for  artillery  positions  in  this  situation.  The  time 
element  is  such  that  the  use  of  this  location  is  inadvisable. 


Illustrative  Problem  No.  4 


THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 

The  School  of  the  Line 
' 1921-1922 


MAP  PROBLEM  No.  5— Series  II 
(TT  81) 

November  15,  1921 

Maps:  General  Map  Gettysburg- Antietam,  1 inch  = 10  miles. 

Gettysburg- Antietam,  1:21120;  Bonneauville,  Gettysburg, 
Knoxlyn,  Arendtsville  and  Hunterstown  Sheets. 

General  Situation: 

Blues,  west  of  South  Mountain,  and  Reds,  east,  have 
declared  war. 

The  Reds  are  known  to  be  concentrating  in  the  vicinity 
of  York,  Lancaster  and  Reading. 

Special  Situation  I (Blue)  : 

The  Blues,  concentrating  at  Hagerstown,  Waynesboro 
and  Chambersburg,  are  hurriedly  pushing  detachments 
through  the  mountains  to  hold  the  passes  near  Cashtown, 
Emmitsburg  and  Thurmont  against  an  expected  Red  inva- 
sion. 

On  November  13,  1921,  the  1st  Brigade,  with  the  1st 
Field  Artillery,  the  1st  Squadron  1st  Cavalry,  Company  A 
1st  Engineers,  Ambulance  Company  No.  1 and'  Sanitary 
Company  No.  1,  attached,  left  Chambersburg  with  orders  to 
seize  and  hold  the  eastern  exit  of  the  Cashtown  pass.  This 
reinforced  brigade  camped  just  east  of  Cashtown  on  the 
night  of  November  13-14.  While  there,  General  B,  com- 
manding the  brigade,  received  information  from  the  Com- 
manding General,  I Corps,  at  Chambersburg,  that  a Red 
force,  estimated  to  be  a division,  had  reached  Brushtown 
on  the  afternoon  of  November  13.  The  corps  commander 
directed  General  B to  secure  the  exit  of  the  Cashtown  pass 
and  stated  that  the  remainder  of  the  1st  Division  would 
begin  to  detrain  at  Orrtanna  at  4:00  PM,  November  14. 


336 


APPENDIX 


337 


He  also  informed  General  B that  the  1st  Observation  Squad- 
ron had  completed  its  mobilization  and  would  begin  recon- 
naissance toward  York  at  daybreak  and  had  been  directed 
to  keep  General  B informed  of  the  enemy’s  movements. 

With  a view  to  occupying  a position  in  the  vicinity  of 
Gettysburg,  General  B marched  his  command  via  the  Cham- 
bersburg— Gettysburg  road  at  6 :00  AM  November  14,  with 
his  troops  (less  the  1st  Field  Artillery)  arranged  in  order 
of  march  as  shown  on  the  accompanying  sheet. 

Required : 

Show  by  interpolation  on  the  accompanying  mimeo- 
graph sheet,  the  positions  of  all  elements  of  the  1st  Field 
Artillery  during  the  march  from  Cashtown,  including  in- 
dividuals or  portions  of  units  which  may  be  detached  from 
their  organizations. 

Time  allowed:  One  hour. 

An  Approved  Solution 
Part  I 

Special  Situation  I: 

ORDER  OF  MARCH  OF  1st  BRIGADE  (Reinforced) 
November  15,  1921 

1st  Squadron,  1st  Cavalry  (less  1 platoon)  : 

One  platoon,  Troop  A,  1st  Cavalry. 

1st  Battalion,  1st  Infantry. 

1st  Platoon,  Howitzer  Company,  1st  In- 
fantry. 

Forward  Echelon,  1st  Infantry. 

Commanding  Officer,  1st  Battalion,  1st 
Field  Artillery  with  his  executive 
officer,  reconnaissance  officer,  four 
agents,  two  scouts  and  one  bugler. 

2d  Battalion,  1st  Infantry. 

Howitzer  Company,  1st  Infantry  (less  1 
platoon).  . 

Battery  commanders  and  reconnaissance 
officers,  1st  Battalion,  1st  Field  Ar- 
tillery, with  orderlies. 

1st  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery. 

1st  Platoon,  Company  A,  1st  Engineers. 
Rear  Echelon,  1st  Infantry. 

One  section,  Ambulance  Company  No.  1. 

One  section,  Sanitary  Company  No.  1. 


Support 


Advance  ) 

Guard  | 

| Reserve 


338 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE — ARTILLERY 


Forward  Echelon,  1st  Brigade. 

Commanding  officer,  1st  Field  Artillery,  with  his  ex- 
ecutive officer,  reconnaissance  officer,  liaison  officer, 
two  agents  and  three  orderlies. 

! 3d  Battalion,  1st  Infantry. 

i lsE  Field  Artillery  (less  1st  Battalion,  Combat  Train 
of  the  2d  Battalion,  and  detachments). 

| Forward  Echelon,  2d  Infantry. 

1 1st  Battalion,  2d  Infantry. 

Main  Body  J 2d  Battalion,  2d  Infantry. 

3d  Battalion,  2d  Infantry. 

Howitzer  Company,  2d  Infantry. 

Rear  Echelon,  2d  Infantry. 

Company  A,  1st  Engineers  (less  1 platoon). 

Rear  Echelon,  1st  Brigade. 

Combat  Train,  2d  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery. 
Ambulance  Company  No.  1 (less  1 section). 

Sanitary  Company  No.  1 (less  1 section). 

r Headquarters  and  Headquarters  Company,  1st  Brigade, 
j 1st  Infantry. 

Field  Trains  J 2d  Infantry. 

1st  Field  Artillery. 

Company  A,  1st  Engineers. 

Special  Situations  II  and  III : 

See  tracing  enclosed. 


Part  II 

1.  This  problem  was  drawn  to  illustrate  certain  phases 
of  the  tactics  and  technique  of  a regiment  of  artillery  as 
a part  of  a reinforced  brigade  on  the  march  and  in  a meet- 
ing engagement. 

2.  The  advance  guard  is  stronger  than  usual  because 
of  the  probability  that  the  enemy  will  be  encountered  in 
strength  and  that  the  advance  guard  will  have  to  fight  to 
seizq  and  hold  ground  to  enable  the  brigade  to  carry  out 
the  mission  assigned  it.  The  proportion  of  artillery  at- 
tached to  the  advance  guard  depends  entirely  on  the  tac- 
tical situation  and  the  strength  of  the  advance  guard.  In 
this  case,  the  proximity  of  the  enemy  in  superior  strength 
and  the  probability  that  artillery  fire  will  be  needed  early 
if  the  force  is  to  be  successful  in  carrying  out  the  plan  to 


Spe  chm 


^Katalysine 

Spring^ 


(3) 


DScham 


Brick  Ki hr, 


TYSBURi 


Culp's  Hill 


APPENDIX 


339 


hold  a position  in  the  vicinity  of  Gettysburg,  requires  that 
the  advance  guard  be  strong  in  artillery.  One  battery  is 
considered  too  small  a proportion  to  give  the  advance  guard 
sufficient  fire  power  for  this  purpose.  Two  batteries  with 
the  advance  guard  might  give  the  requisite  fire  power,  but 
in  order  to  gain  still  more  power  and  to  preserve  the  tac- 
tical organization,  an  entire  battalion  is  deemed  best  in 
this  case. 

3.  The  distance  to  the  leading  element  of  the  advance 
guard  must  be  such  that  the  artillery  will  not  come  under 
hostile  artillery  fire  while  still  in  column.  By  placing  it 
near  the  tail  of  the  reserve  of  the  advance  guard,  the  dis- 
tance from  the  head  of  the  artillery  to  the  point  of  the 
advance  guard  is  about  two  miles  and  to  the  cavalry  at  least 
four  miles,  in  this  case. 

4.  To  insure  its  early  entry  into  action,  the  artillery 
with  the  main  body  should  be  well  advanced. 

5.  When  contact  with  the  enemy  appears  imminent, 
the  commanding  officers  of  artillery  units  should  march 
with  the  commanders  of  the  infantry  units  which  they 
are  to  support,  in  order  that  they  may  keep  in  touch  with 
the  situation  and  promptly  receive  and  execute  the  orders 
of  the  commander.  For  the  same  reason  it  is  well  to  have 
the  battery  commanders  march  at  the  head  of  the  battalion. 
Each  of  these  officers  should  be  accompanied  by  the  requi- 
site number  of  officers  and  men  to  assist  him  in  a hasty 
reconnaissance  and  to  transmit  orders  to  his  subordinates. 

6.  When  the  road  space  is  required  for  other  units, 
the  artillery  combat  trains  are  necessarily  separated  from 
the  battalion.  In  this  situation  the  space  occupied  by  the 
combat  train  of  the  artillery  with  the  advance  guard  is 
net:  needed  for  other  troops  and  the  combat  train  should 
march  near  the  firing  batteries  to  insure  a prompt  re- 
supply of  ammunition.  In  the  main  body,  the  situation 
is  reversed  and  the  combat  train  of  the  2d  Battalion  should 
march  in  rear  of  the  infantry  and  engineers. 

7.  The  choice  of  positions  for  the  1st  Battalion  dur- 
ing the  advance  guard  action  is  controlled  by  the  necessity 
of  bringing  an  effective  fire  on  the  Hanover  Road  and  the 
terrain  just  east  of  the  Mount  Vernon  S.H.  ridge,  since 


340  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE — ARTILLF’RY 

the  latter  affords  cover  for  deploying  for  the  attack  against 
the  Blue  position  on  Wolf  Hill  ridge.  On  the  other  hand 
it  is  desirable  that  the  artillery  should  come  into  position 
promptly  to  assist  the  cavalry  and  to  cover  the  development 
and  deployment  of  the  advance  guard.  A compromise  be- 
tween these  two  conflicting  considerations  fixes  the  area 
for  positions  as  east  of  Gettysburg  and  west  of  Wolf  Hill 
ridge.  Positions  on  the  western  slope  of  Wolf  Hill  ridge 
have  the  advantage  of  being  able  to  reach  Bonneauville  by 
fire,  good  terrestrial  observation  close  to  batteries,  cover  and 
concealment;  but  they  are  objectionable  because  the  guns 
would  generally  be  unable  to  cover  the  terrain  just  west 
of  White  Run  (except  with  reduced  charges,  which  are 
not  always  available),  the  positions  require  more  time  for 
occupancy  and  render  a withdrawal  more  difficult.  Positions 
on  the  reverse  slope  of  the  Benners  Hill — hill  566  ridge  en- 
able the  artillery  to  cover  the  terrain  between  Bonneauville 
and  the  western  edge  of  the  woods  on  Wolf  Hill  ridge.  They 
are  defiladed  from  hostile  terrestrial  observation  and  many 
positions  there  afford  concealment  from  aerial  observation. 
They  are  open  to  the  objection  that  terrestrial  observation 
must  be  from  Wolf  Hill  ridge — well  to  the  front — requiring 
long  lines  of  communication.  Weighing  the  advantages 
and  disadvantages  of  these  localities,  the  latter  appears  best. 

8.  The  combat  train  should  be  so  located  that  the  re- 
supply of  ammunition  to  the  firing  batteries  may  be  carried 
out  without  interruption,  which  makes  a good  road  circuit 
most  desirable,  and  the  train  should  be  given  as  much 
cover  and  concealment  as  possible. 

9.  The  artillery  with  the  main  body  should  be  able  to 
support  the  advance  guard  and  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of 
the  latter,  if  it  should  become  necessary.  In  the  defense 
the  artillery  must  be  able  to  cover  the  main  line  of  resis- 
tance. In  this  situation  the  missions  of  covering  the  with- 
drawal of  the  advance  guard  and  of  defending  the  Herr 
Ridge  position  are  conflicting,  so  far  as  the  choice  of  posi- 
tions is  concerned.  Positions  on  the  western  slope  of  Herr 
Ridge  will  enable  the  artillery  to  reach  Wolf  Hill  ridge 
with  the  maximum  range,  but  will  not  permit  it  to  cover 
the  eastern  slope  of  Herr  Ridge  in  all  places  and,  moreover, 


APPENDIX 


341 


such  positions  are  too  far  advanced,  considering  the  defen- 
sive nature  of  the  mission  now  undertaken  by  the  Blue 
force.  Positions  for  the  2d  Battalion  east  of  Willoughby 
Run  increase  the  effectiveness  of  the  fire  during  the  with- 
drawal of  the  advance  guard,  but  render  the  later  with- 
drawal of  this  battalion  to  positions  west  of  Herr  Ridge 
more  difficult.  Positions  between  Willoughby  Run  and  Herr 
Ridge  are  open  to  the  same  objection,  though  to  a lesser  ex- 
tent, and  such  positions  are  in  view  from  Culps  Hill.  Con- 
sidering all  these  matters,  it  seems  best  to  place  the  2d  Bat- 
talion in  position  near  the  edge  of  the  woods  on  the  west 
slope  of  Herr  Ridge  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the  advance 
guard  and  in  the  sector  of  the  2d  Infantry,  which  regiment 
this  battalion  is  accustomed  to  support.  After  the  1st  Bat- 
talion has  been  withdrawn  to  positions  west  of  Herr  Ridge, 
the  2d  Battalion  can  be  emplaced  farther  to  the  west,  from 
which  positions  it  can  cover  the  front  of  the  Herr  Ridge 
positions  and  the  outpost  position  on  Seminary  Ridge. 

10.  The  movement  of  one  battalion  of  the  artillery 
should  be  covered  by  the  fire  of  the  other  battalion. 

Special  Situation  II  (Blue)  : 

The  detachment  marched  with  the  1st  Battalion,  1st 
Field  Artillery  near  the  rear  of  the  reserve  of  the  advance 
guard.  The  remainder  of  the  regiment  (less  service  bat- 
tery) followed  the  leading  infantry  battalion  of  the  main 
body. 

At  9:15  AM,  Colonel  D,  1st  Infantry,  commanding  the 
advance  guard,  who  is  marching  at  the  head  of  the  reserve, 
reaches  the  center  of  Gettysburg.  The  head  of  the  1st  Bat- 
talion, 1st  Field  Artillery,  is  1300  yards  northwest  of  the 
western  exit  of  Gettysburg  on  the  Chambersburg  Road  and 
the  combat  train  of  the  battalion  is  marching  in  rear  of  the 
last  battery. 

Here  Colonel  D receives  a message  from  the  1st  Squad- 
ron, 1st  Cavalry  stating  that  it  has  been  stopped  by  hostile 
cavalry,  which  is  increasing  in  strength  and  aggressive- 
ness, near  road  junction  550  (353.8—749.1)  and  just  east 
of  Wolf  Hill.  The  cavalry  commander  states  that  he  will 
hold  Wolf  Hill  ridge  until  the  arrival  of  the  advance  guard 


342 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


and  will  then  withdraw  toward  Fairview  School  House  and 
cover  the  left  flank. 

The  advance  guard  commander  is  ordered  to  push  rap- 
idly forward  along  the  Hanover  Road,  to  seize  and  hold  Wolf 
Hill  ridge  along  the  general  line  hill  567 — hill  606,  covering 
the  Hanover  Road.  He  directs  the  1st  Battalion  1st  Field 
Artillery  to  occupy  positions  for  immediate  action  to  sup- 
port the  advance  guard  and  states  that  his  command  post 
will  be  at  Benner’s  Hill. 

Required : 

Indicate  on  tracing  or  on  the  map,  the  positions  selected 
for  the  1st  Battalion  1st  Field  Artillery  for  the  action,  in- 
cluding battery  positions,  battery  observation  posts,  bat- 
talion command  post  and  battalion  combat  train. 

Solutions  to  Special  Situation  II  and  III  to  be  submitted  on  same 
map  or  tracing. 

Special  Situation  III  (Blue)  : 

At  9 :30  AM  the  mist,  which  has  heretofore  prevented 
aerial  observation,  has  cleared  and  General  B learns  from 
the  air  service  that  the  hostile  cavalry  is  followed  by  troops 
of  all  arms,  estimated  to  be  a division,  marching  west  in 
two  columns,  on  the  Hanover  Road  and  the  Whitehall — road 
junction  584 — M.  Rudish  road.  Heads  of  advance  guards 
at  Bonneauville  and  road  junction  584  at  9:20  AM. 

General  B decides  to  take  up  a defensive  position  along 
Herr  Ridge  from  601  (345.8 — 749.5)  to  N.  Grist.  The  1st 
Infantry  is  ordered  to  organize  the  position  north  of  the 
line  0.  McMiller — B.  Herr  and  the  2d  Infantry  south  of  that 
line.  The  advance  guard  is  ordered  to  delay  the  enemy’s 
advance  and  cover  the  organization  of  the  position  and  then 
to  withdraw  (when  ordered)  to  the  Herr  Ridge  position. 
The  1st  Field  Artillery  is  ordered  to  select  and  occupy  posi- 
tions to  support  the  defense  of  the  Herr  Ridge  position. 

At  this  time  the  1st  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery,  is 
occupying  positions  in  the  area  J.  Warner — Rocky  Grove  S. 
H. — Wolf  Hill — Culps  Hill — Gettysburg.  The  head  of  the 
1st  Field  Artillery  (less  1st  Battalion)  is  at  L.  Hoppy. 


APPENDIX 


343 


Required  : 

Show  by  a tracing  or  on  the  map 

1.  Positions  selected  for  each  battery  of  the  1st  Field 
Artillery  (a)  during  the  withdrawal  of  the  advance  guard 
and  (b)  for  the  defense  of  the  Herr  Ridge  position. 

2.  The  relative  order,  in  point  of  time,  in  which  each 
battalion  position  will  be  occupied.  Indicate  by  numbers 
placed  at  the  positions  selected. 

Solutions  to  Special  Situation  II  and  III  to  be  turned  in  at  5:00 

PM. 


Order  of  March  of  1st  Brigade  (reinforced) 

14  November  1921 

To  accompany  Map  Problem  No.  5,  Series  II. 

1st  Squadron,  1st  Cavalry  (less  1 platoon). 

( ("One  platoon,  Troop  A,  1st  Cavalry. 

Support  J 1st  Battalion,  1st  Infantry. 

1 1st  Platoon,  Howitzer  Company,  1st  In- 
L fantry. 

^Forward  echelon,  1st  Infantry. 

2d  Battalion,  1st  Infantry, 
lowitzer  Company,  1st  Infantry  (less  1 
platoon) . 

1st  Platoon,  Company  A,  1st  Engineers. 
Rear  Echelon,  1st  Infantry. 

One  section,  Ambulance  Company  No  1. 
One  section,  Sanitary  Company  No  1. 


Advance  Guard 


Reserve 


Main  Body 


^Forward  Echelon,  1st  Brigade. 

3d  Battalion,  1st  Infantry. 

Forward  Echelon,  2d  Infantry. 

1st  Battalion,  2d  Infantry. 

2d  Battalion,  2d  Infantry. 

3d  Battalion,  2d  Infantry. 

Howitzer  Company,  2d  Infantry. 

Rear  Echelon,  2d  Infantry. 

Company  A,  1st  Engineers  (less  1 platoon). 
Rear  Echelon,  1st  Brigade. 

Ambulance  Company  No  1 (less  1 section). 
Sanitary  Company  No  1 (less  1 section). 


Field  Trains 


("Brigade  Headquarters  and  Headquarters  Company. 
J 1st  Infantry. 

1 2d  Infantry. 

^Company  A,  1st  Engineers. 


344  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

Comments  on  Students’  Solutions 

1.  At  least  two  batteries,  with  the  battalion  comman- 
der and  his  party,  should  be  with  the  advance  guard.  See 
par.  2,  Part  II,  approved  solution. 

2.  Placing  a part  of  the  artillery  in  the  support  of  an 
advance  guard  of  this  size  is  unusual.  In  this  situation, 
however,  such  procedure  may  be  justified. 

3.  The  advance  guard  artillery  (less  battalion  and  bat- 
tery commanders)  should  march  at  least  as  far  to  the  rear 
of  the  reserve  as  the  tail  of  the  howitzer  company,  1st  In- 
fantry, to  give  this  road  space  to  the  infantry. 

4.  The  advance  guard  artillery  should  march  ahead  of 
the  rear  echelon,  1st  Infantry  and  the  sanitary  units,  as  it 
will  be  needed  before  those  units  are. 

5.  There  is  no  good  reason  for  splitting  a battery  in 
this  case  and  tactical  unity  should  be  preserved. 

6.  All  of  the  artillery  with  the  main  body  should  march 
well  forward,  to  permit  its  early  entry  into  action.  In  this 
situation,  it  should  not  be  farther  to  the  rear  than  the  rear 
of  3d  Battalion,  2d  Infantry  and  preferably,  still  farther 
forward. 

7.  The  artillery  with  the  main  body  should  not  march 
in  advance  of  the  leading  infantry  battalion,  for  reasons 
of  security. 

8.  The  artillery  regimental  commander  should  march 
habitually  with  the  brigade  commander — in  this  case,  near 
the  head  of  the  main  body.  Should  circumstances  require 
it  he  goes  wherever  his  presence  is  needed. 

9.  The  commander  of  the  advance  guard  artillery  should 
march  with  the  advance  guard  commander — in  this  situa- 
tion, with  the  forward  echelon,  1st  Infantry. 

10.  Artillery  parties  marching  with  infantry  comman- 
ders should  not  include  all  personnel  of  battalion  or  regi- 
mental headquarters  or  headquarters  batteries.  Only  the 
artillery  commanders  and  such  few  assistants  as  he  selects 
are  necessary. 

11.  The  battalion  and  regimental  commanders  should 
be  accompanied  by  suitable  detachments  of  battalion  and 
regimental  headquarters  batteries. 


APPENDIX 


345 


12.  If  the  battery  commanders  accompany  the  bat- 
talion commander  the  battery  commander’s  parties  should 
be  reduced  to  a minimum.  The  same  is  true  of  battalion 
commanders  marching  with  the  regimental  commander. 

13.  The  artillery  with  the  main  body  is  under  the  di- 
rect command  of  the  brigade  commander  and  the  artillery 
regimental  commander.  There  is  no  good  reason,  therefore, 
for  having  the  commander  of  the  2d  Battalion,  1st  Field  Ar- 
tillery march  with  the  Commanding  Officer,  2d  Infantry  in 
this  situation. 

14.  The  combat  train  is  an  organic  part  of  the  artillery 
battalion,  and  if  not  with  the  remainder  of  the  battalion, 
should  be  definitely  excepted. 

15.  To  better  insure  a prompt  resupply  of  ammuni- 
tion, the  combat  train  of  the  advance  guard  artillery  should 
march  at  or  near  the  rear  of  the  reserve. 

16.  To  allow  the  necessary  road  space  for  the  infan- 
try, which  probably  will  be  needed  before  a resupply  of  am- 
munition is  required  by  the  artillery  with  the  main  body, 
the  combat  trains  of  that  part  of  the  artillery  should  march 
near  the  rear  of  the  main  body. 

17.  The  combat  trains  will  not  be  able  to  function 
properly  if  they  are  kept  back  with  the  field  trains. 

18.  The  service  battery  mans  the  field  train  and  is  with 

it. 

19.  The  field  train  of  the  1st  Field  Artillery  has  been 
omitted. 

20.  The  liaison  officers  should  be  with  the  forward 
echelon  of  the  organization  to  which  attached. 

21.  The  field  trains  usually  march  in  the  same  order 
as  their  respective  units. 

22.  Batteries  or  observation  posts  should  not  be  loca- 
ted so  close  together,  as  they  may  be  more  easily  neutralized. 

23.  Batteries  should  not  be  so  greatly  dispersed,  as  it 
increases  unnecessarily  the  difficulties  of  communication 
and  command. 

24.  Batteries  should  not  be  posted  near  conspicuous 
landmarks,  such  as  tops  of  hills,  towns  or  crossroads,  as 
these  points  are  apt  to  draw  hostile  fire. 

24a.  Better  concealed  positions  are  near  at  hand. 


346  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

25.  Rear  edges  or  middle  of  woods  or  villages  are  not, 
as  a rule,  good  positions  for  gun  batteries,  because  of  the 
difficulty  of  firing  from  such  positions. 

26.  In  this  situation  batteries  should  not  be  posted 
farther  east  than  the  line  hill  566 — Benners  Hill,  because 
of  the  defiladed  space  east  of  Wolf  Hill  Ridge. 

27.  Batteries  should  be  well  advanced  in  this  situa- 
tion. They  should  not  be  farther  west  than  the  eastern  exit 
of  Gettysburg  because  of  the  distance  to  suitable  observa- 
tions posts  and  the  loss  in  range. 

28.  This  is  not  a good  position  for  an  observation  post 
because  of  the  restricted  field  of  view. 

29.  In  this  situation,  each  battery  should  have  an  ob- 
servation post  as  far  forward  as  Wolf  Hill  ridge. 

30.  The  battalion  command  post  should  be  near  that  of 
the  advance  guard  commander — on  Benners  Hill. 

31.  The  combat  train  is  too  far  from  the  firing  bat- 
teries to  enable  it  to  properly  perform  its  mission. 

32.  The  combat  train  is  unnecessarily  far  forward  and 
exposed. 

33.  An  initial  position  for  the  2d  Battalion  east  of 
Willoughby  Run,  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the  advance 
guard,  is  unnecessary  and  is  objectionable  because  of  the 
difficulties  of  withdrawal. 

34.  An  initial  position  for  the  2d  Battalion  in  the 
vicinity  of  road  junction  597  or  to  west  thereof  is  too  far 
to  the  rear  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the  advance  guard. 

35.  Movements  of  artillery  in  action  should  be  made  by 
bounds  of  considerable  distance.  In  this  situation  there  is 
no  apparent  necessity  for  the  1st  Battalion  to  make  more 
than  one  move  to  reach  a proper  position  for  the  defense 
of  the  Herr  Ridge  line. 

36.  Since  the  Herr  Ridge  line  is  to  extend  from  hill 
601  to  N.  Grist  and  the  1st  Infantry  is  to  organize  the 
portion  north  of  the  line  0.  McMiller — B.  Herr,  it  is  un- 
necessary and  inadvisable  to  place  the  1st  Battalion,  1st 
Field  Artillery  south  of  the  587 — 555  road. 

37.  Some  artillery  should  be  as  far  forward  as  the  J. 
Herter  Mill — 597  road  for  the  defense  of  the  Herr  Ridge  po- 
sition. 


APPENDIX 


347 


38.  Positions  selected  for  the  defense  of  Herr  Ridge 
should  be  west  of  the  line  RJ  519 — J.  Grimes  and  east  of 
the  line  McKnightstown  Sta. — road  junction  614. 

39.  Batteries  or  battalions  should  be  well  echeloned 
in  depth  for  the  defense  of  the  Herr  Ridge  position. 

40.  In  this  situation,  the  rearward  echelonment  of  the 
artillery  preferably  is  made  by  battalions,  since  that  method 
meets  the  tactical  requirements  and  keeps  the  artillery  bet- 
ter in  hand. 

41.  The  withdrawal  of  one  battalion  should  be  covered 
by  the  fire  of  the  other  battalion. 


Illustrative  Problem  No.  5 


THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 

The  School  of  the  Line 
1921-1922 


MAP  PROBLEM  No.  7— Series  II 
(TT  86) 


November  17,  1921 

Maps:  General  Map,  Gettysburg- Antietam,  1 inch  = 10  miles. 

Gettysburg  Map,  1:21120;  Gettysburg,  Knoxlyn,  Hunterstown 
and  Arendtsville  Sheets. 

General  Situation: 

Blue  (west  of  South  Mountain)  and  Red  (east)  are  at 
war.  The  1st  Blue  Brigade  was  rushed  through  the  Cash- 
town  pass  in  order  to  secure  it  and  encountered  a Red  force 
near  Gettysburg  estimated  as  being  a division.  The  Blue 
advance  guard  fell  back  and  the  1st  Brigade  organized  Herr 
Ridge  (west  of  Gettysburg)  for  defense  with  an  outpost  line 
on  Seminary  Ridge. 

The  Red  forces  attacked  on  November  14th,  but  the 
remainder  of  the  1st  Blue  Division,  with  the  101st  Field 
Artillery  (155-mm.  howitzers)  attached,  arrived  in  time 
to  check  the  Red  troops  along  Willoughby  Run,  the  western 
bank  of  which  the  1st  Blue  Division  continued  to  hold  de- 
fensively. 

Special  Situation  (Blue): 

Red  and  Blue  outposts  face  each  other  along  Willoughby 
Run  (easily  fordable  throughout)  from  Geo.  Culp  to  Mum- 
masburg  Road.  Blue  patrols  have  been  very  active  and  have 
kept  the  Red  patrols  away  from  the  eastern  bank  of  Wil- 
loughby Run.  Since  November  14th  the  Red  troops  have 
constructed  three  well  identified  lines  of  trenches. 

First  Line:  Entrenchments  at  intervals  along  the  Red  out- 
post line,  east  of  Willoughby  Run  and  200-500  yards  distant 
therefrom. 


348 


APPENDIX 


349 


Second  Line:  Seminary  Ridge,  extending  north  from  500 
yards  south  of  grid  line  749  to  include  hill  574  (348.8 — 749.6)  — 
hill  582— hill  642. 

Third  Line:  hill  588  (600  yards  south  of  Gettysburg) — wes- 
tern edge  of  Gettysburg — hill  527 — hill  522. 

Latest  information  is  that  there  is  but  a reinforced  bri- 
gade of  the  Red  force  present.  Several  Red  battery  em- 
placements have  been  discovered  between  Gettysburg  and 
Rock  Creek;  but,  except  for  occasional  harassing  fire,  the 
Red  artillery  is  silent.  Light  artillery  only  has  been  re- 
ported as  being  in  the  Red  lines. 

Since  the  action  on  the  14th,  Blue  has  been  low  in  artil- 
lery ammunition,  but  an  ample  supply  (no  gas  or  smoke)  is 
now  arriving  (PM,  17  November).  The  division  comman- 
der has  decided  to  attack  at  6:15  AM,  the  18th  instant,  with 
regiments  in  line,  executing  a holding  attack  with  the  1st 
Brigade  against  the  enemy’s  right  and  enveloping  his  left 
with  the  2d  Brigade.  The  artillery  preparation  will  be  lim- 
ited to  ten  minutes  only,  the  objectives  to  be  agreed  upon 
between  the  commanders  of  the  infantry  brigades  and  the 
commanders  of  their  respective  supporting  artilleries, 
recommendations  regarding  which  will  be  submitted  by  the 
supporting  artillery  commanders  to  the  artillery  brigade 
commander  for  his  approval  at  once. 

Boundary  between  brigades:  J.  Herter  Mill — hill  558 

(347.5 — 750.2) — north  edge  of  Gettysburg — Rocky  Grove 
S.H.  (all  to  2d  Brigade). 

The  1st  Field  Artillery  supports  the  1st  Brigade  and 
the  2d  Field  Artillery,  with  the  3d  Battalion,  101st  Field 
Artillery  attached,  supports  the  2d  Brigade.  The  101st 
Field  Artillery  (less  the  3d  Battalion)  is  held  in  general 
support  and  will,  at  the  beginning  of  the  action,  execute 
counter  battery  missions  which  will  have  already  been  as- 
signed. Locations  for  these  two  battalions  of  this  regiment 
have  been  assigned  within  the  area  occupied  by  the  1st  Bri- 
gade. 

The  2d  Brigade  attacks  with  the  3d  Infantry  on  the 
right  and  the  4th  Infantry  on  the  left.  Brigade  line  of  de- 
parture: Willoughby  Run. 

Boundary  between  3d  and  4th  Infantry:  road  junc- 

tion 504  (south  of  J.  Herter  Mill) — hill  601  (600  yards  north 


350 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


of  A.  Butt) — hill  561  (all  to  4th  Infantry) — crossing  of 
Hagerstown  Road  and  Willoughby  Run  (to  3d  Infantry)  — 
south  edge  of  Gettysburg — road  junction  550  on  Hanover 
Road  (both  to  4th  Infantry). 

The  approved  plan  for  the  attack  of  the  2d  Brigade 
calls  for  two  battalions  in  the  assaulting  line  for  both  the 
3d  and  4th  Infantry.  After  the  capture  of  hill  586  (347.3 — 
748.3),  the  right  of  the  3d  Infantry  will  be  advanced  along 
the  line  hill  586  (inclusive) — H.  Bishop  (inclusive). 

The  1st  Battalion,  2d  Field  Artillery,  will  support  the 
attack  of  the  3d  Infantry,  and  the  2d  Battalion,  2d  Field 
Artillery  will  support  the  attack  of  the  4th  Infantry. 

In  the  Red  system  strips  of  trenches  averaging  about 
100  yards  each  in  length  have  been  picked  up  at  the  follow- 
ing points : 

First  Line — edge  of  woods  near  crest  of  hill  586 — hill  541 — 
hill  548— hill  559. 

Second  Line — near  figure  560  at  348.4 — 748.6 — woods  on 
west  slope  of  hill  574  (348.6—749.6). 

Third  Line — hill  588 — junction  of  Hagerstown  and  Cham- 
bersburg  Roads. 

Two  Red  batteries,  not  included  as  objectives  in  the 
counter  battery  scheme  for  the  general  artillery  support, 
have  been  located  at  350.6 — 749.6  and  350.8 — 749.0. 

The  command  post  of  the  2d  Brigade  will  be  initially  at 
hill  601  (345.7 — 749.6)  and  will  be  advanced  to  hill  561 
(347.0 — 749.3)  on  the  capture  of  the  Red  outpost  line. 

Note:  Marsh  Creek  is  fordable  only  with  great  diffi- 

culty. 

Required: 

1.  A tracing  showing  battalion  locations  (exclusive  of 
battalion  combat  trains)  as  recommended  by  Colonel  A, 
commanding  the  2d  Field  Artillery  (show  by  a closed  line 
the  area  occupied)  : 

(a)  For  the  1st  Battalion,  2d  Field  Artillery. 

(b)  For  the  2d  Battalion,  2d  Field  Artillery. 

(c)  For  the  3d  Battalion,  101st  Field  Artillery. 

2.  Recommendations  as  to  the  objectives  to  be  attacked 
by  the  three  battalions  named  in  the  1st  Requirement  dur- 


344 


345 


346 


347 


APPENDIX 


351 


in g the  period  from  H hour  minus  ten  minutes  to  include 
the  assault  and  capture  of  the  Red  outpost  line.  Tabulate 
the  data  in  the  following  form : 


Unit 

Batteries 

Caliber 

Targets 

Duty 

Time 

Remark 

(Number 

(155  or  75) 

(Kind  and 

(Kind  of  task 

(Time  devoted 

of  batteries) 

location) 

such  as  neut- 
ralization, etc.) 

to  each  task, 
with  remarks ) 

3.  Assume  that  the  above  recommendations  were  car- 
ried into  effect.  At  H hour  plus  55  minutes  on  the  18th, 
the  Blue  line  had  advanced  to  grid  line  348  and  was  unable 
to  advance  further.  From  his  observation  post  near  hill 
561  the  commanding  general  of  the  2d  Brigade  saw  a Red 
counter  attack  issue  from  the  west  edge  of  0.  McMiller’s  or- 
chard and  the  woods  immediately  to  the  south.  Telephone 
messages  immediately  verified  the  situation.  Frontage  of 
the  Red  attack:  300  yards  north  of  grid  line  749  and  300 
yards  south  of  same — -total,  600  yards.  The  brigade  com- 
mander turned  to  Colonel  A,  who  was  with  him,  and  said: 
“Give  me  artillery  assistance  at  once  to  crush  that  counter 
attack.” 

What  were  Colonel  A’s  orders  and  messages  ? 

An  Approved  Solution 
Part  I 

First  Requirement: 

See  attached  tracing. 


Second  Requirement: 


Unit  "3 

Batteries  u 

Targets 

Duty 

Time  ^ 

Remark  « 

1 155 

Enemy  batteries  at 
350.6—749.6  and 
350.8—749.0. 

Simultaneous  counts 
battery.  Neutralize 
each  battery  with  1 
nlatocn. 

From  H hour  A 

minus  ten  minutes 
until  the  other 
155  battery  joins 
the  task ; then 
place  one  155  bat- 
tery on  each 
enemy  battery 
until  silenced. 

Aerial  observation 
requested,  as  early 
as  visibility  per- 
mits. 

1 155 

Woods  and  trench  on 
hill  586. 

Neutralize  trench 
and  woods  immedi- 
ately adjacent. 

From  H hour  B 

minus  ten  min- 
utes until  in- 
fantry within 
250  yards  of  trenches, 
then  assist  in  task  A. 

352 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


2 75 

Trench  on  hill  586. 

.Neutralize  trench 

From  H hour  C 

minus  ten  minutes 
until  infantry  with- 
in 200  yards  of 
trenches  then  lift  to 
trenches  near 
figure  660. 

1 75 

Trench  on  hill  541. 

Ditto 

Ditto  D 

2 75 

Trench  on  hill  548. 

Ditto 

From  H hour  E 

minus  ten  minutes 
until  infantry  within 
200  yards  of  trenches, 
then  lift  to  trenches 
at  hill  674. 

1 75 

Trench  on  hill  559. 

Ditto 

Ditto  F 

Third  Requirement: 

a.  Order,  by  telephone,  to  the  Commanding  Officer,  1st 

Battalion,  2d  Field  Artillery:  “Target,  line  of  enemy  in- 

fantry in  counter  attack  moving  westward  from  vicinity  of 
0.  McMiller’s  orchard ; your  battalion  takes  that  part  south 
of  grid  line  749.  Fire  immediately.” 

b.  Order,  by  telephone,  to  the  Commanding  Officer,  2d 

Battalion,  2d  Field  Artillery:  “Target,  line  of  enemy  in- 

fantry in  counter  attack  moving  westward  from  vicinity  of 
0.  McMiller’s  orchard ; your  battalion  takes  that  part  north 
of  grid  line  749.  Fire  immediately.” 

c.  Order,  by  telephone,  to  the  Commanding  Officer,  3d 
Battalion,  101st  Field  Artillery:  “Target,  line  of  enemy  in- 
fantry in  counter  attack  moving  westward  from  vicinity  of 
0.  McMiller’s  orchard ; one  battery  takes  that  part  north  of 
grid  line  749,  and  the  other  south  of  same.  Fire  imme- 
diately.” 

d.  Message,  by  telephone,  to  Commanding  General,  1st 
Field  Artillery  Brigade : “Enemy  counter  attack,  600  yards 
front,  issuing  from  vicinity  0.  McMiller’s  orchard.  All  my 
artillery  attacking  same.  Request  assistance  from  your  ar- 
tillery in  general  support  and  from  the  1st  Field  Artil- 
lery.” 

Should  there  be  any  trouble  in  getting  this  message 
through  promptly,  then  a direct  request  should  be  made  on 
the  Commanding  Officer  1st  Field  Artillery  and  the  Com- 
manding Officer  101st  Field  Artillery. 


APPENDIX 


353 


Part  II 

This  problem  has  been  prepared  with  a view  to  illus- 
trating the  use  of  a field  artillery  regiment  (medium  how- 
itzers attached)  in  the  attack  of  a prepared  position.  It 
will  frequently  occur  that  some  155-mm.  howitzers  will  be 
associated  with  light  regiments  and,  especially  when 
charged  with  an  aggressive  mission  that  may  demand  sep- 
arate tactical  handling  from  the  remainder  of  the  artillery 
brigade,  may  even  be  under  the  command  of  regimental  com- 
manders of  these  light  regiments.  The  problem  is  further 
intended  to  illustrate  the  character  of  targets  that  will  pro- 
bably be  attacked  by  the  different  calibers  as  well  as  the  co- 
ordination of  the  supporting  artillery  with  infantry  needs 
in  case  of  a sudden  crisis. 

First  Requirement: 

1.  In  the  attack  of  a prepared  position  it  is  desirable 
to  locate  the  division  artillery  well  to  the  front. 

This  is  because  it  can  fire  longer  on  successive  targets 
without  forward  displacement  (during  which  the  fire  of  the 
moving  unit  is  lost),  and  because  frequently  the  battery 
commanders  can  remain  near  their  commands  and,  at  the 
same  time,  get  good  observation  of  their  targets,  particu- 
larly in  the  earlier  phases  of  the  attack. 

The  terrain  within  the  2d  Brigade  area  and  west  of 
Willoughby  Run  shows  these  general  features  connected 
with  the  selection  of  locations  of  battalions  of  artillery : 

Cover  can  be  found  near  hill  561;  but  these  positions 
are  within  but  a few  hundred  yards  of  the  Blue  front  line 
and  Blue  artillery  must  expose  itself  too  much  to  hostile 
small  caliber  fire  in  order  to  use  its  guns,  the  flat  trajectory 
of  which  at  these  short  ranges  to  the  Red  outpost  line  will 
demand  sight  defilade. 

The  next  position  to  the  rear  is  Herr  Ridge  with  its 
southern  extension.  This  ridge  may  be  taken  to  be  roughly 
1500  yards  from  Willoughby  Run.  If  the  batteries  be  placed 
in  rear  of  this  ridge,  the  probable  ranges  will  be  somewhat 
increased.  Since  the  probable  initial  targets  will  be  east  of 
Willoughby  Run  and  in  the  Red  outpost  line,  it  may  be 
assumed  that  from  a position  in  rear  of  Herr  Ridge  that 


354 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


Blue  batteries  will  find  their  first  targets  at  a range  of  about 
2000  yards,  or  something  more,  which  is  a favorable  situa- 
tion. 

To  go  back  farther  is  not  desirable,  unless  it  be  neces- 
sary to  get  on  the  forward  slope  of  a hill  farther  to  the 
rear  in  order  to  clear  the  crest  in  firing  on  a close  target. 

In  this  case,  to  place  batteries  west  of  Marsh  Creek 
would  be  a serious  mistake  since  forward  movement  across 
country  is  prevented  by  a stream  fordable  only  with  great 
difficulty,  and  there  are  but  few  bridges  a considerable  dis- 
tance apart  which  are  very  liable  to  receive  interdiction  fire, 
especially  if  it  develops  that  the  enemy  is  able  to  bring  155- 
mm.  howitzers  into  the  action. 

2.  Ease  in  ammunition  supply  is  facilitated  by  select- 
ing artillery  battalion  locations  near  roads  communicat- 
ing with  the  rear. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  battalion  locations  have  been 
so  selected  that  ammunition  supply  may  be  delivered  by  at 
least  two  roads  in  each  case.  If  interdiction  fire  becomes 
heavy,  this  will  prove  to  be  a material  advantage. 

3.  Convenience  for  forward  displacement  is  obtained 
by  locating  artillery  battalions  near  suitable  roads. 

It  will  be  seen  that  one  light  battalion  is  located  near 
the  Hagerstown  Road  and  the  other  is  located  near  the 
555 — 587  road.  The  light  guns  will  probably  be  displaced 
forward  first,  hence  they  should  be  placed  near  the  roads 
suitable  for  forward  movement. 

In  connection  with  forward  displacement,  it  should  be 
noted  that  from  the  initial  positions  the  ranges  will  average 
about  4500  yards  to  the  third  Red  line,  and  only  about  6000 
yards  to  Rock  Creek.  Forward  displacement,  therefore, 
will  probably  not  come  until  the  enemy  has  been  driven  from 
his  third  line.  Assuming  that  one  light  battalion  is  then 
sent  swiftly  forward  by  road,  the  other  will  be  able  to  con- 
tinue firing  effectively  until  the  enemy  is  beaten  across 
Rock  Creek,  so  far  as  range  limitations  only  are  concerned. 

4.  Locations  of  battalions  near  commanding  ridges 
afford  opportunities  for  observing  stations  to  be  established 
near  the  guns. 


APPENDIX 


355 


This  is  a distinct  advantage  in  maintaining  command 
and  shortening  communications.  Parts  of  Herr  Ridge  seem 
to  be  very  suitable,  especially  as  these  heights  are  wooded 
in  some  places  and  will  allow  observing  stations  to  be  placed 
in  the  trees. 

Remark 

The  probable  targets  (entrenchments  on  flat-topped 
hills,  in  general)  are  such  that  there  will  be  little  dead  space 
if  any.  Placing  battalions  north  of  the  brigade  area  in  order 
to  obtain  enfilade  fire  is  considered  in  this  case  not  to  be 
warranted,  because  it  will  be  desirable  to  have  the  bat- 
talions ready  to  go  forward  in  pursuit  with  the  troops  that 
they  support  and  to  follow  up  the  enveloping  movement  in 
which  the  action  is  liable  to  become  the  swiftest  and  most 
subject  to  change.  The  1st  Field  Artillery  will  be  in  posi- 
tion to  respond  in  case  of  this  class  of  fire  becomes  impera- 
tive. Since  theirs  is  a holding  attack  they  are  at  reasonable 
liberty,  probably,  to  respond  to  “eventual”  missions  of  great 
importance. 

As  it  is,  diagonal  fire  can  be  placed  on  any  initial  tar- 
get desired.  For  instance,  if  hill  541  be  attacked  by  the  left 
battery  2d  Battalion,  2d  Field  Artillery  together  with  the 
right  battery  1st  Battalion,  2d  Field  Artillery,  a marked 
case  of  cross  diagonal  fire  occurs. 

Second  Requirement: 

5.  When  a division  is  operating  alone,  attached  155- 
mm.  howitzers  must  he  prepared  to  undertake  counter  bat- 
tery duties . 

Two  enemy  batteries  have  been  located  in  the  area  of 
advance  of  the  2d  Brigade  which  are  not  included  in  the 
scheme  of  counter  battery  arranged  for  the  battalions  of 
the  155-mm.  howitzers  that  are  held  in  general  support.  If 
these  targets  can  be  initially  attacked  by  the  155-mm.  how- 
itzer battalion  attached  to  the  artillery  of  the  2d  Brigade, 
it  will  aid  in  smothering  their  fire.  The  question  to  be  solved 
is  the  determination  of  how  much  fire  to  lay  on  them  im- 
mediately. It  would  be  desirable  to  make  sure  of  the  task 
(as  well  as  to  lighten  the  duties  of  the  “overhead”  of  the 


356 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


battery)  by  placing  a whole  battery  on  each,  but,  for  reasons 
given  later,  it  is  believed  that  but  a platoon  can  be  devoted 
to  each  enemy  battery  initially. 

6.  In  attacking  a wooded  'position  the  155-mm.  howit- 
zers are  more  useful  than  the  75s. 

Hill  586  is  the  target  to  which  reference  is  made.  This 
will  probably  be  a difficult  point  to  secure.  Tactically  it  is 
important  since  its  capture  makes  easier  the  task  of  envel- 
oping the  second  line.  The  fire  of  the  155-mm.  battery  upon 
it  will  obtain  much  greater  effect  in  the  timber  than  the 
lighter  75-mm.  projectiles  which  should  be  placed  on  those 
parts  of  the  trenches  actually  visible.  It  is  probable  that 
the  timber  on  the  top  of  this  hill  will  be  used  to  conceal  both 
troops  and  works,  hence  the  desirability  of  assigning  at 
least  one  battery  of  howitzers,  to  its  attack.  If  plans  are 
successful,  and  this  hill  is  carried  quickly,  then  this  battery 
is  released  early  to  take  up  the  counter  battery  duties  as 
assigned. 

7.  Hill  586  should  receive  a relatively  heavy  artillery 
concentration  during  the  first  phase  of  the  attack. 

Its  command,  location  and  entrenchments  make  it  a 
material  obstacle  to  Blue  advance  and  tend  to  prevent  a 
successful  enveloping  movement  from  that  locality.  For 
that  reason  two  light  batteries  are  assigned  to  its  attack 
in  addition  to  the  155-mm.  battery  mentioned  in  paragraph 
6,  above. 

8.  In  order  to  assist  the  infantry  advance,  artillery  fire 
is  desirable  on  the  trenches  on  hill  5J>1. 

There  is  but  one  light  battery  available  from  those 
assigned  to  support  the  advance  of  the  infantry  in  this 
area ; it  would  be  well  to  assign  it  to  this  task.  It  .is  deemed 
that  a sufficiently  heavy  concentration  has  been  assured  for 
the  attack  of  hill  586,  and  since  this  light  battery  is  not 
needed  for  the  more  important  duty  just  mentioned,  it  finds 
its  best  use  in  overcoming  resistance  from  the  trenches  at 
hill  541. 

9.  Trenches  on  hill  5U8  and  hill  559  should  be  neutral- 
ized by  artillery  to  assist  the  advance  of  the  infantry. 

These  are  in  the  area  of  advance  of  the  4th  Infantry 
which  the  2d  Battalion,  2d  Field  Artillery  supports,  and 


APPENDIX 


357 


this  seems  to  be  the  best  way  for  the  artillery  to  give  ini- 
tial infantry  support.  The  real  question  to  decide  is  the 
manner  of  division  of  the  fire  from  this  battalion.  Since 
hill  548  is  the  nearer  point  to  be  taken,  it  is  deemed  best 
to  place  the  heavier  fire  upon  it  in  order  to  assist  in  its 
prompt  capture  which  will  tend  to  make  the  reduction  of 
hill  559  an  easier  task. 

10.  As  soon  as  the  capture  of  the  first  Red  line  seems 
to  he  assured,  artillery  fire  should  he  lifted  to  include  tar- 
gets in  the  second  Red  line. 

The  infantry  carry  the  first  line  by  assault  and  the 
fire  of  the  artillery  is  lifted  in  time  to  safeguard  them.  This 
Red  outpost  line  is  within  easy  small  arms  range  of  the 
Red  second  line,  and  it  is  to  be  assumed  that  the  attackers 
will  quickly  receive  fire  from  that  source.  For  that  reason 
the  immediate  attack  of  the  Red  second  line  by  the  Blue  ar- 
tillery is  indicated  at  this  stage. 

It  will  be  noted  that  each  of  the  two  artillery  targets 
described  in  the  second  line  will  be  attacked  by  a battalion 
of  light  artillery,  each  in  its  own  subsector.  At  this  time 
the  entire  battalion  of  155-mm.  howitzers  is  expected  to  be 
occupied  in  counter  battery  duties. 

Remark 

It  may  appear  that  a rather  heavy  concentration  has 
been  ordered  on  the  two  known  targets  in  the  Red  second 
line.  Everything  that  can  be  done  to  lighten  the  infantry 
task  is  justified  and  expected.  This  amount  of  fire  is  lia- 
ble to  become  lighter  at  any  time,  due  to  the  fact  that  bat- 
teries are  sometimes  interrupted  in  such  a mission  by  being 
called  upon  to  attack  some  fleeting  target.  For  the  purpose 
of  prior  coordination,  it  has  somethimes  been  found  useful  to 
designate  a certain  battery  in  each  battalion  to  be  ready  to 
respond  to  the  duty  of  attacking  such  targets. 

Third  Requirement: 

11.  To  assist  in  repelling  a counter  attack,  artillery 
must  promptly  abandon  less  important  missions  and  con- 
centrate the  greatest  effort  to  crush  the  enemy  early  in  this 
crisis . 


358 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


The  first  duty  of  an  artillery  commander  concerned  is 
to  direct  the  fire  of  all  his  available  weapons  on  the  ene- 
my's attacking  troops;  his  next  duty  is  to  secure  artillery 
assistance  from  neighboring  sources. 

This  counter  attack  indicates  that  not  only  has  the 
offensive  momentarily  failed,  but  that  the  enemy  has  util- 
ized his  reserve  energy  to  bring  about,  if  possible,  a local 
defeat  for  Blue.  Quick  response  of  all  available  forces  is 
needed  to  save  the  situation.  This  is  truly  a crisis.  The 
messages  sent  indicate  the  help  expected.  In  such  a case 
the  artillery  does  not  wait  the  result  of  the  action  of  its  own 
reserves ; it  should  be  so  prompt  with  an  overwhelming  fire 
laid  on  such  an  objective  that  its  own  reserves  will  not  be 
called  into  action  and  they  will  be  available  to  furnish  the 
energy  needed  at  a later  phase.  This  principle  is  dependent 
on  the  fact  that  observed  artillery  fire  can  be  shifted  far 
more  rapidly  than  troops  can  be  moved. 

Swift  response  from  all  artillery  available  is  necessary 
because,  unless  stopped  quickly,  the  Red  counter  attack 
will,  in  a few  minutes,  be  so  close  to  the  Blue  lines  that  Blue 
artillery  cannot  be  effectively  used  without  probable  injury 
to  its  own  troops. 

Comments  on  Students’  Solutions 

1.  Indicating  three  areas  not  sufficient,  they  should  be 
assigned  to  specific  battalions.  The  requirement  calls  for 
the  area  occupied  by  each  battalion. 

2.  Artillery  battalions  under  consideration  should  be 
entirely  east  of  Marsh  Creek.  See  paragraph  1,  Part  II  of 
approved  solution. 

3.  Artillery  positions  should  be  selected  in  this  situa- 
tion with  a view  to  facilitating  forward  displacement  and 
ammunition  supply.  See  paragraphs  2 and  3,  Part  II  of 
approved  solution. 

4.  Positions  should  be  in  close  proximity  to  command- 
ing ridges,  to  insure  short  lines  of  communication  to  good  ob- 
servation. See  paragraph  4,  Part  II  of  approved  solution. 

5.  Areas  should  not  be  so  located  that  any  batteries 
could  be  placed  on  the  eastern  slopes  of  Herr  Ridge.  Rather 
close  to  hostile  lines  and  unnecessarily  exposed. 


APPENDIX 


3r>9 

6.  The  primary  role  of  the  artillery  supporting  the  2d 
Brigade  is  the  immediate  support  of  the  infantry  advance. 
The  principal  targets  at  the  commencement  of  the  attack 
are  critical  points  of  the  enemy’s  first  line.  All  75s  should 
be  employed  on  these  missions. 

7.  Under  the  principle  enunciated  in  Comment  6,  the 
maximum  number  of  155-mm.  howitzers  should  fire  on  criti- 
cal points  of  the  enemy’s  first  line  at  the  commencement  of 
the  attack,  using  for  counter  battery  the  smallest  number 
of  howitzers  consistent  with  an  effective  accomplishment 
of  the  most  vital  counter  battery  missions. 

8.  Counter  battery  missions  normally  should  not  be 
assigned  on  a time  schedule,  but  rather  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  task  to  be  performed;  i.e.,  destruction  or  neu- 
tralization. 

9.  A counter  preparation  should  not  be  employed  to 
assist  the  advance  of  the  infantry.  Counter  preparation  is 
an  organized  defensive  fire  used  to  break  up  the  enemy’s 
attack  formations.  It  is  not  probable  that  the  enemy,  would, 
in  general,  concentrate  his  troops  for  defense  in  the  identical 
places  from  which  he  would  initiate  an  attack. 

10.  Under  the  conditions  of  Requirement  2,  the  number 
of  batteries  assigned  to  each  target  should  be  shown  in  the 
table. 

11.  As  soon  as  the  capture  of  the  first  Red  line  seems 
to  be  assured,  artillery  fire  should  be  lifted  to  include  tar- 
gets in  the  second  Red  line.  (See  par.  10,  Part  II,  An  Ap- 
proved Solution.) 

12.  Lifting  the  fire  from  hill  586  at  H hour  would  fail 
to  give  the  infantry  adequate  artillery  support  for  the  cap- 
ture of  this  important  hill. 

13.  Hill  586  should  receive  a relatively  heavy  artillery 
concentration  during  the  first  phase  of  the  attack.  Both 
75s  and  155s  would  be  desirable.  (See  par.  7,  Part  II,  An 
Approved  Solution.) 

14.  Fire  should  be  directed  upon  definitely  located  hos- 
tile targets  rather  than  upon  indefinite  areas  or  upon  roads 
not  known  to  be  occupied.  (See  principles  involved  in  para- 
graphs 8 and  9,  Part  II,  An  Approved  Solution.) 


360  TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 

15.  Normally  the  fire  of  a 75-mm.  battery  should  not 
be  directed  on  more  than  one  target  at  the  same  time.  In 
this  case  it  imposes  a simultaneous  double  duty  on  the  “ov- 
erhead,” and  the  number  of  batteries  available  permits  com- 
plete units  to  be  so  assigned ; moreover,  the  ready  flexibility 
for  shifting  fire  of  the  75s  allows  them  to  attack  different 
targets  successively  and  promptly. 

16.  In  the  counter  attack,  Colonel  A’s  orders  to  the 
75-mm.  battalion  commander  should  indicate  the  target  that 
each  battalion  should  cover,  otherwise  the  frontage  of  the 
Blue  fire  against  the  counter  attack  will  not  be  properly  ap- 
portioned. 

17.  To  attempt  to  stop  the  counter  attack  by  the  fire  of 
one  battalion  of  75s  only  is  to  run  too  great  a risk  by  de- 
livering a relatively  thin  fire.  This  situation  demands  a 
sufficiently  heavy  initial  fire  to  insure  prompt  and  decisive 
effect. 

18.  The  order  should  be  issued  so  as  to  give  freedom 
for  the  prompt  use  of  observed  fire  which  is  the  most  effec- 
tive in  repelling  a counter  attack. 

19.  The  counter  attack  will  probably  continue  its  ad- 
vance for  an  appreciable  period  unless  a heavy  fire  (ob- 
served, if  possible)  be  put  down  on  its  front  line  while  it  is 
moving  during  the  initial  stage.  Fire  placed  elsewhere,  or 
in  a fixed  position,  will  be  less  effective. 

20.  The  situation  demands  brief  orders  and  messages 
without  going  into  such  details  as  prescribing  rates  or 
methods  of  fire. 

21.  Messages  and  orders  to  battalion  commanders,  re- 
lating to  targets,  should  be  framed  to  show  the  tactical  mis- 
sion, and  not  merely  direct  a fire  on  a terrain  feature  or  a 
line. 


Illustrative  Problem  No.  6 


THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 

The  School  of  the  Line 
1921-1922 


MAP  PROBLEM  No.  9— Series  II 
(TT  91) 


November  22,  1921 

Maps:  General  Map,  Gettysburg-Antietam,  1 inch  = 10  miles. 

Gettysburg-Antietam  map,  1:21120;  Gettysburg,  Knoxlyn, 
Hunterstown,  Arendtsville  Sheets. 

General  Situation: 

Blue  (east  of  South  Mountain)  and  Red  (west)  have 
recently  declared  war.  The  military  forces  of  these  states 
are  mobilizing  east  of  the  Susquehanna  River  and  west  of 
South  Mountain  respectively. 

Special  Situation  (Blue)  : 

The  1st  Blue  Brigade,  reenforced  by  the  1st  Field  Artil- 
lery and  1st  Battalion,  101st  Field  Artillery  (155-mm.  how- 
itzers), was  advanced  to  secure  and  hold  Gettysburg  pend- 
ing the  arrival  of  other  Blue  forces. 

On  14  November,  1921,  this  reenforced  brigade  encoun- 
tered an  inferior  Red  force  east  of  Gettysburg  and  during 
the  following  three  days  drove  it  west  of  Willoughby  Run. 

On  17  November  the  advance  of  the  Blue  reenforced 
brigade  was  stopped  on  Willoughby  Run  by  the  arrival  of 
Red  reenforcements. 

On  17  November  the  indications  are  that  the  Red  force, 
now  estimated  to  be  a division  reenforced  by  a battalion  of 
medium  howitzers,  is  preparing  for  an  attack.  Strong  Blue 
reenforcements  are  expected  to  reach  Gettysburg  by  3:00 
PM,  18  November. 

On  17  November  the  general  disposition  of  the  Blue 
brigade  and  attached  troops  are  as  shown  on  the  tracing  at- 
tached; likewise  all  that  is  known  of  interest  to  the  Blue 


SCI 


362 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


artillery  concerning  the  enemy’s  dispositions.  Statements 
of  prisoners  indicate  the  enemy,  in  attacking,  may  be  ex- 
pected to  use  the  present  hostile  outpost  line  as  a line  of 
departure. 

The  Commanding  General,  1st  Blue  Brigade,  decides 
to  hold  Gettysburg  at  all  costs  until  the  arrival  of  reenforce- 
ments. 

The  1st  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery,  supports  the  1st 
Infantry,  the  2d  Battalion  the  2d  Infantry.  The  1st  Battal- 
ion, 101st  Field  Artillery,  is  held  in  general  support  of  the 
brigade  especially  for  the  protection  of  both  flanks  in  case 
of  hostile  attack. 

Ammunition  at  battery  positions  consists  of  two  days’ 

fire. 

No  gas  ammunition  available. 

Willoughby  Run  and  Rock  Creek  are  both  fordable. 
Required : 

(a)  Show  on  tracing  (in  blue)  the  targets  selected  for 
a general  counter  preparation  to  be  used  for  protective  fire 
when  observation  is  not  possible.  (One  target  for  each  bat- 
tery or  platoon  of  Blue  artillery.)  Also  indicate  by  a table 
or  other  means  to  what  battery  or  platoon  each  target  is 
assigned. 

(b)  Show  on  the  same  tracing  (in  red)  the  eventual 
targets  selected  for  mutual  support  between  battalions  of 
light  artillery  and  eventual  targets  for  the  howitzer  bat- 
talion. Targets  required  are  those  covered  by  each  battal- 
ion of  light  artillery  and  by  each  howitzer  battery  in  assist- 
ing the  local  counter  preparation  of  the  other  battalion  (or 
battery)  in  an  attack  on  the  subsector  of  the  latter.  Indi- 
cate assignment  of  targets  (by  battery  or  platoon)  as  in 
requirement  (a). 

(c)  Show  on  another  tracing  the  normal  barrage  line 
of  each  battery  in  front  of  the  outpost  line  and  in  front  of 
the  main  line  of  resistance.  Show  also  the  targets  that  the 
155-mm.  howitzers  will  fire  upon  should  either  of  these  bar- 
rages be  callqd  for  and  which  will  supplement  them  and 
assist  in  breaking  up  a hostile  attack. 


*?S 


A 


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r V*& 


i 


a 


ir.. 


cfe 


£ 


Legend 

Hostile  Baiterg  position  determined  $ 

Hostile  Battery  position  doubtful-  $ 

For  other  signs  see  pamphlet 
On  Conventional  Signs  . 

Arrows  show  principal  lines  of  fire 
of  macht ne  guns  and  one  pounders 
for  night  defense  Targets  for  tight 
mortars  are  shown  thus  ) 

Tatget  for  counter  preparation  are 
shown  as  follows  . 

Normal  targets  ( Requirement ca)) 

In  blue  solid  lines 
Eventual  targets  ( Requirement  ib>) 

In  blue  broken  lines 
Targets  for  normal  barrage  are 
shown  as  follows  ( Requir ement ( Cj) 

In  front  of  outpost  I me 

Brown  solid  lines 

In  front  of  main  line  of  resistance 
Brown  broken  tines 


The  general  service  Schools 
The  school  of  the  line 
Map  Problem  No  9 Series  II 


APPENDIX 


363 


NOTES 

1.  It  will  be  assumed  that  machine  guns  and  auxiliary  infantry 
weapons  will  cover  the  intervals  between  the  artillery  barrage  lines. 

2.  Barrages  covering  possible  local  attacks  not  required;  only 
those  to  be  placed  on  vital  points  in  case  of  a general  attack. 

An  Approved  Solution,  Part  I (see  tracing) 

Part  II 

This  problem  is  intended  to  illustrate  the  employment 
of  certain  defensive  fires  that  may  be  prepared  for  use  when 
observed  fire  is  not  practicable,  first;  COP  fire  to  be  deliv- 
ered just  prior  to  the  hostile  attack,  and  second;  defensive 
barrages  and  accompanying  concentrations  to  be  brought 
down  after  the  attack  has  been  launched.  While  the  de- 
fensive barrage  has  been  introduced  for  instructional  pur- 
poses, it  must  be  remembered  that  occasions  for  its  use  will 
be  infrequent;  in  the  great  majority  of  cases  defensive  con- 
centrations will  be  more  effective. 

1.  When  practicable,  observed  fire  upon  visible  targets 
will  always  be  employed  in  preference  to  prearranged  fires 
upon  probable  hostile  locations. 

However,  measures  must  be  taken  to  insure  artillery 
support,  no  matter  what  conditions  exist.  Hence  while  ob- 
served fire  will  be  used  whenever  possible,  plans  for  other 
fires  must  be  ready.  This  is  particularly  true  in  a defensive 
situation. 

2.  Counter  battery  is  always  important,  but  when  the 
attack  starts,  the  defenders’  greatest  foe  is  the  infantry, 
ivhich  must  be  stopped. 

With  a limited  amount  of  artillery  and  a numerically 
superior  enemy,  counter  preparation  can  be  placed  to  great 
advantage  on  the  probable  hostile  jump-off,  and  on  likely 
assembly  places  in  rear  of  same;  even  to  the  exclusion  of 
all  counter  battery,  which  will  be  conducted  at  times  of  less 
emergency. 

3.  Normal  missions  in  counter  preparation  and  defen- 
sive barrages  habitually  will  be  in  the  sector  of  the  sup- 
ported infantry. 

While  artillery  will  often  be  able  to  fire  promptly  and 
efficiently  into  an  adjacent  sector,  emergency  fires,  required 


364 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


at  times  of  great  confusion,  should  be  made  as  simple  in 
execution  as  possible. 

4.  Assignment  to  targets  or  areas  to  be  covered  by 
counter  preparation  fire  are  usually  made  by  battery. 

Assignments  may  be  made  so  that  only  one  platoon  will 
fire  on  a particular  target ; this  is  especially  true  in  the  case 
of  medium  or  heavy  howitzers.  The  methods  of  attacking 
assigned  targets,  in  other  words  the  technical  details  of 
fire  are  left  to  battery  commanders. 

5.  Sheltered  areas  close  to  lines  of  approach , and  fa- 
vorable locations  for  the  the  enemy  to  use  in  initiating  an  ad- 
vance should  be  sought  for. 

6.  Howitzers  ( in  counter  preparation  and  defensive 
barrages)  can  best  be  employed  in  fire  upon  targets  not 
suitable  for  75s;  such  as  heavy  woods,  ivooded  hills,  posi- 
tions behind  hills,  ravines  or  stream  bottoms. 

7.  Habitually  there  will  be  eventual  targets  located  in 
adjacent  sectors  or  zones  of  action. 

Artillery  supporting  a regiment  will  be  given  eventual 
missions  within  the  sectors  of  regiments  adjacent  to  the 
one  supported. 

8.  Eventual  missions  must  be  car ef idly  coordinated 
with  normal  missions  in  the  same  zone. 

Not  only  the  areas  to  be  covered  by  fire  of  the  artillery 
in  normal  support  of  the  sector,  but  also  the  areas  covered 
by  the  infantry  howitzers  and  lanes  of  machine  gun  fire 
must  be  considered;  otherwise,  duplication  of  effort  and 
neglect  of  important  points  are  bound  to  occur. 

9.  With  limited  artillery  support,  it  ivill  generally  be 
impossible  to  place  artillery  defensive  fires  on  all  probable 
hostile  positions  and  works.  With  sufficient  artillery,  this 
would  be  attempted,  but  when  the  amount  is  limited,  coun- 
ter preparation  and  defensive  barrages  must  be  placed  on 
the  most  vital  points,  to  the  exclusion  of  others  not  so  im- 
portant, or  which  may  be  assigned  as  eventual  targets.  De- 
fensive works,  placed  by  an  enemy  to  protect  himself  from 
hostile  attack,  will  not  be  proper  targets  in  this  case,  unless 
they  are  believed  to  have  been  selected  for  the  hostile  line 
of  departure,  or  for  assembly  positions. 


APPENDIX 


365 


10.  The  0 nailer  the  forces  engaged , the  less  impor- 
tant and  less  practicable  becomes  fire  at  distant  objectives. 

Long  range  counter  battery  and  distant  interdiction 
and  harassing  fire,  to  be  freely  used  when  large  forces  with 
ample  artillery  are  involved,  would  be  out  of  place  when  the 
decision  rests  with  local  tactical  dispositions.  Here  all 
effort  must  be  concealed  to  ward  off  the  immediate  dan- 
ger. 

11.  One  battery  of  75s  can  effectively  cover  about  200 
yards  in  a defensive  barrage. 

Barrage  lines  must  be  designated  with  this  limitation 
in  mind.  Better  to  properly  cover  a few  important  points 
than  to  deliver  an  ineffective  fire  over  a great  area,  or  along 
a very  long  line. 

12.  In  locating  defensive  barrages,  the  hostile  prob- 
able plans  of  attack  must  receive  careful  consideration. 

Barrages  should  be  laid  on  favorable  and  likely  lines  of 
approach, — the  enemy  must  not  be  expected  to  drive  against 
the  strongest  obstacles  confronting  him. 

13.  Barrages  are  particularly  effective  when  they  can 
be  placed  ivhere  the  advancing  enemy  will  be  held  up. 

Where  a natural  or  artificial  obstacle  exists,  so  placed 
that  all  hostile  infantry  cannot  avoid  it,  his  advance  over 
such  terrain  naturally  will  be  slowed  up,  and  the  opportunity 
to  inflict  severe  losses  correspondingly  increased.  The  more 
exposed  to  artillery  fire  such  ground  is,  the  more  important 
will  be  the  results. 

14.  Advanced  posts  of  considerable  strength,  if  cap- 
tured, become  positions  of  corresponding  importance  to  the 
enemy. 

Hence  in  the  defensive  barrage  in  front  of  the  main 
line  of  resistance,  provision  must  be  made  to  cover  such 
arer*s  with  fire,  in  case  they  are  evacuated  by  the  defenders. 

15.  When  an  important  road  can  be  enfiladed,  the  op- 
portunity shoidd  not  be  neglected. 

Machine  guns  will  habitually  cover  the  avenues  of  ap- 
proach; but  even  when  they  are  to  fire  on  the  nearer  sec- 
tions of  roads,  artillery  fire  may  be  employed  to  advantage 
at  greater  ranges. 


366 


TACTICS  AND  TECHNIQUE— ARTILLERY 


Comments  on  Students’  Solutions 

1.  There  is  not  enough  artillery  available  to  permit 
counter  battery  during  COP  fire.  (See  Par.  2,  Part  II,  Ap- 
proved Solution.) 

2.  See  Par.  3,  Part  II,  Approved  Solution. 

3.  COP  targets  usually  will  be  by  battery  for  the  75s, 
and  by  battery  or  platoon  for  the  howitzers.  To  assign  more 
targets  than  this  is  apt  to  result  in  an  ill  regulated,  more  or 
less  ineffective,  fire.  Only  primary  targets  were  called  for. 

4.  The  preponderance  of  COP  fire,  both  normal  and 
eventual,  should  be  placed  on  the  enemy’s  probable  jump-off 
line  and  forming  up  places.  This  is  necessary  to  break  up 
his  attack.  It  is  not  considered  an  error  to  place  some  such 
fire  on  his  main  line  of  resistance ; but  considering  the  lim- 
ited amount  of  artillery  available,  the  preponderance  of  the 
COP  fire  should  be  in  the  vicinity  of  the  front  line  as  this  is 
the  critical  area.  (See  Pars.  5 and  9,  Part  II,  Approved  So- 
lution.) 

5.  The  targets  for  some  batteries  of  75s  are  in  wooded 
areas.  The  howitzer  is  normally  a more  effective  weapon  for 
such  targets.  (See  Par.  6,  Part  II,  Approved  Solution.) 

6.  The  most  important  areas  in  each  sector  should  be 
covered  by  the  normal  mission,  the  eventual  missions  being 
on  the  less  important  targets.  (See  Par.  7,  Part  II,  Ap- 
proved Solution.) 

7.  The  eventual  mission  of  a battery  is  normally  in  an 
adjacent  sector.  ,It  is  never  superimposed  on  its  own  normal 
mission,  and  in  the  present  situation  should  not  be  superim- 
posed on  the  normal  missions  of  other  units.  (See  Pars.  7 
and  8,  Part  II,  Approved  Solution  and  comment  No.  8 here- 
with.) 

8.  Eventual  COP  fire  is  for  the  purpose  of  reenforcing 
normal  COP  fire;  it  is  not  fire  to  be  used  after  the  friendly 
outpost  is  forced  back. 

9.  In  this  situation  it  is  not  advisable  to  place  COP  fire 
farther  into  the  hostile  rear  areas  than  likely  assembly 
points  for  regimental  reserves.  (See  Par.  10,  Part  II,  Ap- 
proved Solution.) 

10.  With  the  limited  amount  of  artillery  available,  the 
eventual  COP  fire  should  be  employed  in  the  same  general 


APPENDIX 


367 


zone  as  the  normal  COP  fire  it  amplifies.  Its  purposes  will 
be  to  assist  in  stopping  a local  counter  attack.  With  suffi- 
cient artillery,  other  use  might  also  be  made  of  eventual 
COP  fires. 

11.  Considering  the  amount  of  artillery  available,  an 
OP  or  CP  is  hardly  a suitable  target. 

12.  See  Par.  10,  Part  II,  Approved  Solution. 

13.  Targets  assigned  light  mortars  should  not  also  be 
given  to  artillery  units.  There  is  not  enough  artillery  to 
permit  such  superimposing  of  fire. 

14.  See  Par.  11,  Part  II,  Approved  Solution. 

15.  The  barrage  lines  in  front  of  the  outpost — both  75s 
and  155s — should  be  placed  close  to  the  line  to  be  defended. 
This  fire  is  for  immediate  defense. 

16.  Barrages  should  not  be  placed  so  close  to  the 
friendly  infantry  that  the  latter  will  be  apt  to  suffer  from 
them. 

17.  Requirement  C calls  for  each  battery  for  a standing 
barrage  in  front  of  the  outpost  line  and  another  in  front  of 
the  main  line  of  resistance. 

18.  The  barrage  is  somewhat  concentrated  on  the  front 
to  the  exclusion  of  the  flanks.  The  defensive  position  held 
by  the  Blues  is  not  over-extended  and  hence  the  probabilities 
favor  a Red  envelopment  as  against  a penetration.  (See  Par. 
12,  Part  II,  Approved  Solution.) 

19.  See  Par.  13,  Part  II,  Approved  Solution. 

20.  No  coordinates  or  other  means  of  orientation  given 
on  this  tracing. 

21.  Coordinates  given  appear  to  be  erroneous. 


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